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ABSTRACT
The concept and practice of technology transfer in the agriculture sector in the 
Philippines need rethinking. The common notion of technology transfer in the agriculture 
sector is based on the traditional view of innovation in which technologies and techniques 
are assumed to flow essentially unchanged from one location to another in a linear fashion. 
The technology transfer approaches of interveners in the agriculture sector have been 
generally top-down. While these approaches have achieved some degree of success, they 
have not been sufficiently far-reaching to spur the growth of the rural economy. This thesis 
questions the linear and top-down orientation of technology transfer both as explanation 
and as prescription in the context of the agricultural research and extension system in the 
Philippines.
The central assumption of the thesis is that technology transfer in agriculture can be 
best understood as a social and political process. In this context, four levels of analysis are 
undertaken. First, theories and models associated with technology transfer are reviewed to 
determine the extent to which they explain or influence the technology transfer approaches 
in the agriculture sector. Second, the political economy of the agriculture sector and 
technology transfer is examined to understand the actions of the Philippine state toward 
agricultural development and the context in which other actors operate. Third, the 
immediate setting of the technology transfer process, which is the agricultural research and 
extension system, is analysed in terms of the roles, policies, strategies and 
interrelationships of the different actors. Fourth, detailed case studies of three agricultural 
co-operatives in the Philippines are used to examine the dynamics and complexities of the 
technology transfer process at the field level.
V
The traditional innovation and diffusion models are a reasonable depiction of most 
of the technology transfer practices in the developing countries including the Philippines. 
The actions of participants are limited in part by the largely bureaucratic structure of 
agricultural research and extension, and also shaped by the domestic and global political 
economy. They have been implemented within the context of the economic development 
policies of Philippine governments which in recent years have been export-oriented and 
foreign investment-led. The case studies demonstrate the various approaches to technology 
transfer. In particular, one case illustrates the successful balance between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to rural intervention. Another case shows the complexities of a 
development project funded by a foreign donor. The case studies indicate that farmer 
participation and institution building are important ingredients of a successful technology 
transfer project along with research and development, technology and support services.
The thesis concludes that technology transfer mechanisms and policies must 
consider the intricacies of the larger environment within which the agricultural research 
and extension system operates. It suggests the importance of understanding the 
contradictions, opportunities, socio-political processes and constraints within the political 
economy environment of the agriculture sector. This knowledge is useful for developing 
technology transfer strategies that will overcome such contradictions and constraints. The 
thesis also argues for the application of technology transfer approaches that provide clear 
mechanisms for participation by farmers. Technology transfer programs have the best 
potential to achieve broad-based development when they focus on strengthening rural 
organisations—the foundation upon which appropriate rural-based socioeconomic 
activities could emerge and be sustained.
VI
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Rationale
The Philippines is largely an agriculture-based economy. Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries account for about half of the total national employment. Almost 70% of the total 
population live in the rural areas and are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for 
their livelihood. With the growing population and contracting land resource base1 in the 
rural areas, the agriculture sector is put under heavy pressure to increase its productivity. 
This need for increased agricultural productivity has become more urgent considering new 
developments in the local and international environments that promote freer trade in 
agriculture. These developments point to competitiveness in agricultural production, either 
for export or local consumption, as an implicit rule of the game. As signatory to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-Uruguay Round or what is now referred 
to as the World Trade Agreement (WTA), even the country’s agricultural products 
intended for the domestic market, except for rice, have been subjected to competition from 
imports because of reductions in tariffs. However, the Philippine agriculture sector is faced 
with the problem of declining competitiveness. The country’s agricultural export products 
have not been doing well in the world market. The contribution of the agriculture sector to 
Gross Value Added has been declining and is one of the lowest among Asian countries.2
The role of technology transfer is well recognised in relation to the objective of 
increasing agricultural productivity and competitiveness.3 Agricultural producers need 
technology options and innovations that will improve product quality and increase 
production, processing and marketing efficiencies. Since the agriculture sector in the 
Philippines is characterised by a large number of poor farmers and small enterprises whose 
capacities to generate innovative technologies are limited, the transfer of technologies from 
research institutions to the farmers has been a major component of most rural development 
programs. However, the common notion of technology transfer in this context is
1 Agricultural lands are increasingly being converted into residential and business-commercial areas.
2 Cristina David, GATT and Philippine agriculture: Facts and fallacies, paper presented to the Symposium in
Honour o f Dr. Gelia Castillo, Diliman, Quezon City, 27-28 September 1994, pp. 13, 27.
3 This does not imply that ‘technology’ is the only prerequisite for increasing agricultural productivity and
competitiveness.
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problematic because it implies a linear view of innovation, from technology generation to 
utilisation. With this perspective, technology is assumed to flow from local and 
international agricultural research centres to the end users in a sequential fashion.
In my experience with agricultural research and development coordination in the 
Philippines, technology transfer programs in the rural sector are generally top-down in 
orientation.4 The intended end users of agricultural technologies have little participation in 
the identification and prioritisation of research areas and technologies for dissemination. 
These activities are largely performed by the research and academic institutions.
Another issue with rural development programs is that most of them are 
commodity-oriented. They consider ‘increase in yield’ rather than ‘catering to specific 
market needs’ as a measure of performance. For instance, programs of the Philippine 
grains sector have repeatedly aimed to increase production rather than develop grain 
products that can compete freely in the market.5 As a result, the country’s rice industry 
cannot compete with other countries in terms of producing ‘long-grained, glutinous, no­
broken-kemel’ rice products.6 Certainly, national scientists and farmers can argue that 
technologies for quality rice production are available locally. However, such technologies 
are not properly packaged for commercial application.
One of the consequences of these top-down and commodity-oriented approaches is 
that many technologies generated by the research community do not fit the needs, 
resources and environment of the farmers. There were some 2,000 agricultural technologies 
generated by the research community between the period 1972 to 1985.7 However, few of 
these technologies have been absorbed into the production systems of the farmers and have 
been translated into rural enterprises. This situation is suggestive of the weak research and 
technology transfer linkage. It may also imply that the agricultural technologies developed 
by the research community are irrelevant or simply not ready yet for commercial use.
Technology transfer, to be relevant, must address the issues outlined above: 
increasing the competitiveness of agricultural products; finding alternatives or 
complementary approaches to the traditional top-down oriented programs; and improving
4 ‘Top-down’ means that control is exercised from the top levels o f a hierarchical system.
5 David Gorrez, Countryside agro-industrial development strategy (CAIDS) component: Review and
assessment o f mral development programs and projects in the Philippines, Report to the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Philippines, March 1994, unpub.
6 Ibid.
7 Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development
(PCARRD).
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linkages within the agricultural research and technology transfer system. It has to operate 
in an increasingly complicated environment considering global trade liberalisation and 
growing concerns for need-based technologies, equitable distribution of benefits, and 
environmental protection. These realities dictate the need to rethink the process of 
technology transfer in the agriculture sector.
I have a strong interest in the study of technology transfer in the rural sector. My 
experience in the field inspires me to pursue this research area. I have seen how some of 
the top-down government programs have failed as a strategy for broad-based rural 
development. In contrast, I have also witnessed the potential of some of the bottom-up 
approaches for rural development with emphasis on enterprise building and greater 
participation of the local people. I intend to explore further these alternative approaches in 
my research.
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis tries to give precision to the concept of technology transfer in the 
context of the agricultural research and extension (R&E) system in the Philippines.8 It 
views technology transfer as a social and political process. Its overall objective is to 
examine the concept and practice of technology transfer in the agriculture sector in the 
Philippines using an analytical framework based on some of the elements of 
interorganisational theories and political economy. Therefore, technology transfer is 
analysed in relation to the global and domestic political economy, and the roles, actions, 
and interrelationships of the different actors involved in the agricultural R&E system. It 
seeks to understand the conditions within the immediate and larger environments of the 
agricultural R&E system that limit or facilitate the actions of the various actors involved, 
particularly the farmers’ abilities to exploit and transform technologies9 into economic 
activities. The detailed processes of technology transfer are explored through fieldwork 
that focuses on agricultural co-operatives. The thesis also reviews theories and models 
related to technology transfer and analyses the extent to which these theories help elucidate 
the practice of technology transfer in the agriculture sector.
Specifically, it attempts to answer the following questions:
8 Technology transfer in the agriculture sector is associated with agricultural extension service. It is thus
viewed, on one level, in relation with its immediate environment, which is the agricultural research and
extension system. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of the R&E system.
9 Including both indigenous and introduced technologies.
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1. To what extent do theories and models related to technology transfer explain and/or 
influence the actions and policies of agencies involved in the agricultural research and 
extension system in the Philippines?
2. How do some major political and economic factors, and organisational issues shape 
technology transfer in the agriculture sector in the Philippines?
3. What lessons could be learned from the technology transfer experiences of the 
agricultural research and extension system, in general and agricultural co-operatives, in 
particular?
By drawing insights from these investigations, my thesis aims to contribute to the 
rethinking of the concept and practice of technology transfer in the agriculture sector. At 
the end of the thesis, I first offer some recommendations that could help improve 
technology delivery and utilisation in the agriculture sector in the Philippines, and second 
identify the conditions necessary for these recommendations to have a better chance of 
success.
1.3 Structure of the Argument
The thesis sets out to demonstrate that a good understanding of technology transfer 
and its complexities can be achieved if technology transfer is viewed in the perspective of 
organisational theory and political economy. The conceptual framework of the thesis links 
various levels of analysis: the broad context of the international and national economies 
and the nation state; the immediate environment of technology transfer; and case studies of 
agricultural co-operatives in the Philippines. This multilevel approach is essential to 
capture adequately the complex social and political dimensions of technology transfer.
The thesis analyses the theory and practice of technology transfer in order to 
examine the extent to which linear or traditional models of innovation have informed the 
policies and actions of organisations involved in the agricultural research and extension 
system in the Philippines. I shall challenge this linear notion and top-down orientation of 
technology transfer in the agriculture sector. I shall argue that this common concept and 
practice are inappropriate as a basis for effective technology acquisition and utilisation 
because they do not take into account the socioeconomic and political environment in 
which technology transfer operates. Technology transfer is embedded in the social, 
economic and political structures of the state. Likewise, it is a socioeconomic and political 
process with profound effects on the structure of the rural society. The thesis argues that a
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simplistic view of technology transfer fails to acknowledge many relevant issues, views, 
networks, interactions, linkages and knowledge systems in the agricultural research and 
extension (R&E) system. These shortcomings are a key determinant of the failure of 
technology transfer or extension programs to satisfy the requirements and challenges of 
agricultural development.
An examination of the political and economic context of technology transfer is 
necessary to show how the actions of agencies/entities within the agricultural R&E system 
are influenced in part by the limitations, opportunities and contradictions within the 
domestic and global political economy environments of the system. For instance, 
agencies/entities concerned may not always act in the best interest of the farmers because 
of the need to support the overall economic objectives of the Philippine government. 
Recognising and understanding the operation of these influences is the crucial first step 
toward developing technology transfer strategies that can work within the constraints and 
opportunities they present.
A closer look at the immediate setting of technology transfer will demonstrate that 
the largely bureaucratic character of the agricultural R&E system is counterproductive to 
the efficient delivery of extension service. This arrangement, favouring top-down 
approaches to agricultural R&D and technology transfer, is one of the factors that 
contributes to the weak linkages between research and extension units, between researchers 
and farmers, and between extension workers and farmers. I examine the incentive system 
for agricultural researchers and extension workers as a key determinant of the efficacy of 
linkages between them.
The fieldwork part of the thesis focuses on agricultural co-operatives in order to 
provide insights and lessons for rethinking the process of technology transfer. Agricultural 
co-operatives are good sites for analysis in terms of technology transfer because they have 
been the objects of many agricultural development programs of government and non­
government organisations in the Philippines. The fieldwork examines how specific 
linkages of the co-operatives and technology transfer approaches of their interveners 
facilitate or hinder the process of technology acquisition and commercialisation. The case 
studies are intended to highlight the important ingredients of an effective technology 
transfer project involving agricultural co-operatives.
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Considering the findings of the theoretical work and fieldwork undertaken in this 
thesis, some general principles for enhancing technology delivery and utilisation are 
proposed. The thesis concludes with an outline of the conditions and institutional 
arrangements which will be necessary for these recommendations to be realizable and 
workable.
1.4 The Notion of Technology Transfer
In sections 1.1 and 1.3, I pointed out the inadequacy of the common notion of 
technology transfer which suggests the movement of technology from one location or use 
to another. Chen’s10 interpretation, which states that technology transfer is ‘not just 
acquiring of a knowledge in production but also a building up of a nation’s [farmers’] 
technological capability’ is more useful for my purpose.11 Chen’s definition implies the 
social nature and the complexity of the technology transfer process. With this definition, I 
can relate my own perception of technology transfer—that it involves an assortment of 
interrelated activities, and a continuous exchange of knowledge12 and interaction among 
the different actors involved within and outside the agricultural R&E system. These 
activities, knowledge systems and interactions enable or restrict the intended users in 
absorbing a technology into their production system and in making improvements or 
adjustments to the technology to suit their own conditions.
In this thesis, I view technology transfer in the context of the interrelationship of a 
diverse set of activities, such as technology generation, testing, integration, packaging, 
pilot testing, networking, dissemination, acquisition and utilisation. However, this 
perspective does not in any way suggest a smoothly operating system where different 
components are assumed to perfectly fit one another. The way in which these activities and 
entities deal with each other and the degree of integration or conflict among them is studied 
empirically.
Technology transfer in the agriculture sector in the Philippines is often associated 
with agricultural extension. Extension is defined by Van den Ban and Hawkins13 as
10 Edward Chen (ed.), Transnational Corporation and Technology Transfer to Developing Countries, vol. 18,
Routledge, London, published for UNCTAD, 1994, pp. 1-2.
11 This thesis focuses on the agriculture sector and therefore it highlights ‘technology capability building of
farmers’.
12 Including tacit and codified knowledge, indigenous knowledge, national and transnational knowledge, etc.
13 A.W. van den Ban and H. Hawkins, Agricultural Extension, Longman Scientific & Technical, New York,
i988,pp. 9, 11.
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involving the conscious use of communication of information to help ‘people’ form sound 
opinions and make good decisions. It is usually identified with agriculture, thus the term 
agricultural extension, in which case the word ‘people’ is replaced by ‘farmers’. It connotes 
the process of reaching and educating people in the rural and remote areas generally 
characterised as agricultural in nature. The extension service in the Philippines is 
frequently seen from the perspective of technology dissemination and strategies for 
increasing the knowledge and skills of the farmers. I argue that this view is simplistic 
because its focus is limited to the needs of the farmers. The technology transfer or 
extension service needs to take into account the different resource and knowledge 
processes within the agricultural R&E system. To carry out this strategy, interagency or 
intersectoral linkages and collaboration are required because no single agency can fully 
address the demands of the R&E system. Technology transfer in this thesis is not the same 
as the transfer of technology (TOT) concept of agricultural R&E. The TOT approach 
assumes a linear flow of technologies from researchers to extension workers and finally to 
farmers. Chapter 2 elucidates further the different models of agricultural R&E systems.
Technology transfer can be classified as endogenous or exogenous. Endogenous 
technology transfer takes place within national boundaries—for example between 
industries, and between research organisations and farmers or entrepreneurs. Exogenous 
technology transfer is viewed from the perspective of international business and 
economics—for example occurring between two developed countries, between two 
developing countries, and from a developed to a developing country or vice versa. My 
research is focused on endogenous technology transfer, and international perspective is 
limited to the topics indicated in section 1.5.2.
For purpose of discussion, the terms rural development and agricultural 
development are sometimes used interchangeably in this research. This is not to imply that 
rural development is equivalent to agricultural development. I recognise the fact that there 
is more to rural life than agriculture. For instance, farmers and/or their families engage in 
non-farm activities at certain times of the year either to supplement their farm income or 
for the main source of their livelihood. The terms agricultural research and technology 
transfer system, agricultural research and extension (R&E) system, and agricultural 
innovation system are also used interchangeably in this thesis. In the strictest sense, the
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word ‘agriculture’ refers to crops and livestock production. However, in this thesis, 
‘agriculture’ includes the forestry sector, especially the activities of the upland dwellers.
1.5 Analysing Organisations and their Roles in Technology Transfer and 
Development
To capture the social and political dimensions of technology transfer, the various 
levels of analysis in this thesis are grounded on some of the elements of interorganisational 
theories.14 I find some formulations of interorganisational theory, particularly Benson’s, 
most useful for my research. Benson15 situates interorganisational relations ‘within the 
structures of public policy sector’ and the public policy sector ‘within the structures, 
contradictions and crises of the larger society’. He defines a policy sector as a ‘cluster or 
complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and 
distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource 
dependence’.16 In my case, the agricultural R&E system is the policy sector under scrutiny.
Benson17 views an interorganisational policy sector as consisting of a ‘surface level 
of substantive policy and administrative arrangements’ determined by ‘deep structure of 
rules and interests’. He proposes three levels of analysis to fully understand 
interorganisational relationships in a public policy sector.
The first level of analysis is concerned with administrative structures and policy 
paradigms that determine a set of interorganisational resource dependencies.18 At this level, 
the division of labour or patterns of differentiation and control over activities in a policy 
sector is examined. The commitments of the sector to a particular set of policy options are 
also looked into. Such arrangements and policy paradigms are seen to define the 
relationships of resource dependence between organisations. This means that two agencies 
are most likely to have a resource-dependent relationship if their policy paradigms and 
domains intersect. The effective performance of one agency is contingent upon its access to 
resources provided by another agency. It follows that changes in the division of labour or 
policy paradigms would alter the interorganisational resource dependencies. Benson argues
14 Interorganisational theory is discussed later in this section.
15 Kenneth J. Benson, ‘A framework for policy analysis’, in D. Rogers and D. Whetten (eds),
Interorganisational Coordination: Theory Research, and Implementation, Iowa State University Press, 
Iowa, 1982, p. 137.
16 Ibid., p. 148.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., pp. 149-154.
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that administrative reorganisations are often used to change certain resource-dependent 
relations.19 Conversely, existing interorganisational dependencies are seen to embody 
specific power structures that limit the range of alternative administrative arrangements 
and policy paradigms.20 However, Benson contends that the study of power structures must 
go beyond the immediate set of resource-dependent relations, into the larger political 
economy.21
The second level of analysis involves ‘accounting for the power of the various 
interests and for shifts in the distribution of power’.22 Examples of interest groups in policy 
sectors are cited by Benson as follows: demand groups, support groups, administrative 
groups, provider groups and coordinating groups.23 Each group has its own structured 
interests that lead to a specific set of concerns about interorganisational relations.24 The 
groups behave in such a way that their interests are preserved or advanced. Therefore, 
changes in administrative arrangements that threaten these interests are frequently resisted 
or modified. The bases of power of various interest groups within a policy sector are 
derived from resource dependencies or distribution of resource control, their location in the 
network of interorganisational relations, and distribution of responsibility for decision 
making.25 The power structure underlying a sector involves specific arrangements of 
structured interests that enable some interests but constrain others. In general, this 
underlying interest-power structure ‘tends to preserve an hegemonic model consisting of 
policy paradigm, administrative arrangements, and interorganisational resource 
dependencies’.26
Finally, the interest-power structure is located within the third level—the rules of 
structure formation. Benson27 maintains that there are certain rules, which are not rigid or 
stable norms, that set boundaries upon the organising actions of a policy sector. The rules 
of structure formation are in part related to the requirements of the larger economy and
19 Ibid., p. 151.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 152.
22 Ibid., p. 160.
23 Ibid., pp. 155-158.
24 Ibid., p. 155.
25 Karen S. Cook citing various authors, such as Benson, Lehman and Emerson in ‘Exchange and power in
networks o f interorganisational relations’, The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 18, Winter 1977, p. 72.
26 Benson, ‘A framework for policy analysis’, op.cit., p. 154.
21 Ibid,pp. 149-164.
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society. The theory has been developed for the case of the advanced capitalist countries, in 
which the central feature is the need to sustain capital accumulation and legitimation.28 But 
then this will also apply in many developing countries, including the Philippines.29
Benson30 depicts contradictions and crises in interorganisational structure. 
Contradictions are defined as fundamental structural inconsistencies that necessitate 
changes in existing structures.31 Crisis is defined as a point of breakdown where the 
existing arrangements threaten to collapse in the face of contradictions.32 Contradictions 
may produce ‘dislocations and crises’ which trigger a search for new structural 
arrangements.33 According to Benson, a contradiction in interorganisational structure is ‘a 
fundamental incompatibility between an hegemonic set of policies and administrative 
practices at one level and the underlying limiting set of structures and rules’.34
In summary, Benson’s interorganisational theory focuses on linking levels of 
analysis.35 I adopt this analytical approach in my thesis because it provides a useful 
framework for understanding the complex interorganisational relationships within and 
beyond the agricultural R&E system. Many things that occur within the system can only be 
fully understood or explained by connecting them to or locating them within the larger 
context.
The interorganisational concepts of coordination and resource dependency, which 
are developed by several theorists but already in effect incorporated in Benson’s 
interorganisational framework, are by themselves a useful guide for understanding linkages 
between agencies or entities involved in my case studies. The issue of coordination is 
central in my case studies because co-operatives studied have many formal and informal 
linkages with different agencies, themselves mostly autonomous from each other. Various 
agencies provide co-operatives with support services such as technology, credit, market, 
information and training.
2% Ibid., p. 161.
29 Although there are strong national traditions which may not be capitalist in nature (e.g. remnants of
feudalism, family firms, etc.), many developing countries are often dominated by capitalistic sectors.
30 Benson, ‘A framework for policy analysis’, op.cit., pp. 164-165.
31 Ibid., p. 164.
32 Ibid., pp. 164-165.
33 Kenneth J. Benson, ‘Organisations: A dialectic view’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 22, March
1977, p. 5.
34 Benson, ‘A framework for policy analysis’, op.cit., p. 165.
35 Christopher Ham and Michael Hill, ‘Conclusion: Linking levels of analysis’, The Policy Process in the
Modem Capitalist State, New York, 1993, p. 176.
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My case studies look at, among other issues, the degree of coordination among 
various intervening agencies and its impact on linkages and technology transfer. 
Coordination is defined by Hall, et al, 36 as the process by which ‘organisations attempt to 
ensure that their activities take into account those of other organisations’. Another 
important interorganisational concept is resource dependency. Resource dependency may 
help to explain the manner of linkages between organisations—the formation of particular 
divisions of labour and the development of specific patterns of control between 
organisations. 37 The dependence-characteristics of interorganisational relationships can be 
described in terms of the relative importance of the resource38 to an organisation and the 
degree of substitutability of the source—whether alternative sources of supply cannot be 
easily found. 39
Scharpf40 further elaborates the notion of dependency relations in his discussion of 
‘exchange relationships’. High dependence relationship is defined by high importance of 
the resource and low substitutability of the source; low dependence is defined by a 
combination of low importance of the resource and low substitutability of source, or high 
importance of the resource and high substitutability of the source; and independence is 
defined by a combination of low importance of the resource and high substitutability of the 
source.41
Using this characterisation, the exchange relationship between two organisations is 
classified as mutual dependence, mutual independence, and unilateral dependence.42 
Mutual dependence exists when the resources involved are important for both agencies and 
neither party can find an available alternative source easily.43 Mutual independence is 
described by the situation in which a resource is either not very important to either party or 
alternative sources of supply are easily available.44 With unilateral dependence, the interest 
of the more dependent agency to maintain the existing exchange relations must be greater
36 Richard Hall, J. Clark, P. Giordano, P. Johnson, & M. Van Roekel, ‘Patterns of interorganisational
relationships’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 22, September 1977, p. 459.
37 Benson, ‘A framework for policy analysis’, op. cit., p. 143.
38 ‘Resource’ is ‘any valued activity, service or commodity’. Cited in Cook, op. cit., p. 64.
39 Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Interorganisational policy studies: Issues, concepts and perspectives’, in Kenneth Harf
and F. Scharf (eds), Interorganisational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Control, Sage 
Publications, London, 1978, p. 354.
40 Ibid., pp. 354-355.
41 Ibid., p. 355.
42 Ibid., pp. 355-357.
43 Ibid., p. 356.
44 Ibid.
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than the interest of the less dependent party.45 This typology of resource-dependency is 
related to the concept of coordination.46 A relationship of mutual dependence is said to 
encourage coordination since both parties have high stakes in preserving the ongoing 
exchange relationship.
1.6 Explanatory and Normative Orientations in Development Theories
At the national and international levels of analysis in my research, I also draw 
insights from different development theories. Knowledge of the basic principles and 
themes of development theories is useful for analysing the agricultural technology transfer 
system in its political and economic contexts. Some of the development theories identified 
in the literature are presented in the following section. My intention here is to understand 
their explanatory and normative elements in relation to the agriculture sector, not to review 
them comprehensively.
Modernisation theories define development in terms of economic growth through 
industrialisation and Westernisation.47 They focus on national societies (nation-states) as 
the basic units of analysis48 and view Western development as the model for all countries 
to emulate.49 Development is defined as a succession of stages through which nation-states 
will pass—from traditional stage to modernity.50 The agriculture sector is seen to play a 
major role in the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modem society’ by providing a base for 
industrial growth.51 Technological change or commercialisation of agriculture is identified 
as central to this process.52
One of the major theses of modernisation theories is the importance of Western 
values (for example individualism and entrepreneurship), ideas and investment to
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 John Agnew, ‘Technology transfer and theories o f development: Conceptual issues in the South Asian
context’, Journal o f Asian and African Studies, vol. XVII, nos 1-2, 1982, p. 18; Ray Kiely, Sociology and 
Development: the Impasse and Beyond, University o f East London, UCL Press, 1995; and Johan Galtung, 
‘Part III: Development theory’, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo & Sage Publications, London, 1996.
48 Agnew, op.cit., p. 18.
49 Ray Kiely, Sociology and Development: The Impasse and Beyond, UCL Press Limited Press, London,
1995, p. 4.
50 See ‘stages o f growth theory’ in Walter Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1960, 1971; W. Moore, Social Change, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1963.
5'Agnew, loc. cit.
52Agnew, op.cit., pp. 18-19, citing various authors, including among others, W. Mellor, ‘Increasing
agricultural production in early stages o f economic development: Relationships, problems and prospects’, 
Indian Journal o f Agricultural Economics, vol. 17, 1962, pp. 29-46 and C. Wharton, ‘Research on 
agricultural development in Southeast Asia’, Journal o f Farm Economics, vol. 45, 1963, pp. 1161-1174.
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development.53 Another perspective on modernisation is the ‘dual economy approach’ that 
highlights the co-existence of, and the limited degree of interaction between, traditional 
and modem sectors.54 Agricultural modernisation is perceived as a way of facilitating 
movement of labour from the agricultural to the industrial sector.55
A number of criticisms have been levelled against modernisation theories. Such 
theories are criticised for their following assumptions: technological determinism; a rigid 
separation between tradition and modernity; an unproblematic transformation from 
traditional to modem society; and a conflict-free modem world.56 They failed to put 
development in context by their lack of consideration given to social structure and political 
history of nation-states.57 The position on technology transfer of modernisation theories is 
apparently positive. The following actions are assumed to facilitate modernisation— 
providing the means for supply of technology, infrastructure development, and diffusion of 
knowledge about technology.58
Another group of development theories considers the ‘world political economy’ as 
the level of analysis and emphasises the inequities of the international economic order. The 
‘development of underdevelopment’ theory claims that development in the modem nation­
states or ‘métropoles’ proceeded at the expense of the traditional ones or ‘satellites’ 
through the transfer of economic surplus from the satellites to the métropoles.59 This 
proposition implies that the traditional and modem sectors must not be treated in isolation 
because the traditional sector is as much a feature of the world-system as the modem 
sector.60
This world-systems view was elaborated on by Wallerstein61 in his world-system 
analysis. Wallerstein62 argued that the world capitalist economy in the sixteenth century
53 Rostow, op.cit., 1971, p. 180; Galtung, op.cit., p. 131; Agnew, op.cit., p. 19.
54 Agnew, op.cit., p. 19.
55 Ibid., citing W. Lewis, ‘Economic development with unlimited supplies o f labor’, Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies, vol. 22, 1954, pp. 139-191.
56 Kiely, op.cit., pp. 41-44.
57 Ibid.
58 Agnew, op.cit., p. 23.
59 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America , Monthly Review Press, New
York, 1969.
60 Kiely, op.cit., p. 45.
61 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System: Volumes I to IV (Studies in Social Discontinuity),
Academic Press, San Diego, 1974, 1980, 1989.
621. Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World- 
Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, San Diego, 1974.
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was divided into ‘core-states’, ‘peripheral areas’ and ‘semi-peripheral areas’. The world 
economy then was characterised by a periphery of a modem world-system providing the 
resources for the development of a European-North Atlantic core.63 This imbalance has 
persisted as the core has continued to benefit from and dominate over an expanding 
periphery, and the periphery has become more dependent upon the core for investment, 
market and innovation. These theories have been questioned for implying that the countries 
in the periphery would not develop as long as they are ‘tied to the core-dominated world 
system’.64 Out of this criticism emerged dependency theory.
Dependency theory asserts that development of the economies of the dependent 
countries is predicated by the expansion of the dominant countries, ‘which may have 
positive or negative effects on their immediate development’.65 This suggests that 
development in the periphery is possible but it is ‘dependent’ on and led by the core 
nation-states. The implicit perspective of the world political economy theories on 
technology transfer is somewhat negative. These theories imply that technology transfer 
benefits only those countries that supply and control the technologies.66 Technology 
transfer is viewed as ‘dependency creating’.67
The neoclassical theory of development prescribes the use of ‘free market’ 
economic principles. It assumes that nation-states will benefit from exercising free trade if 
they specialise in producing and trading goods in which they have comparative 
advantage.68 The theory advocates export-oriented growth strategies and minimum state 
intervention in development, state intervention is viewed as counterproductive when it 
results in protection of inefficient economic activities, rent-seeking operations, and 
discrimination against some sectors in the economy.69
Neoclassical theory has been criticised for overlooking the role of the state in the 
economic development of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) and the advantages 
offered by geographical conditions, and the political and social history of particular
63 Ibid.
64 Kiely, op.cit., pp. 46-47.
65Ibid., citing O' Brien, ‘ A critique o f Latin American theories of dependency’, in I. Oxaal, et al. (eds), 
Beyond the Sociology o f Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p. 12.
66 Agnew, op.cit., pp. 23-24.
67 Ibid.
68 This hypothesis is based on the works o f David Ricardo. See for example, D. Ricardo, Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, first published in 1821.
69 Kiely, op.cit., pp. 122-123.
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countries.70 The implicit assumption of this theory on technology transfer is that foreign 
investments and the development of a dynamic private sector will encourage the transfer of 
foreign and local technologies. In this case, the role of the state as a development agency is 
to provide a favourable environment for the private sector to develop and for foreign 
investments to expand.
Different development theories incorporate more or less consistent explanatory and 
normative elements. For instance, neoclassical theorists would celebrate the success of the 
Asian NICs and attribute it to limited state intervention and free market formula. 
Dependency and world systems theorists, on the other hand, would argue that the 
development of NICs led to the growth of a new international division of labour (NIDL).71 
The NIDL is said to have exacerbated dependency in the world system in the sense that 
industrialisation in the periphery or the NICs has continued to depend on the advanced 
capitalist countries.72 Dependency theorists would also argue that the NIC development is 
at the expense of other things, such as labour and the environment. While neo-classical 
theorists would hail globalisation, other development theorists would criticise this as 
consolidating structures of inequality, imbalance and instability, and a new form of 
colonialism.
1.7 Conceptual Framework of Research and Structure of Thesis
The analytical framework of this thesis (Figure 1.1) is based on the premise that to 
understand technology transfer requires analysing it from various perspectives: the 
socioeconomic and political conditions within which technology transfer is embedded, the 
policies and development strategies of the Philippine state in relation to the different forms 
of internal and external pressures (e.g. global economic changes), and their implications for 
the agriculture sector and technology transfer; related theories and models; the roles, 
interrelationships, approaches and mechanisms of the different actors involved in the 
agricultural R&E system; and the organisation and management that govern the system. 
Interactions and approaches tend to vary according to the type of dominant interveners73 in
70 John Brohman, ‘Postwar development in the Asian NICs: Does the neoliberal model fit reality?’,
Economic Geography, vol. 72, no. 2, April 1996, p. 107.
71 Ibid., pp. 89-90 citing the works o f F. Frobel, O. Heinrichs and Kreye, ‘The tendency towards a new
international division of labour’, Review, vol. 1, 1977, pp. 73-88.
72 Ibid.
73 Includes government line agencies, non-government organisations, higher education institutes, the private
sector and international agencies.
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the agricultural R&E system and agricultural producers74 the system is serving. There are 
various levels and domains of interactions that need to be investigated—at international, 
national and local levels; and among and within public, private, or non-government 
organisations (NGOs). This research focuses less on private agribusiness corporations 
since they are self-contained in terms of research capability and technology transfer.
The general structure of the thesis is as follows:
1.7.1 Going Back to Basics: Theories and Models (Chapter 2)
A study of technology transfer process and practices requires an understanding of 
related theories, models and concepts. It is important to have a theoretical grasp of the 
process. Such an exercise can help explain past and current actions of the different 
institutions involved in terms of their technology transfer approaches and policies. It can 
provide the basis for understanding the impact of these actions in terms of their success or 
failure. Going back to theories and examining their strengths and weaknesses may provide 
the basis upon which alternative models can be formulated. I argue that the approaches and 
policies of different institutions concerned with technology transfer are influenced by the 
theories and models they consciously or unconsciously espouse. Conversely, actual 
experiences and problems shape the way theories and models are re-designed.
1.7.2 International Perspective (Chapter 3)
This thesis examines the general position of the Philippines within the changing 
landscape of the global economy and the way in which the global forces influence the local 
political economy. It analyses the manner in which these international and local forces 
interact and mediate each other, the tensions or conflict between them, and their impact on 
the agricultural technology transfer. Chapter 4 partly discusses the international view of 
technology transfer by examining the roles of foreign donors75 and international 
agricultural research centres, and their influence on the agricultural R&E system.
1.7.3 National System of Innovation (Chapter 4)
The technology transfer process in the Philippine agriculture sector is examined in 
the context of the national environment within which it is located. Hence, the roles,
74 Includes private corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises, co-operatives or resource-poor farmers.
75 Include multilateral and bilateral aid, and technical assistance agencies; and international NGOs.
17
interrelationships, organisation, control and management dynamics of the different 
agencies or entities involved76 are explored in terms of their direct and indirect 
involvement, and influence on research and technology transfer. This type of analysis may 
lead to the identification and definition of what specific linkages are weak in the 
agricultural R&E system. Only when the right linkage problems and causes are pinpointed 
can an intelligent proposal for an improved technology transfer approach be put forward. 
The different technology transfer approaches and strategies of actors or entities involved 
are examined in terms of their features, commonalities and differences. It is the intention in 
this exercise to determine areas of possible complementarity among various approaches. 
This type of analysis gives an indication of what changes are necessary to improve the 
system of agricultural innovation and technology transfer.
1.7.4 National Case Studies (Chapters 5-9)
Case studies in the Philippines are conducted to examine the dynamics of 
technology transfer at the field level and demonstrate the complex nature of 
interrelationships among the different stakeholders in the agricultural R&E system. The 
information derived from the case studies is expected to yield practical lessons that will 
contribute to the rethinking of the technology transfer approaches in the Philippines. The 
case studies focus on three farmer co-operatives as entry points for analysing 
interrelationships with and among the different entities providing interventions. 
Intervention in this case refers to assistance provided to co-operatives in terms of 
technology, extension, credit, market information and institution-building.
Finally, chapter 10 explains key points and spells out implications of the research. 
It presents some recommendations on how to improve the practice of technology transfer 
and outlines the conditions necessary for these recommendations to be more effective.
1.8 Case Study Methodology
Agencies providing technology transfer or extension interventions to agricultural 
producers can be classified into five major categories: government line-agencies:77 NGOs 
and private voluntary organisations (PVOs); state colleges and universities (SCUs); the
76 Include the public sector, private sector, NGOs, higher education institutes and agricultural producers.
77 Includes agencies under the Department o f Agriculture (DA), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Department o f Science and Technology (DOST), and Department o f Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR).
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private sector; and foreign donors or international organisations. These agencies assist one 
or a combination of four different types of agricultural producers, as follows: resource-poor 
individual producers, farmer-co-operatives or associations, small and medium-scale rural 
enterprises (SMEs),78 and big agribusiness corporations. Combining these two dimensions, 
there were at least 20 possible types of case studies that could have been chosen as 
indicated in Table 1.1. Each cell in the matrix thus represents an interrelationship between 
an agency that leads in terms of technology transfer or extension service, and a specific 
clientele served. In any instance or case, there is a dominant intervener, but other agencies 
or entities are involved to provide additional support services. This implies that multiple 
types of interaction exist among the different stakeholders within a particular case with one 
linkage79 more dominant than the others.
For the purpose of limiting the choice of case study, only farmer-co-operatives 
were considered. At the technology delivery end, farmer-co-operatives or associations have 
been receiving significant attention from the government sector, as well as other 
interveners. The major arguments for co-operatives as conduit of government rural 
development programs are summed up in the following statements. Filipino farmers are 
generally limited-resource individuals and it is by organising themselves into co-operatives 
or associations that they become more efficient and empowered. Likewise, technology 
transfer or extension service providers can reach a larger number of people if efforts are 
directed towards an organised group of farmers. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of 
agricultural co-operatives in developing countries both in general, and in the Philippines in
78 An SME is defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry, agribusiness and/or other 
services whether single proprietorship, co-operative, partnership, or corporation whose total assets, 
(inclusive o f those coming from loans but exclusive o f the land on which the particular business entity’s 
office, plant and equipment are situated) and employment size fall under the following categories:
SME Value o f Assets Employment Size
Micro-enterprise
Cottage
Small
Medium
US$5500.00 and below 5 workers or less
above US$5,500.00 to 55,500.00 6 to 9 workers
above US$55,500.00 to 555,500.0010 to 99 workers 
above US$555,500.00 to 2,222,200.00 100 to 199 workers
Source: Small and Medium-scale Enterprises Development (SMED) Council, SMED Council Resolution no. 
3, 1995, quoted in Taeyoung Shin, ‘Management o f Technology’, Module II: Technology Support 
Services and Facilities, DOST-UNDP Project Assessment Reports: Achieving International 
Competitiveness Through Technology Development and Transfer, Department o f Science and 
Technology (DOST) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Philippines, 1995, p. 81.
79 Linkage is the ‘means by which an institution bridge interactions with other agencies or organisations to 
ensure complementation o f functions, better communication and efficiency o f operation, whether 
formally or informally, top-down or supply-driven, temporal or permanent, long-term or short-term’. 
Defined by Brown and Librero, ‘The NARRDS-LGU linkage: PCARRD experiences in research and 
extension', Strengthening Research and Extension Linkage , PCARRD Book Series no. 157/1996.
T a b le  1.1 P o ss ib le  e n try  p o in ts  o f  ca se  stu d y
Dominant
Intervener
Clientele Served
Resource-
poor
individual 
producers (1)
Farmer-Co-
operatives/
Associations
(2)
SMEs
(3)
Agribusiness
Corporations
(4)
Government line 
agency(A)
Al A2 A3 A4
NGO/PVO
(B)
B1 B2 B3 B4
SCUs
(C)
Cl C2 C3 C4
Private sector 
(D)
D1 D2 D3 D4
Foreign donor 
(E)
El E2 E3 E4
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particular. By focusing on farmer co-operatives, I do not assume that the observations from 
my case studies will apply to the other clientele groups of the agricultural R&E system.
The criteria applied in the process of selecting co-operatives for case study were
• accessibility and ease of getting information;
• relevance to national S&T priorities;
• engagement in agricultural techno-based enterprises; and
• representation of the following modalities:
Case 1—co-operative whose dominant intervener is a government line agency;
Case 2—co-operative with the private sector as the dominant intervener; and 
Case 3—co-operative with an international donor as the dominant intervener.
The common denominator among the three case studies was the presence of a co­
operative as the object of development interventions. The co-operative was the common 
entry point for investigating the technology transfer approaches employed in the three 
intervention-modalities. The purpose of varying the cases in terms of dominant interveners 
was to determine the differences and similarities in the technology delivery approaches of 
different intervening agencies or entities.
The co-operative was the focus for analysing interrelationships with and among the 
different entities providing interventions. Since linkages among the research sector, 
extension group, farmers and other support institutions are central to the character of 
technology transfer in this research, the case studies examined the effectiveness of linkages 
among the different stakeholders involved in the three co-operatives. Effectiveness of any 
linkage or interrelationship was analysed in terms of the following indicators or questions :
• responsiveness to the needs of the target clients or how well it facilitates the flow of 
information on farmers’ needs to researchers;
• capacity to transfer relevant technology or how well it facilitates the flow of 
information and techniques from the research system to the farmers; and
• sustainability of the linkage mechanism given the variety of institutions involved.80 
Another measure considered in the analysis was the capacity to increase farmers’ access to 
available resources.81
80 Peter Ewell, "Links between on-farm research and extension in nine countries ', in David Kaimowitz (ed.),
Making the Link: Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in Developing Countries, Westview 
Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1990, pp. 154-162.
81 Ricardo Ramirez, Virginia Cardenas and Nimal Ranaweera, “Participatory rapid appraisal o f farmers
agricultural knowledge and communication systems ', Journal o f the Asian Farming Systems Association,
vol. 3, no. 2, 1995.
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As an initial activity, scanning of co-operatives for suitable case studies was done 
in consultation with officials and staff-members from the following agencies: Philippine 
Council for Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources Research and Development 
(PCARRD); University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB); Land Bank of the 
Philippines (LandBank); Co-operative Development Authority (CDA); Philippine Business 
for Social Progress (PBSP); UPLB Foundation; Southern Tagalog Agriculture and 
Resources R&D Consortium, (STARRDEC); Department of Science and Technology 
Region 4 (DOST-IV); Rural-based Enterprise Development (RED) Foundation; and 
Technology Application and Promotion Institute (TAPI).82
The first list (Appendix 1.1) of 20 potential co-operatives for case study was 
subjected to the selection criteria mentioned above. The list was further reduced to 13 co­
operatives shown in Appendix 1.2 based on an additional criterion—that the beneficiaries 
of co-operatives are generally small-farmers or upland dwellers. After careful analysis of 
the shortlist, three co-operatives were finally identified (Table 1.2). The geographical 
location of these three co-operatives is shown in Figure 1.2.
The following techniques and procedures were used in the conduct of case studies: 
in-depth interviews of selected co-operative officers and members, and representatives 
from agencies providing interventions to the co-operative (see Appendix 1.3 for the names 
of persons and groups interviewed),83 direct observation in the field; audio-visual 
recording; official document collection;84 and validation of outputs with key actors 
involved. Permission from all concerned was sought well in advance before conducting the 
field visits and interviews. The nature and purpose of investigation were explained to the 
respondents beforehand. The interviews were mostly tape-recorded with the permission of 
the respondents. Note-taking of key points put forward by the respondents was also done 
during the interview but this was kept to the minimum so as not to break the spontaneity of 
discussion.
There were two sets of questions—one intended for co-operatives (Appendix 1.4) 
and another for the interveners (Appendix 1.5). Questions were mostly open-ended and 
unstructured. Where possible, both individual and group interviews were undertaken in the
82 Some 31 interviews were conducted in deciding what case studies to pursue.
83 Interviews were done during my field visits: 15 visits for Luzon case studies (cases 2 and 3) and 15 days
stay in Iloilo province (which is one hour away from Manila by plane) for case 1.
84 Collected approximately 900 pages o f documents from the 3 co-operatives.
T a b le  1 .2  C o -o p e r a t iv e s  fo r  ca se  stu d y
Co-operative Enterprise Location Dominant
Intervener1
1. Tabarga Multi- Bamboo nursery and Dueñas, Iloilo DOST-PCARRD
purpose Co-operative other livelihood DENR-VI
(TABARGA MPC) enterprises
2. Lutucan Multi- Coco-coir processing Sariaya, Quezon Private sector
purpose Co-operative (inventor)
(Lutucan MPC) LandB ank/UCPB
3. Integrated Jalajala Rice production and Jalajala, Rizal JICA
Federation of Co- processing SEARCA
operatives DAR
(INJAFEDCO) NATCCO
1 Refer to List o f Acronyms
Luzon
Case 1: TABARGA MPC
se 3: INJAFEDCO
Case 2: Lutucan MPC
Figure 1.2 Map of the Philippines and location of case studies
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case studies. Interviews with the co-operatives as a group, particularly in Cases 1 and 2, 
were scheduled to coincide with the regular or pre-scheduled board of director meetings 
and other co-operative activities where the officials and members were expected to attend. 
This arrangement was preferred by the co-operative officials so that they did not have to 
organise a separate activity or meeting solely for my purpose. Interviews of any available 
individual co-operative members were done either during the same occasion or during a 
separate field visit. In terms of intervening agencies or individuals, interviews were held in 
their respective offices or plant sites. The tape-recorded conversations were transcribed not 
later than one week after each interview. The information gathered from the respondents 
was validated with them through either face-to-face, written or telephone communication.
The case studies focus on both success stories and failures within the co-operatives 
because much can be learned from both experiences. However, failures are not necessarily 
a reflection of the actors’ shortcomings as there are other factors that could be beyond the 
actors’ control. I examine the factors behind the success and failures of the co-operatives 
with emphasis on the nature and effectiveness of linkages, and the technology transfer 
strategies of the intervening agencies.
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CHAPTER 2
GOING BACK TO THE BASICS: THEORIES AND MODELS
2.1 Introduction
A study of the technology transfer process and practices requires an understanding 
of related theories, models and concepts. It is important to have a theoretical grasp of the 
process. Such an exercise can help explain past and present actions, and policies and 
strategies of different institutions involved in terms of their success and failure.
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the different theories and models 
related to technology transfer, and determine their specific applications and implications 
for rural or agricultural development. The review is not exhaustive considering the 
agglomeration and diversity of literature on this topic. The literature is multifarious and 
cuts across several areas and disciplines. Hence, boundaries are often vague, and to some 
extent arbitrary. Nevertheless, the inclusion of selected theories and models in this chapter 
are guided by usefulness and the purposes outlined here.
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section reviews the 
theories and models related to technology transfer with emphasis on innovation. Most of 
the literature on innovation, and much of that reviewed in this section, generally refers to 
industrial manufacturing firms. It is provided to give the context of innovation studies 
before focusing on agriculture. However, this section does outline a few implications of 
innovation theories—especially induced innovation and innovation diffusion—for the 
agricultural research and extension (R&E) system. The second section deals with theories 
and models that have direct application for understanding the agricultural R&E systems in 
the developing countries. It also presents some empirical work on these agricultural R&E 
models. This chapter concludes by drawing a parallelism between the manufacturing based 
and the agricultural focused studies, and identifies themes emerging from the review of 
literature.
The central argument of the thesis is that the conventional theories of innovation, 
diffusion and extension are inadequate explanations of the technology transfer process, but 
they may have shaped actual technology transfer practice to the extent that agencies and 
actors concerned have accepted them. In this chapter, I review, compare and contrast
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various theories and models relevant to the process of technology transfer. I draw 
theoretical insights from this analytical work and use them as one of the bases for 
formulating a program of change to facilitate technology transfer and commercialisation. 
This program of change becomes the basis upon which alternative models and approaches 
can be developed.
The chapter pulls together theoretical models from the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors. It points to parallels between theorising innovations in the 
manufacturing sector, and research and extension in the agriculture sector. The review of 
these models reveals two dominant schools of thought, namely the top-down or linear 
models of innovation and diffusion, and theories that recognise the evolutionary nature of 
innovation, the diversity of choices and knowledge processes, and the complexity of the 
institutional structure of technology transfer.
Analysis of the empirical reference of these theories illustrates that the top-down or 
linear models both predominate as prescription for actions in institutions within many 
national agricultural R&E systems in the developing countries, including that of the 
Philippines, and thus help explain the character of the programs and the behaviour of those 
institutions.
The theories reviewed in this chapter have their own assumptions, usefulness, 
applications and limitations. However, I argue that the linear and top-down models of 
innovation, diffusion and extension are inadequate representations of the more complex 
and diversified nature of agriculture and its environment in the Philippines. Such simplistic 
models may obscure from the decision-makers in the agricultural R&E system the 
actualities and complexities of the technology transfer process and its setting. The 
intricacies within the immediate and larger environments of the agricultural R&E system, 
as demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4, suggest the need for technology transfer approaches 
that are grounded in evolutionary and dynamic theories of innovation, and of research and 
extension.
2.2 Innovation Theories and Models
A variety of ideas related to technology transfer have been put forward by scholars 
from various disciplines—economics (including agricultural economics), geography, 
sociology, communication, political science and others. This implies the multi-disciplinary 
orientation o f technology transfer.
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Technology transfer can be associated with the concepts of innovation, innovation 
diffusion, a n d  research and extension. The literature is rich with both theoretical and 
empirical studies. For instance, on the topic of innovation diffusion alone, Rogers1 noted 
some 4,000 studies since the 1950s when research on agricultural innovations among US 
farmers was first made. The literature ranges from very abstract models to very detailed 
prescriptions on technology transfer, from international to national perspectives, from firm­
centred to industry-focused concepts, from quantitative or econometric representations to 
qualitative explanation of mechanisms, and from statistical surveys to case studies.
This section is focused on and limited to selected literature on innovation which has 
potential contribution for understanding agricultural or rural development systems. 
Whenever possible, implications of the theories and models for agricultural policy are 
discussed.
2.2.1 Innovation Models
Various works on innovation models can be classified into four broad categories, 
namely traditional linear models, interactive models, firm-centred models and national 
innovation systems.
The traditional linear model literature has been dominated by the technology-push, 
dem and-pull debate. Proponents of the ‘technology-push’ school of thought consider 
scientific and technological discoveries as the primary stimulus of innovative activity. 
Those who adhere to the demand-pull model claim that innovation is driven by market 
needs.
Schumpeter was one of the early advocates (1940s) of the ‘technology-push  ’ model 
of innovation. His theory on economic growth was an attempt to be consistent with the 
K ondratiev long w ave form ation . According to Rothwell and Zegveld,2 Schumpeter 
illustrates that for each Kondratiev cycles of 40-50 years, major innovations, wars and 
harvest failures are forces affecting economic growth. Innovations, however, were regarded 
as the leading factor in major structural changes in these periods (e.g., steam power and 
textiles in the first Kondratiev to automobile, semiconductors and electronics in the 4th 
Kondratiev). Schumpeter puts emphasis on the role of entrepreneurs, monopolies (in his
1 Everett Rogers, ‘The diffusion of innovations model’, in I. Masser and H. Onsrud (eds), Diffusion and Use
of Geographic Information Technologies, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993, pp. 9-10.
2 Roy Rothwell and Walter Zegveld, Reindustrialisation and Technology, Longman, London, 1985, pp. 28­
30.
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later works) and product technologies (more than process technologies) in the creation of 
new industries. In each of the waves, he describes four stages: entrepreneurs taking 
advantage of the emerging technologies; many entrepreneurs imitating; many firms 
developing and gradually cutting down on production costs; and re-innovation or new 
wave of innovations. Rothwell3 describes Schumpeter’s innovation model as a linear 
progression from the basic research, through applied research to commercial development, 
and on to diffusion. At the first stage, new inventions or breakthroughs were generated, 
followed by the 2nd stage in which these inventions were tried, applied, tested and 
packaged, leading to the 3rd stage in which new products were developed for commercial 
purposes by firms. Finally, in the 4th stage, products were assumed to find their way into 
the market-place through the firms. According to Rothwell and Zegveld,4 there are two 
versions of Schumpeter’s innovation model, namely Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter 
Mark II. The difference between the two lies in their view of ‘source of innovation’. 
Schumpeter Mark I regards science and innovation as an exogenous factor (Figure 2.1). In 
contrast, Schumpeter Mark II views technological development as endogenous in larger 
science-based companies (Figure 2.2).
Rothwell5 observes that during the second part of the 1960s, with greater realisation 
of the importance of market-place in innovation, the dem and-pull m odel of innovation 
gained prominence. This model assumes a linear need-pull flow in which innovations are 
believed to be dictated by the customers’ needs. Schmookler’s time series analysis of 
patented invention and investment across different industries (railroads, petroleum refining, 
agriculture machinery and paper making)6 in the United States has supported this demand- 
pull hypothesis. His findings suggest that the ‘inventive activity in a field tends to fluctuate 
with economic activity in that field’7 8or as Coombs et a l*  put it, ‘upswings in inventive 
activity responded to upswings in demand’. Schmookler s demand-pull model of
3 Roy Rothwell, ‘Developments towards the fifth generation model o f innovation’, Technology Analysis and
Strategic Management, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, p. 73.
4 Walsh et a l,  1979, quoted in Rothwell & Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
5 Rothwell, op. cit.
6 Rothwell & Zegveld, op. cit., p. 60.
7 Jacob Schmookler, ‘Technological change and economic theory’, in Z. Griliches and L. Hurwicz (eds),
Patents, Invention, and Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambndge, Massachusetts, 19/2,
p. 74. '
8 Rod Coombs, P. Saviotti & V. Walsh, ‘Patterns o f innovation’, Economics and Technological Change,
1987, Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, p. 96.
Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of Schum peter’s model of 
entrepreneurial innovation (M ark 1)
Source: Walsh et al., 1979 based on diagrams of Philips, 1971 quoted in Rothwell 
and Zegveld, 1985.
Figure 2.2 Schematic representation of Schumpeter’s model of 
large-firm managed innovation (Mark II)
Source: Walsh et al., 1979 based on diagrams of Philips, 1971,
quoted in Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985
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innovation is represented by Walsh e t al. 's diagram in Figure 2.3 as it appeared in 
Rothwell and Zegveld.9
Both technology-push and demand-pull theories of Schumpeter and Schmookler, 
respectively, have been supported by many subsequent empirical studies focused on firms 
and industries in capitalist societies. Coombs et a l. 10 1summarise the various attempts at 
establishing whether science or demand has been responsible for technological 
development and economic growth. Coombs et a l.u point to Mowery and Rosenberg’s 
observations that their empirical studies tend to support the contention that demand is the 
most important factor of the innovation process. However, Mowery and Rosenberg doubt 
the reliability of this conclusion for lack of ‘comparability’ of the studies.12 In their final 
analysis, Mowery and Rosenberg13 argue that neither technology-push nor demand-pull is 
‘solely’ important but it is the ‘coupling’ of technology and market that matters.
A more recent analysis of innovation research is contained in a paper by 
Chidamber and Kon.14 They review eight major studies on innovation, and classify the 
works of SAPPHO, Meyers and Marquis, Langrish, and Utterback as demand-pull 
oriented, and those of Mowery and Rosenberg, Freeman, Casey, and Pavitt as generally 
technology-push studies. Chidamber and Kon critically analyse the methodologies used by 
these studies. These methodologies are project focus, case study, economic or national 
level statistical analysis, and meta-analysis. A major inference Chidamber and Kon make is 
that differences in ‘research objectives or constructs, definitions, and models’ make these 
studies incomparable and that different levels of analysis give different results.15
The technology-push and demand-pull models of innovation are observed by 
various authors to be incomplete representations of the innovation process. Both models 
assume one-way flow of the innovation process with very little, if not zero feedback loops. 
They fail to consider and explain the external and internal environments of innovation.
9 Rothwell & Zegveld, op. cit., p. 62.
10 Coombs et al., op. cit., pp. 97-103, citing analyses made by various authors, namely Mowery and 
Rosenberg, Rothwell, Rothwell and Zegveld, Pavitt, Walsh, Dosi, Freeman et al.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 David Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit o f Economic Growth, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 9.
14 Shyam Chidamber & H. Kon, ‘A research retrospective o f innovation inception and success: The 
technology-push, demand-pull question’, International Journal in Technology Management, vol. 9, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 94-112, citing the works o f SAPPHO, 1974; Meyers and Marquis, 1969; Langrish, 1972; and 
Utterback, 1974; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Freeman, 1982; Casey, 1976; and Pavitt, 1971.
15 Ibid.
Demand met by using existing plant
Figure 2.3 Schematic representation of Shmookler’s model 
of demand led invention
Source: Walsh et ah, 1979, quoted in Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985
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Rothwell16 presents the other models which were basically ‘in teractive ’ (Figure 2.4) and 
‘firm -cen tred*  as follows:
• Coupling (3rd generation) model - represents the linking of the firm with S&T and 
market place, with inter and intra organisational coordination and interaction. However, 
this is still a sequential process model.
• Integrated innovation process (4th generation) - characterised by increased vertical and 
horizontal integration and collaboration with other companies including research 
institutions.
• Systems integration and networking (SIN) model - involving more intense linkages both 
with primary customers and major suppliers, and emphasising corporate management, 
development speed, total quality systems and computer aided production.
Other contemporary writings suggest models which are parallel to those discussed 
above. However, it is worthwhile citing the works of authors considered by Forrest,17 18as 
these add new dimensions into the model. Mansfield et a l.’s'* five -s ta g e  m odel of the 
process of product innovation includes applied research, product specification, pilot plant 
or prototype construction, tooling and construction of manufacturing facilities, and 
manufacturing start-up. Their definitions of these stages are made specific enough to allow 
actual measurement of time and cost, which are traceable in a firm’s accounting records. 
Marketing start-up, although not a numbered stage, is included under items to be costed. 
The length of time between applied research and date of commercial introduction is also 
considered. Mansfield et a l 19 introduce the idea of time-cost tradeoff function, which is the 
relationship between the amount spent for innovation and the length of time it would take 
to develop a new product. In their empirical study, they conclude that spending more 
money can generally reduce the time it takes a firm to innovate. Their study also indicates 
that the biggest share of the total cost of innovation is concentrated on the stage of tooling 
and designing, or constructing manufacturing facilities, and that the longest period of time 
in the innovation process occurs in the prototype or pilot plant stage.20
16 Rothwell, op. cit., pp. 73-75.
17 J. Forrest, ‘Models o f the process o f technological innovation’, Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, vol. 3, no. 4, 1991, pp. 440-447.
18 Edwin Mansfield, J. Rapoport, J. Schnee, S. Wagner, & M. Hamburger, Research and Innovation in the
Modem Corporation, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1971, pp. 111-115.
19 Ibid., pp. 126-131, 135.
20 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
Figure 2.4 Interactive model of innovation process
Source: Rothwell, 1983, quoted in Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985
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G ardiner and Rothw ell's m odel21 regards the innovation process as iterative 
involving continuous re-designing of products based on customers’ feedback to improve 
performance and reduce costs.
U tterback an d  Abernathy's m odel12 emphasises the change in focus from product 
technology in the beginning of an industry to one which concentrates on process 
technology and cost reduction as the industry matures. This model is related to the concept 
of product life cycle, in which a product is observed to undergo four phases, namely 
introduction, growth, maturity and decline. The product life cycle (Figure 2.5) illustrates 
the volume of sales of a product over time, starting from a low level of sales during the 
period of introduction, followed by a growth period characterised by increasing volume of 
production and sales (as the product is adapted to and improved based on users’ needs and 
as demand increases), followed by a maturity stage where demand levels off as the market 
becomes saturated, and followed eventually by product decline.
There are ways in which firms or industries can delay product decline or extend 
product life. Rothwell and Zegveld21 3 identify some of these strategies: phasing-in new 
products as the original product’s life is starting to decline; product cost reduction through 
change in technology to stimulate demand; and introduction of a ‘family of products’. 
Utterback and Abernathy’s product/process cycle (Figure 2.6) is an extension of the 
product life cycle model. With a ‘productive unit’ instead of a single product as their unit 
of analysis, the model relates the rate or frequency of innovation to the stages of product or 
process development.
Utterback and Abernathy24 describe three stages of process development, namely 
the uncoordinated , f lu id  and inefficient stage  with market expansion and redefinition 
resulting in frequent competitive improvements; the segm ental stage  with production 
systems aiming for efficiency and becoming more rigid or specialised as price competition 
gets stiffer, thus production processes tend to be segmented; and the system ic stage  with 
processes becoming highly developed, efficient, and integrated, during which state process 
redesign is difficult and therefore sparse.
21 Forrest, op. cit., pp. 443-444.
22 Ibid., pp. 444-445.
23 Rothwell & Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 17-19.
24 James Utterback & William Abernathy, ‘A dynamic model o f process and product innovation’, in 
Christopher Freeman (ed.), The Economics o f Innovation, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Aldershot, 
Hants, England, 1990, pp. 426-427.
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Figure 2.5 The product life cycle: four phase model
Source: Duijn, 1983, quoted in Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985.
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Figure 2.6 Innovation and stage of development (product/process life
cycle)
Source: Utterback & Abernathy, 1985
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The stages of product development are identified as follows: the perform ance­
m axim ising s tage  during which period the rate of product change is rapid and product 
innovation tends to be stimulated by new market needs; the sa les m axim ising stage  with 
emphasis on product variation as producers gain internal technical capability and as 
markets become less uncertain; and the cost-m inim ising stage  with products becoming 
more standardised for cost reduction.25 The stages of process development are viewed by 
Utterback and Abernathy as corresponding to the stages of product development (Figure 
2.6). The hypothesis underlying the model is that the proportion of product innovations 
undertaken by firms is greater during the early life of process and product development. 
The reverse is the case for process innovations during this stage. However, as the 
production system becomes more specialised, process innovations become more 
significant. The product/process cycle model also helps to explain the relationship between 
innovation process and competitive strategy of firms. It assumes that competitiveness 
during the early stage of product/process development depends on the introduction of 
market-oriented product innovations. To sustain competitiveness, however, emphasis will 
be given to innovations that will improve product performance and manufacturing process. 
Utterback and Abernathy’s framework, as observed by Teece,26 is appropriate only to 
‘mass markets where consumer tastes are relatively homogeneous’ and less suited to ‘small 
niche markets’.
Other models cited by Forrest27 include: Twiss's activity stage m odel that recognises 
the pre-innovation factors such as ‘creativity’; and Schmidt-Tiedemann's  theoretical m odel 
that recognises ‘milestones’ which are business-oriented, and considers important decision 
points and environmental factors.
With increasing realisation of the inadequacy of both the technology-push  and 
dem and-pull m odels as wholly explaining the behaviour of firms and industries, innovation 
scholars have introduced the concepts of technological paradigm , natural trajectory, 
technological guidepost and other similar ‘path dependent’ models. Based on these 
concepts, innovation within a firm or industry or sector is no longer a simple matter of 
responding to changes in demand or scientific breakthroughs. The locus of analysis has
25 Ibid., pp. 427-430.
26 David Teece, ‘Profiting from technological innovations: Implications for integration, collaboration, 
licensing and public policy’, in Freeman (ed), op. cit., p. 188.
27 Forrest, op. cit., pp. 442-446.
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shifted to ways in which perceived needs and opportunities are mediated and converted 
into technological decisions by a particular firm or organisation. Such concepts suggest a 
specific boundary that limits the range of technological options perceived by a firm and 
dictates the directions it will take. Dosi28 describes technological parad igm  as a ‘pattern for 
solution of selected techno-economic problems based on highly selected principles derived 
from natural science’ or a ‘body of knowledge, expertise, selected physical and chemical 
principles that defines technological opportunities for further innovation and some basic 
procedures on how to exploit them’. Further elucidating on the definition of technological 
p arad igm s , Dosi29 conceives it as ‘both a set of exem plar (an artefact that is to be 
developed and improved) and a set of heuristics (e.g. Where do we go from here?, Where 
do we search?)’. In differentiating technological paradigm from Nelson and Winter’s 
concept of technological trajectory, Dosi30 explains that technological tra jectory  is the 
‘activity of technological progress along the economic and technological trade-offs defined 
by a paradigm’.
A similar notion has been advanced by Sahal31 in his technological guideposts and  
innovation avenues theory. In his investigation of the technological progress in aircraft, 
farm tractor and computer industries, his results seem to indicate that the innovation 
process follows a ‘certain topography of technological evolution’. Sahal specifically states 
that ‘technical progress is... characterised by the existence of...technological guideposts and 
innovation avenues that lay out certain definite paths of development’.32 For instance, in 
his case study of farm tractor industry, Sahal observed that the introduction of Fordson and 
Farmall models (general-purpose tractors), during the period 1917-1926, provided a basic 
pattern that guided subsequent developments in tractor designs. He added that, except for 
numerous refinements, the essential features of these tractors remained the same until a 
limit to incremental technological development was reached by late 1930s. This led to the 
development of ‘three-point hitch and control system’ model, a clear attempt to overcome 
constraints on further evolution of technology.
28 Giovanni Dosi, ‘The nature o f the innovation process’, in G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg &
L. Soete (eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory, Pinter Publishers, London, 1988, p. 224.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 225.
31 Devendra Sahal, ‘Technological guideposts and innovation avenues’, in Freeman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 442­
462.
32 Ibid.
31
In general, the agricultural sector has been dominated by the m echanical-chem ical 
paradigm . This technological paradigm has resulted, for example, in the development of 
new crop varieties that adapt to specific agricultural machines or chemical inputs (e.g. 
varieties resistant to weedicide). However, some analysts of agricultural development have 
predicted the imminent shift from the m echanical-chem ical to the bio log ica l parad igm  in 
agriculture, noting, among others, new developments in biotechnology and increasing 
pressure to adopt environment-friendly technologies. Examples of technological paradigms 
and natural trajectories that have wide-ranging effect over large number of industries are 
given by Nelson and Winter,33 namely mechanisation and exploitation of latent economies 
of scale (e.g. chemical process industries, power generation), and by Perez,34 namely 
microelectronics.
Another way of interpreting technological change through evolutionary processes is 
put forward by Nelson and Winter. They introduce the evolutionary m odel o f  firm  
behaviour and the concept of selection environment. The evolutionary theories of 
innovation have drawn analogies from the evolutionary theory of Darwin. The core of 
Darwin’s theory suggests that species change through a process called natural selection and 
that they are what they are as an aid to survival. Accordingly, species’ diversity and the 
struggle for existence interact and only the most successful ones survive to reproduce and 
pass on traits on which their success is based.35 The theory implies a continuing process of 
evolution and suggests that selection favours those who are able to adjust to the new order 
of things. These notions are most appealing to authors like Nelson and Winter who 
acknowledge the stochastic evolutionary nature of innovation, the diversity and 
disequilibrium of choices, and the complexity of the institutional structure for innovation.36
These ideas are in contrast to the equilibrium and statis assumptions of the 
traditional theories of economic growth. Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of firm 
behaviour37 involves the elements of ‘organisational routine’ and ‘search operations’. 
Organisational routine is defined as ‘regular and predictable operations of a firm’,
33 Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, ‘In search o f a useful theory o f innovation’, Research Policy, vol. 6,
1977, p. 58.
34 Carlota Perez, ‘Microelectronics, long waves, and world structural change: New perspectives for 
developing countries’, in Freeman (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1990,441-463.
35 Carlota Perez, When Where Why and How it Happened, Readers Digest, London, 1993, p. 253.
36 Nelson & Winter, ‘In search o f a useful theory o f innovation’, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
37 Richard Nelson & Sidney Winter, An evolutionary Theory o f Economic Change, The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982, pp. 14-21.
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including skills, procedures and decision rules of a firm that determine its behaviour given 
external conditions.38 Search operations are described as the process of evaluating and 
monitoring existing routines and finding ways to improve them. Routine here is compared 
with ‘genes’ in the sense that it is inheritable (firms are what they are in the future 
according to routines employed in the past) and selectable (firms with certain routines 
survive better than others). Search processes on the other hand are considered to generate 
mutations or new set of routines.
In the context of the foregoing discussion, a firm will tend to follow certain routines 
or decision rules until its targets are satisfied and not simply respond to profit maximising 
behaviour. If targets are not satisfied, firms will change routine according to their search 
results and this is where innovation lies. Nelson and Winter39 do not discount the 
possibility of the existence and importance of perceived natural trajectories (that 
innovation has a certain inner logic of its own), and of technological regimes (the frontier 
of achievable capabilities given a broadly defined way of doing things).40 Coombs et al.41 
illustrate Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary model of firm behaviour in a graphical 
presentation (Figure 2.7).
Nelson and Winter42 extend their theory to include the concept of selection 
environment. The selection environm ent is determined by factors exogenous to a firm or 
sector and by behaviour of other firms in the sector. The concept suggests that choices 
(innovations or new set of routines) made by firms are influenced by specific selection 
environments that differ among firms, and among industries or sectors. In general, a 
selection environment is described by Nelson and Winter as either a market environment, 
where economic competition leads to the selection of the most successful innovation, one 
that will possibly be imitated by other firms, or non-market (e.g. public education system, 
public health service), where actions of these institutions are for the public interests and not 
necessarily profit motivated. Each selection environment presents different motivations, 
incentives and criteria for success and rules for competition among firm/sectors/industries. 
According to this concept, the choice of specific innovations will depend upon the
38 Ibid.
39 Nelson & Winter, ‘In search o f a useful theory o f innovation’, op. cit., pp. 56-60.
40 Natural trajectories and technological regimes have the same connotation as technological trajectories and
technological paradigms, respectively.
41 Coombs et al., op. cit., p. 117.
42 Nelson & Winter, ‘In search o f a useful theory o f innovation’, op. cit., p. 61-70.
Figure 2.7 Nelson &W inter’s evolutionary model of firm behaviour
Source: Coombs, et al., 1987
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institutional diversity within which firms/industries/sectors function. This includes the 
perception of firms regarding what is profitable, consumer preferences and regulatory 
policies, and mechanisms of information sharing among firms in the imitation process. 
Imitation is viewed as the primary means by which innovation spreads. Within the general 
framework discussed above, Nelson and Winter present different sets of models (embodied 
in a computer simulation program) that focus on key determinants of industry structure and 
performance under competition Tike ease of imitation, the degree to which large firms 
restrain investment, and character of the technological change regime’.43
To summarise, common to the foregoing concepts is the notion that there exist 
‘paradigms’ with different levels of generality or specificity in various industrial sectors. 
Innovations within firms or industries are likely to be ‘paradigm-bound’ and follow a 
specific path or ‘trajectory’. This implies that technological changes tend to be incremental 
and cumulative anchored on some existing technological base. This will be the case until 
no further improvements can be made within the boundaries of existing technological 
paradigms and trajectories, or until an external shock (e.g. an energy crisis) warrants a 
major technological change. Such major ‘discontinuities in the pattern of change’44 will 
signal shifts in technological paradigms. In the concepts discussed above, there has been a 
recognition of the influence of techno-economic factors on innovative activities but only to 
the extent permitted by a given technological paradigm.
Another useful perspective to understand innovation and innovation policies is the 
theory of long w aves  or long cycles. The long waves theory assumes that the rise and fall 
phenomenon are indicators of economic growth and that they recur about every 40 to 50 
years.45 46It points to the centrality of innovations that have far-reaching effect across a wide- 
range of industries as the driving force of the economy. Based on observed patterns, many 
authors claim that the current period is a transition from one cycle, where innovations such 
as the automobile, semiconductors, electronics, pharmaceuticals dominate the economy, to 
the next cycle, where innovations such as information technology may dominate. Perez 
associates this long wave concept with what she calls *techno-econom ic paradigm s . 
Freeman47 regards Perez’ theory as a ‘meta-paradigm’ that recognises the pervasive
43 For a more detailed discussion o f the models, refer to ibid, chapters IV to VI.
44 Dosi, op. cit., p. 228.
45 Rothwell and Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 28-30.
46 Perez, op. cit.
47 Christopher Freeman, ‘Preface to Part IF, in Dosi et al., op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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consequences of a change in ‘technological style’ throughout all sectors of the economy. 
Perez argues that a major structural change is necessary before a new techno-economic 
paradigm ‘can generate a new wave of world-wide economic growth’. She brings a new 
perspective into the concept with her idea that ‘long wave recession is a syndrome of a 
mismatch between the socio-institutional framework and the new dynamics in the techno­
economic sphere’.48 Already, people are speculating on innovations or cluster of 
innovations that are likely to bring/push the economy up towards the next wave.
In agriculture, some people assert that biotechnology will lead to an evolutionary 
growth of the sector. Biotechnology has various applications to a wide range of economic 
activities especially the chemical-pharmaceutical domain. It has the potential to overcome 
the limits of technological paradigm based on inorganic and non-renewable resources. But 
rather than advancing within the agricultural sector, Goodman and Wilkinson49 50expect 
biotechnology to ‘merge the agro-food system with the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries to form a bio-industrial processing complex’.
Recent attempts to model the innovation process are found in the works of Nelson 
and his colleagues on national system s o f  innovation (N S I)50  Nelson and Winter’s 
evolutionary model of firm behaviour and theory of selection environment appear to 
provide strong basis for the NSI concept. NSI offers a more holistic view of innovation 
locating it in the context of national system s or nation states. This is in contrast with the 
micro perspective of both linear and firm-centred models. Nelson and Rosenberg51 promote 
the idea that the technological capabilities of national firms depend largely on the system 
for national action or the support and interaction of a set of many institutional actors, not 
only the R&D sector. Therefore, analysis is focused on the roles and interactions of 
government, universities, firms, marketplace, other sectors of society, and international 
factors in shaping national technological capabilities. In recent years, there has been a 
growing interest in the national context of innovation. This is because of the successes of 
countries espousing it, such as the Japanese and German economies, and the trend towards
48 Perez, op. cit., p. 468.
49 David Goodman & John Wilkinson, ‘Patterns of research and innovation in the modem agro-food system’,
in Philip Lowe, Terry Marsden, & Sarah Whatmore (eds), Technological Change and the Rural 
Environment, David Fulton Publishers, London, 1990, p. 139.
50 Strictly speaking, one should speak of state systems of innovation. However, the word ‘national’ is widely
used as a synonym for state in this context.
51 Richard Nelson & Nathan Rosenberg ,’Technical innovation and national systems’, in R. Nelson (ed.),
National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 3-20.
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globalisation, régionalisation and internationalisation. Empirical studies on NSI focus on 
institutional differences/similarities across nations, specifically looking at institutions and 
mechanisms supporting innovation in these countries. As Nelson and Rosenberg52 argue, 
national differences (e.g. in the mix of industries) and boundaries influence the shape of 
national systems of innovation.
The know ledge or learning cycle models of innovation incorporate the role of 
knowledge into the innovation process. According to Steen et a l.,53 recent attempts at 
theorising knowledge cycles in the innovation process are represented by the works of 
Boisot,54 and Nonaka and Takeuchi55. These models emphasise the need for firms to exploit 
both tacit or uncodified, and explicit or codified knowledge to continually innovate in a 
cycle of learning. For example, Boisot’s learning cycle involves the elements of 
codification through problem solving, diffusion of the codified information, absorption or 
decodification of information diffused through the organisation after problem solving, and 
scanning or the internalisation of tacit knowledge from a larger pool of tacit knowledge 
(Figure 2.8).56 Iterative collaboration, team-based research, and social networking between 
firms and R&D organisations can enhance the utilisation of these types of knowledge.57
It is interesting to note the various attempts at theorising and modelling innovation 
and their differing claims to applicability. The theories of the firm have provided a 
framework for understanding the innovative behaviour of firms. Then there are the more 
macro views of technological change, namely path-dependent or paradigm concepts, and 
attempts at explaining choice of specific technological paradigm in the context of national 
systems; knowledge or learning cycles; and the socio-political, economic and ecological 
dimensions of technological change.
52 Ibid., pp. 11, 14.
53 John Steen, Dallas Hanson & Peter Liesch, ‘Collaborative research and development: New insights from
cyclic models o f the innovation process’, International Journal o f Innovation Management, vol. 2, no. 1, 
March 1998, pp. 107-121.
54 M. Boisot ‘Is your firm a creative destroyer? Competitive learning and knowledge flows in the 
technological strategies o f firms, Research Policy, vol. 24, 1995, pp. 489-506; Boisot, Information 
Space: A Framework for Learning in Organisations, Institutions and Culture, Routledge, London, 1995.
551. Nonaka & H. Takeuchi, The knowledge-Creating Company, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
56 Boisot, ‘Is your firm a creative destroyer?’, cited in Steen et al., op. cit.
57 Steen et al., op. cit.
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Figure 2.8 Organizational learning cycle
Source: Boisot, 1995, quoted in Steen et al., 1998
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2.2.2 Induced Innovation Theory
The beginnings of induced innovation models can be traced from the works of 
Hicks58 in 1932, who postulates that changes in relative prices of factors of production will 
induce inventions that save on the use of the more expensive factor. This theory is 
contested by Salter59 in 1961 who argues that entrepreneurs are profit motivated and will 
try to reduce all their costs. Coombs et a l.60 also mention the separate works of Kennedy, 
von Weizsacker, and Drandakis and Phelps during the 1960s, who all observe that there is 
a greater tendency to economise on a production factor, the greater its proportion in the 
production cost. The induced innovation theories generally employ an aggregate 
framework. For instance, a specific innovation theory may explain technological changes 
for the entire sector or economy as a whole. The induced innovation theories advanced by 
Hayami and Ruttan are given more attention in this section, having been developed and 
tested primarily to understand patterns of agricultural development.
At this point, the neo-classical theory of production, although limited in its capacity 
to explain the innovation process, shall be briefly discussed as a prelude to the induced 
innovation concept in which ‘factor endowments’ are a fundamental consideration. Neo­
classical production function is an input-output relationship postulating that output is a 
function of two major factors, namely capital and labour, considering all other variables 
constant. It is seen as a series of isoquants, each of which represents the most efficient 
combinations of factors for a particular level of output61 62 (Figure 2.9). An isoquant 
represents a specific level of technology which determines the available factor 
combinations or techniques to produce a maximum amount of output. The shape of 
isoquants (Ql5 Q2) is assumed to be convex because of the law of diminishing returns. Line 
AB in Figure 2.9 is referred to as the isocost line indicating all possible combinations of 
factors that can be used for a fixed sum. As described by Coombs et al., the production 
function theory assumes that from among the available techniques on the most advanced 
production function (Q2—one which is nearest the origin), the firm will tend to choose the
58 Vernon Ruttan & Yujiro Hayami, ‘Induced innovation theory and agriculture development: A personal
account’, in B. Koppel (ed.) Induced Innovation Theory and International Agricultural Development, 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995, p. 23; Coombs et al., op. cit., p. 104.
59 Ruttan & Hayami, op. cit.; Coombs et al., op. cit., p. 105.
60 Coombs et al., op. cit.
61 David Heathfield, Production Functions, Macmillan Press Ltd., London & Basingstoke, 1971, p. 18.
62 Coombs et al., op. cit., pp. 25-26.
Figure 2.9 The production function
Source: Coombs, et al., 1987
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technique that minimises total production costs. This is the point at which the isocost line 
touches the given isoquant (C). Technical change in this respect is represented by shifts in 
production towards the origin, identified as either capital saving, labour saving or neutral 
technical change.
The production function theory has been criticised as lacking in realism and does 
little to explain the nature of the innovation process. For instance, it assumes zero output 
on zero input, unlimited substitutability of labour and capital, thus it disregards possible 
complementarity of these factors, unlimited techniques at a given level of technology, and 
that only cost-reducing improvements can be described by the theory.63
The Hayami and Ruttan induced innovation model is an extension of Hicks’ 
microeconomic theory of the firm which has been further pursued by Ahmed, Hayami, 
Ruttan, and Binswanger.64 According to Koppel,65 the model ‘in its fully developed form’, 
speaks of two interrelated concepts, namely: induced technological innovation and induced 
institutional innovation. Technological innovation is viewed as ‘induced by changes in 
factor supplies and product demand, and by institutional change’ while institutional 
innovation is seen as ‘induced by changes in factor supplies and product demand and by 
technical change’.66 This implies that technical and institutional changes are stimulated by 
similar forces and are both endogenous to the economic system. In Hayami and Ruttan’s 
earlier works, the induced technological innovation m odel was empirically verified in the 
macro-economic context of aggregate national factor endowments.67 Historical experiences 
of agricultural development in the United States and Japan were examined to demonstrate 
the theory of induced technological innovation. The general observation was that factor 
prices tend to ‘reflect national factor scarcities’ such that technologies attuned to specific 
resource endowments were developed and utilised.68 Ahmed and Ruttan69 specified that in 
the United States, where labour was scarce and land and capital relatively abundant,
63 Ibid., pp. 28-29; Heathfield, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
64 Ruttan & Hayami, ‘Induced innovation theory and agricultural development: A reassessment’, in Bruce
Koppel (ed.), Induced Innovation Theory and International Agricultural Development, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1995, p. 180.
65 Bruce Koppel, ‘Why a reassessment?’, in Koppel (ed.), op. cit., p. 3.
66 Ibid.
67 Iftikhar Ahmed & Vernon Ruttan (eds), ‘Introduction’, Generation and Diffusion of Agricultural 
Innovations: The Role o f Institutional Factors, Gower, Aldershot, 1988, p. 2.
68 Stephen Biggs & Edward Clay, ‘Generation and diffusion of agricultural technology: Theories and 
experiences’, in ibid., pp. 30-31.
69 Ibid.
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capital-intensive technologies were promoted. The opposite case was observed in Japan. 
Accordingly, it was mechanisation technology that accounted for most of the increase in 
agricultural productivity in the US.70 In Japan, it was essentially biological technology such 
as varietal improvement (substituting use of fertiliser for land) that accelerated rapid 
growth in agriculture.
The application of induced technological innovation m odel has been expanded to 
encompass the theory of induced institutional innovation. Institutional innovation is 
defined by Ruttan71 as a ‘change in the actual or potential performance of existing or new 
organisations; in the relationship between an organisation and its environment; or in the 
behavioural rules that govern the patterns of action and relationships in the organisation’s 
environment’. For example, the institutional innovation model helps to explain the 
innovative behaviour of research organisations. As stated by Biggs and Clay,72 research 
institutions in the US and Japan are expected to meet the needs of producers for 
technologies conforming with the country’s factor endowments, at least in the agricultural 
sector. To further illustrate the application of the model, it helps to look at Ruttan’s73 
explanation, as follows:
A rise in the price o f labour relative to other factors induces technical changes designed to permit the 
substitution o f capital for labour and, at the same time induces institutional changes designed to enhance 
the productive capacity o f the human agent and the control by the worker o f the conditions of his 
employment. A rise in the price o f land induces technical changes designed to release the constraints on 
production resulting from the inelastic supply o f land and, at the same time, induces institutional changes 
leading to greater precision in the definition and in the allocation of property rights in land.
The induced innovation model has been a powerful tool to explain, even justify, the 
emergence, structure, and innovative behaviour of international and local agricultural R&E 
systems. However, it has been the subject of many criticisms. The major ones74 include: a) 
inability of the model to account for complex political economy dimension to relationships 
between farmers and agricultural research, and the politics of research problem 
identification; b) inability to explain innovations where markets tend to fail or in centrally-
70 Ibid.
71 Ruttan, ‘Generation and diffusion o f  agricultural technology: Issues, concepts and analysis’, in Ahmed &
Ruttan (eds), op. cit., p. 85.
72 Biggs & Clay, op. cit., p. 32.
73 Ruttan, op. cit., p. 89.
74 Koppel, op. cit., pp. 11-18; Ahmed & Ruttan, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
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planned economies; c) inequalities in agrarian structure often do not reflect shadow values 
of factors; d) focus on technological change in the aggregate level, (e.g. for the entire 
agricultural sector rather than for specific crops, farms and regions); e) imported 
technology or activities of multinational corporations may not correspond to relative factor 
endowments of individual countries; and f) inability to explain technical change induced 
by growth in product demand. In partly addressing these criticisms, Hayami and Ruttan in 
their recent but incomplete work (as it lacks empirical testing) introduce an expanded 
version of the model (Figure 2.10).75 The new model incorporates cultural endowments 
and demonstrates the interrelationships among resource endowments, cultural 
endowments, technology and institutions. Since this type of model is difficult to subject to 
econometric evaluation, the approach of testing the model has been done through case 
studies in different countries.
Some implications for agricultural research system can be drawn from the induced 
innovation model. For one, the case studies conducted by the group of Ahmed and Ruttan75 6 
indicate that a decentralised agricultural research system in terms of location, funding and 
management appears to be ‘more responsive to the resource and cultural endowments’ of a 
country. This implies that a decentralised system is more effective in supplying 
technologies to farmers than a centralised system. A general implication of the induced 
innovation model for agriculture is that the demand for technological change is influenced 
by a country’s resource endowments. Likewise, the capacity of a nation to respond to the 
demand for technological change is determined to a large extent by its ability to organise 
and manage institutional changes conducive to agricultural R&D.
2.2.3 Innovation Diffusion Theories
The preceding discussion on innovation theories helps to explain, among others, the 
origin or inducement of technological change, the behaviour of firms/industries, and their 
technological decision-making patterns. But technological change, whether incremental or 
radical, involves the process of diffusion. Therefore, it is only logical to look also at the 
innovation diffusion theories. Innovation diffusion is commonly defined in geography 
literature as the manner by which innovations spread among members of a social system
75 Ruttan & Hayami, ‘Induced innovation theory and agriculture development: A personal account’, in B.
Koppel (ed.) op. cit., p. 30.
76 Ahmed & Ruttan, op. cit., p. 404.
Note: Arrows indicate the effect of one element on another and vice versa.
Figure 2.10 Interrelationships between changes in resource endowments, 
cultural endowments, technology and institutions
Source: Y. Hayami and V. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, rev. ed. 
John Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1985, p. 111.
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over time through the use of communication channels.77 Diffusion is a major area of 
interest for geographers because it includes ‘basic geographic elements of distance, 
direction and spatial variation’.78 Diffusion theories consist of the following basic 
elements: innovation; communication channels; potential adopters of innovation; and time.
Traditional theories o f  diffusion are viewed from the adoption perspective, or what 
Brown79 referred to as the demand side of diffusion. According to Brown,80 these theories 
are represented by the works of Hägerstrand81 and Rogers,82 in which adoption of an 
innovation is seen as the result of a learning or communication process. Important elements 
controlling this process are seen to be information flows or communication, and the 
innovativeness or resistance of adopters. Based on this model, adopters are categorised into 
early adopters, leaders, laggards and others. The behaviour of adopters towards innovation 
and their reasons for such behaviour (adoption or rejection) are given emphasis. For studies 
related to firms, the variables that are highlighted are firm size, rate of growth of industry, 
quality of management and profitability of innovation.83
The epidem ics m odel o f  diffusion complements the traditional view of diffusion. Its 
assumption fit well with the concept of the linear model, that is an innovation generated by 
a particular organisation is transported and diffused from this organisation to the users as a 
whole package.84 As the term implies, the epidemics model compares the diffusion process 
with the spread of a disease.85 As the disease spreads, it infects healthy individuals until 
their number become so small that the rate of infection decreases. In a similar sense, as 
more firms/individuals adopt innovation, the perceived risks associated with the innovation 
decreases, the rate of adoption increases until such time that the potential adopters are
77 Department o f Geography, The Ohio State University, Diffusion o f Innovation, Discussion Paper Series,
USA, n.d.
78 Lawrence Brown, ‘Diffusion research in geography: A thematic account’, Studies in the Diffusion of
Innovation, Discussion Paper no. 53, Department o f Geography, Ohio State University, USA, n.d., p. 9.
79 Lawrence Brown, ‘The innovation diffusion process in a public policy context’, Studies in the Diffusion of
Innovation, Discussion Paper no. 58, Department o f Geography, Ohio State University, USA, n.d., p. 4.
80 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
81 See for example, Torsten Hägerstrand, Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.
82 See for example, Everett Rogers, ‘Aspects o f the spatial structure of social communication and the 
diffusion of information’, Papers o f the Regional Science Association, vol. 16, pp. 27-42; E. Rogers & F. 
Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach, The Free Press, New York, 
1971; E. Rogers (ed.), Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives, Sage, Beverley Hills, 
1976.’
83 Brown, Discussion Paper no. 58, op. cit., p. 9.
84 Stuart Macdonald, Information for Innovation, Managing Change from an Information Perspective, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 72-86.
85 Coombs et al., pp. 121-122.
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almost saturated. The S-shaped curve of cumulative adoption (Figure 2.11) represents the 
total percentage of those who adopt the innovation at any given point in time and illustrates 
the speed by which innovation is adopted. The S-shaped curve of innovation diffusion can 
also be associated with Schumpeter’s idea of a ‘bandwagon effect’,86 with few 
entrepreneurs at first followed by slowly growing number of imitators. The epidemics 
model is also reflected in a mathematical formula ‘x  (t) = \/[ \+ e x p  {-a -131 )]’,87 where a is 
the point at which the diffusion curve begins to rise, 13 the diffusion rate constant or the 
slope at which the curve rises, x(t) the fraction of potential adopters who have already 
adopted at time t , and (1 -x(t)) the fraction of potential adopters not using the innovation 
yet.
A classic and perhaps most important early research on diffusion pertains to hybrid 
com. Advocates of the traditional diffusion model refer to studies on hybrid com in the 
United States to demonstrate the robustness of the model. For instance, Rogers88 cites the 
works of Ryan and Gross (1943) in Iowa as the most ‘influential diffusion study’. When 
data were plotted cumulatively on a year-to-year basis, the adoption rate revealed an S- 
shaped curve over time. The study illustrates the interplay of four major elements of 
diffusion: innovation, communication channels, time and social system. Communication 
channels, and the farm community as a social system played significant roles in the 
‘innovation-decision’ process.89
The traditional theory and epidemics model have been criticised as simplistic and 
deterministic. Innovation is assumed to be static from points of origin to destination. 
Macdonald90 explains that these models have failed to account for ‘incremental or 
subsequent’ changes in a particular innovation. Other criticisms of the model include the 
following: adopter’s environment is presumed to be homogeneous; it has an ‘adopter- 
blame’ bias implying that if innovation is not adopted, there is something wrong with the 
adopter; it assumes a fixed population of potential adopters; and it makes no allowance for 
incremental or subsequent innovation. The model speaks a great deal about who is
86 John Hagedoom, The Dynamic Analysis o f Innovation and Diffusion: A Study in Process Control, Pinter
Publishers, London, 1989, p. 120.
87 Coombs, op. cit.
88 Everett Rogers, Diffusion o f Innovations, 4th edition, The Free Press, New York, 1995, pp. 31-35.
89 Innovation-decision process is the ‘process through which an individual (or other decision-making unit)
passes from first knowledge o f an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to a decision 
to adopt or reject, to implementation and use o f the new idea, and to confirmation of this decision. 
Defined in Rogers, ibid., p. 20.
90 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 75.
Tim e
Figure 2.11 The S-Curve for diffusion through time
Source: Brown, Discussion Paper no. 53
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adopting, even relating the characteristics of adopter with the rate of adoption, but lacks an 
explanation of ‘how’ an innovation is diffused.91
Another perspective of diffusion takes into account the supply side of the process. 
Brown92 describes this concept as focusing on ways in which potential adopters are 
provided access to innovation. Its major emphases include the establishment of diffusion 
agencies and implementation of strategy by these agencies. Attention is shifted from the 
adopter to the diffusion agency. The locations and services of these agencies determine the 
rate and pattern of diffusion or when and where innovation will be available. One major 
weakness of this approach is that, like the epidemics model, it assumes that there is no 
further innovation taking place throughout the diffusion process.
The more dynamic and evolutionary diffusion theories take into account the 
following possibilities: the number of potential adopters during the process of diffusion 
changes and is not fixed; and the technology itself changes during the process of 
diffusion.93 According to Brown,94 these perspectives acknowledge the continuity of the 
innovation process. Innovations are assumed to be modified and adapted to an ‘increasing 
array of uses and markets’. Learning and adaptation by the potential users of the innovation 
are also considered. The development perspective has also been incorporated in the more 
dynamic models of innovation diffusion. In this case, the role of level of development in 
the diffusion process and the impact of diffusion practices upon individual or collective 
welfare are considered.95 Coombs et a l.96 refer to the alternative models put forward by 
Stoneman, David Davies, and Metcalfe. These writers noted the inter-firm differences in 
these alternative models and the attempt to incorporate the ‘supply side’ of the diffusion 
process. They incorporated more sophisticated microeconomic factors, including the 
possibility of inducement mechanisms, the effects of firm size, decision rules and firm 
behaviour, and the interaction between technical and demand influences. However, such 
models have not been as thoroughly tested as the epidemics model.
91 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
92 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 9-17.
93 Hagedoom, op. cit., p. 167.
94 Brown, op. cit., pp. 17-21.
95 Ibid., p. 27.
96 Coombs et al., pp. 125-133, citing the works o f Stoneman, 1983 & 1984; David, 1975; Davies, 1979; and
Metcalfe, 1981 & 1982.
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The diffusion theories have influenced some of the major agricultural development 
programs in the developing countries. Such programs, particularly the green revolution 
movement, were guided by the traditional diffusion theory, which focuses on increasing 
the rate of adoption of technologies and/or strengthening the diffusion agencies. However, 
there are some problems with the assumptions of the traditional diffusion theory that have 
policy implications for agricultural development strategies. The traditional diffusion theory 
gives emphasis to communications in diffusion strategies. This is based on the premise that 
potential adopters may be convinced to adopt a technology through communications with 
emphasis on change/extension agents as the primary means of communication. But since it 
is humanly and financially impossible to reach all potential adopters, there is a tendency 
for development agencies to concentrate on the most responsive clients or leaders. The 
assumption of this diffusion strategy is that information or new techniques will ‘trickle- 
down’ from the leaders to their followers. Hence, communication efforts tend to be 
directed to or favour the progressive adopters or opinion leaders. Objections have been 
raised against this diffusion strategy because, as critics argue, it has perpetuated inequality 
in the rural areas by widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Rogers97 notes that 
innovations tend to ‘trickle across’ instead of ‘trickle down’ because ‘interpersonal 
communication networks’ link individuals with similar socio-economic status. Progressive 
clients are characteristically eager for new ideas, possess the means or capital to adopt new 
technology, and have easier access to credit. Therefore, they get to adopt innovations 
earlier than others. By doing so, they gain more competitive advantage and capture higher 
profits out o f the use of innovations. In contrast, the economic gain of late adopters is 
relatively smaller because innovation adoption becomes a matter of survival rather than 
advantage chosen. Reliance on traditional diffusion theory also implies the need to focus 
resources upon a small number of persons. This brings the issue of diffusion inefficiency or 
minimum return on investment.
The diffusion theory that focuses on diffusion agencies (supply side) instead of 
adopters, promotes the use of marketing or promotional and infrastructure strategies to 
induce demand and adoption. It suggests policy consideration on where to locate 
agricultural diffusion agencies. The dynam ic theories o f  diffusion suggest the need to
97 Rogers, 1995, op. cit., p. 430.
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periodically evaluate and adjust diffusion strategies and programs to enhance 
leaming/adaptation of technologies.
2.3 Agricultural Research and Extension Models
The field of agricultural research and extension (R&E) has its own tradition in 
terms of analysing, understanding, modelling, and conceptualising innovation and 
diffusion. This section reviews the major theories and models according to which 
agricultural R&E systems in most developing countries can be understood. While the 
previous discussions on innovation (except the induced innovation and diffusion concepts) 
are generally focused on the commercial or industrial sector, much of the theoretical and 
empirical work on agricultural innovation process is based on observations of the public 
sector and its environment. In particular, they deal more with social, cultural and political 
environments. Research and extension activities in agriculture in most developing 
countries have been the responsibility of their governments. This public sector bias has 
been regarded by Hayami and Ruttan98 as a major ‘induced institutional innovation’. The 
uncertainties or risks associated with agricultural research and the ‘public good’ nature99 of 
most agricultural technologies make this option socially desirable.
The theories and models covered in this section reflect the dominant thinking and 
practice in agricultural innovation from the period late 1960s. This period marked the 
beginning of the development of formal national R&E systems in Asia inspired by the 
successes of the ‘green revolution movement’. The development and expansion of public 
sector R&E service in most developing countries was financed by loans largely from the 
World Bank.
98 Iftikhar Ahmed & Vernon Ruttan (eds), op. cit., pp. 3, 11-13. Ahmed and Ruttan present statistics showing
that in resource-poor countries o f Asia and Afnca, about 97% of the entire agricultural research is under 
the public sector responsibility.
99 Most agricultural research outputs have the ‘non-rivalness’ and ‘non-excludability’ features of a public
good. Non-rivalness means that the research output is available to everybody at zero marginal cost. For 
instance, the use o f one farmer of ‘a new crop rotation pattern that improves crop production and reduces 
soil erosion’ does not prevent other farmers to adopt the same practice. The non-excludability suggests 
the infeasibility o f denying use to those who do not pay for it. A common aspect o f agricultural research 
is that many products are not simple to protect by patent laws. Quoted in Carl Pray and Ruben 
Echeverria, ‘Determinants and scope o f private sector agricultural research in developing countries’, 
International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) Staff Notes, no. 90-82, April 1990, p. 
4.
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2.3.1 Traditional Linear Model
Roling and Seegers100 describe the traditional linear models in agricultural R&E as 
a sequential process starting from science, then to extension and ending with farmers. 
Examples of the traditional linear models are the following. The transfer-of-technology 
(TOT) model views technology transfer as a one way, top-down process from researchers 
to the farmers. The feed b a ck  technology transfer model considers the response of the users 
to technologies introduced, and regards the feedback function as the sole responsibility of 
the extension service. However, like TOT, the feedback model assumes that farmers are 
passive recipients of technologies.101
The technology f lo w  pro cess  models also suggest linear progression in the 
generation and extension of technologies. Specific examples of this thinking include the 
technology innovation p ro cess  (Figure 2.12) of McDermott as cited by Zuidema102 and the 
research-extension p ro cess  (Figure 2.13) of Bernardo.103 104These models are integrated by 
Javier into his research-extension interface model (Figure 2.14).104 The technology flow 
process models have been regarded as useful for understanding the types of research 
activities (e.g. basic research, applied research, adaptive research) and for defining 
interfaces and linkages between research and extension. However, the one-way flow 
assumption of the models present an incomplete picture of the more complex nature of the 
R&E system. While feedback arrows are incorporated, they appear to be ineffective 
features of the models. To cite Biggs’105 argument, ‘funds are not often spent on feedback 
activities’.
According to Roling and Seegers,106 the linear model also assumes that ‘science is 
the major source of new ideas’. Biggs107 illustrates this concept in what he refers to as
100 Niels Roling & Stephan Seegers, ‘Fitting AKIS to the technology: A diagnostic framework for designing 
knowledge systems suitable for different innovative outcomes (draft chapter for ISNAR/RTTL Synthesis 
Report’ edited by Thomas Eponou), ISNAR, The Hague, October 1991, p. 12.
101 W. Stoop, ‘NARS linkages in technology generation and technology transfer’, ISNAR Working Paper no. 
11, 1988 quoted in V. Asopa & G. Beye, ‘Module V, Management o f Agricultural Research: A Training 
Manual, Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations (FAO-UNDP), Rome, 1997, p. 58
102 Larry Zuidema, ‘Managing research-extension linkages’, Research Management in the Philippines, 
PCARRD, Philippines, 1988, pp. 328-331.
103 Fernando Bernardo, Report o f the consultation meeting o f agricultural research and extension experts, 
SEARCA, Philippines, 1986.
104 Emil Javier, ‘Recent approaches in the study and management of the linkages between agricultural 
research and extension’, ISNAR Staff Notes no. 89-63, quoted in Asopa & Beye, op. cit., p. 50.
105 Stephen Biggs, ‘A multiple source o f innovation model of agricultural research and technology 
promotion’, World Development, vol. 18, no. 11, 1990, p. 1489.
106 Roling & Seegers, loc. cit.
107 Biggs, op. cit., pp. 1481-1499.
World Stock of Agricultural 
Science and Technology
Figure 2.12 McDermott’s model of the technology innovation process
Source: Rivera &  Schram (eds), quoted in Zuidema, 1988
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Figure 2.14 The research-extension interface in the technology flow 
process
Source: E. Javier, Recent approaches in the study and management of the
linkages between agricultural research and extension, ISNAR Staff Notes. 
No. 89-63, 1989.
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central source o f  innovation m odel o r  cen tra l m o d el This model emphasises the transfer of 
technology from research centres to the rural populace. Biggs’ illustration in Figure 2.15 
demonstrates this technology flow. It implies that major innovations in agriculture are 
generated by the international research centres,108 and are then passed on to national 
research centres, on to extension institutions, and down to the farmers level. The central 
model considers the R&E system as hierarchical, with research institutions/groups having 
specific roles to play. For instance, basic and applied research activities109 are conducted by 
international research agencies while adaptive research110 and extension are considered the 
responsibility of national centres. In the model, technology development is viewed as a set 
of stages. This means that technologies generated by scientists at the centre are expected to 
be adapted in subsequent stages until ready for demonstration to and adoption by the 
farmers. The process of developing research capability in terms of institutions is also 
assumed to be sequential. The central model does not reflect the role of socio-political and 
economic factors in agricultural research and extension.
Rôling111 points to another assumption of the model—the ‘commodity metaphor’. 
The commodity perspective assumes that technology is a single, uniform product which 
can be transferred to a ‘homogeneous mass of consumers’. Farmers are regarded as ‘users’ 
of technologies generated by outsiders instead of being perceived as ‘active problem 
solvers’.112 The commodity metaphor overlooks the fact that ‘transformation of a 
technology’ is an ongoing process as it spreads among farmers.113
The training and visit (T&V) approach  to extension is based on the assumptions of 
the linear innovation and diffusion models. The T&V approach was originally conceived 
by Daniel Benor.114 The approach became popular in the 1970s until the early 1980s, with 
the World Bank investing almost US$2.3 billion for its implementation in more than forty
108 International research centres are under the auspices o f the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
109 Basic research involves the development o f new knowledge while applied research, the generation of new 
technologies on the basis o f this knowledge to solve specific agricultural problems.
110 Adaptive research is the process o f refining technologies to adapt them more to agro-ecological and 
socioeconomic conditions o f specific producer groups of regions.
111 Niels Rôling, ‘Why farmers matter: The role o f user participation in teclmology development and
delivery’, paper prepared for the International Workshop, Making the Link Between Agricultural
Research and Technology Users, the Hague, Netherlands, November 20-25, 1989, pp. 2-4.
m Ibid., p. 3.
1.3 Ibid.
1.4 Daniel Benor & J. Harrison, Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit Systems, Washington, World 
Bank, 1977.
Linkage 1 = Transfer of technology 
Linkage 2 = Feedback linkage
Networks = Exchanges of germplasm, other technology and information
Figure 2.15 Institutions of a central source of innovation model or agricultural 
research and technology promotion
Source: Biggs, 1990
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countries.115 The approach assumes that technologies are relevant, available, and will 
increase the production level of farmers once transferred to these farmers. The key features 
of T&V system include among others: a specialisation of extension staff to deliver only 
technical information and advice; a clear definition of responsibilities in which subject 
matter specialists (SMSs) are responsible for the content of technical messages while the 
village extension workers (VEWs) communicate these to farmers; and a clearly defined 
fortnightly schedule of meetings between extension workers and contact farmers, and 
training of VEWs by SMSs.116 The T&V system is an effort to improve the linkage 
between research and extension. Sims and Leonard117 noted the approach’s concern for 
‘adoption’ more than ‘responsiveness’. They noted some of the issues against T&V, as 
follows: it often represents external interests and priorities (e.g. of foreign donors) more 
than domestic ones; and the hierarchical structure of T&V limits feedback from 
subordinates (e.g. about their grievances) and clients.118
The T&V approach and the traditional linear model in general have been observed 
to work best when promoting well-defined technological packages with wide application in 
simple farming systems. It is most applicable to farming conditions which are relatively 
homogeneous, which are similar to those of the research stations, and where farmers’ 
resources are adequate. This approach has successfully diffused the green revolution 
agriculture exemplified by the irrigation/high-yielding cereal/fertiliser technology. 
However, the T&V approach has limited application to more complex, diversified farming 
systems, which are likely to require location-specific technologies rather than the 
generally-applicable extension messages and technology packages of the T&V approach.
2.3.2 Users’ Perspective Theory
The user’s perspective or need-based theory underscores the importance of 
generating and transferring technologies that fit the needs and interests of the local farming 
system conditions. The role of farmers is viewed as that of providing information to 
outsiders/experts who help identify research needs and opportunities.
115 Philip Woodhouse, ‘Extension systems for agricultural projects’, in Nicholas Maddock & Frank Wilson 
(eds) ^Project Design for Agricultural Development, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994, p. 60.
116 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
117 Holly Sims and David Leonard, ‘The political economy o f the development and transfer o f agricultural 
technologies’, in David Kaimowitz (ed.), Making the Link: Agricultural Research and Technology 
Transfer in Developing Countries, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1990, p. 61.
m Ibid, pp. 61-63.
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The fa rm in g  system s research (FSR) approach  is designed according to the users’ 
perspective theory. It had its beginnings in the late 1970s in response to the limitations of 
the traditional models of agricultural research and extension. It originated from the early 
works of the International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs), notably the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI, Philippines) for rice-based cropping systems, 
and Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT, Mexico) for wheat 
and corn-based farming systems. IRRI is associated with the ‘cropping systems research 
approach’ and CIMMYT with ‘on-farm adaptive research approach’.119 These approaches 
are observed to be most useful in commodity research, for the introduction of new varieties 
but tend to neglect other important factors of farm production.
FSR is an attempt to increase the relevance of technology through multi­
disciplinary, location-specific research focusing on solving farm-level constraints. Its 
purpose is to develop and test site-specific technologies to improve the efficiency of 
specific farming systems. In actual practice, activities include basic research, research-on 
station, on-farm and multi-location trials, and extension and production programmes.120 
The whole process is mostly managed by researchers and extension workers. Like the T&V 
system, FSR is frequently seen as representing the interests of external donors and agencies 
who introduced them. Sims and Leonard121 note the claim of some observers that FSR is 
still a ‘top-down’ approach to the transfer of technology. Despite its good intention, the 
FSR, in actual practice, has limited avenues for direct participation of farmers in setting 
research priorities. A multi-disciplinary team identifies the local needs through diagnostic 
research methodologies, such as the rapid rural appraisal (RRA). Chambers122 describes 
RRA as extractive and elicitive of local people’s knowledge conducted by outside experts. 
Some of the modes/methods used by RRA include: secondary sources; semi-structured
119 Allan Low , ‘Placing improved agricultural technology in the hands of resource-poor farmers’, in 
Nicholas Maddock & Frank Wilson (eds), Project Design for Agricultural Development, Avebury, 
Aldershot, Brookfield USA, 1994, pp. 41-44. The cropping system research approach involves five 
components, namely: environmental description; cropping system design; cropping system testing; 
component technology research; and preproduction testing. The on-farm adaptive research approach 
includes the following stages: identification of target zones; description and understanding farmer’s 
circumstances; identifying factors for experimentation; conducting on-farm experiments; evaluation; and 
verification.
120 Andre Cornwall, I. Guijt, & A. Welboum, ‘Acknowledging process: Methodological challenges for 
agricultural research and extension’, in Ian Schoones & John Thompson (eds), Beyond Farmer First, 
Intermediate Technology Publications, London, UK, 1994, p. 105.
121 Ibid., p. 60.
122 Robert Chambers, ‘The origins and practice o f participatory rural appraisal’, World Development, vol. 22, 
no. 7, 1994, pp. 957-959.
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interviews; key informants; transect walks and observing (walking with local people 
through an area); and many other means. A major weakness of RRA, as emphasised by 
Avtar et a l. ,123 is that it does not adequately empower local communities to participate in 
defining their problems and identifying solutions. It does not make effective use of 
indigenous knowledge to explain aspects of a community’s physical, ecological, and 
sociocultural environments from the point of view of the local residents themselves.
2.3.3 Participation Paradigm
This theory is an expansion of or a step further along the lines of the users’ 
perspective theory. The basic assumption in the participation  paradigm  is that technology 
users/farmers have their own indigenous knowledge system and much can be gained by the 
interaction of local knowledge with scientific knowledge. The theory gives primacy to 
farmers’ active participation in all aspects of R&E. Emerging out of this theory are 
approaches labelled as farm er-back-to-farm er by Rhoades and Booth (Figure 2.16), 
farm er-first— and last by Chambers and Ghildyal, and fa rm er partic ipa tory  research by 
Farrington and Martin.124 Chambers et a l.125 later refer to all these as farm er-first 
approaches, highlighting the following common elements: analysis of needs and priorities 
is done by the farmers assisted by outsiders; the primary R&D location is farmers’ fields 
and conditions; outsiders transfer principles, methods and choices to farmers instead of 
messages and packages of practices; and the ‘menu’ is not fixed but responds to farmers’ 
needs. The role of outsiders in this approach is to support farmers in analysis, choice and 
experiment. Therefore, scientists and extensionists involved require new skills as 
facilitator, consultant, catalyst, convenor, information collector, and planner of 
interventions, as well as other non-conventional roles. Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) 
is one of the diagnostic tools used in this approach. PRA, an offshoot of RRA, is described 
by Chambers126 as ‘more visual, with local people more active’ and more facilitating rather 
than extractive. In terms of methods used, PRA employs more visual representations and
123 Kaul Avtar, Draeger Kathryn, Lewis Bernard, ‘Methodology for participatory rapid resource assessment 
with indicators o f  sustainability’, Proceedings o f the International Symposium on Systems-oriented 
Research in Agriculture and Rural Development, Montpellier, France, 21-25 November 1994, pp. 243­
244.
124 Robert Chambers, Arnold Pacey & Lori Ann Thrupp. (eds), Farmer First: Farmer Innovation and 
Agricultural Research, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1989, p. xix, citing Rhoades & 
Booth, 1982; Chambers & Ghildyal, 1985; Farrington & Martin, 1987.
125 Ibid., pp. xix, 182-183.
126 Chambers, ‘Origins and practice o f participatory rural appraisal’, op. cit., pp. 958-959.
Farmer evaluation and FARMER KNOWLEDGE Farmer-scientist-
adaptation ;
AND PROBLEMS extensionist diagnosis
Figure 2.16 ‘Farmer-back-to-farmer’ technology generation and transfer system
Source: R. Rhoades & R. Booth, ‘Farmer-back-to-farmer: A model for generating acceptable
technology’, CIP Social Sciences Department Working Paper No. 1982-1, 1982, as 
quoted in Asopa & Beye, 1997.
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analysis by local people, such as mapping or modelling on paper/ground, free listing and 
card sorting, linkage diagramming, presentations for checking and validation plus some of 
the RRA methods. One major criticism of PRA, as explained by Avtar et a l ,127 is that since 
it depends largely on indigenous community knowledge, practitioners may not fully 
exhaust ‘the entire range of scientific knowledge potentially available’ to address specific 
problems. Mosse128 on the other hand argues that the ‘participatory orthodoxy’ has not 
adequately dealt with a range of interests and power relations which define the limits and 
social conditions of participation. He points to the limitations of rapid participatory 
appraisal techniques in analysing the ‘dominance, factional conflicts, patronage relations, 
leadership struggles and other power relations which determine social conditions of 
participation itself.129
2.3.4 Knowledge Systems and Actor-Oriented Perspective
The agricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS) analyses the R&E 
interface from a knowledge system perspective. AKIS is defined by Rôling and Seegers130 
as follows:
The articulated set of actors, networks and/or organisations, which potentially work synergistically to 
support knowledge processes in agriculture, so as to improve the goodness-of-fit between knowledge and 
environment, and/or the control provided through technology use.
By knowledge processes, Rôling and Seegers131 give the following examples: ‘anticipation, 
generation, transformation, transmission, storage, retrieval, integration, diffusion, and 
utilisation of agricultural knowledge, information and technology’. The role of experts is 
seen as facilitating the knowledge processes. As a diagnostic framework, Rôling and 
Seegers132 describe AKIS as follows: synergy is the desired state; innovation is the desired 
outcome; the performance of AKIS is measured in terms of the extent to which it creates 
access to information and technology; it is a ‘soft system’133 because it is a human activity
127 Avtar et a l, op. cit., p. 243.
128 David Mosse, ‘People’s knowledge in project planning: the limits and social conditions o f participation in 
planning agricultural development’, ODI, Network Paper 58, July 1995, p. 2.
™Ibid.
130 Rôling and Seegers, op. cit., p. 9.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 11.
133 Checkland and Scholes (in P. Checkland & J. Scholes, Soft Systems Methodology in Action, 1990, John 
Wiley, Chicester) explain that ‘soft systems methodology’ addresses messy, ill-defined problems which 
characterised human affairs, while ‘hard systems’ deal with well-defined problems or look at how to do 
it’ when ‘what to do’ is already defined. Bullow (1989) summarised Checkland’s concepts of soft
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system whose performance is the result of shared learning and collective decision-making 
by actors involved. Figure 2.17 illustrates AKIS involving the interface of top-down and 
bottom-up flows in linkage processes.
The theory has considerations wider than just the degree of farmer participation. It 
recognises that the farm and the farmer are among many other actors in agricultural 
development. Campilan134 (in justifying why the program entitled ‘User’s Perspective with 
Agricultural Research and Development [UPWARD]’ has adopted knowledge systems 
thinking to expand its diagnostic framework) explains that the knowledge system 
perspective considers not only the content but also the knowledge processes and 
multiplicity of actors, and their dynamic interrelationships under a given structure and 
environment. Campbell,135 the former National Landcare Facilitator, Australia, considers 
the knowledge system thinking as more relevant to the requirements of ‘sustainability’ as it 
attempts to address socioeconomic and biophysical issues, advocates diversity and holistic 
inquiry, and copes with technical uncertainty and longer time frames over larger areas. 
Campbell136 cites some issues raised by critics against knowledge system (KS), as follows: 
there is a danger that proponents (many of whom are biophysical scientists) may view KS 
as a tangible ‘hard system’ rather than as an abstract construct to aid thinking and focus 
debate; KS is largely descriptive and capable of showing which problems exist within a 
particular situation but not why and how such problems arise; and there is doubt about the 
extent to which it can deal with issues of power and conflict. While KS can make practical 
statements about appropriate balance of power among the different actors, it provides little 
explanation on how this can be achieved.
systems methodology (SSM), as follows: ‘SSM aims to bring about improvement in areas of social 
concern by activating in the people involved in the situation a learning cycle which is ideally never- 
ending. The learning takes place through the iterative process of using systems concepts to reflect upon 
and debate perceptions o f the real world, taking action in the real world, and again reflecting on the 
happenings using the systems concepts. The reflection and debate is structured by a number of systemic 
models. These are conceived as holistic ideal types o f certain aspects of the problem situation rather than 
as accounts o f it. It is taken as given that no objective and complete account o f problem situation can be 
provided’.
134 Dindo Campilan, ‘Enhancing the user-oriented diagnostic framework through knowledge systems 
thinking’, Taking Root, Proceedings o f the International UPWARD Planning Conference held in 
Tagaytay City, Philippines, 4-9 April 1995, p. 150.
135 Andrew Campbell, ‘Participatory inquiry: Beyond research and extension in the sustainability era , 
Proceedings o f the International Symposium on Systems-oriented Research in Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Montpellier, France, 21-25 November 1994, p. 397.
136 Ibid.
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Figure 2.17 AKIS: an agricultural research and extension linkage 
system
Source: N. Roling, ‘The research/extension interface: A knowledge system
perspective’, ISNAR Staff Notes No. 89-48, 1989, as quoted in Asopa 
and Beye, 1997.
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Kaimowitz et a l.ni prefer to use the term ‘agricultural technology system’ instead 
of KS and define it as ‘all individuals, groups, organisations and institutions engaged in 
developing and delivering new or existing technology’. This is different from Rôling’s 
definition in that it makes no assumption that the different institutions in the system work 
together in harmonious manner.
Other agricultural R&E linkage models that are based on the systems perspective 
include the agricultural technology management system or ATMS (Figure 2.18), and the 
research and technology transfer linkages framework (RTTL). ATMS refers to ‘all 
institutions, individuals and their interdependent relationships aimed at the generation, 
assessment and diffusion of improved agricultural technologies in order to increase 
agricultural production and incomes’.137 38 The ATMS model aims to identify opportunities 
for improving agricultural technology management in a particular country.139 RTTL is 
designed for analysing linkages among participants in the national agricultural technology 
system (NATS). It suggests that political, technical and organisational factors affect the 
choice, operation and effectiveness of linkage mechanisms within the NATS.140
The knowledge system models outlined here have similar themes with some of the 
innovation concepts presented earlier in this chapter, such as selection environment 
(Nelson and Winter), national innovation system (Nelson), and knowledge or learning 
cycle (Boisot, and Nonaka & Takeuchi as quoted by Steen et al.). They all deal with 
innovation in a social milieu.
2.4 Empirical Reference of the Theories and Models
The empirical reference of the theories and models outlined here can be classified into:
• studies of agricultural research-extension systems or a subset141 thereof and identifying 
the model that best explains a given situation;
137 David Kaimowitz, Monteze Snyder, & Paul Engel, ‘A conceptual framework for studying the links 
between agricultural research and technology transfer in developing countries , in David Kaimowitz 
(ed.), Making the Link: Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in Developing Countries, 
Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1990, p. 231.
138 Javier, op. cit., as quoted in Asopa & Beye, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
139 Asopa & Beye, op. cit., p. 66.
140 Ibid., p. 67. .
141 Set o f institutions involved in the development and transfer o f technologies for a specific domain like 
region, a commodity, a specific group o f farmers, or a specific problem area.
ITGS = International technology generating system. ITTS = International technology transfer system.
TGS = technology generating system. TTS = technology transfer system. TUS = technology using system.
Figure 2.18 ATMS: the agricultural technology management system
Source: H. Elliot, Farming systems in francophone Africa: Methods and results.
Paper presented to the Ford Foundation Farming System Seminar, Tunis, 
Tunisia, 1977, quoted in Asopa & Beye, 1997.
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• case studies to illustrate the practical application of the models and theories (e.g. as 
analytical framework; for research-extension planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation); and
• models and theories as basis for the design of a research-extension programme or 
system.
The literature either deals with these theories and models in their totality or focuses on a 
particular approach, method and tool developed according to a specific theory.
2.4.1 Traditional Linear Model
The are many empirical evidences of the traditional linear innovation or diffusion 
model. According to Eponou,142 the linear model explains the existing R&E practices in 
seven developing countries143 covered in their study of links between research and 
technology transfer systems. Likewise, Roling and Seegers,144 using the same set of case 
studies in analysing AKIS, conclude that most AKIS in the studies were ‘designed and 
managed5 according to the linear model. They claim that the linear model is an implicitly 
shared perspective among agricultural scientists, economists and administrators in national 
research systems.145 This thinking has serious implications for policy and decision-making 
because it may obscure the decision-makers from the complexities of the agricultural 
innovation processes.
There is perhaps no better way of demonstrating the ‘top-down’, traditional linear 
model in practice than the creation of the IARCs of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). As mentioned, these centres became the 
major source of new agricultural technologies, which were passed on to national research 
and extension centres for verification and transfer to farmers. Their existence has been 
initially justified by the success of the green revolution, in which broad-based 
technological packages have increased the level of production in many resource-abundant 
farming areas. Observers credit the technological advances of the research centres and the 
T&V extension system for rapid dissemination of the green revolution technologies.
142 Thomas Eponou, ‘Partners in agricultural technology: Linking research and technology transfer to serve 
farmers’, ISNAR Report No. 1, International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), March 
1993, p. 28.
143 Including Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’ Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Philippines and Tanzania.
144 Roling and Seegers, pp. 12, 16.
145 Ibid., p. 16.
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Eponou146 147notes that almost all the technology transfer systems financed by the World 
Bank in Africa and Asia have used the T&V approach. The implementations of the 
approach in these countries are well documented and it soon became evident that the T&V 
system has served the interest of large and middle-sized farmers better than the small 
resource-poor farmers.
2.4.2 User’s Perspective Theory
As mentioned previously, the IARCs were active with FSR during late 1970s 
through the 1980s. As observed by Shaner et a l.,XAn the IARCs were encouraged by the 
findings, recommendations, and CGIAR acceptance of the Technical Advisory Committee 
Report of 1978, which contained reviews of the farming systems research and development 
(FSR&D) programs throughout the world. Some of the IARCs with farming systems in 
their mandates include the following: IRRI; CIMMYT; International Crops Research 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (ICRISAT, India); International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA, Nigeria); International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA, Ethiopia); 
International Potato Centre (CIP, Peru); International Centre for Agricultural Research in 
Dry Areas (ICARDA, Lebanon); and International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (ClAT, 
Colombia).148
Many of these IARCs provided training on FSR&D methodologies to the national 
agricultural research systems (NARS) in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America. Collaborative farming systems programmes were undertaken between IARCs and 
NARS. The adoption of FSR approach in most NARS was generally supported by outside 
funding.149 For instance, in the Philippines, FSR gained prominence through the 
implementation of the World Bank supported project entitled ‘Agricultural Support 
Services Project’ during the period 1983 to 1990. Experiences of various countries with the 
FSR approach are many, and well documented. For example, the Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)150 published the farming systems research
146 Eponou, op. cit., p. 11.
147 Willis Shaner, Perry Fred Philipp, & W. Schmehl, ‘Appendix 3-A: Review of FRS & D activities’, 
Fanning Systems Research and Development: Guidelines for Developing Countries, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1981, pp. 237-239.
148 Ibid.
149 F. Anderson & J. Dillon, ‘Farming systems research at the International Agricultural Research Centres 
and other international groups’, in Joseph Vincent Remenyi (ed.), Agricultural Systems Research, jor 
Developing Countries, Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, ACT, 1985, p. 145.
150 Joseph Remenyi (ed.), Agricultural Systems Research for Developing Countries, Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research, ACT, 1985, pp. 96-141.
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experiences of Australia, PNG, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, South Asia 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal) and the IARCs. Another collection of country experiences with 
FSR, done by SEAMEO,151 cover countries in South East Asia. One important observation 
about FSR is put forward by Norman and Collinson.152 They claim that donor agencies 
hastily supported FSR type of work even before the methodologies for resource-efficient 
ways of implementing FSR were fully established. As the FSR approach  has been used in 
the NARS, some modifications and improvements were made to fit specific objectives of 
various government and non-government institutions concerned.
2.4.3 Participation Paradigm
Agricultural conditions in most countries in Asia, Saharan Africa and Latin 
America are described as ‘complex in its farming systems, diverse in its environments, and 
risk-prone’.153 The traditional linear model has shown itself to be not appropriate for this 
type of agriculture. It is thus countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America where many 
participatory research and extension approaches have been implemented and tested. One 
such compilation of experiences was documented in the workshop entitled, ‘Farmers and 
Agricultural Research: Complementary Methods’.154 The case studies included in this 
documentation are India, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Peru, Brazil, Kenya, Botswana and Zambia. Some of the major 
themes of the cases presented include the following:
• farmers’ ability to experiment and innovate themselves, indicating the need for less 
focus on technology packages and more on ‘basket of choices’;155
• approaches in which farmers take more part in the analysis and identification of research 
priorities and in the conduct of their own experiments;156
• practical ways in which farmers can participate in on-farm research;157 and
151 SEAMEO Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, Proceedings of the Regional 
Consultative Seminar-Workshop on Farming Systems Research, SEARCA, Philippines, June 30-July 21 
1986.
152 D. Norman & M. Collinson, ‘Farming systems research in theory and practice’, ibid., pp. 16-29.
153 Chambers, Pacey, and Thrupp, op. cit., p. xviii.
154 Ibid., p. xiii. This workshop was held at Sussex, UK in 1987 and attended by practitioners who are 
developing new participatory research methods.
155 Ibid., p. 3.
156 Ibid., p. 55.
XS1 Ibid., p. 109.
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• changes in the organisation of research and extension (on a project basis) to link formal 
and non-formal research and development.158
Some examples of the topics presented by the authors are as follows:159
• rice cultivation in India which demonstrates how farmers select their varieties and how 
their criteria differ from those of scientists;
• local knowledge for agroforestry and native plants in Africa;
• crop ethnohistories, local networks or interest groups, and farmer experimentation for 
better problem identification for adaptive research in Dominican Republic;
• group treks (scientists and farmers together) in Nepal to identify location-specific 
research problems;
• community appraisal, community organisation and process documentation using various 
methods in the Philippines;
• diagramming and mapping to aid analysis;
• systems diagramming to help farmers decide on-farm research;
• experience with group techniques in Colombia;
• innovator workshops in Bangladesh;
• farmers’ groups for technology development in Botswana; and
• participatory technology validation in highland communities of Peru.
There is also considerable material on accounts about the use of participatory tools and 
techniques that include among others: participatory rural appraisal;160 participatory rapid 
appraisal;161 and rapid appraisal of agricultural knowledge systems (RAAKS).162 The Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has its own experiences with people’s participation 
projects (PPP) starting with seven PPPs in Africa (Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) throughout the 1980s and in Asia (Thailand, Sri Linka
158 Ibid., p. 165.
159 Ibid., pp. 9-13, 14-23, 61-67, 68-72, 73-76, 77-92, 93-100, 127-149.
160 Chambers, op. cit., pp. 953-969; Chambers, ‘Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Challenges, potentials 
and paradigm’, World Development, vol. 22, no. 10, 1994, pp. 1437-1454; Chambers, ‘Participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA): Analysis o f experience’, World Development, vol. 22, no. 9, 1994, pp. 1253-1268.
161 Ricardo Ramirez, ‘Participatory rapid appraisal of farmers’ agricultural knowledge and conununication 
systems’, Proceedings o f the International Symposium on Systems-oriented Research in Agriculture and 
Rural Development, Montpellier, France, 21-25 November 1994, pp. 675-676.
162 Paul Engel & Monique Salomon, ‘RAAKS: A participatory action-research approach to facilitating social 
learning for sustainable development’, Proceedings o f the International Symposium on Systems-oriented 
Research in Agriculture and Rural Development, Montpellier, France, 21-25 November 1994, pp. 206­
211.
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and Pakistan) by the end of the 1980s.163 Only three of these PPPs were directly 
implemented by farm extension agencies, and these were observed to have been the most 
successful.164 165
While experiences with participatory R&E are many, they remain limited in scope, 
unlike the T&V system and FSR approach, which gained national attention in many 
developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s. One explanation for this hesitation on 
the part of national governments to adopt the more participatory approach has been put 
forward by Oakley. Oakley explains that ‘participation’ implies grassroots movement, 
dialogue and debate—factors which are difficult to fit into the bureaucratic set-up of most 
national governments.
2.4.4 Knowledge Systems and Actor-Oriented Perspective
As a relatively new concept, references about the practical application of actor- 
oriented approach and knowledge systems (KS) are still limited. They include the works of 
Rôling,166 Rôling and Seegers,167 and some case studies or field research by twelve 
institutions from Africa, Asia and Latin America.168 The case studies are compiled in the 
book entitled Beyond Farm er F irst.169 They address issues of p o w er , knowledge and 
agricultural practice. They view KS in the context of a multiplicity of actors (e.g. farmers, 
development workers, extensionists, researchers) and networks (e.g. resource poor farmers, 
men/women) through which specific information or a particular technology is 
communicated and negotiated.170 Examples of the case studies using the KS perspective 
include the following:
163 John Rouse, ‘Experiments with democracy’, Technology Transfer and Research and Extension Linkages, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
164 Ibid.
165 Peter Oakley, ‘Bottom-up versus top-down: Extension at the crossroads’, Technology Transfer and 
Research and Extension Linkages, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), n.d.
166 Niels Rôling, ‘The emergence o f knowledge systems thinking: A changing perception of relationships 
among innovation, knowledge process and configuration’, Knowledge and Policy: The International 
Journal o f Knowledge Transfer and Utilisation, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 42-64.
167 Rôling & Seegers, op. cit.
168 These were commissioned in 1991 by the programme, ‘Sustainable Agriculture of the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London.
169 Ian Scoones & John Thompson (eds), Beyond Farmer First: Rural People’s Knowledge Agricultural 
Research and Extension Practice, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, UK, 1994.
170 Ibid., p. 3.
58
• Landcare programme in Australia, a case of demand-led research and extension 
support171 (according to Scoones and Thompson, it is the largest and most effective 
locally driven resource management programme in the world172);
• The case of Hawkesbury Agricultural College (The University of Western Sydney), 
which underwent a major change from a conservative, top-down to a flexible, people- 
centred, systems-oriented learning institution for agricultural science;173
• A range of methodologies (including their strengths and weaknesses) that help analyse 
differences in order to understand competing interests, alliances and social networks 
for more flexible learning, analysis and development174 (reflected in the cases of 
participatory methodologies for village-level watershed management planning in India, 
the case of the integrated pest management Field School in Indonesia, merits and 
limitations of farmer experimentation in Central America, Mali, Northern Ghana);
• Illustrations of contrasting interests of different internal and external actors in 
development programmes and potential for conflict and compromise in Zimbabwe and 
Peru;175 and
• Case studies in Guinea, West Africa to demonstrate how social dimensions of local 
complexity is important to understanding how rural livelihoods are composed.176
As far as the status of farmer participatory research within IARCs of CGIAR is 
concerned, there is an apprehension raised by Fujisaka.177 He observes that while IARCs 
such as IRRI, CIMMYT, International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), West 
Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), and CIP have continued to undertake 
participatory research activities, the present funding and policies of CGIAR may limit
171 A. Campbell, ‘Community first: Landcare in Australia’, op. cit., pp. 252-257. Landcare is a grassroots 
movement in Australia involving more than one thousand voluntary community groups aimed at 
developing more sustainable systems of land use. Landcare is supported by a national ten-year funding 
programme. Some activities o f Landcare groups include: field days and farm walks; demonstration 
projects (land degradation rehabilitation works); flights over a group area and/or tours to Landcare 
groups in other regions; development o f a catchment or district plan which identifies land degradation 
problems; development or purchase o f land conservation equipment for hire to members; research and 
development trials with state agencies, universities and agribusiness; production of educational 
pamphlets, videos and manuals.
172 Scoones & Thompson, op. cit., p. 182.
173 Richard Bawden, ‘Creating learning systems: A metaphor for institutional reform for development’, in 
Scoones & Thompson, op. cit., p. 258-263.
174 Scoones & Thompson, op. cit., pp. 97-177.
115 Ibid., pp. 57-74.
176 Ibid., pp. 75-79.
177 Sam Fujisaka, ‘Will farmer participatory research survive in the International Agricultural Research 
Centres?’, ibid., pp. 227-235.
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these activities in the future. For instance, there is pressure for IRRI to shift its research 
focus to more strategic and more basic approaches, such as biotechnology, geographic 
information systems and modelling. These new developments in IARCs will call for more 
active commitment of NARS and NGOs in the conduct of the needed farmer participatory 
research.
Table 2.1 summarises the theories and models with more specific applications to 
the agriculture sector. It outlines the approaches that can be identified or that have emerged 
out of these theories and models. The same table indicates the conditions in which these 
approaches were observed to be most useful and their limitations.
In recent years, there have been new initiatives in agricultural R&E based on the 
more dynamic models. However, these efforts have been limited in scope, and constrained 
by funding, resistance from some actors involved, and other institutional or structural 
rigidities. Another possible reason for the limited use of the more dynamic models is 
because they are rich with rhetoric, which may be difficult to translate into action.
Some inferences can be derived from the review of agricultural R&E theories, 
models and approaches. The paradigm or theory that one takes determines one’s view of 
the roles the different actors play in agricultural R&E. These assumptions in turn influence 
the choice and development of approaches employed. The actual experiences and 
constraints encountered in the implementation of these approaches serve as lessons learned 
for the design of new theories and approaches. The different approaches to agricultural 
R&E requiring different types of skills are appropriate in different situations. For instance, 
as the level of complexity and uncertainty (e.g. rainfed or marginal farms), the number of 
stakeholders and perspective, and the interdependence of technical, economic and social 
issues all become more complicated, there is an increasing need for people skills, use of 
participatory approaches, use of interdisciplinary teams, more facilitation and others.
2.5 Conclusion
There is an implicit evolutionary phase in the agricultural R&E literature that has 
parallels with the more manufacture-focused literature. For example, the development of 
ideas toward concepts such as national innovation systems is similar to the knowledge 
systems in agricultural R&E. The linear model of agricultural R&E parallels the 
technology-push innovation model and the innovation diffusion theory. The user’s 
perspective theory with its focus on the farmers’ needs can be associated with the demand-
Table 2.1 Summary of theories and models related to agricultural innovation
Model/Theory M ajor Approach Applications W eaknesses
1. Traditional linear model
Assumptions:
• Farmers are users of 
technologies generated 
by outsiders instead of 
being active problem  
solvers.
•  Reason for non­
adoption o f
technologies is farmers’ 
ignorance
Training and visit (T & V)
approach
Purpose:
•  To dissem inate available 
technologies assumed to be 
relevant through extension  
education
Key features:
•  Hierarchical and highly 
structured with clearly 
defined roles o f research and 
extension workers:
-subject matter specialists 
(SM Ss) prepare technology  
packages and train extension  
workers on them  
-extension workers deliver 
technology packages through 
contact farmers
Relatively 
hom ogeneous  
farming conditions 
similar to those o f  
research stations 
and where farmers’ 
resources are 
adequate
N ot applicable 
to more 
com p lex  and 
diversified  
farming  
system s
2. Users' perspective theory
Assumptions:
•  Role o f farmers view ed  
as providing 
information to outsiders 
who help them identify 
research needs and 
opportunities
• Reason for non­
adoption o f  
technologies is farm- 
level constraints
Farming system s research (FSR) 
approach; rapid rural 
appraisal(RRA) as diagnostic  
tool
Purpose:
•  To generate and transfer 
technologies that fit the 
needs o f  local farming 
system  conditions
Key features:
• M ultidisciplinary, location  
specific research focusing on 
solving farm -level constraints
•  W hole process mostly 
researcher and extension  
w orker-m anaged
C om m odity  
research (e.g. rice- 
based farming 
system s) and 
introduction o f new  
varieties
Direct
participation
o f  farmers in
setting
research
priorities
limited
3. Participation paradigm Farmer-first approach; W ide applications Interests and
Assumptions: participatory rural appraisal in com plex, diverse pow er
• Farmers have own stock (PRA) as diagnostic tool and risky farming relations not
of systematised Purpose: environments properly dealt
indigenous know ledge • To encourage farmers' active with
available for participation in all aspects of
assimilation and research and extension; to
incorporation. generate choices for farmers
•  Much can be gained by to experim ent, adapt and
the interaction o f local innovate
with scientific Key features:
knowledge • Analysis o f  needs and
• Reason for non- priorities done by farmers
adoption o f  technology assisted by outsiders
is inappropriate •  Outsiders transfer principles,
technology methods, and choices instead
o f  packages
• ‘M enu’ is not fixed but
responds to farmer's needs
4. Knowledge systems and Relatively new concept-'Beyond More relevant to Limited
actor-oriented farm er first' requirements o f empirical
perspective Purpose: sustainable studies
Assumptions: •  To acknow ledge the developm ent Largely
•  Existence o f multi- m ultiplicity o f  actors and descriptive
layered fragmentary networks and their dynamic and capable o f
diffuse know ledge with interrelationships sh ow in g
complex, inequitable, Key features: w hich
discontinuous •  Incorporates a problem s exist
interactions between sociop olitica lly  differentiated but not w hy
actors and networks view  o f developm ent where and how  such
(local & external). age, gender, ethnicity, class problem s arise
• Role o f experts seen as and religion are considered.
facilitating o f • A ddresses socioeconom ic
"knowledge processes". and biophysical issues,
• Farmers are viewed as advocates diversity and
creative investigators holistic inquiry, and copes
and analysts. with technical uncertainty 
and longer tim e frames over 
larger areas.
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pull innovation model. The innovation models such as national innovation systems, 
selection environment, and knowledge or learning cycles recognise the evolutionary nature 
of innovation, the diversity and disequilibrium of choices, and the complexity of the 
institutional structure of innovation. These models are congruent with the participation 
paradigm, actor-oriented perspective, and knowledge system thinking in agricultural R&E.
A major theme that emerges in this chapter is the observed dominance of the 
traditional innovation and diffusion models as depicting agricultural R&E systems. That 
they do not provide an adequate explanation of the complex, diversified, unpredictable and 
interactive nature of agriculture and agricultural R&E system is a major insight derived 
from the discussions in this chapter. This implies the need to search for and encourage 
alternative or complementary systems, strategies and techniques for agricultural R&E in 
the context of the more evolutionary or dynamic models of innovation. It suggests the 
importance of flexibility in the R&E structure and policies. For one, the budgetary 
constraints in most developing countries have increased the pressure for governments to 
limit funding for public research. This brings into the picture NGOs, the private sector and 
other non-traditional actors. Agricultural R&E system will increasingly rely on these 
groups for innovations and technology transfer. However, this will require major 
institutional changes in the present R&E system of most developing countries.
61
CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURE 
SECTOR AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of the larger context within which the agriculture 
sector operates. Much of what happens within the agricultural sector, including its 
technology transfer strategies, can be explained or influenced by the domestic economic 
and political factors on one level and the global economy on the other. In recent years, the 
capacity of nation-states to meet the needs of its citizenry for economic security, political 
representation, physical safety and cultural identity has been observed to be increasingly 
challenged by global capitalism.1 With globalisation, the economies of nation-states are 
more and more integrated into the world capitalist markets. Various super international 
bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organisation, and multilateral trade agreements such as the World Trade Agreement 
(WTA)2 and in particular, the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
have emerged to promote and coordinate international economic relations and integration. 
Therefore, the legitimacy and sovereignty of nation-states are increasingly threatened 
because domestic policy issues are becoming more subjected to these international 
organisations and agreements.
This chapter examines the political economy environment of the Philippine state in 
order to gain a better understanding of the development of the agriculture sector. This 
contextual understanding is important for the analysis of the technology transfer process in 
the agriculture sector. Some of the questions explored in this chapter are the following. 
What are the Philippine state’s strategies for development with emphasis on its 
industrialisation and agricultural development objectives? What are the major policies and 
actions of the state in relation to these objectives? To what extent are these actions 
constrained or facilitated by the different local and global interests? What do these actions,
1 Roland Axtmann, ‘Collective identity and the democratic nation-state in the age o f globalisation , in Ann
Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner (eds), Articulating the Global and the Local, Westview Press, Colorado, 
1997, pp. 43-44.
2 Previously known as General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs-Umguay Round (GATT-UR).
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policies, and local and global forces mean for the agriculture sector and technology 
transfer?
Analysis of the political economy of the Philippines provides useful insights into 
the complexity of the larger environment of the technology transfer process. A good 
understanding of the development theories discussed in chapter 1 (e.g. dependency theory, 
neoclassical theory) is important in this type of analysis.
A closer look at the Philippine political economy reveals the different domestic and 
global forces that shape the Philippine agriculture sector and its processes such as 
technology transfer. It leads to the conclusion that various contradictions, constraints and 
conflict of interests within the Philippine political economy have directly or indirectly 
limited the development of the agriculture sector and its ability to provide technology 
transfer or extension service. The basic structure and conditions for the successful 
implementation of agricultural development programs have often been compromised in 
favour of the industrialisation objective of the Philippine government. In recent years, this 
industrialisation policy has been export-oriented and foreign investment-led. Economic 
policies have often been made conducive to foreign capital at the expense of small farmers 
and the environment.
The structures of the Philippine agriculture sector and the agricultural research and 
extension (R&E) system have been historically influenced by foreign intervention. For 
example, the World Bank supported the implementation of two technology transfer 
strategies that overhauled the entire Philippine agricultural R&E system in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. These were the training and visit (T&V) approach to extension and the farming 
systems research approach. The T&V approach, which is based on the conventional model 
of innovation, was a direct prescription by the World Bank to many developing countries 
including the Philippines to promote the green revolution movement.
There are some factors in the Philippine political economy that, if viewed in the 
positive light, could offer opportunities to the agriculture sector. The World Trade 
Agreement that liberalises agricultural trade provides new market opportunities to local 
agricultural producers. The role of technology transfer is crucial because the local 
producers urgently need technology options that would enable them to compete with their 
counterparts from other countries. The local government code, which decentralises the 
extension service from central to local government units (LGUs), has the potential to 
deliver more need-based and relevant extension service because of the proximity of the
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LGUs to the farmers. However, the technology transfer skills of the LGUs must be 
enhanced to prepare them for their new role.
This chapter argues for the use of technology transfer approaches that could deal 
with the challenges presented by the domestic and global political economy. It suggests the 
need for actors within the agricultural R&E to become more aware of the various political 
economy issues and opportunities so that benefits from technology transfer could be 
maximised and cost of negative consequences minimised.
3.2 Overview of the Philippine Economy
3.2.1 History of the Philippine Economy
During the immediate post-World War II period, the Philippines had the most 
impressive economic growth record in Southeast Asia. Until the end of the 1950s, the 
Philippine economy registered the highest growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita relative to other market economies in the region.3 The Philippines showed great 
promise for industrialisation during this time because its literacy level was higher than its 
neighbouring countries in Asia. Its ‘exposure to formal democratic processes and western 
entrepreneurial ideology’ during the American occupation was also seen as an advantage 
for the country.4 However, since the 1960s, the Philippine economy had lagged behind 
those of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. Economic growth has been slow and frequently 
interrupted by major domestic crises and external shocks.5 Figure 3.1 shows how poorly 
the Philippine economy had performed compared with other developing Asian countries in 
terms of GDP growth rate. The average growth of GDP in the country declined from 5.9 
percent during the period 1965-1980 to 1.8 percent in 1980-95.6 External shocks in the 
1970s, such as oil price hikes and the increase in world interest rates, led to serious terms- 
of-trade losses in the Philippines.7 Furthermore, the political turmoil that heightened during 
the 1980s, induced among others by the assassination of Benigno Aquino, resulted in
3 Temerio Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing, The
University o f the Philippines Press and Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Diliman, Quezon 
City, Philippines, 1994, p. 1.
4 Ibid.
5 Rob Vos and Josef Yap, The Philippine Economy: East Asia’s Stray Cat?: Structure, Finance and
Adjustment, Institute o f Social Studies, the Hague, MacMillan Press Ltd., Great Britain and St. Martin s 
Press, Inc., New York, 1996, p .l 1.
6 Arsenio Balisacan, ‘Policy reforms and agricultural development in the Philippines’, ASEAN Economic
Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 1, April 1998, p. 79.
7 Vos and Yap, loc. cit.
Figure 3.1 Average GDP Growth Rate of Developing
Asian Countries
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massive flight of capital and decrease in foreign loans.^ As the balance of payments 
worsened, and the World Bank and the IMF structural adjustment policies were adopted,8 9 
the Gross National Product (GNP) of the country was at its record low levels, averaging - 
4.9 percent during the period 1983-85.10
The following conditions characterised the state of Philippine economy for the 
period 1960s to early 1990s:
• Huge foreign debt servicing that limited the government’s spending for basic services 
such as education, social services and infrastructure;
• Declining levels of investments;
• Low savings generation resulting in poor capital formation;
• High import dependence and low export levels;
• Low revenue collection which was among the lowest in Asia; and
• Inadequate science and technology. 11
For the first time since the debt crisis in the 1980s, the Philippine economy showed 
signs of recovery during the period 1994 to 1997. The Philippines achieved remarkable 
rates of growth with GDP growth of 4.30, 4.80, 5.70, and 5.10 percent for the years 1994, 
1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively.12 Exports, imports and investments were steadily 
increasing.13 There were expansion of consumption, a reduction of external indebtedness, 
and a decrease in the public sector account deficit.14 A series of political and economic 
reforms were credited for such economic turnaround in the Philippines. Since the 
restoration of the Philippine democracy in 1986, economic reforms such as liberalisation, 
deregulation of the domestic economy, and privatisation have been carried out by the 
leaders of post-Marcos regimes. Growth in exports has been induced by increase in foreign
8 Romeo Bautista, Impediments to Trade Liberalisation in the Philippines, Gower, Aldershot, Brookfield,
USA for the Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 1989, pp. 1-2.
9 The debt crisis in the 1980s further weakened the bargaining power of the Philippine government vis-a-vis
foreign lenders. It became vulnerable to the changes in the sentiments o f foreign lenders and had little 
choice but to comply with the restrictive policy measures imposed by WB and IMF.
10 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 12.
11 Felicito Payumo, ‘Abandoning the pork-barrel state, rethinking economic policies’, Kasarinlan: A 
Philippine Quarterly o f Third World Studies: Rethinking the State and the Economy, vol. 1, no. 1, Third 
World Studies Center, University o f the Philippines, 3rd Quarter 1994, pp. 9-11.
12 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.-PERC, Country risk report: Philippines, 
http://asiarisk.com/phil.html, accessed on 15 January 1999.
13 Philippines-back in business: National economy, http://www.tky.hut.fi/-remburssi/projects/ 
philippines/economy.htm, accessed on 14 January 1999.
14 Ibid.
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direct investment (FDI), more liberalised foreign exchange policies, and the resolution of 
the power crisis.15
Unfortunately, the remarkable economic growth of the 1990s has not been 
sustained due to the widespread financial crisis in Asia that started in 1997. Asian countries 
suffered from collapsing stock markets and devaluation of currencies, which made their 
exports more expensive and less competitive in the world markets.16 In the region, the 
Philippines was the country least affected by the recent Asian crisis. In 1998, only the 
Philippines and Singapore achieved positive growth rates in the Asian region, just enough 
to keep the country out of recession. The economic reforms and the political legitimacy17 
enjoyed by the Philippine government in recent years were claimed to have enabled the 
country to survive the Asian crisis.18
3.2.2 Structure of the Philippine Economy
In the Philippines, only a small segment of the labour force is employed in 
manufacturing; the majority of the population is engaged in agriculture and urban informal 
services.19 The manufacturing subsector involves mainly the processing of primary or 
agricultural products with some assembly of electronics products for foreign companies.20 
The agriculture sector involves the cultivation in small landholdings of food crops such as 
rice, maize, coconut, cassava, vegetables and various tropical fruits. It also includes export 
crops such as banana, pineapple and sugarcane grown in plantations, tobacco and abaca. 
Livestock and poultry are raised for local consumption. Coconuts are the leading export 
crop, mainly in the form of coconut oil. A more detailed discussion of the nature of the 
agriculture sector in the Philippines is presented in section 4.2 of chapter 4.
The industry sector that includes manufacturing, mining, construction and public 
utilities has been relatively underdeveloped compared with the newly industrialising
15 Ibid.
16 OTN explores Asia’s economic crisis: Why did it happen, http://www.megastories.com/ 
seasia/why/why.htm, accessed on 20 October 1998.
17 The restoration o f freedom and democracy since 1986 has resulted in a more stable political environment
in the Philippines. There has been a perceived increase in confidence o f the Filipino people in the 
government, and the legitimacy o f  the political regimes after Marcos have improved since.
18 The first 100 days o f the Estrada Presidency, 08 October 1998, http://www.erap.com/100 days/speech.htm,
accessed on 20 October 1998; Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.-PERC, Country risk report: 
Philippines, http://asiarisk.com/phil.html, accessed on 15 January 1999; John Shaw and Maggie Macrae, 
‘Steady Eddy’s impressive legacy’, International Business Asia, 29 May 1998, vol. 6, no. 10, p. 12(2).
19 Vos and Yap, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
20 ‘Overview: Republic o f the Philippines’, http://www.abisnet.com/philippines.htm, accessed on 14 January
1999.
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countries of Asia.21 The industry sector’s contribution to GDP was 35.3 percent in 1970 
and barely increased since then up until 1992.22 Its share to total employment fluctuated 
between 11 to 13 percent for the period 1960 to 1990.23 The employment share of 
manufacturing was only 10 to 12 percent between 1960 to 1990.24 Agriculture, including 
forestry and fisheries, is still the most important sector because it directly employs almost 
half of the Philippine workforce—61 percent in 1960 down to 46 percent in 1995.25 Its 
contribution to export earnings has remained at significant levels although it plunged from 
86% in 1965 to about 30 percent in 1990.26 These trends do not approximate the 
commonly-observed structural changes in modernising growth where a shift from 
traditional agriculture to modem manufacturing would occur during the initial stages of 
growth.27
3.2.3 Modes of Production
Different modes of production ranging from various forms of the pre-capitalist to 
the capitalist mode coexist in the Philippines. There are different positions taken by 
different analysts on the issue of which mode is dominant in the Philippines society. The 
advocates of the capitalist thesis claim the following: most of the surplus labour is 
appropriated by means of wage exploitation; commodity production predominates; and 
most labourers are without landholdings.28 Those who argue that the semi-feudal mode 
continues to prevail in the Philippine society cite the following reasons: the ruling classes 
extract most of the surplus labour by means of land rent; the economy lacks heavy
21 Rene Ofreneo, ‘Philippine industrialisation and industrial relations’, State o f the Nation Reports, no. 12,
The University o f the Philippines Press and Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Diliman, 
Quezon City, Philippines, 1995, p. 2.
22 Vos and Yap, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
23 Sectoral employment shares, 1960-1990, National Statistics Office, Philippines.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Balisacan, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
27 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 13.
28 R. Santos, Beyond the Surface: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the Mode o f Production and
Social Formation in the Philippines, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM), Inc., Davao 
City, Philippines, 1990, pp. 1-2.
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industry; a big comprador bourgeoisie29 is the dominant class; and industry does not tend to 
accumulate because of monopoly.30
The rural Philippines is largely semi-feudal in structure despite attempts of different 
administrations to effect land re-distribution or transfer of income to the landless through 
various land reform laws. The semi-feudal unpaid labour is at the same time semi-colonial 
since it is directed at promoting the foreign monopoly capitalists. Monopoly capitalism, 
largely through multinational corporations, did somehow develop a capitalist mode in the 
Philippines in the following industries: food; textiles; clothing; machinery; equipment; 
chemicals; pharmaceutical’s; and other agribusiness fields. However, the Filipino 
capitalists and entrepreneurs generally end up as junior partners of these corporate giants.
3.2.4 Class Segments and their Economic Interests
The Philippine society can be classified into different class segments, namely the 
rural elite involving the old and the new rich,31 landed and non-landed capitalists in 
manufacturing and industry,32 the peasantry and the rest of the labour force. The two most 
dominant social classes in the Philippines include the traditional land-owning oligarchy, 
and the landed and non-landed capitalists in industry or the business elite. The following 
statistics illustrate the social inequality that has pervaded the country and the dominance of 
the Philippine elite: the top 5.5 percent of all landowning families own 44 percent of all 
arable land in the country; the richest 15 percent of all families account for 52.5 percent of 
all the nation’s income; and in 1991, only 10 corporations accounted for 26 percent of all 
revenues, 40% of all net income, and 34% of the total assets of the top 1000 corporations.33 
The influence of the Philippine oligarchy has extended into the country’s political system, 
with about 60 to 100 political clans controlling all elective positions at the national level.34
29 ‘Comprador bourgeoisie’ are landlords assuming the personality of big businessmen or native agents 
directly employed by a foreign establishment or transnational corporation. They may own plantations or 
large farm estates where farm workers or tenants pay rentals and where large number of hired wage 
labourers are organised under a central management are employed.’ Cited in Ephraim Romero and 
Virgilio Esguerra, Agrarian Reform Taxation and Cooperatives (A Social Science Perspective), Center 
for Human Rights and Peace Studies Series no. 1, National Bookstore, Inc., Philippines, 1991. p. 49.
30 Santos, loc. cit.
31 ‘The traditional landlords are those who obtain their income from the extraction of rent like the sugar farm
owners. The new rural elite includes the new breed of landowners like the coiporate and commercial 
local farms, rural bankers, farm input dealers, tractor lenders, merchants, rice dealers, warehouse 
operators, millers, big importers, distributors o f agricultural inputs, handicraft industrialists and others. 
Cited in Romero and Esguerra, op. cit., p. 60.
32 Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing, loc. cit.
33 Jose Almonte, ‘The politics o f development in the Philippines’, Kasarinlan: Philippine 2000: Dream or
Delusion, Third World Studies Center, University o f the Philippines, Quezon City, vol. 9, nos 2 and 3, 
1993-1994, p. 112.
34 Ibid.
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One of the most significant results of the colonisation of the Philippines was the 
emergence of the agrarian elite.35 The landowning elite was observed to have obtained their 
economic foundation from production for the US market. The Philippine products, notably 
sugar, could enter the US market free of duty.36 However, the nature of the oligarchy has 
changed from a cohesive landholding elite, generated by the Spanish and American 
colonial policies, to a more diversified elite after World War II. This diversification was 
the consequence of the imposition of the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies 
in the 1950s to 1960s, implementation of the export-led industrialisation strategy in 1970s, 
the centralisation of economic resources by the Philippine government under Marcos, and 
the influx of foreign investors.
There were four class segments noted within the Philippine elite during the Marcos 
regime, namely crony capitalism, state capitalism, those who produce for the domestic 
market (ISI manufacturers), and those who produce for the world market (exporters).37 The 
cronies were largely private but depended on their close ties with the President to advance 
their own private ends. Their main political-economic interests were the maintenance of a 
capitalist, class-divided economy and the continuation of the Marcos regime. Government 
monopolies were created to take control of several important sectors of the economy. For 
instance, state-trading monopolies for sugar and coconut were established and entrusted to 
Marcos’ landed-capitalist friends.
The ISI policy during the 1950s created an entrepreneurial group, largely but not 
exclusively Filipino, that depended on government protection for their economic well­
being. However, judging this sector as highly protected and inefficient, the Marcos 
government embarked on an export-oriented industrialisation program. The program was 
supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the 
power and economic interests of the ISI entrepreneurs were significantly eroded, they have 
persisted through the years. Some ISI manufacturers were attacked by the regime not 
because of their ISI activity but because of their perceived political opposition against the 
government.
The exporters of both manufactured products and raw materials were a mix of 
foreign direct investors and locally-owned enterprises under contract for multinational
35 Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export, Cornell University
Press, New York, 1987, pp. 125-126.
36 Ibid.
11 Ibid, pp. 135-142.
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corporations. It is in the interest of these groups to see the continuous lowering of tariffs, 
barriers to foreign investment and wages. The landed elite in the agroexport sector 
collaborated with Marcos in return for their continued class rule in the countryside.38 Up to 
this day, they have succeeded in maintaining their positions in society and the political 
scene.
Post-Marcos governments (under Aquino and Ramos) have sought to abolish crony 
capitalists and diminish the role of the state capitalists through their privatisation 
programs.39 These administrations have committed to reducing the control of the oligarchy 
over the Philippine economy through comprehensive market-oriented reforms.
On the other hand, the peasantry has stratified into a small sector of relatively well- 
off owner-cultivators, the amortising tenants who were awarded certificates but who still 
carry the burden of paying for their lands and expensive farm inputs, the lessees, and the 
remaining sharecroppers who labour under feudal conditions.40 In capitalist-run plantations 
such as in banana, pineapple, sugar and other export crop industries, farmers have become 
wage labourers. However, the population of landless rural poor who do not benefit at all 
from the agrarian reform program has remained at a significant level.
The development of the class segments within the Philippine economy is further 
discussed in section 3.4. It is important to be aware of these economic groups and their 
respective interests to understand agricultural development and technology transfer in the 
Philippines. These groups could be any of the following: direct participants in the 
agribusiness sector; beneficiaries of technology transfer programs; or obstructions to a 
more equitable agricultural development.
3.3 Overview of the Philippine State
3.3.1 Colonial History of the Philippine State
The Philippines was colonised by Spain for over three centuries, from 1564 to 
1898.41 This was followed by nearly forty years of American occupation from 1898 to 
1935; ten years of Filipino self-government under American control; and three years of
n Ibid., pp. 129-130.
39 Ibid., p. 159.
40 Renato Constantino, The Nationalist Alternative (rev. edn.), Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Inc., 
Quezon City, 1990, pp. 68-69.
41 Stanley Kamow, In Our Image: America ’s Empire in the Philippines, Ballantine Books, New York, 1989,
pp. 9-10.
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Japanese rule during World War II.42 The Philippines finally achieved independence in 
1946.43
The colonial history of the Philippines had deprived the Filipinos of an indigenous 
national character. Instead, it produced a mixed cultural identity characterised by 
contradictions and uncertainties that existed long after the colonisers left the country.44 For 
instance, since gaining independence from the Americans, the attitude of Filipinos towards 
the United States has alternated between ‘imitation and resentment, subservience and 
defiance, adulation and contempt.’45 American colonial mentality has been manifested in 
the Philippines’ educational system, political system, government and economic 
institutions, and people’s lifestyle. On the other hand, an example of the Filipinos’ display 
of nationalism and resentment against the US was the clamour for the removal of the US 
bases from the country in the 1980s. While colonialism was a very unfortunate experience 
for the Filipinos, it had some benefits, too. The Filipinos have a facility for languages, 
particularly English. They have become more flexible and can easily adapt to and identify 
with different cultures. With globalisation, speaking English, flexibility and adaptability 
are helpful for international communication.46
The long history of colonialism in the Philippines has perpetuated four social 
features that had influenced the nature of the modem Philippine state. These include a 
dominant land-owning and export-based oligarchy; a tradition of clientelist politics; a 
history of popular opposition movements and uprisings;47 and a continuing dependence on 
foreign external resources.48
3.3.2 The Philippine Government
The Philippine government is at present based on a freedom Constitution 
characterised by elections, competing political parties and a relatively free press. The
42 John Shaw and Maggie Macrae, ‘Steady Eddy’s impressive legacy’, International Business Asia, vol. 6,
no. 10, 29 May 1998.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Kamow, op. cit., p. 15.
46 Mina Ramirez, Serafín Talisayon, and Edgardo Espiritu, ‘The Philippines as knowledge center in the Asia-
Pacific’, Occasional Monograph 5—Asian Social Institute, Asian Social Institute Printing Press, Metro 
Manila, 1994, p. 4.
47 For example the leftist insurgents called Hukbalahap of the 1950s who took up arms against rural poverty;
the armed communist-led peasant uprising that nearly toppled the central government of Marcos during 
1970s and early 1980s; and the Muslim rebels o f Mindanao.
48 Temerio Rivera, ‘The state and industrial transformation: Comparative and local insights’, Kasarinlan-
Rethinking the State and the Economy, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, 
Quezon City, vol. 10, no. 1, Q3 1994, p. 61.
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Constitution provides for a bicameral Congress with a Senate of 24 members and a House 
of Representatives of a maximum of 250 members.49 The President is the Head of state, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and controls all the executive departments, 
bureaus and offices.50 The President is elected by the people every six years.51 The present 
system of government includes the legislature, executive bodies, judiciary, bureaucracy, 
local government and public corporations.52 The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government share powers within a scheme of checks and balances.
The Philippine government started with the 1935 democratic Constitution based on 
American congressional model and institutions. This American style Constitution53 lasted 
until 1972 when martial law was declared by the then incumbent President Ferdinand 
Marcos.54 The authoritarian martial law government eliminated the old landlord-dominated 
Congress. It adopted a one political party system, centralised the police, imposed 
censorship on the press and took over public utilities.55 Liberal democracy was restored in 
February 1986 and has since been the constitutional framework of the modem Philippine 
governments.56 The new Constitution has shifted significant powers from the executive to 
the legislature.
3.3.2.1 The Bureaucracy
The Philippine administrative system is based on the Western organisational 
model—the Weberian bureaucracy. In the Philippine government context, the term 
bureaucracy refers to the departments or ministries, bureaus and other instrumentalities of 
government through which the different government policies, programs and projects are
49 Sections 1 to 2 and Section 5 under Article VI, ‘Legislative Department’, The 1987 Philippine 
Constitution.
50 Sections 1, 17, and 18 under Article VII, ‘Executive Department’, The 1987 Philippine Constitution.
51 Section 4 under Article VII, The 1987 Philippine Constitution.
52 Raul de Guzman, Mila Reforma, and Elena Panganiban, ‘Local government’, in Raul de Guzman and Mila
Reforma (eds), Government and Politics o f the Philippines, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988.
53 The 1935 Constitution, while democratic in form and type o f government structures, did not develop a
democracy identical with its American Constitution model. The 1935 Constitution provided for a strong 
central government and concentrated powers on the executive (emphasis on the State) in contrast with the 
decentralised structure o f the American political system (emphasis on the rights of the individual). Cited 
in Amando Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the Philippines: 
1946-1972, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, pp. 35-40.
54 Harold Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia: Philippine
Development Compared With the Other ASEAN Countries, Southeast Asian Studies Program and Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1985, p. 41.
55 See for example Crouch, op. cit., p. 45 and Kamow, op. cit., pp. 356-370, 379-383.
56 Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the Philippines: 1946-1972, op.
cit., p. 1.
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carried out.57 The bureaucracy provides services to the Filipino people in the areas of 
health, agricultural extension, irrigation, construction, maintenance and improvement of 
roads and other public works, electricity, and water services.58 Bureaucracies in the 
Philippines may be classified in terms of major branch of government, level of 
government, functional categories or sectoral concerns, and those created as provided for in 
the Constitution (see Appendix 3.1). The Philippine bureaucracy has undergone major 
modifications and changes particularly when a new leader takes over the reins of 
government.
3.3.2.2 Local Government
There are five levels of local government in the Philippines: the barangay, the 
municipality, the city, the province and the region. The barangay is the only indigenous 
local government unit in the country whose origin can be traced to a pre-Spanish 
institution.59 Local governments exercise legislative, executive, administrative and 
governmental (primarily intended for promoting public welfare) functions within their 
respective jurisdictions.
The Philippine local government structure had been characterised by hierarchy and 
centralism, largely the result of colonial imposition.60 Moves for decentralisation were 
evident during the period 1946-1972, but this trend was reversed in favour of centralisation 
when martial law was declared in September 1972.61 In 1991, the Local Government Code 
(LGC) was enacted. It provides for greater local autonomy through devolution of 
responsibilities, authorities and powers from national to local government units (LGUs). 
The Code has been regarded as a radical and significant legislation, involving complex 
structural, administrative and political reforms. The proponents of the LGC view this 
policy as the most potent mechanism for decentralising power and achieving faster 
development. The LGC critics, on the other hand, are worried about decentralised 
corruption, incompetence of local official, and other uncertainties in its implementation. 
The Code provides for countervailing forces against corruption and incompetence by
57 Raul de Guzman, Alex Brillantes Jr., and Arturo Pacho, ‘The bureaucracy’, in de Guzman and Reforma
(eds), Government and Politics o f the Philippines, op. cit., p. 180.
58 Ibid.
59 de Guzman, Reforma, and Panganiban, op. cit., p. 208.
60 Proserpina Tapales, ‘Devolution and empowerment: The Local Government Code of 1991 and local 
autonomy in the Philippines’, State o f the Nation Reports no. 7, University o f the Philippines Press and 
Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Philippines, 1993, p. 7.
61 de Guzman, Reforma and Panganiban, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
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prescribing membership of non-government organisations (NGOs) in all local boards and 
councils. However, the existence of such channels for NGO participation may not 
necessarily guarantee an effective intervention by civil society in the government’s 
political process. There remains a wide gap between policy and practice when it comes to 
the actualisation of NGO participation.62
3.3.2.3 Public Corporations
Public corporations63 have been organised and operated in the Philippines because 
of actual or presumed weaknesses of the market. But there were exceptions, particularly 
when powerholders realised the advantages64 of the corporate structure for the 
consolidation of economic and political powers. Such was the case during the Marcos 
administration when the number of public corporations bloated from 60 in 1970 to 301 in 
1985. The number of public corporations was reduced to about 78 in 1986 as part of the 
economic reform program of the Aquino government.65 The public corporations had eaten 
up a huge portion of the government’s resources. During the period 1975 to 1984, the 
public corporations accounted for an average of 18% of the total national government 
expenditure for the period.66
3.3.3 Civil Society
Civil society in the Philippines during the colonial period had very little 
opportunity to develop and intervene in official decision-making. Instead, the colonial 
experience of the Filipino people stimulated the formation of revolutionary and militant 
groups. All throughout the Spanish colonial rule, many revolts and armed struggle 
occurred.67 These revolts were led by ‘peasant brotherhoods’ who aspired to free 
themselves from hardships of feudalism.68 The Muslims of Mindanao and the mountain
62 Marlon Wui and Ma. Glenda Lopez (eds), State-Civil Society Relations in Policy-Making, Philippine
Democracy Agenda, vol. 2, The Third World Studies Center, University o f the Philippines, Quezon City, 
1997, p. 7.
63 Defined as ‘a public or government institution performing business, or alternatively, a business enterprise
entrusted with certain socially-relevant goals’. Cited in Maria Fe Villamejor-Mendoza, ‘Towards 
deepening public enterprise reforms: Alternatives beyond privatisation’, in Proserpina Tapales and Nestor 
Pilar (eds), Public Administration by the Year 2000: Looking Back into the Future, University of the 
Philippines, Quezon City, 1995, p. 348.
64 For example, flexibility, autonomy and preferential treatment.
65 Juanita Amatong, ‘The Philippine experience in the monitoring and supervision o f government-owned
and/or controlled corporations’, in Tapales and Pilar (eds), op. cit., p. 313.
66 Villamejor-Mendoza, op. cit., p. 355.
67 Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, TA KUNG PAO, Hong Kong, 1971.
68 Jose Abueva, ‘Philippine ideologies and national development’, in de Guzman and Reforma, op. cit., pp.
34-35.
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people in the various Philippine islands maintained resistance.69 During the American 
regime, trade unions and peasant associations emerged to fight against US imperialism and 
feudalism. They formed the core of the Communist Party and Socialist Party of the 
Philippines in the 1930s.70 The organised actions of these groups, such as labour strikes and 
agrarian unrest, had set the stage for the ‘full-scale rebellion’ of the HUKBALAHAP 
(Anti-Japanese People’s Army) and Communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s.71
Civil society in the contemporary Philippines includes the NGOs, people’s 
organisations (POs), social movements and civil organisations that mediate the citizen’s 
relationship with the state. The constitutional and legal framework of the post-Marcos 
governments has provided new avenues through which civil society can influence state 
governance. While there are built-in mechanisms by which the government and civil 
society can interact, problems regarding the utilisation and effectivity of these means of 
interaction persist. Utilisation of these mechanisms can be maximised if the citizens 
become more aware of the political processes involved in decision-making and the means 
by which they could intervene in the process.72
In designing a technology transfer strategy, it is important to understand the 
relationship between civil society and the state and their varying interests. An effective 
technology transfer strategy must engage both the state apparatus and civil society in a way 
that would advance the cause of the rural population.
3.3.3.1 NGOs
According to Ocampo,73 NGOs in the Philippines can be classified into four types, 
namely a) sectoral people’s organisations, b) issue advocacy groups, c) service agencies 
and d) popular coalitions. Sectoral people’s organisations may involve, among others, the 
following: women; industrial workers; farmers; teachers; church people; youth and 
students; doctors; lawyers; tribal Filipinos and nationalist businessmen. Some of the 
problem areas addressed by the issue advocacy groups are foreign debt, freedom from 
nuclear power and military bases, human rights and militarisation, prostitution of women 
and children and environmental protection. Examples of service agencies are those
69 Guerrero, op. cit., p. 17.
70 Abueva, op. cit., p. 48.
n Ibid., p. 42.
72 Wui and Lopez, op. cit., p. 19.
73 Danilo Ocampo, ‘NGOs and the bureaucracy: A collaboration in search of a framework , Kasarinlan,
Third World Studies Center, UP, Quezon City, vol. 5, no. 3, 1990, pp. 66-67.
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engaged in community organising, those assisting in the implementation of socioeconomic 
projects in the community and non-government research agencies. Popular coalitions are 
formal temporary alliances among sectoral or multi-sectoral organisations that seek to 
promote common objectives or demands at a particular time (such as Freedom from Debt 
Coalition, Coalition for Peace, Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform).
Many authors have claimed that the Philippines has the most developed and vibrant 
NGO movement among the ASEAN countries. NGOs began to emerge in the 1950s to 
attend to the needs of the people at the grassroots level.74 Many of these NGOs were 
religious missions and farmer organisations such as the Federation of Free Farmers75 
established in 1953.76 They intervened in the rural areas because the government at that 
time could not seem to cope with the political chaos confronting the country.77 In the 
1970s, during the martial law regime, more NGOs were organised. They initiated 
livelihood projects and organised peasants and workers against the abuses of the 
authoritarian state. The many ‘cause-oriented NGOs’ during this period were also the 
principal actors that supported the ‘people power’ which ended the authoritarian rule of 
Marcos in 1986.78 The Philippine NGO movement gained more enthusiasm during the 
Aquino government. They were also motivated by the entry of new social movements from 
the First World concerned with issues related to environment, peace and gender.79
NGOs in the Philippines have an advantage over their counterparts in other 
countries because, at the level of policy, their role has been officially recognised. The 1987 
Philippine Constitution provides the legal basis for the participation of NGOs and POs in 
the policy-making processes of the state,80 particularly in the government’s social 
development efforts.81 This policy has been actualised in the 1991 Local Government Code
74 Segundo Romero, Jr. and Rostum Bautista, ‘Philippine NGOs in the Asia Pacific context’, in Tadashi
Yamamoto (ed.), Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community, Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies and Japan Center for International Exchange, Singapore, 1996, p. 187.
75 The Federation of Free Farmers still exists with some 200,000 farmer members.
76 Romero and Bautista, op. cit., pp. 187-188.
77 Teresa Encamación, ‘Southeast and Northern Asian NGO experiences: Intervening in state-led economic
miracles’, Kasarinlan-Rethinking the State and the Economy, Third World Studies Center, University of 
the Philippines, Quezon City, vol. 10, no. 1, Q3, 1994, p. 84.
78 Romero and Bautista, op. cit., p. 188.
79 Encamación, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
80 Examples o f NGOs’ participation in government include the following: NGOs are represented in the local
development councils (at least 1/4 of the total membership must come from NGOs); NGOs 
representatives are members o f various sectoral inter-agency planning subcommittees and are participants 
in public hearings and consultations about the Philippine Development Plan; NGOs undertake project 
studies and assist farmers in marketing their products.
81 The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 23 Article II— The State shall encourage non-governmental, 
community-based or sectoral organisations that promote the welfare o f the nation; Section 15 Article
76
(LGC) or the Local Autonomy Act. The LGC provides for the sectoral representation of 
NGOs in the local government councils. It mandates the local government units (LGUs) to 
undertake joint rural development and social welfare projects with NGOs and POs.82 83The 
government has encouraged NGO participation in government processes by providing 
incentives such as duty and tax-free donations, income tax exemption, education and
» • Cltraining.
NGOs in the Philippines are engaged in action projects, policy advocacy activities, 
research, training, community organising, resource mobilisation and management and 
networking.84 They can claim some modest successes in terms of influencing public policy 
or advancing their causes. To name a few:
• The anti-US bases movement won a major victory when the Philippine government, 
under Aquino, finally decided for non-retention of the US bases in the country;85
• The Feedmillers Association in the country has influenced government decisions on 
whether to import com; and
• The farmers-co-operative movement has become partners of government in most of its 
rural development programs.
Other struggles, such as on debt, structural adjustment and agrarian reform issues, have not 
been as successful. In the GATT-UR or WTA debates, the NGOs made headway not so 
much in convincing the authorities to reject or limit the commitments of the Philippines to 
WTA, but in bringing up the matter to a wide public debate.86
Despite the attention that the NGOs are getting, a lot of their potential has remained 
untapped. It has been observed that most NGOs still act as networks of convenience, 
mainly for fund accessing.87 While most NGOs are engaged in trading, marketing and rural
XIII—The State shall respect the role o f independent people’s organisations to enable the people to 
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and 
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means; Section 16 Article XIII—The right of the people and their 
organisations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic 
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate 
consultation mechanisms.
82 Local Government Code 1991, Section 34 (Role of POs and NGOs), Section 35 (Linkages with POs and
NGOs), and Section 36 (Assistance to POs and NGOs).
83 Ocampo, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
84 Romero and Bautista, op. cit., pp. 193-194.
85 The anti-US bases movement mobilised the biggest mass action/demonstration since the EDSA revolution
in 1986, thus putting a lot o f pressure to the Executive and the Legislative.
86 Jocelyn Cajiuat and Aurora Regalado, ‘Dynamics o f civil society and government in the GATT-UR debate
in die Philippines: Lessons for policy advocacy’, Philippine Democracy Agenda: State-Civil Society 
Relations in Policy-making, The Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 
Quezon City, Philippines, 1997, p. 194.
87 Ronald Llamas, ‘We’re trying to learn from our mistakes’, in J. Gershman and W. Bello (eds), Re­
examining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision, Papers and proceedings of the FOPA
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finance, there has never been a network of national or local NGOs uniting on the issues of 
traditional cartels88 and alternative rural financing.89 Therefore, the potential for real 
development work has not been maximised.
3.3.3.2 Progressive Movements
The Philippine progressive movement was once the most formidable threat to the 
government. This movement had its roots from the revolutionary forces during the colonial 
period. During the Marcos dictatorship, the movement included, among others, the 
National Democratic Front (NDF), the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), New 
People’s Army (NPA) and Muslim rebels in Mindanao.90 The movement went deep 
underground and concentrated on armed warfare during the Martial Law regime. After the 
fall of the dictatorship, the movement was observed to be organisationally, politically and 
ideologically unprepared.91 Even then, the movement continued to assert its armed 
struggle, but it soon found itself marginalised and less recognised in the new political 
landscape. However, some sectors of the progressive movement adjusted their practice and 
concepts. They employed political intervention strategies that were more appropriate under 
the new democratic system. The NGOs and POs previously organised by the progressive 
movement were central to these formations.
The governments under the new freedom Constitution have pursued the strategy of 
reconciliation with the progressive movement and have continued to negotiate peace with 
the Muslim rebels of Mindanao. The improved investment climate in the Philippines 
during the 1990s was attributed by the Ramos government to the relatively stable political 
environment due to the nationwide drive to eliminate insurgency. However, for as long as 
poverty and inequality problems in the rural areas are not properly addressed, the 
progressive movements will continue to exist and struggle for a just society.
conference, San Francisco Bay Area, California, 1993, p. 34.
88 Cartel on rice and com distribution and marketing has existed in Binondo, Manila. The cartel has 
reportedly controlled up to 90% of the distribution, thus enabling it to dictate market prices. Their market 
dominance has been made possible by their financial resources and the trade volume that they handle. 
Citing Manila Bulletin in Aida Librero and A. Rola (eds) in Agricultural Policy in the Philippines: An 
Analysis o f Issues in the Eighties, UPLB, PCARRD, Los Banos, Philippines, pp. 186-197.
89 Llamas, loc. cit.
90 FOPA, ‘The dual crisis of the Philippine progressive movement’, in Gershman and Bello (eds), op. cit., pp.
13-14.
91 Ibid.
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3.3.3.3 Quasi-Government Organisations
Quasi-government organisations (QGOs) have proliferated across and within the 
Philippine bureaucracy. The common reasons for creating QGOs include the following:
• The inadequacy of the existing government administrative apparatus to cope with the 
new demands of development;
• The traditional problems of civil service such as hierarchy based on authority rather than 
expertise, rigid recruitment procedures, and cumbersome procedures for disbursement 
of funds; and
• The lack of entrepreneurial skills and technical expertise.92
There are some documented positive results of creating QGOs in the country. For 
example, the Philippine rice production program in 1966 could have been implemented by 
the Department of Agriculture but the decision-makers at that time opted for an ad hoc 
agency.93 94The Rice and Com Production Coordinating Council (RCPCC) was created and 
staffed with qualified personnel with the necessary expertise. The RCPCC was later 
credited for the successful Rice Production Programme of government. The Presidential 
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was formed immediately after the restoration 
of democracy in the Philippines. The PCGG was an ad  hoc body created because of the 
urgency and critical nature of the task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. 
Both the PCGG and the RCPCC were abolished after some time. While the existence of 
QGOs at a certain point in time are deemed necessary, government efforts and resources 
would have been more effective if they had focused more on making the existing 
bureaucratic structure more efficient.
3.4 Political Economy of the Philippine State at Different Political 
Regimes
Throughout Philippine history, both the domestic and the global political economy 
have played an important role in influencing the country’s economic, political and social 
structures. The Philippine state has always been caught in the tension among the various 
interest groups and class segments within the country. The IMF and the WB have had
92 de Guzman, Brillantes and Pacho, op. cit., p. 200.
93 Ibid, p. 201. .
94 The IMF was visualised both as facilitator in promoting international trade relations among countries and
a fiscaliser by providing short-term loans to countries experiencing balance-of-payments deficits (those 
short o f foreign currencies to finance imports). All loans from IMF are accompanied by conditionalities 
addressed to a debtor country’s financial system to get its own book of accounts m order and ensure loan 
repayment.
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virtually an unbroken influence over the economic policy and direction of the Philippine 
state since the balance-of-payment crisis in 1962. The IMF, the WB and the US 
government collaborated to support the first export-oriented industrialisation attempt of the 
Philippine government in the late 1960s and especially after the declaration of martial 
law.95 6 Since 1979, the Philippine governments have been under structural adjustment 
programs (SAP)97 imposed by IMF and WB. As a signatory to the WTA,98 the Philippines 
moves towards greater trade liberalisation and submits itself to another international 
body—the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO oversees the implementation of 
WTA and the agreed rules of trade and economic relations between contracting parties. In 
addition to international trade groups, the Philippine state is also a member of different 
regional trade organisations and collaborations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC).
To illustrate the interplay among different internal and external forces in the 
political economy of the Philippine state, the next sections of this chapter focus on the 
analysis of the different attempts of the Philippine state at industrialisation and rural 
development. Industrialisation and agricultural or rural development have been two of the 
major development goals of the Philippine governments. Other development concerns of 
the Philippine state are unemployment, poverty, income distribution, education, health, and 
peace and order. Poverty and income distribution are closely linked with agricultural 
development since the majority of the population rely on the agriculture sector for their 
livelihood. For lack of space, the analysis in this section concentrates only on policies and 
actions related to industrialisation and rural development.
3.4.1 Colonial Economic Policies
When the Philippines was under the Spanish rule during the 19th century, the 
cultivation of sugar along with hemp, copra, and tobacco became popular. This production 
trend was induced by the big demand for such commodities in Europe and America during
95 The World Bank focuses on the more developmental aspect of project lending initially to reconstruct the
economies o f Europe and Japan. Votes in both IMF and WB are allocated based on each country’s capital 
contribution. This means bigger fund contribution would merit a corresponding increase in voting shares. 
To date the US, UK, West Germany, France and Japan hold about 40 percent o f the votes.
96 Hawes, op. cit., pp. 143-144.
97 The main elements of SAP include among others, reduced government spending, tight money supply,
increased interest rates, currency devaluation, privatisation, export promotion and increased taxes.
98 The Philippine Senate ratified the country’s participation in GATT-UR or WTA on 14 December 1994.
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the industrial revolution." The Spanish government instituted liberal economic policies in 
the Philippines to promote the production of export crops to meet the market demand.9 100 
Since then, sugar had become a major source of economic and political power in the 
Philippines. The big sugar plantation owners and millers101 accumulated huge profits from 
sugar exports during the Spanish era at the expense of the landless peasants who became 
tenants and labourers.102 This inequitable practice altered the social structure in the sugar- 
producing areas in the Philippines. The gap between the rich and the poor in these areas 
had increasingly widened until the collapse of the sugar industry beginning in the 1980s. 
Another consequence of the production of cash crops such as sugar and tobacco was the 
massive conversion of rice lands into plantations, resulting in food shortages and 
importation.103
During the American rule, the Philippine economy was dominated by the US 
economic interests through the preferential access it has on the Philippine market.104 
American products could freely enter the country in the same way that the Philippine 
products, mainly mineral resources and agricultural crops, enjoyed a duty free market in 
the United States. Sugar production continued to flourish under the American regime 
through this privileged market access. The American monopoly over the Philippine 
economy continued even after the declaration of political independence of the Philippines 
from the US in 1946. This was made possible through the passage of the Bell Trade Act or 
the ‘Free Trade Act’. This Act gave equal rights to Americans in exploiting the natural 
resources and public utilities of the Philippines.105 While Filipino capital investments 
increased significantly against foreign capital, the Philippines remained an export-oriented 
economy catering to the raw material input needs of the US market.106 Local manufacturing
99 Kamow, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
100 Ibid.
101 These consisted o f both local property owners, foreign investors, and the monastic orders who were 
proprietors o f large estates.
102 Kamow, loc. cit.
103 Ibid.
104 Emmanuel de Dios and Joel Rocamora (eds), Of Bonds and Bondage: A Reader on Philippine Debt, 
Transnational Institute, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, and Freedom from Debt Coalition, 
Philippines, 1992, pp. 203-204.
105 Cornelia Aldana-Benitez and Conchita Posadas, in Ernesto Valencia (ed.), TNCs in the Thick of 
Everything: IBON TNC Book Series, IBON Philippines, Databank and Resource Center, Manila, 1994, p. 
183.
106 The signing o f the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1954 facilitated the growth of the export sector but 
limited the composition o f exports to sugar, copra and coconut oil, logs and lumber and other products 
needed by the US market. The Agreement gave ready US markets (at good prices and low tariffs) to these 
products. Cited in ibid., p. 184.
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and other economic sectors did not develop because resources were invested in the export 
sector only.107 The landed elite and foreign investors who profited from the export sector 
became the dominant social class in the Philippines during this period. They procured 
luxury goods from the US instead of using their earnings for expansion and diversification 
of the sector. Heavy importation of US manufactured goods continued while the other 
sectors of the economy remained underdeveloped. This eventually led to the first balance- 
of-payment crisis in the Philippines.
3.4.2 Import Substitution in the 1950s and 1960s
Industrial development in the Philippines was first induced by the post-war balance- 
of-payments crisis in 1949-1950. This forced the government to drastically intervene in the 
economy by launching the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy. Import and 
foreign exchange controls were enforced to promote the growth of import-substituting 
industries. Through the ISI program, importation of non-essential and luxury goods was 
restricted while importation of production inputs was allowed.108 Filipino entrepreneurs and 
American firms, who were previously distributors of imported products and who opened 
subsidiaries in the Philippines, participated in the program. This led to the establishment of 
an inward-looking manufacturing sector producing light consumer commodities and luxury 
goods. The ISI campaign did not produce basic heavy industries, apart from steel 
integration industry, which up to then had not been fully developed.109 At first, the ISI 
strategy encouraged rapid growth in the manufacturing sector, but this was short-lived and 
limited in scope in the type of industries promoted.110
The agriculture sector was heavily penalised during the ISI period. Earnings and 
surplus from the traditional exports such as sugar and copra were used to support the ISI 
industries. Public spending for agricultural productivity-enhancing investments such as 
technologies, rural education, rural infrastructure and forest management have been limited 
in relation to the contribution of the agriculture sector to national income and 
employment.111 The overvalued local currency and high tariffs that nurtured the ISI
107 Benitez and Posadas, op. cit., p. 187.
108IBON Philippines, ‘Industrialisation: The attempt’, IB ON Facts and Figures, vol. 12, no. 22, 1989, p. 4.
109 Ibid.
uo Ibid.- Offeneo, op. cit., pp. 3-4; IBON Philippines, TMF-WB: 50 years of global devastation’, People’s 
Policy and Advocacy Studies, IBON Special Release, no. 8, July 1994, pp. 3-5.
111 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernisation, Modernising Agriculture, Congress of the 
Philippines, Metro Manila, 1997, p. 4; UPLB Rural Development Study Team, Philippine Rural 
Development: Problems, Issues, and Directions, University of the Philippines Los Banos, 1991, p. 34.
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industries restricted the growth of the agriculture sector. Many of the products covered by 
high tariffs and import bans were agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and farm 
machineries.112 Therefore, income of the local farmers was severely affected.
Meanwhile, the well-protected manufacturing sector did not develop industries that 
were competitive in the world market. For one, the domestic market was limited because of 
the lack of purchasing power of Filipinos, many of whom depended on agriculture for their 
income. The ISI industries had little incentive to cut production cost and innovate.
A large part of the ISI sector were controlled by foreign investors and multinational 
corporations (MNCs),113 mostly American firms. These MNCs entered into partnerships 
with the local capitalists and large Filipino landlords. Through time, the MNCs have 
diversified their presence in the Philippines, from mainly foreign direct investment (FDI) 
until mid 1960s to subcontracting, joint ventures, licensing, franchising and management 
contracts. Technology choices among joint ventures were generally made by the MNCs. 
These technologies were observed to be very simple involving the final stage of the 
manufacturing process.114
The trade deficit problem persisted and worsened at the end of 1950s. This problem 
was aggravated by the increasing dependence of domestic industries on imported 
machinery, raw materials, tools, and parts and processes. The trade deficit crisis led to the 
introduction of decontrol schemes in the early 1960s aimed at rationalising industry and 
encouraging exports. This represented the country’s first episode of liberalisation. The 
IMF, group of exporters, and the American Chamber of Commerce pushed for an open 
economy policy to avert the balance-of-payment crisis. Because of these pressures, the 
Philippine government was forced to go to the IMF and accept its recommended policies of 
peso devaluation, foreign investments promotion and export-oriented production.115 The 
increasing influence of the IMF over the domestic policy-making process was supported by 
the Western-trained technocrats in the bureaucracy.116 On the other end were the Filipino 
industrialists whose political clout rested in the old Congress, the media, and some
112 Dante Canlas, ‘Institutional challenges of global market reform’, in Cayetano Paderanga, Jr. (ed.) The 
Philippines in the Emerging World Environment: Globalisation at a Glance, University of the 
Philippines-Center for Integrative and Development Studies and U.P. Press, Philippines, 1996, p. 44.
1,3 MNCs or transnational corporations are very large enterprises whose operations span the globe. They are 
based in one country but their factories, plantations, and mining sites are located in many countries in the 
world.
114 Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines, 1946-1972, op. 
cit., p. 55.
115 Offeneo, op. cit., p. 4.
116 Ibid.
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government agencies. They campaigned against further lowering of protection to local 
industry.117 Therefore, the government tried to maintain the industry’s import-substituting 
orientation through tariff protection program. The Philippine economy under the decontrol 
program did not recover because there was so much ambivalence on the economic 
directions the Philippine government would take.
During the second half of the 1960s, the Marcos administration adopted 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in support of a large-scale economic 
development plan. The government resorted to heavy borrowing from both internal and 
external sources to finance this project. However, a combination of continuous protection 
policies and ambitious development plans resulted in a renewed foreign-exchange crisis in 
the late 1969. The policy response was to float the Philippine peso in early 1970 and 
eliminate some of the exchange controls which had been instituted since 1967 and partially 
replaced by higher tariffs.118
As mentioned in section 3.2.4, the ISI episode caused the diversification of the 
Philippine social structure. The manufacturing industry nurtured during the ISI period was 
dominated by three groups as follows: the exporting landed elites, and mining and logging 
concessionaires who diversified into manufacturing; big merchant-traders; and non-landed 
capitalists such as entrepreneurial professionals, technicians and small traders.119 These 
groups exercised oligopolistic control over the manufacturing sector. They entered into 
joint venture projects and collaborated with the MNCs that opened subsidiary assembly 
plants within the tariff protection policy. Their extensive linkages with foreign capital and 
international market increased their economic and political clout. The government was 
often caught between the interests of supporters of ISI and EOI, and this resulted in 
indecisiveness and economic stagnation.120 The declaration of martial law in 1972 resolved 
the policy confusion and the breakdown in elite cohesion in favour of the export sector.121
117 Ibid.
118 Geoffrey Shepherd and Florian Alburo, ‘Liberalising foreign trade: The Philippines’, in D. Papageorgiou, 
M. Michaely, A. Choksi (eds), Liberalising Foreign Trade: Korea, the Philippines and Singapore, voi. 2, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pp. 207-213.
119 Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing, op. cit., pp. 27­
28.
120 Ofreneo, op. cit., p. 5.
121 Hawes, op. cit., p. 20.
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3.4.3 Export-Oriented Industrialisation in the 1970s and Trade Liberalisation 
Episode 1981-1985
Upon the declaration of martial law in 1972, the authoritarian government adopted 
the export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) program as a central state policy. The 
congressional system, which was dominated by the landholding elite and was a site of 
major conflicting economic and political interests, was abolished. With the old Congress 
closed, freedom to participate in the political process repressed, and economic and political 
powers concentrated in the President, it was easy to implement EOI-ffiendly policies. For 
instance, labour strikes were prohibited, wage levels were forcibly reduced, government 
subsidies for consumer goods eliminated, and incentives for new foreign investment 
provided. The IMF and WB fully supported the EOI program. They assisted in forming the 
‘Consultative Group of Creditor Countries’ to help finance EOI-related projects.122 Three 
major world events signalled the era of export-orientation as a development model among 
nation-states, namely the recovery of the economies of Western Europe and Japan, which 
meant that IMF and WB had the resources to assist the rest of the world; the rapid 
decolonisation of most of Africa and Asia; and the failure of ISI strategy in many 
countries.123 Consequently, the Philippines became a recipient of huge amount of loans 
from multilateral and development agencies during the period of martial law.
The EOI program in the beginning of the 1970s focused on the creation of labour­
intensive industries and acceleration of non-traditional exports.124 It involved the 
development of infrastructure for export-oriented industries such as export processing 
zones through the use of foreign loans.125 Incentives to further encourage investments in 
export industries were provided through the Export Incentives Act of 1970 and the 
establishment of the Export Processing Zone Authority in 1972.
A series of reforms were instituted, including government reorganisation and a new 
rural development push. A massive agricultural production program on rice and com using 
green revolution technology was launched to provide cheap food and ensure a low real 
wage level.126 Subsidised credit schemes127 were introduced by the Marcos administration
122 Ofreneo, op. cit., p. 6.
123 BON Philippines, ‘IMF-WB: 50 years of global devastation’, People’s Policy and Advocacy Studies, 
IBONSpecial Release, no. 8, July 1994, p. 5.
124 Ofreneo, op. cit. and Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 149.
125 Ibid.
126 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 149.
127 Called Masagana 99 for rice and Maisagana 77 for com.
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to ensure the success of the rice and com program. The World Bank provided a large loan 
to the Philippine government in support of these schemes. The loan was used to implement 
the training and visit (T&V) extension methodology that would disseminate the green 
revolution technology. It enabled the government to provide subsidised credit to farmers 
for the purchase of HYV seed, pesticides, fertiliser, herbicides and agricultural 
machineries. The World Bank loan also provided the Philippine government the means to 
make bold changes in the structure of the Department of Agriculture (DA). The 
reorganisation of the DA was deemed necessary to suit the requirements of the T&V 
delivery system.
The boldest attempt by the Philippine state at passing agrarian reform law128 was 
made during the period 1965 to 1972. The whole country was declared as ‘land reform 
area’. The landholding retention limit was lowered from 75 hectares to 24 hectares.129 
During the martial law regime, the land reform coverage was limited to rice and com lands, 
and the landholding retention limit was lowered to 7 hectares.130 However, in both cases the 
government lacked the commitment and did not allocate sufficient funds to carry out the 
program.131
The agrarian reform program during this period was accompanied by a vigorous 
campaign for co-operative development. Participation in agricultural co-operatives became 
one of the prerequisites to land ownership. Agricultural co-operatives were used to ensure 
that agrarian reform beneficiaries would pay their land amortisation. The co-operatives 
were utilised as channels for credit delivery. The effectiveness of this strategy in co­
operative development is assessed in chapter 5.
The martial law government directly participated in the economy, including the 
agriculture sector. This intervention led to crony and state capitalism132 or market-distorting 
privileges for specific individuals or firms. In 1974, a monopoly to control the domestic 
trading and export of sugar was established. This monopoly was extended to include the
128 These are government policies meant to innovate or modify the agrarian stmcture by making changes in 
rural institutions including credit and marketing institutions, and the redistribution of land property right. 
Cited in Romero and Esguerra, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
129 Romero and Esguerra, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
m Ibid.
131 Ibid• . .
132 Crony capitalism involves the use o f official government position to advance private economic interests. 
Most of the cronies during martial law were not government officials but private citizens who had close 
personal friendship with the president or first lady. State capitalism involves state-owned enterprises 
managed by technocrats and professional managers. Cited in Hawes, op. cit., pp. 136-139.
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power to set prices paid to sugar planters and millers.133 The monopoly was carried out at 
the time when the preferential access to the US market ended and when world market price 
for sugar began to decline.134 These local and international events meant great losses for the 
industry as a whole. The sugar workers were the hardest hit by these events. Faced with 
military repression and low wages, workers of the sugar industry started to show dissent. 
This led to many cases of violence against sugar workers. Meanwhile, the sugar monopoly 
provided a new source of revenue for the government and became a centre for capital 
accumulation.135
A monopoly was also introduced in the coconut industry. Control of the coconut 
industry was centralised in the hands of a single government agency. The agency started to 
collect levy from coconut farmers in 1973 for a replanting program, research and 
development, extension services, and other development projects.136 However, the levy was 
turned over to the organisation of big landlords of the industry,137 who used the money 
mainly for their private use. For instance, part of the levy was used to fund the purchase of 
a bank, through which a private milling and marketing company was created.138 This 
company was a big threat to independent oil millers. It captured almost three-quarters of 
the country’s coconut-milling capacity and used its purchasing power to further decrease 
producer prices.139
There were other trade monopolies created or accorded to specific private firms 
such as in wheat in addition to rice and com, on importation of meat from Australia and 
New Zealand, production of newsprint, satellite communications transmissions, gambling 
operations, and others.140
The martial law also ushered in the growth of state enterprises. State managers and 
technocrats took over the operations of Philippine Airlines, multinational oil companies 
and privately-held steel mills. The state-owned financial institutions were used to bail out
133 Hawes, op. cit., p. 95.
134 Ibid., p. 94.
135 Ibid., p. 96.
136 Ibid., p. 70; Shepherd and Alburo, op. cit., pp. 228-229.
137 The landlords obtained a favoured government-protected position in the sector through powerful friends 
of the First Family.
138 Shepherd and Alburo, op. cit., p. 228.
139 Emmanuel de Dios (ed.), An Analysis o f the Philippine Economic Crisis, University of the Philippines 
Press, Quezon City., 1984, pp. 49-51, quoted in Shepherd and Alburo, op. cit., p. 228.
140 Ibid., pp. 41, 49-51; Gerardo Sicat, ‘A historical and current perspective o f Philippine economic 
problems’, Address delivered before the 21st Annual Meetings of the Philippine Economic Society, 
PICC, Manila, 08 December 1984.
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ailing but important companies including the crony-controlled enterprises that were not 
successful.141 These state-owned banks were themselves bankrupt by early 1980s. The 
failure of these banks led to a severe cut in policy-guided credit schemes, to the detriment 
of the farmers and urban entrepreneurs.142
Unlike the sugar and coconut industries, the fruit industry has been historically 
dominated by the MNCs. The MNCs and their allies143 were not considered by the martial 
law government as a major political threat. Therefore, the government, through the 
National Development Corporation (NDC), facilitated the acquisition of vast tracts of land 
for banana and pineapple plantation establishment and expansion of the MNCs.144 The 
alliance between MNCs and NDC displaced a lot of small landholders and ethnic 
minorities. The alliance used force through the military on several occasions. The health, 
education and housing needs of workers in the plantations were seriously wanting. Under 
martial law, workers were not allowed to form unions and the minimum wage rate set by 
government was insufficient.
The agriculture sector suffered much during the period of martial law because trade 
monopolies captured the gains from the sugar, coconut, meat, rice and com industries, 
instead of the surplus being available to improve the condition of small farmers. 
Meanwhile, there was evidence to show that MNCs in both agribusiness and 
manufacturing have been contributing to foreign exchange shortage. MNCs of the past and 
the present have relied heavily on imported machineries and intermediate inputs to operate 
their factories. Imports from parent companies are ways by which MNC subsidiaries can 
repatriate profits to their related companies.145 If MNCs remit profits to their parent 
companies in large volumes, the country’s balance-of-payment position will be severely 
affected.146 Furthermore, MNCs have been borrowing huge amount of funds from the local 
banking system to finance their acquisitions and expansion projects. The Philippine laws 
have allowed foreign firms to finance at least 50 percent of their operations from borrowed
141 Hawes, op. cit., pp. 137-138.
142 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 154.
143 The MNCs worked closely with landlords who on their own were politically powerful and supporters 
from inside the government such as the then Ministry of Agriculture, the National Economic and 
Development Authority, and Board of Investment who encouraged the giving of incentives for foreign 
investors.
144 Benitez and Posadas, op. cit., pp. 76-78; Hawes, op. cit., pp. 122-124.
145 Benitez and Posadas, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
146 Ibid., pp. 65-67.
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funds.147 In terms of technology transfer, studies showed that US MNCs perform their 
R&D activities primarily in the US or other developed countries and only about less than 
one percent by their subsidiaries in the developing countries.148
The implementation of the first phase of the EOI resulted in a policy of wage 
control since labour strikes were forbidden by martial law.149 Real wages declined during 
the martial law years and continued to fall until 1987.150 The Philippines became self­
sufficient in rice by end of the 1970s. There was rapid growth in the economy in the 1970s 
but the source of growth was mainly external, from foreign loans and investments.151 
However, by the early 1980s, the economy was again in a severe balance-of-payment 
crisis. Earnings from EOI industries were not sufficient to cover the declining earnings 
from primary products (such as export crops, minerals and timber) and the increasing cost 
of foreign debt servicing.152
Confronted with a combination of the second oil shock of 1979-80 and the balance- 
of-payment crisis of 1983, the authoritarian government accepted the structural adjustment 
loan from the World Bank. The loan was conditional upon the implementation of 
adjustment measures, which called for greater liberalisation, removal of the remaining 
protection to ISI industry, and several austerity measures. The timing of SAP coincided 
with unfavourable external economic developments such as recession in 1980-83, 
depression in 1983-85, world interest rates increase, and declining prices of leading 
agricultural exports.153 The SAP affected everyone in the economy, with the poor suffering 
the most because government services were reduced as part of the austerity measures. A 
combination of economic hardships and the growing political unrest in the Philippines 
culminated in the overthrow of the 20 year-authoritarian regime in 1986.
3.4.4 Trade Liberalisation Episode 1986-1992
The first government under restored democracy continued to push for economic 
liberalisation. The government deepened the SAP’s implementation by reactivating import 
liberalisation program, removing some of the state-supported monopolies, and embarking
U1 Ibid., pp. 67-70.
m Ibid., p. 35.
149 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 149.
150 Ibid
151 Ofreneo, op. cit.
152 Ibid
153 Ofreneo, op. cit., p. 7.
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on a privatisation program.154 It used the Industrial Estates (IEs)155 formula to attract 
foreign investors. However, while credited for having facilitated the restoration of 
democratic institutions,156 the administration’s term closed with the country’s growth rate 
not reflecting the pattern observed in the other Southeast Asian countries. There was 
impressive growth in GNP from 1986 to 1988. However, the period 1989-1991 was 
troubled, exacerbated by consequences of the failed coup attempt of December 1989, the 
earthquake in 1990, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, and intermittent drought and 
flood in various parts of the country.157
A neoclassical interpretation of the kind of liberalisation and export-oriented 
growth under the Aquino government is described as follows: ‘the same equilibrium 
between protectionists and free-traders pervaded within the cabinet, blocking attempts 
toward liberalisation during the first years of the government’.158 To illustrate, the 
protectionist lobby was able to pressure the President to change the executive order for 
dismantling tariff walls of some 1,200 categories of imported goods. The government 
finally agreed to proceed with liberalisation of about two-thirds of the 1,200 items, leaving 
400 items unliberalised.159 The protected domestic producers continued to lobby for the 
postponement of the liberalisation of the remaining 400 items and successfully delayed the 
process until April 1988.
The Aquino government eliminated trading monopolies in agriculture and reduced 
the power of state capitalists. According to Balisacan,160 fertiliser distribution and 
importation was liberalised; price controls on rice, poultry products and pork were 
removed; import trade in wheat, flour, and animal feeds was opened to the private sector;
154 Ibid.
155 The Board of Investment’s definition o f an IE is a ‘large and suitable tract of land which has been 
subdivided and developed primarily for the use of a community of industries and provided with roads, 
water supply, electrical and communication facilities, sewerage and drainage systems and other 
infrastructures’. The most familiar IE to the Filipinos is the export-oriented estates known as export 
processing zones (EPZs). The other types o f IEs being promoted in the Philippines include science and 
technology parks, technology incubation centres and S&T centres. A major criticism against the EPZs is 
that there were few important technologies transferred by foreign firms in the IEs since these estates lured 
only light and medium industries. Cited in IBON Philippines, ‘Industrial estates: A lure for development’, 
IBONFacts and Figures, vol. 13, no. 23, 1990, pp. 1-3.
156 For example, the three branches o f government (the legislative, executive and judicial) were re-activated, 
the media blossomed, and the NGOs proliferated.
157 Bmce Tolentino, ‘Imperatives for sustainable industrialisation’, State of the Nation Reports, no. 9, 
University o f the Philippines Press and Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1993, p. 9.
158 Walden Bello, ‘Revisioning Philippine industrialisation’, Mindanao Focus Journal, no. 32, Alternate 
Fomm for Research in Mindanao, 1993, p. 8.
159 David Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1991, p. 339.
160 Balisacan, op. cit., p. 82.
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and the National Food Authority was divested of its powers over non-grain activities. 
However, the deregulation of agriculture was slow and incomplete because laws necessary 
to effect deregulation involved not only the executive branch of government but also the 
legislative and judicial branches.
In terms of rural development, the major reforms introduced were the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Local Government Code (LGC), 
Countryside Agro-Industrial Development Strategy (CAIDS), and Magna Carta for Small 
Farmers.
The CARP is a social amelioration program of the Philippine government that 
started in July 1987. It was supposed to be implemented in three phases within a period of 
ten years.161 The program is called ‘comprehensive’ because of the following features:
• The land distribution component cut across tenurial arrangements, from agricultural 
leasees to those directly working on land;
• CARP covered both private and public agricultural lands including those controlled by 
MNCs and corporate landowners; and
• The program was time-bound unlike other previous agrarian reform policies.162 
However, CARP’s implementation has been very slow and problematic. CARP is based on 
the comprehensive agrarian reform law that was passed by the landlord-dominated 
Congress. The World Bank163 noted that CARP was loaded with many loopholes. It was 
full of inherent flaws that the landowners, and domestic and foreign investors could use to 
preserve or advance their interests. One study estimated that about 75% of private 
agricultural lands would be excluded from CARP because of the law’s retention limit of ‘5 
hectare plus 3 hectares for each legal heir’.164 MNCs are allowed by CARP to lease back 
lands transferred to farmer-beneficiaries, hence corporate landowners can maintain control 
of their properties. Examples of specific provisions that are in favour of the landowners 
and foreign and domestic investors are listed in Appendix 3.2. These provisions have 
excluded some 254,000 hectares from land redistribution. Furthermore, the implementation 
of CARP has been constrained by its huge budgetary requirement, the inaccurate inventory 
of lands and the limited technical capacity of agencies involved.
161 Republic Act No. 6657, Republic o f the Philippines.
162 Sentro Para sa Tunay na Repormang Agraryo (SENTRA), ‘Market-oriented CARP: A recipe for failure , 
Agrarian Trends, Special Issue, SENTRA, Philippines, September 1997, p. 7.
163 The World Bank Policy Research Report, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 169.
164 Romero and Esguerra, op. cit., p. ix.
91
Through the LGC, the research and extension services have been devolved to the 
local government units (LGUs) to improve the efficiency of agricultural production. 
However, the national government has not provided sufficient institutional support, 
technical guidance and funding to the LGUs to ensure a strong, decentralised extension 
system. The intention of the LGC has been to develop local capability for development. 
However, the development process has remained top-down with national government 
agencies dictating the direction of rural programs. The implications of the LGC for 
agricultural research and technology transfer are discussed further in Chapter 4.
The CAIDS was conceptualised in 1989 to be the main strategy for rural 
industrialisation involving the public and private sectors, but there were no concrete 
guidelines for CAIDS’ implementation. The strategy was for the CAIDS concepts to be 
integrated into the development programs of the various sectoral government agencies. 
However, within these sectoral programs, CAIDS was generally considered in concept and 
did not necessarily form the basis for program implementation.165 The organisational 
structure at the local levels to achieve agro-industrialisation was not clearly defined in 
CAIDS.
The Magna Carta for Small Farmers stipulates that the importation of agricultural 
products that are produced locally in sufficient quantity is prohibited unless certified by the 
Department of Agriculture.166 It provides that farmers must have access to credit at a 
subsidised interest rate and that a government price support system for certain commodities 
be created. These provisions were viewed as inconsistent with the deregulation objectives 
of the Aquino government.
The Aquino government decided to honour the country’s debt commitments— 
accumulated because of the excesses of the previous regime—to the disappointment of 
some sectors of society. The political economy of the Aquino government was laden with 
conflicts of interest, inefficiencies and lack of co-ordination among various government 
agencies.167 The struggle for power among the economic, development and fiscal policy­
makers of government resulted in policies that were directly in conflict with the market- 
oriented policies.
165 David Gorrez, Review and assessment of rural development programs and projects in the Philippines: 
Countryside Agro-industrial development strategy (CAIDS), Report to the National Economic and 
Development Authority, Philippines, March 1994, unpub.
166 Republic Act 7607, Magna Carta for Small Farmers, 1992, Republic of the Philippines.
167 Vos and Yap, op. cit., p. 162.
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3.4.5 Trade Liberalisation Episode 1992-1997
The Ramos administration underscored trade liberalisation in its policy reform 
package. The major policy reforms of the government included the following: imposition 
of laws that rule out monopolies; encouragement of foreign investment through the Foreign 
Investment Act of 1991; accelerated import liberalisation and rationalisation of non-tariff 
protection; deregulation of foreign exchange transactions and the banking sector; tax 
reform packages; rationalisation and privatisation of government-owned or controlled 
corporations; and greater budgetary support for social services.168 The reform measures 
sought to address the system of privilege and protection involving the state-oligarchy.169 
The oligarchy was viewed as the major impediment to the development of the country. 
This strategy worked on the assumption that greater reliance on the market would remove 
the political source of oligarchic power. One valid apprehension about this strategy was 
that, in the absence of a sizeable entrepreneurial class (especially in agriculture) to replace 
the oligarchy, market-oriented reforms would advantage the same oligarchy they sought to 
break.170 At best, the strategy could only ‘discipline’ this oligarchy by forcing them to 
become more efficient.
The rural development strategies of the Ramos administration were incorporated in 
its Social Reform Agenda. In effect, these strategies were not much different from those 
instituted during the Aquino administration. Agricultural development was operationalised 
based on the concept of ‘comparative advantage’ because of the changes in the global and 
regional economic order. The government implemented the Key Production Area (KPA) 
approach to agricultural development. Under this program, priority was given to the 
planting of high value crops in areas where they were most suitable to grow. The acreage 
devoted to rice and com was deliberately reduced to areas where these commodities have 
the best agro-climatic conditions for optimum growth and productivity. Land freed from 
rice and com production were devoted to high value or export crops. However, this KPA
168IBON Philippines, ‘The 1993-1998 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan: Against commitments 
and paths to development, where is the MTPDP leading us?’, IBON Facts and Figures, vol. 16, no. 3, 
1993, p. 3.
169 The Philippine oligarchy or elite includes personages, families and clans of influence who dominate the 
Philippine economy. Some members o f the elite can trace their roots back to the local officials during the 
Spanish era. Most of them were Spanish and Chinese mestizos who became wealthy by accumulating 
land or in finance and commerce. The concentration of wealth in the hands o f the few has allowed these 
families to dominate politics and government since the Philippines gained independence in 1946. Cited in 
Timberman, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
170 Nepo Malaluan, ‘Philippines 2000 and the politics of reform’, Kasarinlan: Philippines 2000: Dream or 
Delusion?, vol. 9, nos 2 & 3, Third World Studies Center, UP, Quezon City, Philippines, 4th Quarter 
1993-1st Quarter 1994, pp. 40,47-48.
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policy, along with the minimal government support on irrigation, post-harvest facilities, 
feeder roads and others, have been blamed for the food shortages experienced in recent
171years.
It was during the period 1994 to 1997 that the Philippines began to achieve 
significant economic growth. It is also during this era that the Philippine government 
acceded to the WTA. This means not only that the Philippine state has the IMF, WB, other 
multilateral agencies, and the MNCs to negotiate with, but it has been subjected to the rules 
set by the WTO. A more detailed analysis of WTA, its implication for domestic policy­
making process, the policy responses of the government with respect to WTA rules, and its 
impact on the agriculture sector are presented in section 3.6.3. Other regional economic 
integration groups and agreements are featured in section 3.6.2. Particular attention is 
given to WTA because agricultural trade, which was not previously included in the GATT 
rules, will now be subjected to liberalisation.
In conclusion, the political economy of the Philippine state for the past 50 years has 
been dominated by industrialisation as a development policy and has been generally biased 
against agriculture. Ironically, however, each industrialisation episode had been 
unsuccessful in achieving the desired economic growth for the country, except briefly in 
the mid 1990s. Even when the country has showed signs of economic recovery due to the 
structural reforms instituted by the recent Philippine governments, sustained growth 
appears to be unachievable. The increase in GNP of 5.5% in 1994 was caused not so much 
by rapid capital formation and increased production or exports but more so by factors 
which were ‘short-term in character’ (such as large power plants), ‘speculative’ (such as 
investments in construction and real estate projects), and ‘seasonal’ (such as good weather 
in 1994).17 72
Although agricultural development has always been part of the Philippine 
government agenda, the basic structure necessary for its successful implementation has 
been grossly lacking. While some rural development efforts have succeeded, maintaining 
their gains at a level where competitiveness can be achieved has not been fully realised. 
Judging by the failed attempts at passing genuine agrarian reform laws and the bias of
171 Renato Constantino, The Invisible Enemy-Globalisation and Maldevelopment, Foundation for Nationalist 
Studies, Quezon City, Philippines, 1997, pp. 96-97.
172IBON Philippines, ‘The Philippines finally taking off?’, IBON People's Policy and Advocacy Studies, 
Special Release, January 1995, pp. 3, 12.
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economic policies against the rural sector, the Philippine state has lacked the commitment 
to a more equitable distribution of economic benefits.
In recent years, Philippine governments have been trying to correct the overall bias 
of economic policies against agriculture. However, by this time, the agriculture sector has 
seriously deteriorated.173 This situation has prevailed at a time when productivity and 
competitiveness are needed to survive the globalisation of technological and commercial 
development.
3.5 Relative Autonomy of the Philippine State
The Philippine state has historically been the site of struggle among various social 
classes arising from conflicting economic interests. Within the elite itself, during the 
authoritarian regime, there were at least four class segments competing for control of the 
state. However, the Philippine state was not a total captive of the social forces that seek to 
dominate the economy and the political scene. According to the study made by Doronila,174 
the Philippine state had some ‘room to exercise relative autonomy’175 vis-a-vis the 
dominant social classes in the country and the policy preferences of foreign interests for the 
period 1946 until the collapse of democracy in 1972. For one, while the 1935 Constitution 
embodied a liberal democracy philosophy, it gave legitimacy to state intervention.176 It 
provided for a strong central government by concentrating powers in the presidency or the 
executive.
The interventionist role of the Philippine state can be illustrated by the following 
case. The industrial promotion policies of the 1950s based on the ISI strategy were earned 
out at the expense of the agricultural exporting interests. The exporters at that time 
represented one of the powerful political groups during that period. State intervention, at 
this point, resulted in elite pluralism and led to the conflict of interests among this 
diversified elite. Such conflict invited more state intervention and growth in the power of 
the executive in relation to the legislature and the judicial system, culminating in the 
declaration of martial law in 1972.
173 The Philippines is prone to calamities such as typhoons, earthquake, volcanic eruption, El Niño and El 
Niña phenomena. These calamities have aggravated the poor condition of the agriculture sector.
174 Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the Philippines: 1946-1972, op. 
cit., p. 6.
175 Rueschemeyer and Evans in their definition of the state and its role in economic transformation argued 
that ‘the State must acquire a certain degree of relative autonomy from the dominant class m order to 
promote economic transformation effectively’. Cited in Doronila, ibid., p. 4.
176 Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the Philippines: 1946-1972, op. 
cit., pp. 39-40.
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The period of strongest state intervention was during the martial law regime. The 
‘emergency Constitutional provisions’ allowed those in control of the state the use of 
authority and military power to overthrow members of the elite opposed to the 
authoritarian model of development.177 This operation was performed even to the extent of 
forcing some important foreign corporations out of business, replacing them with locally- 
owned companies headed by crony capitalists. The leadership was able to assert national, 
executive-branch control over the local factions led by the landowning elite. The state 
interfered aggressively in the private sector domain by creating public corporations and 
state monopolies. However, the ruling government did not use its coercive power to bring 
about positive economic development in the Philippines. Surpluses extracted from public 
and private monopolies were not utilised to create new industries but were used for 
individual political goals of the dictator and his allies.178 Dictatorial power was not 
exercised to bring about agrarian transformation.
During the post-martial law years, the state’s autonomy has been Constitutionally 
restricted. The 1987 Constitution has reduced the power of the presidency in relation to 
Congress. For example, during the immediate post-martial law period up to 1992, there 
were at least three areas of policy in which the state demonstrated weakness, namely on 
insurgency problems, on agrarian reform, and on the restructuring the economy towards 
export promotion.179 The State was caught in the tensions between the communist 
insurgents and the military rebels and the factions within the armed forces. These tensions 
resulted in seven coup attempts and the dominance of military thinking in the insurgency 
policy.
The progress of the land reform program—CARP—during this period, illustrates 
the failure of the state to achieve relative autonomy over the landed elite. In terms of 
economic reform legislation, it took two years before the Aquino government could get 
Congress to approve the gradual elimination of tariff protection and liberalise foreign 
investment rules.180 The only time that the Philippine state during the period 1986 to 1992 
was able to make effective use of state intervention was when it quickly abolished public 
and private monopolies created during the martial law regime.
177 Hawes, op. cit., p. 43.
178/&«/., pp. 82, 128.  ̂ .
179 Amando Doronila, ‘The state, economic transformation, and political change in the Philippines , in 
Tapales and Pilar (eds), Public Administration by the Year 2000: Looking Back into the Future, op. cit., 
pp. 12-17.
180 Doronila, ibid., p. 15.
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The Philippine government for the period 1992 to 1997 aspired to free the state 
from the dominance of the oligarchy through a ‘minimalist state strategy’. The assumption 
here was that greater reliance on the market would remove the political source of oligarchic 
power. However, there were some policy contradictions in this strategy and other reform 
programs. The reform programs involved painful measures that cut across income classes 
and social sectors. The government’s industrialisation scheme was in conflict with the land 
reform program. Regional industrial centres, such as the EAGA, economic zones, and 
development projects, had already displaced thousands of peasant families and indigenous 
people.181 The same industrialisation program promised more jobs yet contained some anti­
labour policies. For example, the government had set a low minimum wage in order to 
attract foreign investors even if it did not meet the high cost of living. The government also 
promoted 19 regional industrial centres (RICs) to foreign investors as being ‘strike-free’ as 
a result of its open support for ‘labour-only’ contracting.182 Also, there was conflict 
between ‘devolution’ and the need to enhance the capacity of central government in 
pushing its industrialisation agenda. The Local Government Code has increased the share 
of LGUs in taxation income. It has expanded the power of LGUs to impose new taxes. 
These provisions in the Code considerably reduced the central government’s resources at a 
time when what was needed was a more cohesive plan for maximising distribution of 
resources for development.
It is in the issue of land distribution or reform that the Philippine state has 
miserably failed to free itself from the interests of big landlords. Various attempts at land 
reform have failed because they contained provisions that allowed powerful landowners to 
circumvent the law or even use the law to strengthen their positions in power. Land 
redistribution based on the agrarian reform laws has always been slow because the 
Philippine governments have not allocated enough funds to implement the agrarian reform 
programs.
In terms of policy issues related to foreign debt and international trade, the 
sovereignty of Philippine state has often been constrained. The Philippine state has been
181IBON Philippines, ‘Regional agro-industrial growth center—growth at the expense of development. The 
final blow’, IBON Facts and Figures, vol. 17, no. 17, 1994, p. 7.
182 With ‘labour-only’ contracting and subcontracting scheme, the formation of union is discouraged because 
workers are hired on temporary basis as specified in the job contract. When job contract is finished, new 
set of workers may be hired. With this arrangement, workers will not be able to enjoy economic benents 
accorded the regular employees like 13th month pay/bonus. Cited in IBON Philippines, ibid., p. 3; lBUJN 
Philippines, ‘Of labor relations and policies: Legislation of interests’, IBON Facts and Figures, vo . ,
no. 9, 1994, p 4.
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trapped in continued indebtedness to both local and international financial institutions to 
support its development projects. The country’s foreign debt began to accumulate during 
the authoritarian regime. The amount of foreign debt soared from US$2 billion in 1970 to 
US$24.3 billion in 1983.183 It was claimed that a large portion of the Philippine debt went 
to unproductive investments184 and ‘crony’ capital abroad.185 The huge debt servicing has 
drained the country’s foreign reserves and has, in part, contributed to the dependency 
relationship of the Philippine governments with IMF and WB for foreign loans. It has 
limited the state’s capacity to deliver basic services that were poverty-alleviation related. 
The government was forced to adopt austerity measures, which meant less government 
spending for social services, infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, education, 
agricultural research and development, and extension service.186
Some of the foreign loans and grants or what is called Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)187 have been in the form of tied aid. Tied aid is assistance provided on 
the condition that part of it will be utilised by the recipient country to buy goods and 
services for the development projects from the donor country.188 This condition has been 
viewed as benefiting the donor countries’ companies or MNCs. Case 3 (under chapter 9) is 
an example of a rural development project funded through foreign aid. Appendix 9.2 
explains the nature and workings of aid with focus on Japan’s Official Development 
Assistance.
The commitment of the Philippine government to WTA implies adherence to the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).189 If the MAI commitments become binding 
on WTO members, the Philippine government will be forced to amend the 1987
183 de Dios and Rocamora, op. cit., p. 71.
184 An example is the US$2.2 billion nuclear plant built by Westinghouse and then mothballed.
185 de Dios and Rocamora, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
186 SAP requires cost-cutting measures on practically all aspects of government expenditures excluding debt 
servicing.
187 Official Development Assistance refers to the flow of resources through official channels which could be 
in the form of financial or technical assistance. Financial assistance could be either loans or grants. Loans 
are transfer of funds from one economic entity to another (e.g. government to government, multilateral 
agency to government) which must be repaid with interest over a prescribed period of time. Hard loans 
refer to those given at market rates o f interest. Soft loans are given at concessionary or low interest rates. 
Grants are financial aid which will not be repaid but will be spent based on the agreement with the 
foreign donors. Cited in EBON Philippines, ‘Official development assistance, anyone?’, IBON Facts and 
Figures, vol. 17, no. 18, September 1994.
188 IBON Philippines, ‘Official development assistance, anyone?’, IBON Facts and Figures, vol. 17, no. 18, 
September 1994.
189 Negotiations on the components of MAI such as national treatment of foreign investors are suspended in 
the WTO at the time of writing. National treatment means that foreign investors will be given the same 
rights and privileges accorded to their local counterparts.
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Constitution. The Constitution is now seen as an impediment to the globalisation policies 
of the government and WTA.190 In particular, there are at least nine provisions under 
Article XII of the Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony that are in conflict 
with the trends to globalisation. The possibility of foreigners owning land in the 
Philippines and the provision on national treatment of foreign investors are being reviewed.
The Magna Carta for Small Farmers has been regarded as one of the foundations of 
political and social stability in the country. However, it has been eyed for revision. Some 
of its provisions are seen as inconsistent with the objectives of agricultural modernisation 
and limited government’s intervention.191 There are other laws to be amended and repealed 
in response to WTA. This topic is discussed in section 3.6.3.3.
In summary, the Philippine state has been caught in the tensions between interest 
groups, resulting in delays in implementation or stifling of reforms. In trying to negotiate 
order vis-a-vis these competing interests, the government has often undermined the 
agriculture sector. The relative autonomy of the Philippine state has been increasingly 
affected by major changes in the international level— from aid relationship between the 
Philippines and the US during the colonial period, to new forms of intervention by 
international and regional organisations. However, within the limitations of the 
dependency relationship of the Philippine state with these foreign entities, it had some 
opportunities to exercise control over its own policy-making process. This autonomy was 
greater during the ISI period, which led to major changes in the economic structure of the 
country, and elite pluralism. It was strongest during martial law except that dictatorial 
powers were misused and abused by the ruling elite. On the other hand, the new 
Constitution has allowed the exercise of influence by all interest groups. While this has 
improved the legitimacy of the post-martial law governments, the policy-making process 
has become much more difficult and slow. In recent years, the power of the state has been 
increasingly reduced as decision-making has been influenced by changes in the global 
economic order.
190IBON Philippines, ‘Globalising the Constitution: The economic basis of charter change , IBON eop e s 
Policy and Advocacy Studies Special Release, no. 40, IBON Foundation, Inc., Metro Manila, Decern er 
1998, pp. 9-10. .
191 Congress o f the Philippines, Modernising Agriculture, Report and recommendations of the Congressional 
Commission on agricultural modernisation, Philippines, 1997, p. 125.
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3.6 Global and Regional Trade Agreements: Implications for Philippine 
Agriculture
In a more liberalised environment, where competitiveness in terms of product 
quality and production efficiency is the rule of the game, the demand for technologies is 
expected to increase. However, it is difficult to predict whether an increase in the need for 
technologies will strengthen local technological capability or encourage the transfer of 
foreign or local technologies. Proponents of trade liberalisation claim that reduced trade 
barriers will stimulate technology transfer because commercial relationships in the form of 
foreign direct investment, joint ventures, licensing, and importation of capital goods will 
expand. Technologies are assumed to flow in nearly all these transactions. On the other 
hand, trade liberalisation can also be viewed negatively in the sense that it will reduce the 
protection against influx of inappropriate technologies and undermine efforts to maintain 
environmental protection measures.
In this section, I examine regional and global trade agreements and their 
implications for the agriculture sector. Emphasis is given on the agreements directly 
affecting the agriculture sector and technology transfer, namely the Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the agricultural agreements of the WTA. These 
two sets of agreement have been the cause of serious concern for the agribusiness sector, 
farmer groups, scientists, environmentalists and legislators in the Philippines.
3.6.1 The Concept of Protectionism
At this point, it may be necessary to describe briefly the principle of ‘protectionism’ 
as this topic will appear quite often in the following discussions. The rationale behind 
protectionism is to discourage imports. The system of protection can be in the form of 
tariff barrier or non-tariff barrier. There are two classes of non-tariff barriers, namely those 
that bypass GATT’s rule of law, and those that capture the ‘fair trade’ provisions of 
GATT.192 The former can include some of the following measures: voluntary export 
restrictions; and other export-restraining arrangements such as import quotas, non­
automatic licensing, state-subsidies, and state monopolies. On the latter, countervailing- 
duty and anti-dumping provisions in GATT can be used to harass foreign rivals to force 
their governments into negotiating voluntary export restrictions. For example, the US has
192 Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, pp. 43-53.
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applied the super 301 provision of the US Tariff and Customs Code193 on countries whose 
markets are seen as inadequately open to American goods and investments.194 Sometimes 
environmental and labour standards (such as claiming that products from the South are 
produced through exploited labour) are used as excuses for protectionism. There was 
substantial reduction of tariffs after the GATT-Tokyo Round in the 1980s. However the 
use of non-tariff barriers as a means of restricting trade has grown in varying degrees 
across the world.195
3.6.2 Regional Trade Agreements
In recent years, there have been moves toward régionalisation. This régionalisation 
trend is thought to be a response to the ‘breakdown in the world trade system’196 as 
evidenced by many breaches of the trading rules.197 The United States, Canada and Mexico 
organised the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) in the 1990s. Europe 
pursued its own free trade agreement in 1992.198 In the Asia-Pacific region, there are two 
régionalisation efforts. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formalised 
in 1992 its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA is a program for freeing trade among 
ASEAN countries—Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia— 
within fifteen years, subsequently accelerated for completion within 10 years.199 The 
ultimate goal of AFTA is to create a regional market to stimulate regional 
industrialisation.200 The initial success of emerging Growth Triangles, such as the Brunei- 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East Asian Growth Area (EAGA), is an indication of 
increasing economic integration in the ASEAN region. The Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) with membership from 18 economies in the Asia-Pacific201 started in
193 The super 301 is a kind of black ball which the Americans arbitrarily and unilaterally impose to stop the 
entry of goods from trade-unfriendly developing countries.
194 Constantino, The Invisible Enemy-Globalisation and Maldevelopment, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
195 Alburo, op. cit., p. 6.
196 See section on protectionism for examples o f violations of international trading mles in the form of 
various kinds of protectionist practices.
197 Florian Alburo, ‘An overview of the emerging world economic environment’, in Cayetano Paderanga, Jr. 
(ed.), The Philippines in the Emerging World Environment: Globalisation at a Glance, The University of 
the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies and The University of the Philippines 
Press, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines, 1996, p. 8.
198 For detailed discussion of the political economy of NAFTA and EEC, see for example Chapters 20 and21 
in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, The 
MacMillan Press Ltd., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1994.
199 Constantino, The Invisible Enemy-Globalisation and Maldevelopment, op. cit., p. 13.
200 Ibid.
201 Members include the six ASEAN countries; five East Asian economies: Japan, China, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hongkong; three from Australasia: Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Gumea, and our 
from the Americas: Canada, United States, Mexico and Chile.
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1989 as a loose forum for discussing trade liberalisation in the region. It soon launched a 
bold program for free trade within 25 years.202
AFTA has been affected by other international trade developments such as WTA 
and APEC. WTA has further liberalised trade on a global scale, thus superseding the tariff 
arrangements within AFTA.203 APEC, on the other hand, has the potential for 
subordinating the economies of Asia, although at this stage, it is just a forum whose 
pronouncements are non-binding on its members. APEC which includes non-Asian 
countries is becoming viewed as a vehicle to serve the interests of the US and Japan.
All the trade blocs and agreements outlined above imply that Philippine agricultural 
farms and firms must be more technologically and financially equipped to be able to 
compete head-on with their foreign counterparts.
3.6.3 World Trade Agreement
3.6.3.1 Overview
GATT is a multilateral agreement on the rules governing the conduct of 
international trade. It convened a series of multilateral negotiations in 1947, 1949, 1951, 
1956, 1962, 1967, and 1979.204 The earlier rounds focused on reducing tariffs while the 
latter rounds covered rules on anti-dumping, import licensing, customs valuation, technical 
standards and subsidies. The latest and most ambitious round was the GATT-UR. 
Negotiations for it started in 1986 and were concluded on 15 December 1993.205
Starting 01 January 1995, the GATT-UR has been replaced by the WTA. The WTA 
requires all Contracting Parties to eliminate trade barriers and harmonise their domestic 
policies with the international agreement to liberalise world trade. It adheres to the 
principle of the most favoured nations (MFN) or trade without discrimination. This means 
that concessions given by one country to another member must also be granted to all other 
members.206 A summary of the New World Trading Pact under WTA is shown in 
Appendix 3.3.
202 Alburo, op. cit.
203 Constantino, The Invisible Enemy-Globalisation and Maldevelopment, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
204 The GATT-UR Interagency Committee, ‘The Philippines in WTO: Moving the Filipino to win , The 
GATT-UR Interagency Committee Report, Philippines, 1995, p. iii.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
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The WTA includes new areas such as agriculture, services, textiles and clothing, 
intellectual property rights and investment measures.207 As agriculture comprises the bulk 
of economic activity in the Philippines, the WTA’s agricultural provisions have generated 
much controversy among different sectors of the Philippine society. It is for this purpose 
that this section is focused on, but not limited to, the implications of trade liberalisation in 
Philippine agriculture.
The WTO oversees the implementation of the WTA and the agreed rules of trade 
and economic relations between Contracting Parties. The scope of its attention extends 
beyond international trade—also covering intellectual property, the environment, 
occupational health and safety, consumers’ welfare, the foreign investment regime, 
industrialisation strategy, food security, agricultural technology and national security.208
As the Philippines’ participation in the WTO has not yet fully materialised and the 
liberalisation conditions are still being worked out, some of the discussion and arguments 
here are speculative in nature. However, this section hopes to contribute to the increased 
understanding of possible consequences of the different governments’ responses to WTA.
3.6.3.2 Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
The WTA intends to reduce impediments to international trade through the 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The main objective of 
TRIPS is to promote technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of 
technology. The Agreement requires all member-countries to align their laws with existing 
international agreements and protocols on international protection. The principles of 
national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment shall be used in the resolution of 
IPR disputes. This would mean that member-countries would provide the same treatment 
to other member-countries’ nationals as they would their own citizens. Members shall also 
give any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to the nationals of one country 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other member countries.
There are many apprehensions regarding the tighter controls on intellectual property 
rights under TRIPS. For instance, it is well known that advanced countries, through their 
MNCs, own most of the world’s patents. It is felt that with TRIPS requiring governments
207 Jose Antonio Buencamino, ‘GATT realities and trade alliances: Implications and prospects for the 
Philippines’, Kasarinlan: GATT Defining the Discourse, vol. 9, no. 4, Third World Studies Center, Ur 
Diliman, Quezon City, Q2 1994, p. 86.
208 Walden Bello, ‘The case against GATT: Drastic surrender of sovereignty’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
December 1994, p. 6.
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of the South to extend patent protection for a minimum period of 15 years, royalty 
payments to MNCs and the cost of imported technology will substantially increase. 
Another area of great concern among the farmer groups and scientists is the plant variety 
protection. TRIPS obliges member states to provide protection for plant varieties, either by 
patents or locally developed regulation. The anti-plant variety protection lobbyists are 
concerned that the MNCs would legitimise their rights over the traditional seed varieties 
and medicinal plants of the developing countries. For instance, ninety percent of the 
vegetable varieties recommended by the Philippine Seed Board have come from the 
farmers.209 By patenting seed varieties, the farmers are expected to pay royalties to make 
commercial use of these seeds. The supporters of TRIPS argue that granting protection to 
plant variety developers will stimulate creativity and innovation among agricultural 
scientists.
The indigenous and traditional community knowledge and practices are also 
endangered because these are not acknowledged in TRIPS. However, policy makers in the 
Philippines have started to design a system for protecting indigenous community 
knowledge and practices.210
While there are indeed some costs to IPR protection, it is hoped that these costs will 
be outweighed by the benefits of having access to critical information or technology at the 
time of value. Other commonly cited benefits from TRIPS are as follows: R&D will be 
encouraged because it will be protected from illegal use; with assurance of IPR protection, 
foreign companies will be more confident not only in generating but also in sharing 
technologies; and there will be better utilisation and employment of scientific manpower.
3.6.3.3 WTA: Implications for Domestic Policies and Policy-Making Process
Policy Adjustment Measures
There are two ways by which the Philippine government will respond to the 
requirements of WTA, namely amending existing laws to conform to the Agreements; and 
where there are no existing laws, enactment of appropriate legislation. On agriculture, 
the Magna Carta for Small Farmers212 needs to be amended to reflect the conversion of
209
210
211
212
Oscar Zamora, University of the Philippines Los Banos, cited in Cajiuat and Regalado, op. cit., p. 184. 
Janes limes and Tim Turpin, Intellectual Property Legislation and Innovation in Asia-Pacific Economies, 
Law Crest, a publishing imprint o f Hybrid Publishers, Ormond, 1999, pp. 90-93.
GATT-UR Interagency Committee, op. cit., pp. viii-ix.
Specifically Section 23 (10) Magna Carta for Small Farmers, stipulating that ‘importations shall not be 
allowed on agricultural products that are produced locally in sufficient quantity mcludmg co ,
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quantitative restrictions (QRs) into tariff equivalents.* 213 According to the GATT-UR 
Interagency Committee,214 this amendment will only tariffy the QRs and will create little 
change in the importation of agricultural products. Rice, which is covered by the Special 
Treatment215 provision of WTA, is excluded from tariff reduction for ten years. Restrictions 
contained in other existing laws216 shall likewise be repealed to incorporate the tariffication 
of all agricultural products except rice in the Tariff and Customs Code.217 An executive 
order or law on the introduction of foreign plants and animal pests in the country that is 
consistent with the international plant and animal protection agreement needs to be created. 
The Seed Industry Development Act (R.A. 7308)—prohibiting the ‘importation in 
commercial quantities of species of seeds that are being produced locally....’—shall also be 
amended, and provision on sanitary and phytosanitary measures will be added. 218 The 
National Food Authority (NFA)219 charter will be revised to allow import and export of rice 
and com.220 Its mandate will be changed from price support to buffer stock management for 
food security objectives. There are pending bills in the Senate or Congress221 that the 
GATT-UR Interagency Committee recommends to be immediately acted upon to improve 
the competitive position of the Philippines relative to WTA.
The WTA antagonists are concerned with the socio-political implications of policy 
changes in connection with the Agreement. For one, by amending the Magna Carta for 
Small Farmers, Bello222 argues that the government is in effect breaking a social contract 
which was carefully negotiated among different social and political sectors of the country.
products, coffee, potatoes, garlic, cabbage, onions and seeds.
213 Congressional Planning and Budget Office, ‘Legislative measures required by GATT-UR of Agreements , 
House of Representatives-Philippines, April 1994.
214 GATT-UR Interagency Committee, op. cit.
215 Stipulates that a GATT Contracting Party has the privilege to postpone for ten years the required 
conversion of a politically sensitive non-tariff measure on a food staple. However, this is accompanied by 
the guarantee o f minimum import access from one percent in the first year of implementation to 4 % at 
the end of ten years.
2,6 Including Republic Act (R.A.) 1296 QRs on onions, potatoes, garlic, and cabbages; R.A. 2712 QRs on 
coffee; and Presidential Decree 1297 and 1593 QRs on beef and beef products.
217 GATT-UR Interagency Committee, op. cit., Annex D.
218 Congressional Planning and Budget Office, op. cit.
219 NFA is a government marketing agency responsible for the attainment of the rice price policy objectives 
of government. It influences the domestic price levels by monopolising the importation and exportation 
of rice and through domestic procurement and disbursement operations. It is mandated to be the buyer 
and the seller of the last resort.
220 Congressional Planning and Budget Office, op. cit.
221 For example, House Bill (HB) 9288 - Encouraging farmers to shift from low value marginal to high value 
crops; HB 1173 - Urging Pres. Ramos and the legislature to sustain and maximise the budget tor 
irrigation; HB9943 - Amending import duties and tariff rates of agricultural packaging materials.
222 Bello, The case against GATT: Drastic surrender of sovereignty’, op. cit.
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Another social issue raised involves the agrarian reform law. By acceding to WTA, 
oppositionists maintain that land utilisation will be affected, further undermining the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).223 For example, smaller, contiguous plots 
of land may be reconcentrated to form big plantations, a condition necessary to survive the 
demands of large, fast, and export-quality production of crops.
Impact on Domestic Policy-Making Process
The concern of some local WTA observers over the effect of the WTO on the law­
making power of the Philippine state deserves mention in this section. Bello224 foresees 
conflict between the ‘sovereign law-making power’ of the Philippine Congress and the 
‘supersovereign power’ of the WTO. According to Bello, the WTO—a body vested with 
enormous trade-related authority—is not a democratic association such as the UN General 
Assembly.225 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism will operate on the principle of 
‘consensus’ controlled by the ‘Quad’226 instead of ‘one-country one vote’ procedure.227 As 
Bello points out,228 the decision-making process in the WTO will be conducted by closed- 
door, secret tribunals ‘from whose decisions there is no effective right of appeal’.
The legislative authorities of the Philippine Senate and Congress have already been 
compromised upon joining the WTO. Congress is obligated to repeal at least 22 laws that 
are incompatible with GATT, including the Magna Carta for Small Farmers.229 Congress is 
obligated to pass or amend certain laws to firm up WTO authority over trade-related 
areas.230 Congress is prevented from passing future laws involving any dimension of 
national life if they are considered ‘unduly trade restrictive’ by the standards set forth in 
the UR.231
223 CARL as it is has been besieged with loopholes and amendments, thus slowing down its implementation 
and effectively diminishing its coverage. The liberalisation of land ownership or the Investors’ Lease Act 
was passed to encourage foreign and big investors to invest in agribusiness. It allows investors, including 
foreigners to lease land up to 50 years, renewable for another 25 years. This violates the Constitution 
which specifically disallows foreign entities to own land. (Kasarinlan Canlas p. 41).
224 Bello, The case against GATT: Drastic surrender of sovereignty’, op. cit., pp. 1, 6.
225 Ibid.
226 An American GATT expert, Dr. Fred Bergsten, said that this consensus is controlled by the Quad the 
United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada. Cited in ibid.
227 Bello, The case against GATT: Drastic surrender of sovereignty’, op. cit., pp. 1, 6.
228 Ibid.
229 tu:J
231 To illustrate his point, Bello gave the following example— ’Suppose the Philippine Congress decides to 
enact a bill banning all imports o f DDT (agricultural input which is highly carcinogenic) to protect the
health of the farmers and the general public. But the US pesticides’ producers protest and gets the US 
government to bring this to the attention of the WTO Disputes Settlement Unit on the grounds that t e 
Philippine law has ‘no scientific basis’ and is ‘unduly trade restrictive’. Suppose the panel ot three tra e
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The WTA, on the other hand, appears to legitimise and reinforce the 
industrialisation program of the Philippine governments starting 1992 up to the present. 
The export-industrialisation development objective of the Philippine government is well 
served by the WTA Agreement. Under the Agreement, Philippine agricultural exports will 
not be discriminated against in the world markets and their competitiveness enhanced by 
the removal of developed countries’ subsidies to their agricultural exports.
At this point, the decentralisation policy of the Philippine government through the 
Local Government Code232 shall be examined vis-a-vis the WTA. Although 
decentralisation has drained the resources of government especially during the transition 
period, it can serve the needs of the agriculture sector under WTA. Increasing 
competitiveness of the agriculture sector requires the delivery of fast and reliable support 
services in the rural areas. This implies the need for greater participation of local 
government units (LGUs) in the provision of agricultural support services. For instance, 
the LGUs will be partly responsible for overseeing the construction of farm to market 
roads, community irrigation projects, and port and cold storage facilities needed to improve 
agricultural competitiveness. Even the delivery of agricultural extension services has been 
devolved from the DA to the LGUs. This extension role is viewed as crucial in ensuring 
that agricultural producers are provided technologies that will increase farm productivity. 
However, the LGUs are not fully equipped and ready for this role. At this stage, it also 
needs the active support from the S&T community, the NGOs and the central government.
3.6.3.4 Impact of WTA on Agriculture
The benefits and disadvantages of WTA on agriculture have already been the 
subject of many debates in the Philippines. A closer examination of these issues provides 
insights on the policy responses to WTA of the Philippine government.
On the benefit side, local economists233 estimate an increase in global access for 
agricultural products, resulting in a P3.4 billion (US $146.7 million) net gain yearly, with 
500,000 jobs expected to be generated annually, and agricultural gross value added to
experts examining the case rules against the Philippines. The decision of this panel is final and the last 
recourse for the Philippines is to get not simply a majority o f 125 members of WTO but all to agree to 
reverse the verdict.5
232 The Local Government Code provides for greater local autonomy through the devolution of 
responsibilities, authorities and powers from national to local government units. It increases the snare ol 
local governments in taxation income and expands their power to impose new taxes.
233 From, among others, the Agricultural Policy Research and Advocacy Assistance Program of the 
University of the Philippines Los Banos, the Department o f Agriculture, and the GATT secretariat.
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increase by P60 billion (US $2.5 billion). More specifically, the benefits of agriculture 
from global trade liberalisation through WTA can be summarised as follows:
a) World prices of selected agricultural commodities will increase due to the reduction of 
subsidies. Domestic prices of tradeable agricultural commodities and net foreign earnings 
or savings will consequently increase.
b) Reductions in import barriers of trading partners will create new market access for 
traditional and non-traditional exports.
c) The degree of overvaluation of the domestic currency will be reduced and will raise the 
relative prices of agriculture compared with other goods and services because most 
agricultural commodities are tradeable.
d) Lowering the excessive protection on a number of agricultural commodities will lead to 
a more efficient allocation of resources within agriculture and across sectors. Lower prices 
of these commodities and processed food products using sugar and com as major inputs 
will improve the consumers’ welfare.
e) The WTA will divert the government’s attention from counter-productive trade 
regulations toward addressing the problem of declining competitiveness of Philippine 
agriculture.234
On the other hand, the main argument against WTA is that it may legitimise further 
the dominance of industrial powers over developing and underdeveloped countries. 
Appendix 3.4 summarises the perceived negative impact of the Agreement on agriculture 
and the corresponding actions by the Philippine government. As indicated in Appendix 
3.4, the Philippine government chooses to provide safety nets235 to allay the fears of 
affected commodities or industries and to counter the negative effects of the WTA on 
agriculture. The soundness of this approach shall be discussed later in section 3.6.3.6.
3.6.3.5 WTA: Impact on the Environment
There are a number of WTA provisions that appear to be safeguards against adverse 
environmental consequences (Appendix 3.5).236 The Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI)237 for its part released public statements about the subject, as follows:
234 Cristina David, GATT and Philippine agriculture: Facts and fallacies, paper presented at the symposium 
in honour of Dr. Gelia Castillo, Philippine Social Center Commonwealth Ave., Diliman, Quezon City, 
27-28 September 1994, pp. 9-10.
235 Safety nets are in principle short-run measures that can reduce shocks for the affected sectors of society 
and not in themselves contributions to long-term solutions.
236 Ricardo Umali, Brief on GATT-UR in relation to environment, paper presented during the DENR 
National Management Conference, Davao Insular Hotel, Davao City, Philippines, 25 August 1994, pp. -
108
• Environmental degradation has resulted not because of trade itself but because prices 
fail to reflect costs to the environment;237 38 there is an absence of well-defined property 
rights which allows open access to resources; government has failed to invest on 
environmental protection control infrastructure; and poverty, population pressure and 
high demand for Philippine exports have led to excessive scale of extractive resource 
use.
• GATT members are free to adopt and enforce environmental measures as long as they 
apply to all and there is no discrimination.
• The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment will give the needed attention to link 
trade with environmental policy.
While the direct impact of WTA on communities and resources worldwide are 
largely unknown, there are reasons to be concerned because of the following observations:
• GATT rules often treat environmental measures as trade-restrictive;
• Investment rules in GATT do not require investors to meet certain environmental 
standards. The same rules create strong temptation for multinational corporations 
(MNCs) to invest in nations with weaker environmental laws; and
• There are no guidelines on natural resource extraction or harvest rates nor on the 
promotion of sustainable practices.
Concerns about the first issue are justified on the basis of previous cases in which certain 
trade principles conflict with measures to protect the environment. To illustrate this point, 
it is worthwhile looking at the specific cases cited by Gutierrez.239 In 1990, a GATT panel 
mled against Thailand’s act of banning imported cigarettes for reasons of protecting human 
health, because it did not impose a similar ban on domestic production and sales of 
cigarettes. Similarly, the GATT panel ruled against the US ‘Superfimd’240 on the grounds 
that a tax on imported petroleum violated the principle of national treatment.
5.
237 Eric Gutierrez, ‘History A.G. (After GATT): The Philippines when the GATT spills over’, Political Brief, 
Institute for Popular Democracy, Philippines, November 1994, p. 12.
238 According to M. de los Angeles (in ‘Philippine trade and the environment: Exploring the implications of 
GATT), pricing failures is the most direct cause o f environment degradation where environmental costs 
and/or consumption are not internalised by the concerned producers and consumers. As a consequence, 
the scale o f production and the techniques employed in using environmental and natural resources tend to 
be wasteful and/or generate pollution. The government has also failed to capture the economic rents (e.g. 
environmental taxation) from the exploitation of the country’s resources.
239 Gutierrez, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
240 Collected from higher taxes imposed on petroleum and certain imported substances, and supposed to be 
used to clean up toxic wastes.
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Bello241 provides a clear illustration of the adverse effect on the Philippine 
environment of export-oriented production. He correlates this with the impact of the debt 
crisis and structural adjustment. He claims that prawn farming in the Philippines, intended 
for the foreign markets, not only destroyed mangroves but also affected traditional 
agriculture because of its extensive use of a mix of salt and fresh water. He explains that 
the inflow of salt water threatened to lower the productivity of adjacent rice fields. Indeed, 
the tales of environmental damage associated with free trade and industrialisation in the 
Philippines are many. Environmental problems are common in logging, mining and agri­
business industries that are developed around the needs of Japan, United States, and other 
industrialised countries. Some of these stories are summarised in Appendix 3.6.
While trade liberalisation may force inefficient and pollutive local industries to 
modernise more quickly by adopting state-of-the-art technologies—which may include 
pollution control equipment due to lower importation costs—there are accompanying 
ecological costs as well. Some of these modem technologies will be resource and energy 
intensive. In their bid for competitiveness, production sectors are expected to shift to 
highly productive although uniform one-dimensional systems. For example, monoculture 
in agriculture might be used. This system of production is vulnerable to outbreak of 
diseases and insects and requires higher inputs in terms of fertilisers and pesticides.
With freer trade due to WTA, the intensity of industrial processes is expected to 
increase. As a consequence, pollution will most likely escalate until such time that local 
industries will shift to cleaner and environment-friendly technologies. Statistics show that 
at the present level of industrialisation in the Philippines, the extent of pollution is already 
alarming. According to a United Nations report cited by Bello,242 some 20-30% of water 
pollution in the whole country and 30-40% of air pollution in Metro Manila originate in 
industry. The Environmental and Natural Resource Accounting Project (ENRAP)243 
examined the Philippine trade in terms of factor content and pollution intensity, ‘based on 
the DENR-Environment Management Bureau 1983 classification of commodities . The
241 Walden Bello, ‘Global economic counterrevolution: The dynamics of impoverishment and 
marginalisation’, in Richard Hofhchter (ed.), Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental 
Justice, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 203-204.
242 The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific report, Environmental 
Aspects of TNCs Activities in Pollution-Intensive Industries in Selected Asian and Pacific Countries . 
Cited in Bello, ‘Revisioning Philippine industrialisation’, op. cit., p. 15.
243 ENRAP c/o Project leader M.S. delos Angeles, Philippine trade and the environment: Explormg the 
implications o f GATT, discussion paper presented during the Third ENRAP Network meeting, NEDA, 
November 1994. pp. 1-6.
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project indicates that during the period 1975-1990, there was a trend towards less pollution 
intensity of Philippine exports. Examples are exports with unskilled labour and human 
resource-intensive components (except in the semiconductor industry). However, during 
the same period, there was an observable increase in the importation of more hazardous 
commodities. It is uncertain, though, whether this trend will prevail in the context of freer 
trade. The same project concludes that at the national level, while industry as a group is the 
major source of air pollutants, government and household sectors are also responsible for 
significant pollution.
The foregoing discussions indicate that there is uncertainty as to the impact of 
greater trade liberalisation on the environment. A comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) to reduce this uncertainty and prepare government and all sectors for the 
consequences of WTA is deemed necessary. The idea of adopting resource accounting 
systems, as advanced by the scientific community, makes much sense. With this system, 
the costs incurred on the environment as a result of expanded trade will be reflected in the 
balance sheets. The ongoing research of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
(PIDS) for the formulation of standards for a resource accounting system is a step in this 
direction. For the long term, ways by which government can capture economic rents (such 
as environmental taxation) from the exploitation of the country’s resources should be 
developed. This way, firms will be forced to abate pollution to avoid payment of taxes. The 
revenues from this activity, in turn, can be used to improve the government’s resources 
monitoring, enforcement of rules and regulations, conservation, and public investments. 
These revenues can be used to provide the necessary infrastructure that will enhance the 
capability and competitiveness of the rural communities.
3.6.3.6 Safety Nets as Response to WTA
The preceding discussions indicate that with the WTA, there will be winners and 
losers in the agriculture sector. To counter the perceived negative effects of WTA and to 
increase agricultural competitiveness, safeguard or ‘safety net’ measures will be provided 
by government. Some of these safety net measures, as outlined in the report prepared by 
the Congressional Planning and Budget Office,244 are as follows:
a) More vigorous construction of farm to market roads, irrigation facilities, port and cold 
storage facilities;
244 Congressional Planning and Budget Office, op. cit.
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b) Accelerated technology transfer to farmers and their co-operatives;
c) Improvement in the genetic quality of Philippine agricultural products;
d) More credit opportunities for farmers and their co-operatives;
e) Reduction in tariffs to a maximum of 10% for agricultural and food packaging materials, 
refrigeration equipment; and
f) Decartelisation of shipping and demonopolisation of arrastre and other port services to 
reduce cargo transport and handling cost.
David245 observes that the other proposed safety net measures are counterproductive 
and may create more distortions in agriculture. The case of com is an example. To allay the 
fears that with a 100% tariff on com the livestock producers will substitute wheat for com, 
tariff rates for wheat, when used as feeds, are proposed to be increased to the level for com. 
This move will be detrimental to the livestock and poultry industry, whose most important 
feed ingredients (such as com and wheat feeds) will be taxed at a much higher tariff rate. 
The DA also proposes that tariff proceeds from imports of agricultural products under the 
minimum access requirements be earmarked to fund support services. David246 finds this in 
violation of good public finance management because it will be a highly unstable source of 
funding for agricultural support services. She explains that a committee composed of 
representatives from government and the affected sectors is being proposed to manage the 
collected funds. David247 argues that this committee cannot be expected to allocate 
resources in favour of commodities with the highest technological and market potential.
In conclusion, the major problem of Philippine agriculture is its declining 
competitive advantage (see Table 3.1). With or without WTA this must be addressed. I 
take the same position as David,248 namely that the provision of agricultural support 
services must be considered in the light of improving the competitiveness of Philippine 
agriculture and not as safety nets. The issue is not how to provide safety nets because of 
WTA but rather how to take advantage of the opportunities for improving the competitive 
advantage of agriculture. This position finds strength in the argument that as a safety net, 
there is a tendency to choose short-term rather than more effective long-term policies such 
as a genuine agrarian reform program.
245 David, op. cit., pp. 12-20.
246 Ibid., p. 16.
247 Ibid.
M Ibid„ p. 13.
Table 3.1 Average growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP), agricultural value
added (GVA), and agricultural exports in selected Asian countries, 1980-1992 
(%)■
Country GDP Agriculture
GVA
Agriculture
Export
China3 8.5 5.6 9.1
Indonesia 5.6 2.9 2.6
Malaysia 6.2 3.4 1.8
Thailand 9.9 5.8 5.2
Philippines 1.5 1.1 -3.2
India 5.6b 3.8C 5.1
Pakistan 13.1 11.3 1.6
Nepal 4.5 4.6 -1.0
Bangladesh 4.0 2.9 -1.5
Sri Lanka 4.1 1.8 -0.4
aRefers to China and Taiwan 
 ̂Data up to 1990 only 
C Data up to 1991 only
Source: David, ‘GATT and Philippine agriculture: Facts and fallacies’, p. 27, citing FAO Production and
Trade Yearbooks.
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This section demonstrates the diversity of interests, interactions, concerns and 
political processes involving the various stakeholders of the international and regional 
trade agreements. This complexity suggests the importance of looking at the technology 
transfer process in the context of the socio-political interests of many groups apart from 
those directly involved in the application of technologies.
3o7 Conclusion
Viewed from the global economy perspective, the Philippine state has for a long 
period been tied to or associated with US capitalism. The structure of the Philippine 
agricultural sector has been influenced, in large part, by the US market during the 
American colonial rule, by the Free Trade Act between the Philippines and the US during 
the immediate post-independence era, and by the interventions of the US-dominated IMF 
and WB in recent decades. The Philippines has been one of the most heavily indebted 
developing countries with debt servicing severely affecting its foreign exchange reserves. 
This situation has made it more vulnerable to the dictates of foreign donors. The Philippine 
state has relied heavily on foreign investments to finance its industrialisation and rural 
development programs. It has been home to many MNCs that operate in all areas of the 
economy including the agribusiness sector.
The development strategies of the Philippine state have been dominated by export- 
oriented, foreign investment-reliant, and import-dependent industrialisation policies, 
except during the ISI period in the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, economic policies have 
been directed towards attracting foreign capital, often at the expense of small farmers and 
workers. Philippine governments have introduced a number of economic and political 
reforms. However, these reforms have been mainly biased against the rural or agriculture 
sector. For example, CARP has been compromised on several occasions because it has 
been implemented within the context of the export-oriented development policy of the 
government. In the first instance, there is already a contradiction between the objectives of 
CARP and the requirements of the Key Production Area program that promoted the 
production of export crops, the development of growth centres, and the WTA. The 
slowness by which the past and present land reform programs in the Philippines have been 
implemented has also created an atmosphere of uncertainty. This has encouraged 
premature conversion of lands to non-agricultural uses and has given time to big 
landowners to find ways to avoid the land reform laws.
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Public investments in agricultural productivity-enhancing projects, such as land 
reform, irrigation facilities, rural roads, research and development, extension and 
technology transfer, have been grossly insufficient. As a result of this policy bias, the 
agriculture sector has not developed into a competitive, productive and efficient sector. 
With the agriculture sector now opened for global competition, it finds itself ill-prepared 
for the competition. There is also a danger in the tendency of government institutions in the 
Philippines to focus on the most affected areas of the WTA and short-term policies at the 
expense of more effective long-term agricultural policies. With or without the WTA, it is 
important that the Philippine government rehabilitate the agriculture sector and provide the 
necessary competitive-enhancing support measures, which will continue to be allowed 
under the WTA.
The Philippine state has been generally captured by conflicting domestic and 
foreign interests, except in a few cases when particular Philippine governments displayed a 
strong activist role in the economy.249 These local and global pressures resulted in delays in 
the implementation of meaningful economic reforms, constrained the state’s ability to 
make decisions for the interest of the majority of the Filipinos, and led to an overemphasis 
on short-term policies at the expense of long-term planning. Partly due to the frustration 
over the inability of the Philippine governments to alleviate poverty in the country, the 
NGO movement has developed in the Philippines. During the martial law regime, there 
were many underground NGOs involved not only in initiating livelihood projects but also 
doing advocacy work such as organising the peasants against the dictatorial rule. The 1987 
Constitution and post-martial law policies have allowed NGOs to freely operate and have 
provided them greater opportunities to participate in the decision-making process of the 
government. An active NGO community can stimulate a strong civil society that will serve 
as a check and balance on the powers of the state and the elite.
Agricultural subsidies and trade barriers which are rampant in industrialised 
countries are expected to decrease progressively with the WTA. Taking this positively, 
new opportunities are opened to net agricultural exporters such as the Philippines. There is 
no assurance, however, that these countries will not continue to practice other means of 
protectionism. As in the past, they may find loopholes in the WTA and use this to agitate 
their competitors. There is also a perceived increase in opportunities for technology
249 For example, during the ISI period that resulted in elite pluralism, and martial law regime that resulted in 
major economic distortions such as monopolies, rent-seeking activities and corruption.
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transfer with WTA. However, the Philippine government must learn how to manage this 
technology transfer well to ensure that the benefits from technology transfer are maximised 
and the cost of negative consequences minimised. It has to ensure that the local capability 
to absorb the technologies from abroad is in place.
The smallness of a country such as the Philippines may inhibit it from confidently 
advancing its rights vis-a-vis the industrialised countries. It is thus important that the 
developing countries join forces and continue their vigilance for fair trade. For instance, 
there is a move among the Asian countries to create its IMF counterpart, the Asian Fund.
It is within the political economy environment outlined in this chapter that 
agricultural development and technology transfer in the Philippines should be understood. 
It is important for technology transfer managers and interveners in the rural sector to 
understand and discern the contradictions, opportunities, socio-political processes and 
constraints within the political economy of the Philippines. This awareness can help the 
agricultural technology transfer managers and interveners design innovative strategies that 
will overcome such constraints and use opportunities as they arise. This sensitivity could 
increase the chances for their strategies to bring about meaningful change in the rural 
sector.
The complex setting in which the agriculture sector and technology transfer is 
located suggest the importance of adopting technology transfer models and theories that 
incorporate a social, economic and political view of agricultural development. The 
traditional models of innovation and technology transfer do not provide a satisfactory 
framework for these observations; the dynamic and evolutionary models of innovation and 
technology transfer are more appropriate.
While this contextual analysis offers considerable insights into the broader issues 
that the agriculture sector and the technology transfer process need to consider, this 
approach needs to be supplemented by an understanding of the more immediate 
environment. The analysis of the agricultural research and extension system the direct 
setting of technology transfer—offers such an opportunity. This is examined in the 
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provides a macro view of the socioeconomic and political 
environment of the Philippines highlighting the aspects that have relevance to the 
agriculture sector. The macro view brings into focus a complex array of interests, 
structures and political processes that have implications for agricultural technology 
transfer. This chapter shifts the focus of discussion and explores the inner sphere of 
technology transfer in the agriculture sector, which is the national agricultural research and 
extension (R&E) system.
This chapter begins with background information on Philippine agriculture and an 
organisational sketch of the agricultural R&E system. It examines the interrelationships 
among the various entities within the system that are directly or indirectly involved in the 
technology transfer process. The technology transfer approaches and strategies of these 
institutions are analysed in terms of their features, commonalities and differences. These 
approaches vary from simple rural extension projects to more sophisticated approaches 
such as science parks, business incubators and joint ventures. Differences in strategies 
depend on which segment of the agricultural sector the agencies involved are targeting 
(such as small farmers and private agribusiness companies), the technology transfer 
objectives, the type of technology being promoted (such as product, process and service), 
and/or the technology transfer models the agencies involved are following. This chapter 
also examines the impact of the international research and donor agencies on the R&E 
system in the Philippines. It ends with the identification of some complementarities among 
various technology transfer approaches.
The technology transfer or extension system of the Philippine agriculture sector has 
always been associated with government services. As mentioned in chapter 1, the existence 
of numerous widely dispersed farmers and small enterprises, not capable of undertaking 
their own research, has impelled government to assume the major responsibility of
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technology transfer. The private sector, non-government agencies, and universities also 
have their own technology transfer initiatives, although limited in scope.
Analysis of the state of technological change in the sector points to the wide gap 
between potential commodity yields based on research and actual farm outputs. To narrow 
this gap, I underscore the importance of an effective technology transfer strategy together 
with other agricultural productivity enhancing services. I acknowledge that the policy bias 
against the agriculture sector in the Philippines, as outlined in chapter 3, has constrained 
the delivery of these services to the rural areas and has resulted in less competitive and 
productive agriculture sector. Ironically, competitiveness and productivity are qualities 
necessary to be able to survive this period of greater liberalisation and globalisation.
The bureaucratic structure of the agricultural R&E system is at the core of the 
problem. It is a major obstacle to an effective technology transfer system and is conducive 
to the implementation of top-down approaches to agricultural development. With this 
structure, the identification of national and regional R&D and extension plans and 
programs is generally done by the research and academic institutions. This practice often 
results in technologies that do not match the needs and resources of the farmers.
This organisational problem has intensified the weak linkages at various levels 
within the agricultural R&E system. The 1992-decentralisation policy of the Philippine 
government is an attempt to reduce bureaucracy in extending agricultural services to the 
rural areas. However, the potentials of this policy have not been fully explored because of 
some budgetary, political and human resource management issues. The weak linkage 
between research and extension groups is also associated with the incentive system for 
agricultural R&D and extension. For instance, extension workers have relatively low 
morale compared to researchers because they get much lower salaries and fewer skill 
development opportunities than the researchers. The award system for researchers is 
usually based on scientific publications instead of putting emphasis on technology transfer.
The analysis of the agricultural R&E system in relation to foreign intervention 
shows that the technology transfer approaches and policies of agencies concerned 
described in section 4.6 are in part influenced by the international donor agencies. Because 
of limited local funds, these donor agencies will continue to play a major role in 
agricultural R&E. However, I argue that arrangements with these foreign institutions must
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be regulated and carefully assessed so that benefits that will go to the fanners will be 
maximised.
This chapter also observes the tendency of some agencies in the agricultural R&E 
system to introduce a new development program to correct another failed program. The big 
rural development programs are usually funded by international agencies. I argue that this 
practice will be more effective if the deep-rooted problems within the system, such as the 
issue of bureaucracy, are acknowledged and dealt with. Also, a more careful review of past 
and existing strategies/programs is necessary to draw useful lessons and identify areas in 
which different programs can complement each other. Comparative analysis of some of 
these strategies reveals areas of complementarity and provides indications of what changes 
are appropriate to improve the national system for agricultural R&E. These elements tend 
to converge towards the following bottom-up strategies: development of techno-based rural 
enterprises; engagement of the services of team of expert facilitators, mentors and 
communicators that can provide management support to the clientele; incorporation of 
sustainability measures in the programs; and conscious effort to involve the clientele in all 
aspects of the technology transfer process.
4.2 Background on the Philippine Agriculture Sector
The structure of the Philippine agriculture sector can be deduced from Figure 4.1. 
Rice, com and coconut jointly represent 78 percent of the total area harvested to crops. 
Export crops (other than coconut), such as sugarcane, banana, pineapple, mango, abaca and 
mbber, constitute about 10 percent, while the rest are harvested to a wide range of high 
value and minor crops.1 In terms of the main occupation of families in the rural areas, sixty 
percent (60%) are engaged in the production of rice, com, coconut or a combination 
thereof, three percent (3%) in sugarcane, and the rest are involved in the production of 
other agricultural commodities (Table 4.1).
The Philippine agriculture sector consists of a large number of small farm owner- 
cultivators, landless rural farmers, upland farmers (farming on marginal and rolling hills 
and steep mountain slopes) and fisherfolks. It also involves a significant number of 
commercial farms and agribusiness corporations (such as those growing bananas and
1 Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources (PCARRD)-Policy Advocacy Group 
(PAG), ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, 
Philippines, September 1993, pp. 3-4.
Mango, Pineapple,
Rubber, Coffee,
Banana,
Sugarcane, Abaca Others
9% 13%
Corn
25%
Rice
29%
Coconut
24%
Figure 4.1 Area harvested to agricultural crops 
in the Philippines, 1994
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture, 
Philippines
Table 4.1 Main occupation of farm households.
Main O c c u p a tio n  o f  H o u s e h o ld  
Head
T o ta l N o . o f  Fam ilies S h a re  o f G ro u p  
in T o ta l F a m ilie s  
(%)
P o v e rty  
G a p  (% )
All agricultural families 3962.3 100 100
Rice farmers 1103.9 27.86 24.04
Corn farmers 596.4 15.05 20.48
Sugarcane farmers 19.4 0.49 0.29
Other crop farmers 203.4 5.13 6.13
Coconut farmers 360.9 9.11 9.37
Fruit tree farmers 17.6 0.44 0.22
Livestock and poultry raisers 23.4 0.59 0.41
Other livestock farmers 9.2 0.23 0.22
Rice & corn workers 215.2 5.43 6.49
Sugarcane workers 88.5 2.23 3.04
Other crop farm workers 16.4 0.41 0.49
Coconut farm workers 61.6 1.55 1.81
Livestock & poultry workers 13.8 0.35 0.24
Other crop & animal 
husbandry workers
80.1 2.02 1.21
Forestry workers 46.6 1.18 1.29
Fishermen 515.4 13.01 13.38
Other occupation 590.5 14.9 10.88
Source: Balisacan, 1991, quoted in PCARRD-PAG, 1993.
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pineapples for export), which according to Quisumbing2 can be considered as capitalist 
enterprises because of their large-scale operations and use of wage labour. There are non­
capitalist plantations, such as those in sugar and coconut, in which the common 
arrangement is the hacienda system3 or tenancy.4 A few agricultural processing companies, 
such as food and feed processors, are mostly urban-based, capital intensive and basically 
import dependent. To give an idea of the size of these groups in the rural areas, the 
following selected research findings indicated in Callanta’s5 book are worth revisiting. 
Aguilar’s study6 of 1981 indicated that the proportion of landless households in rice 
growing areas of the Philippines could be anywhere between 20-50 percent. Various 
studies revealed that bulk of landless farm workers could be found in the rice and com 
subsectors.7 With regard to upland farmers population, the Bureau of Forest Development,8 
gave an estimate of 7.5 million9 in 1981, 4.5 million of which are national cultural 
minorities.10 The Luzon Secretariat for South Action (LUSSA) Research staff found out 
that in 1982, about 13 percent of rice farmers are small farm owner-cultivators.11
The agriculture sector can also be classified according to the type of farming 
activity. Gorrez12 describes this typology in the following manner. Subsistence agriculture 
involves poor soil conditions, use of low levels of inputs, lack of access by farmers to 
technologies and capital, and very low productivity. Self-sufficient farm ing  has capabilities 
for providing the household food need, hence resulting to improved nutrition, but with 
limited access to technologies, capital and market. Diversified farm ing is a production level
2 Ma. Agnes Quisumbing, ‘Agrarian reform and rural poverty in the Philippines’, Countryside Development:
The Journal for the CD Professional, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1990, p. 42.
3 Hacienda system refers to farm estates where large number of hired wage labourers, organised under a
central management, are employed.
4 Quisumbing, loc. cit.
5 Ruth Callanta, Poverty: The Philippine Scenario, Bookmark, Inc., Makati, 1988.
6 Ibid., p. 42.
7 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
8 Ibid., p. 59.
9 About 12.5 % of total Philippine population.
10 National cultural minorities are indigenous peoples of the Philippines. As of 1986, therewere 60 groups
with a total population of about 7 million people (14% of national population). They are mostly 
concentrated in the northern and central part of Luzon (25 groups) and southern Philippines (35 groups). 
They are the descendants o f peoples who refused to surrender to colonisation by the Spaniards and 
Americans. Their cultures are rooted in their lands. Cited in IBON Facts and Figures, vol. 16, no. 22 , 30 
November 1993, pp. 2-3.
11 Callanta op. cit., p. 43.
12 David Gorrez, ‘Review and assessment of rural development programs and projects in the Philippines. A
countryside agro-industrialisation development strategy (CAIDS)’, National Economic Developmen 
Authority (NEDA), Manila, March 1994, pp. 119-121.
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in which agricultural activities are diversified and multi-purpose. Crops and livestock are 
common combinations. Here, there is improved access to technologies, capital and market. 
Specialised farm ing  is self-contained and fully integrated. Typical of this type are large 
plantation-scale crops intended for a specific market. This makes full use of prime 
resources in land and infrastructure and employs a variety of technical or managerial 
expertise. The majority of rural households fall under types 1 and 2.
A closer look at Philippine agriculture will give a general picture of the level and 
state of technological change and innovations, and the nature of support services in the 
sector. Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.5 provide a snapshot of agricultural innovations on a 
commodity or industry basis, namely rice and com; coconut and sugar; banana, pineapple 
and mango; livestock; and timber and furniture. Section 4.2.6 describes the agricultural 
inputs industry including seeds, fertilisers, and agricultural machineries. Section 4.2.7 
considers the role of research and extension and other support services (intellectual 
property right protection, credit, irrigation, rural roads and transport, postharvest facilities 
and information access) in the development of the agriculture sector.
4.2.1 Rice and Corn
The annual production rates of rice and corn in the Philippines have grown at 1.9 
and 2.03 percent, respectively for the past 10 years while the population is growing at 2.7 
percent per year.13 At these rates, the World Bank estimates rice shortage in the Philippines 
of 0.5 to 1.1 million MT by year 2000.14 Total rice production area is 3.2 million hectares, 
half of which is irrigated.15 The entire rice industry was valued at around US$458 million 
in 1992.16
Rice production in the country has, since the 1970s, been characterised by the use 
of high yielding varieties (HYVs). Rice HYVs have been developed primarily by the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) based in the Philippines and later by the 
Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice). De Leon17 reports that in 1967, only 2.62 
percent of total rice area in the Philippines was planted to HYVs. This figure rose to 50
13 PCARRD-PAG, ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, op. cit., p. 4.
u Ibid.
15 PCARRD, ‘The rice industry’, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, October 1996 (reprinted).
16 PCARRD, ‘The rice industry’, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion rate:
US$1.00 = 24.00 pesos
17 Normando de Leon, ‘Technology transfer in rice and com in the Philippines’, A Survey of Technology
Transfer in Agriculture in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Productivity Organisation, Tokyo, 1990, p. •
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percent by 1971 and 87 percent by 1986.18 Based on Kikuchi and Hayami’s19 account, ‘it 
took only five years for 50 percent of Philippine ricelands to be covered by HYVs’. The 
phenomenal increase in adoption rate of HYVs during the 1970s-1980s can be explained 
by the following factors: it is a major ‘breakthrough’; it was launched as a package of 
technology (HYV, irrigation, fertiliser, and pest and disease control technologies) through 
a massive government program called ‘Masagana 99’;20 and the program was accompanied 
by an aggressive information campaign, the use of trained extension workers and 
supervised credit program. In recent years, the integrated pest management (IPM)21 
technology for pest control in rice production has increasingly been promoted and adopted 
nationwide.
While modem rice technology has resulted in increased yields and reduced unit 
costs, there are indications that the technology has led to a less equitable distribution of 
income and wealth.22 This has been more evident in countries where the distribution of 
land ownership is very skewed such as in the Philippines. In 1995, the country suffered 
from a rice crisis, necessitating a huge importation of rice from Thailand and Vietnam. 
This rice crisis has been attributed to a combination of natural calamity such as drought (el 
Nino) and the more serious problem of decreasing productivity and post-harvest 
inefficiencies. Citing Herculano Co, Head of Grains Confederation-Philippines, Tiglao23 
compares the extent of irrigation service in the Philippines with those of other countries. 
Only 800,000 of 3.5 million hectares of ricelands in the Philippines are irrigated compared 
to 5 million in Vietnam and 10 million in Thailand. What aggravates the situation in both 
rice and com industries is the inefficient post-harvest operations, resulting in about 10 to 
37 percent postharvest losses and wastage.24 For instance, the usual types of rice mills have
"Ibid.
19 Quoted in Ibid.
20 ‘Masagana’ means bountiful and ‘9 9 ’ as the target production goal—99 sacks (44 kg each) of palay per
hectare per crop.
21 IPM is a ‘pest management system that, in the context of the associated environment and population
dynamics o f the pest species, utilises all suitable techniques and methods in as compatible a manner as 
possible and maintains pest populations at levels below those causing economic injury’, as defined by the 
Entomological Society o f America Publication 75-2. IPM uses pest control judiciously to ensure 
favourable economic, ecological and social consequences.
22 Aida Librero, ‘A survey o f technology transfer in rice, com, and wheat in Asia and the Pacific , A Survey
of Technology Transfer in Agriculture in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Productivity Organisation, Tokyo, 
1990, p. 1.
23 Rigoberto Tiglao, ‘Myopia in Manila’, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28,1995, p. 87.
24 PCARRD-PAG, ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, op. cit.
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an average milling recovery of only 65%.25 Drying facilities and warehouses are inaHpq n ^  
in many rural communities.
Corn is grown in 3.3 million hectares with grain production valued at US$875 
million in 1992.26 Domestic production has, since the 1960s, been unable to meet local 
demand for food and the requirements of the growing livestock and poultry industry for 
feeds. As a consequence, the country has become a net importer of com with an average 
importation of 200,000 MT per year from 1980 to 1992.27 Com research from 1980s to 
1990s focused on intensive development of high-yielding open-pollinated varieties and 
hybrids. Com farmers have been using either hybrids, improved varieties developed by 
local research institutions, or local traditional varieties. De Leon28 referred to various 
studies in com growing areas of Mindanao, the southern island of the Philippines. These 
studies showed that the majority of farmers in Mindanao preferred a local variety called 
Tinigib over hybrids. In a study conducted in 1986, the combined area of local and 
improved varieties in South Cotabato, the biggest com producing area in the country,29 
accounted for 86 percent of the total area planted to com. The rest of com areas was 
planted with hybrids. A later study (1992) by Pamplona and Garcia30 revealed that 88 
percent of total area planted to com in the Philippines in 1989 was still planted to varieties 
which were neither hybrid nor high-yielding open pollinated ones. Average yield of com 
for the period 1987 to 1991 was about 1.4 tons per hectare compared to the yield potential 
of hybrid com which is 6 tons per hectare. Bias in favour of local and improved varieties 
can be explained by the fact that seeds of these varieties are less expensive and they have 
greater resistance to drought, pests and diseases. Supply of com is crucial to the feed and 
livestock industries because it accounts for about 40 to 50 percent of total feed mixture by 
weight basis and 30 percent of total feed cost.31 Therefore, these industries cannot tolerate
25 PCARRD, ‘Highlights of the roundtable discussion on rice policies’, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, 
Philippines, 23 August 1995, p. 9.
26 PCARRD, ‘The com industry’, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion rate:
US$1.00 = 24.00 Pesos
27 PCARRD, ‘Highlights o f the national consultative meeting on com production, utilisation and policies’,
PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 9-10 October 1995, p. 2.
28 De Leon, op. cit., pp. 237-238.
29 Producing 80% of the national com output.
30 A. Costales, Integrating the Philippine com and livestock markets: A derived demand model, PhD 
dissertation, University o f the Philippines Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1990.
31 PCARRD, ‘Highlights o f the national consultative meeting on com production, utilisation and policies’,
op. cit., p. 5 .
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deficits in com and are the first ones to press government for importation if shortage in 
local com production occurs.
4.2.2 Coconut and Sugarcane
Coconut and sugarcane are traditional export crops of the country. The coconut 
industry consists of about 1.6 million farmers, 1.9 million farm workers, 100 oil mills ,32 72 
oil refineries,33 11 desiccated coconut processors,34 6 activated carbon manufacturers and 6 
oleo-chemical plants.35 Coconut occupies 3.1 million hectares and has an average annual 
earnings of USS700 million.36 Coconut is the Philippines’ leading agricultural export and 
the country is the world’s leading supplier of traditional coconut products. The coconut 
industry’s comparative advantage is in the diversity of the by-products such as copra, 
coconut oil, desiccated coconut, coir fibre, copra meal, coco chemicals, activated carbon, 
timber and many others. However, the industry has been in serious trouble because of 
problems in both international and domestic scenes. For example, Philippine coconut oil 
has been confronted with unstable world prices. The demand and prices of coconut oil is 
highly elastic owing to the high substitutability by other oils particularly soybean and palm 
oil. In the domestic front, coconut production has been declining because of lack of 
improved technology utilisation, an increasing number of senile unproductive trees, and 
lumber cutting for low cost housing. A massive replanting or rehabilitation program has 
been implemented by the government, but it will take several more years before the 
industry can recover. With about 20 million Filipinos directly or indirectly involved in this 
industry, it will remain an important foreign exchange earner of the Philippines.
The Philippine sugar industry has been unstable and in a sorry state since 1982 
when the world price of sugar started to decline. This price decline is partly due to the 
emergence of substitute sweeteners in developed countries. This has led to a steady decline 
in the production of and area planted to sugarcane. There have been major disinvestments 
in sugarcane research since then. Consequently, the industry has become more inefficient 
and technologically inadequate. The sugar industry has been depending on the US quota 
for its market with almost 97 percent export going to the US. However, the World Trade
32 With capacity o f 3 to 950 tons copra/day
33 With capacity o f 1.0 to 700 tons oil
34 With capacity o f 127,854 tons DCN/annum
35 PCARRD, ‘The coconut industry’, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines May 1995.
36 Ibid.
123
Agreement (WTA) calls for the lifting of such quota. This means further reduction in the 
country’s sugar market. The association of sugar plantation owners and millers has been 
lobbying the Department of Agriculture (DA) to negotiate for the repeal of the Philippines’ 
commitment for sugar under the WTA. The DA in turn has asked the association to come 
up with a feasibility study for such action because this could mean trading-off other 
commitments in more vital commodities such as rice and com. As demonstrated in chapter 
3, sugar is a highly political commodity.
4.2.3 Banana, Pineapple and Mango
Banana, pineapple and mango are the leading fruit exports of the country. Banana 
and mango are exported either in fresh or processed form while pineapple is exported 
mainly as syrup. Banana and pineapple are produced largely by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) in Mindanao accounting for 40 percent and 37 percent of total area harvested to 
these crops, respectively.37
Banana is planted in 325,000 hectares with total production valued at US$444 
million in 1993.38 The banana export industry has its beginnings in 1963 with the 
introduction of Cavendish banana. During the early years of the industry, it was purely 
controlled by the MNCs who either leased the lands through local subsidiaries or entered 
into growers’ contracts with local corporations where the MNCs provided technology for a 
price and a ready market.39 Large banana corporations, producing mainly the Cavendish 
variety, generate the production and handling technologies of the fresh banana export 
industry with minimal support from government S&T agencies. Many of these 
technologies are used as baseline information for the development of local technologies for 
other banana cultivars and are applied by smaller plantation farms and packinghouse 
systems.
The banana industry has a distinct advantage of high production efficiency because 
of its rich experience in production and handling technologies, and highly integrated 
production and marketing operations.40 To sustain this position under the threat of the
37 PCARRD-PAG, ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, op. cit.,p. 7.
38 PCARRD, ‘The banana industry’, May 1995, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines. Conversion rate.
US$1.00 = 24 pesos
39 Gorrez, op. cit., p. 9 4 .
40 Concepcion Lizada, ‘Assessment o f the fruits industry’, Achieving International Competitiveness Through
Technology Development and Transfer, Assessment Reports: Module 1 : Export Winners, Department oi 
Science and Technology and United Nations Development Programme, Philippines, 1995, p. 55.
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Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the agribusiness firms involved have 
started to enter into joint ventures with agrarian reform beneficiaries. An example is the 
joint venture between the Tagdangua CARP Beneficiaries Co-operative and the Landasan 
Timber Corporation.41 The joint venture is called Tagdangua Development Corporation 
(Tagdecor). The Tagdecor has developed CARP-distributed lands in the community into a 
banana plantation and has entered into a marketing agreement with Davao Fruits 
Corporation (DFC). The Tagdecor is responsible for plantation development and 
production costs following the cultural management and handling technologies of the DFC. 
The DFC provides pest control services and banana packaging materials.
Pineapple is grown in 66,925 hectares with total production valued at US$218 
million in 1993.42 MNCs used to operate this as a closed system with only employment and 
taxes benefiting the country. However, the agrarian reform program has changed the 
MNCs production system. They now include co-operative growouts instead of mainly in­
house corporate farming.43 Through this system, local growers are able to leam the MNC 
technology.
Mango occupies 57,669 hectares with production valued at US$193 million in 
1993.44 Mango production in the country is concentrated in a large number of small non­
contiguous farms each having few trees. The usual production arrangement is for farm 
owners to contract-out mango trees to traders who in turn induce the trees to flower. With 
this method, mango trees are seldom given proper care and nutrition. Since growers are 
rarely involved in the marketing of fruits and have pre-arranged sharing agreement with the 
traders, they see no benefit in adopting cultural management technologies.45 Large 
plantations exist but their combined area is still relatively small. The mango industry 
involves many marketing intermediaries resulting in mango quality problems. Some 
agribusiness corporations are engaged in procuring the fruits from traders and exporting 
these to Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other markets.
41 Ibid.
42 PCARRD, ‘The pineapple industry’, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion
rate: US$ 1.00 = 24 pesos
43 Gorrez, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
44 PCARRD, ‘The mango industry’, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion rate:
US$ 1.00 = 24 pesos
45 Lizada, op. cit., p. 34 .
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Production of banana and mango has been declining in the last decade because land 
areas have lost their productive potential due to excessive chemical applications. The 
banana industry is highly dependent on chemicals, using pesticides during the production 
phase and chemical treatments during the postharvest stage. With the growing concern of 
the world market for safety and wholesomeness of imported food, the banana industry has 
been considering integrated pest management technology. The local research and 
development (R&D) community has been packaging technologies for the production of 
organic and reduced-pesticide bananas to support the industry.
In mango, there has been indiscriminate use of flower induction chemicals46 
without corresponding fertilisation. A comprehensive mango commercialisation program 
to address production and post-production technological problems of the industry has been 
launched since 1993 by the Department of Science and Technology.
The political economy of the fruits industry in the Philippines, with emphasis on 
the operations of the MNCs, is covered in chapter 3.
4.2.4 Livestock Sector
Livestock production in the country is classified into backyard and commercial 
operations. Livestock industry is one of the growth leaders in the domestic market, 
contributing about 22 percent of gross value added in agriculture. So developed are the 
poultry and hog industries, that either in small or large-scale operations, producers can 
efficiently operate. Integrated production is the dominant mode in commercial hog and 
poultry farms. One of the major problems of the commercial poultry and hog industries is 
the continued reliance on imported breeding stock, feed ingredients and feed additives. The 
poultry industry requires the importation of grand parent stocks from the United States and 
Europe that produce day-old chicks for broiler production. The industry is at present 
controlled by five large integrators, who have the means to import the breeding stocks. In 
the hog industry, 83 percent are backyard farms and 17 percent commercial farms. In 1992, 
pork valued at US$1.71 billion was produced.47 The poultry  industry consists of 72 percent
46 In early 1970s, a chemical—Potassium nitrate or KNO3 was discovered to induce flowering of mango
trees.
47 PCARRD, ‘The swine industry’, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion rate:
US$1.00 = 24 pesos
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backyard farms and 28 percent commercial farms. A total of US$1.42 billion worth of 
chicken was produced in 1992.48
The beef industry consists of 85 percent backyard and 15 percent commercial 
farms. It relies largely on importation (mostly from Australia) of feeder stocks for 
fattening. Local stocks are very few in number and not capable of meeting local demand 
for beef. Low production level of cattle in the country is a consequence of problems 
including widespread incidence of diseases, indiscriminate slaughtering of stocks to meet 
local demand for beef, and inability of cattle ranchers to undertake normal operations due 
to land tenure uncertainties.49 Cabanilla50 explains the predicament of cattle ranchers with 
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). CARP 
covers all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangements and 
crops produced. It limits the size of landholdings for non-rice and non-com lands to five 
hectares. Cattle ranchers, which serve as domestic source of feeder stock, are among the 
first to be affected by CARP. Since cattle ranching requires large areas for grazing, many 
operators have either stopped operations or shifted to feedlot or confined fattening. While 
CARP can explain the closure of some large-scale cattle farms, Costales argues that it 
cannot directly account for the declining cattle population in smallholder-backyard farms.51 
A more detailed discussion about CARP is presented in chapter 3.
With low cattle population and high level of technological requirements of dairy 
operations, the dairy industry is highly import dependent. Industrial dairy processing plants 
in the country are occupied with reprocessing and repacking of imported ingredients into a 
variety of products. Backyard dairy operators can only supply as much as 10 percent of the 
domestic demand.
4.2.5 Timber and Furniture Industry
The Philippine timber industry, with its indiscriminate logging operations (using 
sophisticated resource utilisation technologies) to serve the needs of the export market,
48 PCARRD, ‘The poultry industry’, PCARRD Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, May 1995. Conversion rate:
US$1.00 = 24 pesos
49 PCARRD-PAG, ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, op. cit., p. 13.
50 L. S. Cabanilla, ‘Ruminant sector deserves more support’ and ‘Cattle importations are still unavoidable ,
Economic Notes: Collected Articles on Agricultural and Economic Policy, The Research and Training 
Program on Agricultural Policy, College, Laguna, Phils., 1990, pp. 16-17,22-23.
51 Achilles Costales, ‘Small-scale cattle raising must be encouraged’, Economic Notes: Collected Articles on
Agricultural and Economic Policy, The Research and Training Program on Agricultural Policy, College, 
Laguna, Phils., 1990, pp. 32-33.
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particularly Japan, has caused serious damage to the country’s environment. Lately, the 
Philippine government has banned logging in the remaining virgin forests of the country, 
and the exportation of lumber and logs. This policy has displaced many upland dwellers 
who depend on the industry for their livelihood. The objective of present resource 
management programs and technology development is to provide livelihood opportunities 
or interim business to uplanders as immediate source of income while at the same time 
conserving and expanding the forest base through participative reforestation program. An 
example of a short-term source of income is the production of fast-growing-softwood tree 
species (vis-a-vis reforestation trees) for firewood, charcoal making, furniture and fashion 
accessories industry.
4.2.6 Agricultural Inputs and Mechanisation
Agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, agricultural machineries 
and agricultural product-processing machines, are mostly imported or controlled by 
transnational corporations.
The seed industry is dominated by foreign seed corporations such as Pioneer and 
Cargill and big local companies such as San Miguel Corporation and Ayala Corporation.52 
These companies control the breeding of hybrid seeds.
Fertiliser and pesticides usage in agricultural farms has increased considerably 
since the introduction of HYVs in the 1960s. However, local production of such inputs has 
been very low. Foronda53 indicates that in 1990 about 70 percent of domestic fertiliser was 
imported (Table 4.2). Fertiliser policies of the Philippine government appear to have 
conflicting objectives—provision of low-priced fertiliser through importation on one hand 
and granting adequate incentives to local fertiliser manufacturers on the other.54 However, 
any increase in protection or incentives given to fertiliser importers or local producers 
would increase the farmers’ buying price of fertiliser. Recognising the environmental 
hazards of chemicals, recent research by the local S&T community has focused on the 
generation of technologies that will produce fertiliser and pesticide substitutes. Most of
52 IBON Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, Contract Growing: Intensifying TNC Control in 
Philippine Agriculture, IBON Books, Metro Manila, Philippines with the assistance of World Council of 
Churches, p. 119.
53 Cristeta Foronda, ‘Policy issues on productivity and input use’, in A. Librero and A. Rola (eds), 
Agricultural Policy in the Philippines: An Analysis of Issues in the Eighties, University of the Philippines 
and PCARRD, 1991, pp. 59-60.
54 Ibid., p. 60.
Table 4.2 Fertiliser and pesticide imports and consumption in the 
Philippines.
Y e a r F e rtilis e r Im p o rts 1 C o n s u m p tio n 4 P e stic id e s  Im po rts '5
In th o u s a n d  to n s MT/KL MT C FI Value
in US$000
1980 745.23 819.6 7088 26222
1981 426.89 785.4 11166 33978
1982 765.45 845.9 10771 42468
1983 613.38 878.3 11960 36296
1984 626.35 665.2 11098 35397
1985 557.47 - 10959 30840
1986 876.64 - 12908 40443
1987 974.404 1.2M5 15901 52464
Source: Taken by Foronda, 1991 from:
1 Balisacan, 1990
2 Rola, 1990
3 Rola, et al., 1990
4 Agriscope, vol. 2, No. 8 
_______5 Agribusiness Weekly, 22 April 1988
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these researchers are in the areas of biotechnology (such as fertilisers from nitrogen-fixing 
organisms and mycorrhiza, and pesticides from isolates of the bacterium and Bacillus 
thuringiensis), organic-inorganic fertiliser combination technologies, integrated pest 
management studies and others.
Agricultural machineries in the Philippines have been mostly imported. During the 
1960s and early 1970s, importation of farm machineries, specifically for rice production, 
was prevalent. This was made possible through a combination of macro policies of 
government (such as devaluation of currency making it cheaper to import equipment) and 
specific mechanisation credit programs (through World Bank agricultural mechanisation 
loan programs). But these policies have discouraged the growth of local agricultural 
equipment manufacturing. During the 1980s, however, a small farm equipment 
manufacturing industry began to emerge in response to the need by rice farmers for smaller 
equipment more suitable to local conditions. Small-scale manufacturing has gained 
popularity because of the following: big market demand for such types of equipment; its 
low capital and its high labour requirements; and entry into the industry was relatively easy 
with IRRI providing most of the technologies. Through the joint industrial extension 
program of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and IRRI, about 484 cooperating 
manufacturers produced 39,358 pieces office farming equipment during the period 1975 to 
1984.55 IRRI has worked closely with selected local manufacturers providing them with 
blueprints of their designs as part of their technology promotion activities.
The national research institutions and farmers themselves have developed small- 
scale or village-type farm equipment for major agricultural crops and small-to-medium 
scale food processing industry. However, the local mechanisation industry needs adequate 
supply of steel materials, and effective rate of protection from importation to be able to 
manufacture equipment more affordable by farmers and small-scale food processors.
4.2.7 Agricultural Support Services
Support services determine the level of technology utilisation, commercialisation 
and efficiency at which agricultural production and processing, and output distribution can 
be carried out. The discussions in this section are limited to the state of agricultural support
55 Felisa Cruz, ‘Agricultural mechanisation policy issues’, in A. Librero and A. Rola (eds), Agricultural 
Policy in the Philippines: An Analysis of Issues in the Eighties, University of the Philippines an 
PCARRD, 1991, pp. 131, 134.
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services in the Philippines. The nature of support institutions, their policies and their 
interactions with other agencies are dealt with under sections 4.4 and 4.5. Agricultural 
R&D and extension are discussed in general terms in this section, and more extensively in 
the remaining sections of the chapter.
Agricultural Research and Development and Extension
Despite empirical studies that show high returns on investments in research (Table 
4.3), the Philippines has underinvested in R&D.56 The proportion of R&D expenditures to 
gross value added (GVA) is widely used as a measure of adequacy of agricultural research 
investment. Librero57 reports that the Philippine annual expenditures for R&D in 
agriculture for the years 1989 to 1996 averaged only 0.3% of the GVA. This is the lowest 
in Asia for the same period and much less than what the World Bank recommends, that is 1 
percent of agricultural GVA.
R&D development in the Philippines has also been hindered by the relatively small 
R&D workforce pushed away to other sectors and even abroad because of inadequate 
salaries of scientists, researchers and technicians. There were only 155 scientists and 
engineers per one million population in the Philippines during the period 1987 to 1994 
compared to 6042 in Japan, 2038 in Korea, 364 in Indonesia and 326 in Malaysia. 
Guerrero58 noted that compared to R&D workers of most other Asian countries, the 
country’s R&D personnel are paid poorly and the salary rates are not competitive with 
those of the private sector.
Some recent developments that provide a more favourable environment for research 
include: a) the issuance in 1991 of the Accounting and Auditing Manual for Research 
Operations (AAMRO), which is more responsive to the exigencies of R&D activities of 
government researchers and research institutions compared to the stifling rules contained in 
the old law; b) the ‘Scientific Career System’59 which aims to provide rewards and 
recognition to attract and retain outstanding scientists; and c) more S&T scholarships
56 Aida Librero, Research investment in agriculture and natural resources, paper presented to Hon. Richard 
Gordon and the PCARRD Technical Advisory Committee, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, Zambales, 
13 September 1997, p. 5.
51 Ibid.
58 Jose Guerrero, ‘Science and technology in the Philippines: Before, today and tomorrow , S&T Post, vol.
12, no. 7, 1994, p. 8 .
59 Under the Scientific Career System, a scientist is ranked based on his or her educational qualification and
training, scientific productivity, significant contributions, practical application of their research findings, 
discoveries and inventions in commerce, published works, and professional standing in the community. It 
is a way o f promoting scientists without burdening them with administrative tasks.
Table 4.3 Rates of return on investment in agricultural research for selected 
countries and commodities.
Country Commodity Annual Rate of Return
____________________________________________________________________ (%)
Malaysia Rubber 25
Indonesia Rice 133
Japan Rice 25-27
USA Com 35-40
Mexico Com 35
Australia Sugarcane 40-50
India Sugarcane 63
South Africa Sugarcane 40-50
Philippines Rice 11-20
Com 29-48
Sugarcane 51-71
Mango 85-107
Poultry 154-163
Coconut 12-48
Source: Aida Librero, Research investment in agriculture and natural resources, paper presented to Hon. 
Richard Gordon and the PCARRD Technical Advisory Committee, Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority, Zambales, 13 September 1997.
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awarded by the Department of Science and Technology in 1996 to students from various 
municipalities and barangays in the country.
The agricultural R&D community has produced technologies that have vast 
potential to increase agricultural outputs. However, wide gaps between actual farm and 
experimental yields exist for most crop commodities.60 This situation suggests that the 
technology being generated is not relevant to farmers’ conditions or that the agricultural 
extension programs and other supports services are not effective. However, there are some 
exceptions. In mango, the yield gap is small, perhaps because most mango producers in the 
Philippines use high yielding technologies such as the flower inducer. Similarly, there is a 
small gap between the experimental and actual farm technical efficiency in poultry and 
swine farms. This condition could be related to the fact that the poultry and swine 
industries are highly commercialised in the Philippines. Livestock operations can still be 
improved by using technologies that reduce the cost of production per unit of input.61
Appropriate agricultural extension and technology transfer activities are important 
to narrow the yield gaps discussed here. However, the system for agricultural research and 
extension in the Philippines is confronted with various linkage problems. This issue is 
covered at greater length in later sections of this chapter.
The condition of the extension service in the Philippines is affected by the lack of 
human resource development program for agricultural extension agents. The extension 
workers are the most poorly paid of the professional agricultural workers in the 
Philippines. They lack training opportunities to upgrade their skills so that they will be able 
to perform their functions more effectively. They also get inadequate allowance for 
transportation and equipment.
Intellectual Property Right Protection
The intellectual property right (IPR) law in the Philippines covers patents 
(invention, industrial design and utility model), trademarks and copyrights. Some of the 
issues related to the IPR system in the Philippines include the following: slow processing 
of applications; slow and less certain legal process for settling infringement 
complaints/cases; uncertainties on the rules regarding inventions generated by the public 
sector; and the absence of plant variety protection (PVP). The Philippine Congress has
60 Librero, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
61 Ibid.
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recently enacted a new IPR Code to improve the patenting system in the country. However, 
this new law does not include plant varieties.
As discussed in chapter 3, the WTO-Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) provides for member countries to develop IPR protection to plant variety 
developers in the form of patent or breeder’s right. The TRIPS Agreements require 
developing countries to observe the provisions of plant variety and biotechnology 
processes protection starting 1 January 2000. In compliance with TRIPS, the Philippine 
Congress has been scrutinising (as of the second quarter of 1999) draft legislation that will 
provide protection to new plant varieties.62 The controversial nature of the Act has resulted 
in a long ongoing deliberation within the House of Representatives. There are two 
opposing views about patenting plant varieties. Supporters of the patent policy for life 
forms argue that IPR protection will encourage increased private sector investment on 
agricultural R&D. They also claim that IPR protection will motivate the researchers from 
both the public and private sectors to be more creative and productive. Those who are 
against patenting of life forms argue that such policy will deliver the agricultural sector’s 
future into the hands of the multinational corporations (MNCs).63 They claim that MNCs 
would eventually own most of the patents on seeds, monopolise trade and increase prices 
of seeds to the detriment of the farmers.
A separate draft law on community knowledge and ownership, namely House Bill 
No. 38, was proposed in 1996 before the Philippine Congress. This House Bill provides for 
the mechanism in which the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities and local 
farmers can be protected.64 The implication for technology transfer of this proposal can be 
inferred from the following arguments. The proponents of the Bill allege that many 
international companies have exploited the country’s traditional knowledge such as 
traditional medicines, engineering approaches to irrigation and crop improvement 
practices.65 With the traditional knowledge protection law, the local communities reserve 
the right to prohibit companies from using their traditional innovations. When the
62 House Bill No. 1070 or the Philippine Plant Variety Protection Act of 1998 introduced before the House of
Representatives, Quezon City, Republic o f the Philippines.
63 Dave Llorito and Fermin Adriano, ‘True lies: Myths and facts about the GATT-UR agreement, Po/zcy
Update, Agricultural Policy Research and Advocacy Assistance Program, vol. 2 no. 10, October 199 , p.
8 .
64 Janes Innes and Tim Turpin, Intellectual Property Legislation and Innovation in Asia-Pacific Economies.
Case studies o f intellectual property law in Australia, China, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines an
Thailand, Law Crest, a publishing imprint o f Hybrid Publishers, Ormond, 1999, pp. 90-92.
65 Ibid., p. 91.
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communities concerned agree to the use of their knowledge, the law ensures that the 
commercial benefits from products of companies based on this knowledge will accrue to 
the communities.66
Credit
The access to cheap, timely and adequate credit has always been expressed by 
farmers as an important input to production. However, credit flowing to the rural areas has 
been inadequate and has steadily declined since the 1980s.67 For instance, of the total 
agricultural loans extended by the banks in 1992, only 11 percent went to small farmers.68 
There are few banking institutions that cater to rural development in the Philippines. Banks 
that participate in the lending program of the government for the rural sector tend to choose 
clients from the agriculture sector who are of lesser credit risk such as agribusiness firms. 
Furthermore, the loan borrowing procedures of banks are highly complicated compared to 
those of informal lenders (such as usurers and traders). Interest rates in the country are also 
among the highest in Asia, ranging from 27 percent to 35 percent. Therefore, the small 
farmers normally rely on informal lenders for their credit requirements.
The Philippine government has generally failed in its various subsidised credit 
schemes through the formal financial institutions. The main reasons for this failure are 
poor repayment by farmers and the complex nature of the formal lending system. The 
government agencies concerned have only recently considered integrating some of the 
features of the informal lending system with the official lending scheme.
Irrigation
Irrigation increases farm productivity because it allows farmers to plant a second or 
third crop in a year. While the Philippine government has always had irrigation as one of 
its priority programs for rural development, the emphasis in the past—especially during the 
1970s and 1980s—was on large irrigation projects such as multipurpose dams.69 This type 
of irrigation system has proven to be costly to develop, operate and maintain. Furthermore,
66 Ibid., p. 92.
67 PCARRD Policy Advocacy Group (PAG), International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture,
Draft report, PCARRD, Philippines, 1993, pp. 15-17.
68 L. Rola, Credit and cooperatives: Issues, problems and prospects to strengthen global competitiveness of
Philippine agriculture, Report submitted to the Congressional Commission on Agricultural 
Modernization, manuscript, 1997, quoted in Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization, 
Modernizing Agriculture, Congress o f the Philippines, n.d., p. 62.
69 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization, Modernizing Agriculture, Congress of the 
Philippines, n.d., pp. 56-57.
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many studies have shown that the construction of large dams has caused social and 
environmental damages to the displaced communities and surrounding areas.
The recent policies on irrigation have shifted to the development of irrigation 
systems that are cheaper to install, that farmers can easily manage and maintain, and that 
are amenable to the participation of the private sector in its construction and 
sustainability.70 Examples of these irrigation systems include shallow tubewells, low-lift 
pumps, and similar low-cost farmer controlled and sustainable irrigation facilities.
Rural Roads and Transport
The poor quality of road network in the Philippines, especially in the rural areas, 
has resulted in marketing problems such as the cost of transporting agricultural products 
being high, and traders dictating the farmgate prices. The government expenditures for 
road repairs and maintenance have largely been skewed in favour of the urban areas. The 
Philippine shipping industry is far from efficient because monopolies exist in most of the 
country’s major ports. To illustrate, shipping com from the US west coast to Manila in 
1985 cost P0.26 per kilo, from Bangkok to Manila, it cost P0.16 per kilo, but ferrying one 
kilo of com from South of the Philippines to Manila cost P0.60.71
Postharvest Facilities
Inefficiencies in postharvest operations have resulted in losses and wastage of up to 
37 percent of rice paddy, 30 percent of com, and 40 percent of fruits and vegetables.72 The 
adoption or use of postharvest facilities (such as mills, threshers, com shellers, mechanical 
dryers, storage facilities and transportation units) by farmers has been low. Some of the 
constraints in the adoption of these facilities include the following: inappropriate 
technology considering the users needs and their environment; inadequate knowledge of 
the users on proper operation of the facility; unsuitable location of postharvest facility 
considering the farm and consumption centres; inadequate supply of agricultural products 
to run the facility at capacity; and labour displacement as a result of using capital-intensive 
facility.73
70 Ibid.
71 PCARRD-PAG, ‘International trade policy agenda for Philippine agriculture’, loc. cit.
72 PCARRD, Agricultural mechanisation R&D program, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1996.
73 University o f the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB) Rural Development Study Team, Philippine Rural 
Development: Problems, Issues and Directions, UPLB, Philippines, January 1991, pp. 121-123.
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Information Access
Farmers in the Philippines have limited access to vital information that will 
enhance their production and marketing activities. Timely information on available 
technologies, and market outlets and prices will improve the farmers’ ability to make 
technological decisions and deal effectively with market traders.
Other support services
Crop and livestock insurance policy minimises the risks involved in primary 
agriculture production. However, the coverage of this program is limited to very few 
commodities.
4.3 Types of Innovation in Philippine Agriculture
The foregoing discussion gives a glimpse into what kinds of technologies are being 
utilised in Philippine agriculture. The type of technology determines the nature of activities 
and linkages required to be successful in its dissemination or transfer. Technologies or 
innovations in Philippine agriculture can be categorised as product, process, service and 
information.74
4.3.1 Product
This type of technology takes the form of physical goods. Examples of product 
technologies include farm equipment and machinery; new crop varieties and hybrids; feed 
formulations; biocontrol products such as Trichogramma for com borer control and 
Nematicide in banana and citms industries; and fertiliser substitutes such as Mycorrhiza 
Ecto for the reforestation program, Rhizobium  as soil inoculant in food legumes, Nitrogen­
fixing bacteria in rice and com, and Trichoderma for rapid composting. These technologies 
are normally directed toward a specific market demand.
4.3.2 Process
Technologies of this nature are not tangible and may refer to systems for doing 
things or systems for improved production and postproduction. These may also involve 
models or strategies for efficient utilisation, conservation, and management of resources, 
marketing and distribution system; seed production system; and others. In general, they are
74 Maripaz Perez & Bessie Burgos, ‘Technology transfer and commercialisation framework’ Staff Paper 
Series no. 17/92, PCARRD-DOST, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1992.
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aimed at increasing productivity and efficiency but cannot by themselves create a market 
for their use. Examples of these technologies include biological method of coconut oil 
extraction, improved agroforestry methods, farming systems for smallhold upland farmers, 
and village-level coconut processing.
4.3.3 Service
This type of technology generally provides the complementary activities or services 
to enhance existing government programs and policies. For instance, the technology on 
‘upgrading of Philippine carabao through estrus synchronisation and artificial 
insemination’ may not have a high utilitarian value as in ‘product technology’ but it has 
high impact in terms of complementing the government’s program to improve Philippine 
carabao stocks. Technologies under this category may necessitate government support 
especially in the early stages where market structure may not yet provide adequate 
premium to encourage payoff to private investments.
4.3.4 Information
Other technologies are simply information or research findings that may indicate 
valuable socioeconomic and technical databases for policy formulation and follow-up 
R&D activities. These may also refer to computer aided information systems in support of 
agricultural production such as Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer 
(DSSAT), Agrotechnology Suitability Evaluation System (ASES), and Agriculture and 
Resources Regional Technology Information System (ARRTIS).
In agricultural language, technologies can also be classified into component 
technology or package o f  technology (POT). Component technology refers to a specific 
cultural technique in the management and production of crops, livestock or forestry. In 
crops, this may include choice of variety; tillage and method of crop establishment; 
management of water, pests and weeds; and harvesting and processing techniques. 
Examples in the case of animals include choice of breed, management of herd, feeding and 
nutrition techniques, and specific breeding practices. In forestry, this may involve the 
choice of forest species; management of fertilisation, water and pest; nursery and
plantation techniques; and harvesting methods.
A package o f  technology (POT) refers to the combination of all necessary 
component technologies for production or postproduction activities. These technologies are
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proven to be individually outstanding and when utilised together will result in improved 
performance and greater productivity in the farm or firm. For instance, the POT for 
improved mungbean production includes the improved variety called Taiwan Green, 
inoculation of seeds using rhizobia at the rate of 100 g per 20 kg of seeds, and drill method 
of planting.
The importance of distinguishing the two categories is basically in the amount and 
nature of commercialisation activities required for each. Although efforts are more specific 
and directed for component technologies, the probability of attaining development 
objectives is improved if technology transfer activities carefully consider other components 
that may prohibit or induce technology adoption.
There are some issues associated with POTs that deserve mention here. The POT 
concept can be an important vehicle for some agribusiness firms to create and maintain 
continuous demand for their products. The green revolution POT is a case in point. It 
involves the use of HYVs which require heavy application of fertiliser, irrigation and pest 
control, without which the full potential of HYVs will not be achieved. It thus creates 
continued dependency of farmers on agrochemical products. However, small farmers find 
it difficult to adopt the different components of POT at one time. One of the major reasons 
for this difficulty is the limited access to irrigation and credit necessary to buy seeds, 
fertilisers and pesticides. This case demonstrates the importance of promoting technologies 
whose requirements match with the farmers’ resource capabilities. Greater importance 
must be given to local options, something that may not be consistent with the generalised 
recommendations of POTs. In recent years, there has been a growing interest among 
international and local research-extension agencies to promote organic fertiliser and 
integrated pest management (IPM). This is with the intention of complementing and 
reducing but not completely eliminating the use of agrochemicals.
4.4 The Structure for Agricultural Research and Extension in the 
Philippines
The agricultural research and extension system in the Philippines consists of the 
following groups of institutions: coordinating agencies; R&D institutions; extension 
service units; the clientele group or agricultural producers; support institutions; and 
international research and donor agencies. Agricultural research and extension in the
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Philippines are mainly the responsibilities of the government. Therefore, the R&E system 
is in general bureaucratic.
The R&D component of the system operates on a network basis or the ‘Research 
Council Model’ in which R&D activities are dispersed across several line departments and 
universities, and coordination is undertaken by a council.75 In this set-up, 127 institutions 
with R&D mandates are members of the National Agriculture and Resources Research and 
Development Network (NARRDN) or what is internationally known as the Philippine 
National Agricultural Research System (NARS). Coordination of the network’s activities is 
undertaken by the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources 
Research and Development (PCARRD). At the regional level, an ad  hoc arrangement for 
R&D management exists through the regional R&D consortia in agriculture, forestry and 
natural resources. The following sections describe the various groupings within the R&D 
system and the nature of their interrelationships.
4.4.1 Coordinating Bodies
The Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research 
and Development (PCARRD) is one of the five planning councils of the Department of 
Science and Technology (DOST). Originally called Philippine Council for Agricultural 
Research (PCAR) when it was created in 1972, the major reason for its existence was to 
provide order in the national agriculture research system. The NARRDN then was 
characterised by duplication and fragmentation of research efforts, lack of central planning 
and coordination, inadequate research facilities and trained manpower, and ineffective 
dissemination of research results. Now referred to as PCARRD (after 2 major 
reorganisations since 1972), it coordinates, monitors and evaluates the R&D activities—in 
crops, livestock, forestry and environment, agricultural resources and systems, and 
socioeconomics—of the NARRDN member agencies. Although accountable to PCARRD 
on matters outlined above, the network member agencies are administratively independent 
from PCARRD.
75 E. Javier, ‘Organizational design issues in agricultural research in the Philippines: Structure at die nationa 
level’, Research Management in Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Philippines, PCAKRÌ-), Los 
Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1989, quoted in Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization - 
Standing Committee on Technology, ‘Committee Report: First Draft’, Congress o f the Philippines, Metro 
Manila, 1996, p. 16.
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As part of PCARRD’s ‘development’ mandate, it promotes technology transfer and 
commercialisation activities in coordination with the NARRDN and other entities 
concerned.
PCARRD is the overall R&D coordinating agency at the national level. On a 
sectoral basis, the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR) have their own units responsible for R&D and extension 
planning and coordination. The DA Undersecretary for Research, Training and Extension, 
through the Bureau of Agricultural Research (BAR) and the Agricultural Training Institute 
(ATI), oversees the implementation of the R&D and extension functions of the department. 
The DA-BAR plans, coordinates and monitors the research activities performed by the DA 
field stations, staff bureaus, and other attached institutions and corporations.76 Before the 
devolution of extension service to the local government units, the DA-ATI was mandated 
to communicate research results to the farmers through appropriate training and extension 
activities.77 Since the decentralisation, the role of DA-ATI has been limited to the 
coordination of the provision of technical assistance to the LGUs. On the part of DENR, 
the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB) coordinates the R&D and 
technology transfer activities of the Department’s field units.
4.4.2 The R&D Network: NARRDN
PCARRD has established the NARRDN consisting of agencies that conduct basic 
and applied research on one or more commodities across a broad range of disciplines. The 
NARRDN operates using the ‘commodity assignment’ principle. This means that an 
agency is encouraged to work only on commodities in which it has research capability and 
which are important to the area where it is located. NARRDN is classified into national 
and regional centres, and cooperating stations. National research centres act as the main 
research stations which conduct basic and applied research in one or more commodities. 
They are either single commodity centres (such as Philippine Coconut Authority, 
Philippine Rice Research Institute) or multi-commodity national research centres 
represented by leading state colleges and universities which have broad based disciplines 
needed in fundamental research, and have strong applied communications units. Regional
76 Section 14, Executive Order No. 116, Republic of the Philippines, 1987.
77 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization - Standing Committee on Technology, op. cit.,
p. 19.
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research centres conduct applied research for commodities of major importance in the 
region where the centre is located. They conduct studies to verify findings from national 
research centres. Cooperating field stations provide facilities and sites for adaptive trials or 
location specific testing.
The NARRDN is composed of 70 stations of the DA, 12 stations of the DENR, 39 
state colleges and universities (SCUs), 3 research institutes of DOST, and 3 specialised 
agencies.78 While member agencies of the NARRDN are autonomous from each other, 
PCARRD coordinates, monitors and evaluates their R&D activities to avoid duplication of 
efforts.
The DA has the primary responsibility over agricultural development in the 
Philippines. Its constituent agencies, such as the DA-regional offices and field units, staff 
bureaus, and attached agencies and corporations, perform both regulatory (i.e. regulating 
product quality and supply) and R&D functions.
Likewise, the DENR agencies have regulatory function and undertake R&D 
activities as well. R&D and technology transfer are carried out through the ERDB and the 
Ecosystems R&D Service Units of the DENR field offices.
State colleges and universities (SCUs) have 3 major functions, namely teaching, 
research and extension. They engage in both basic and applied research and provide the 
human resource development needs of the agricultural R&D community.
4.4.3 Regional R&D Coordinating Mechanism: Regional Consortia for 
Agriculture and Natural Resources
To facilitate and decentralise R&D management, PCARRD encouraged and 
supported the NARRDN to form themselves into regional consortia. There are 14 regional 
consortia in the country today (Appendix 4.1). Figure 4.2 shows the specific locations of 
the regional consortia in the Philippine map. A consortium serves as mechanism for R&D 
priority setting, planning, monitoring and evaluation; applied communication and 
technology transfer; and sharing of R&D resources among member-agencies at the 
regional level. The consortium system aims at balancing the national, regional and local 
R&D agenda. Membership in the consortium is not limited to the NARRDN. Regional 
offices of the National Economic and Development Authority (NED A) are members in all
78 PCARRD, ‘The road to agro-industrialization: Agricultural technology in the Philippines , paper submitted 
to the Standing Committee on Technology o f the AGRICOM, 23 May 1996.
Figure 4.2 The Regional Research and Development Consortia
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consortia. Some consortia have members coming from the private sector, non-government 
organisations (NGOs) and lately, representatives from local government units (LGUs). The 
problem of regional R&D consortia is that they exist on the basis of interagency 
‘memorandum of agreement’ and not by some legal basis. Lacking legal status, the 
regional consortia are in a difficult situation because they do not have specific budget 
allocations from government for their operation. Funding for regional consortia activities is 
sourced from the regular contributions of member-agencies either in kind or cash. The 
biggest contribution comes from the base agency79 and PCARRD.
4.4.4 Extension Service: The Local Government Units
The DA had the major responsibility for agricultural extension and on-site research 
services until 1992 when this function has been devolved to LGUs. With the devolution, 
agricultural development became the responsibility of local executives. The rationale 
behind this move is to facilitate the delivery of extension services to the farmers. The 
previously single extension agency has been replaced by 75 provincial extension units and 
some 1,300 municipal extension services.
4.4.5 The DOST’s Provincial Centres for Science and Technology and 
Technology Application and Promotion Institute (TAPI)
The DOST created 73 Provincial S&T Offices to identify technology needs in the 
provinces, localise the implementation of DOST programs, and link DOST with other 
agencies working on or supporting S&T. The TAPI, on the other hand, promotes 
technology transfer and commercialisation of technologies, markets the services of other 
DOST units, and encourages the formation of technology-based enterprises.
4.4.6 The Private Sector and Non-Government Organisations
The private sector, particularly agribusiness companies and some NGOs, have their 
own R&D and technology transfer agenda and activities. The agribusiness sector, although 
technology beneficiaries of the R&E system themselves, conduct their own R&D work. 
Their R&D investments in the Philippines are mostly concentrated in the agricultural 
chemical, com seed, livestock, banana and pineapple industries. High commercial and 
market incentives exist in these industries, hence the agribusiness companies concerned are
79 a t_ •A base agency is the seat o f the consortium secretariat.
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motivated to conduct R&D. Furthermore, since most of the agribusiness firms engaged in 
these industries are multinational corporations, they have access to more diverse 
germplasm and outside technologies that can be tested for local adaptation.
Pray and Echeverria80 describe 6 types of private institutions conducting 
agricultural research and extension in the developing countries including the Philippines. 
These are production input and supply companies, large farms and plantations, processing 
companies, consulting firms and agricultural publishing companies, co-operatives and 
commodity groups, and research foundations. According to Pray and Echeverria,81 most 
private sector research in the developing countries is applied in nature and undertaken by 
large companies engaged in seed, pesticide and livestock feed production. Both 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and local companies are involved in seed and feedstuff 
research. Seed production research is focused on breeding hybrid cultivars while most 
livestock feed research is focused on discovery of new materials to reduce production cost 
of high-quality-feed. Private sector research on pesticides is mostly conducted by MNCs. 
Initial research is undertaken in Europe, the USA and Japan; field trials of new pesticides 
are carried out at their experiment stations in various agro-climatic zones; and final trials 
are conducted by local subsidiaries. Large companies especially those involved in 
agricultural chemicals employ their own technical or extension staff.82
Pray and Echeverria83 explained the roles of other groups within the private sector. 
Research conducted by large farms and plantations focuses on improving production 
management techniques. Processing companies rely on their extension staff for contact 
with farmers. The extension force acts as buyers of raw materials and gives feedback to 
researchers on the needs of farmers. Most consulting firms in Asia serve the needs of large 
farms or plantations. Publishing companies of agricultural magazines can serve as an 
important medium for transferring technical information from the public and private 
sectors to farmers. Commodity groups are associations of large commercial farmers, such 
as the Davao banana plantations in the Philippines, that hire experts to provide technical 
advice on farm management and commercialisation issues. There are also non-profit, non-
80 Carl Pray & Ruben Echeverria, ‘Private sector agricultural research and technology transfer links in
developing countries’, in David Kaimowitz (ed.), Making the Link: Agricultural and
Technology Transfer in Developing Countries, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1990, p. 199.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
83 Ibid., pp. 200-201,208.
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stock foundations that conduct or fund research and provide technical assistance to 
farmers.
Overall, the private sector’s investments in agricultural R&D in the Philippines are 
very low. According to Guerrero,84 it amounts to only 9.8 percent of the total R&D 
expenditures in the country.
The NGOs involved in agricultural R&D and extension are service type agencies 
that assist in the implementation of socio-economic projects in the rural areas. Their 
strengths are in providing extension support and education programs for value orientation, 
and in community organising.
4.4.7 Agricultural Producers
The beneficiaries or clientele of the R&E system include the farmers, upland 
dwellers, fisherfolks, rural enterprises and agribusiness companies. They are either served 
by the system individually, through contact farmers or leaders, or through co-operatives or 
farmers organisations. In recent years, major agricultural programs (such as lending 
programs) and other government support services have been provided to the farmers 
through co-operatives. A more detailed description of the agricultural producers in the 
Philippines is given in section 4.2. The discussion about agricultural co-operatives is 
covered in chapter 5.
4.4.8 Support Institutions
The support service institutions play an important role in mobilising resources— 
such as credit, technical inputs, and market linkages—in the rural areas. In the forefront of 
agricultural credit delivery is the Land Bank of the Philippines (LandBank). But the 
LandBank lending program is far from sufficient in meeting the needs for rural credit. The 
LandBank, in 1990, changed its policies to undertake non-agricultural banking. This shift 
in policy resulted in a situation in which loans extended to non-agriculture enterprises were 
greater than those granted to small farmers.
The bulk of credit resources of the Philippine commercial banks are captured by 
large corporations. As IBON85 notes, not even the Agri-Aqua Law which requires banks to 
‘allocate 10 percent of their loanable funds for agriculture, 15 percent for agrarian reform,
84 Guerrero, loc. cit.
85 IBON, ‘Liberalisation o f banking system’, IBON Peoples Policy and Advocacy Studies Special Release,
no. 5, June 1994, p. 3.
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and 10 percent for small-medium scale enterprises’, has improved the rural credit situation. 
This problem has been partly due to the perception among banks that farmers are non­
bankable and are credit risks.
Recently, there has been a move by the Department of Finance and the DA to 
review and rationalise the charters of the LandBank, the Philippine Crop Insurance 
Corporation, Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises, Quedan and Rural Credit 
Guarantee Corporation, and Agricultural Credit Policy Council. The objective of the 
review is to develop policy changes and measures to induce the private sector’s 
participation in lending to agriculture, to improve credit access by farmers, and to plan a 
special financing program for long-gestation agricultural projects.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA), an attached agency of the DA, is 
responsible for the development and rehabilitation of irrigation systems in the rural areas. 
It collaborates with the DENR and the Bureau of Soils and Water Management for 
watershed protection. Recent irrigation policies provide for the gradual transfer of 
communal irrigation systems and the budget for their construction, operation and 
maintenance to the LGUs. The government has only recently started to consider the 
construction of irrigation facilities through other innovative schemes such as build-operate 
transfer.
There are some NGOs or private sector groups that provide enterprise management 
assistance to co-operatives (such as assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies 
required by credit institutions, enterprise planning and operation). While farmers are 
production experts in their own right, the majority of them are lacking in ‘business 
orientation’ and not yet ready to take on the responsibilities of entrepreneurship. Hence, 
support agencies are needed to augment the production know-how of farmers with 
management intervention in the immediate interim period. NGOs may also serve as 
conduits between the farmers, and government development programs and financing 
institutions. Tolentino observes86 that in many instances, the NGOs are seen as a preferred 
mechanism for the distribution of government resources since they have better access to 
the grassroots level.
86 Bruce Tolentino, ‘Imperatives for sustainable industrialisation’, State of the Nation Reports, no. 9, 
University o f the Philippines Press and the Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1993, p. .
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The Technology Livelihood and Resource Center (TLRC), a government 
corporation, is also involved in agricultural technology transfer and commercialisation. It 
provides technology information packages, training courses, financing, and consultancy 
service or feasibility study assistance for technology commercialisation. It obtains 
technology information from PCARRD and the NARRDN and package them into multi­
media promotion materials.
Access to land is one of the preconditions to rural development. Therefore, policies 
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) have a strong influence over the technology 
generation and transfer system. For instance, with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP), ownership of agricultural land is in smaller parcels with new owners. 
Smaller land sizes dictate the need for technologies which will intensify production or a 
production scheme that will group small landowners into more productive units.
The Co-operative Development Authority (CDA) is the agency in charge of the 
registration and regulation of co-operatives. CDA is responsible for conducting 
management and training programs in entrepreneurial capabilities, management expertise 
and technical skills for efficient co-operative operation.87 8
Other agencies providing support to the agriculture sector in terms of infrastructure 
facilities include the Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of 
Transportation and Communication, and Philippine Ports Authority.
The Department of Trade and Industry supports agricultural R&D through the 
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) and the Bureau of 
Export Promotion. They are represented in the PCARRD Technology Transfer Advisory 
Committee and Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). The BPTTT is responsible for the 
review of patent applications. The DOST-TAPI provides IPR-related services to 
researchers and technologists of private and government R&D institutions, inventors and 
student-researchers. These services include guidance in the preparation of patent 
application documents, assistance in filing the patent request to the express lane service of 
BPTTT, and techno-legal advisory services in infringement cases.
87 Ephraim Romero and Virgilio Esguerra, Agrarian Reform Taxation and Co-operatives: A Social Science
Perspective, National Bookstore Inc., Metro Manila, Philippines, 1991, p. 1/2.
88 Republic Act no. 7459, the Republic o f the Philippines.
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4.4.9 International Development Donor Institutions and Research Agencies
Merill-Sands and Kaimowitz89 describe foreign donors as including multilateral and 
bilateral aid and technical assistance agencies, externally funded NGO, and international 
agricultural research centres (IARCs). The major donor agencies for agricultural 
development in the Philippines include the World Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organisations (FAO) of the United Nations, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). They extend loans and grants to the Philippine government to 
augment the national budget for rural development projects. Examples of these projects 
include those in the areas of integrated area development, irrigation and watershed 
protection, agricultural R&D and extension, and other rural infrastructure improvement 
projects.
The following discussions focus on linkages with international organisations in 
terms of agricultural research. The NARRDN through PCARRD collaborates with its 
counterpart national agricultural research systems (NARS) in other countries. NARS are 
organisations that are responsible for national program planning and coordinating, 
monitoring, evaluation, budget programming, and capability building for agricultural 
R&D.90 Inter-NARS linkages provide opportunities to share experiences of parallel 
systems and to find solutions jointly to common problems in managing agricultural R&D.91 
Most of PCARRD’s commitments with other NARS include exchange of scientists and 
training, and joint R&D projects. Specifically, PCARRD and the NARRDN have linkages 
with the Indian Council for Agricultural Research, Bangladesh Agricultural Research 
Council, International Technical Cooperation Center-Rural Development Administration 
of Korea, Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute, Pakistan 
Agricultural Research Council, Agency for Agricultural Research and Development on 
Indonesia, and Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Research.
89 Deborah Merill-Sands and David Kaimowitz, The Technology Triangle: Linking Farmers Technology
Transfer Agents, and Agricultural Researchers, The Hague: International Service for a on 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR), 1990, p. 24.
90 William Dar, State o f Affairs o f PCARRD Partnerships with National and International R&D Institutions,
PCARRD-DOST, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1997, p. 25.
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The NARRDN through PCARRD is also a member of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). CGIAR is a network of 16 international 
agricultural research centres (IARCs) supported by 42 public and private sector donors.93 
Its goal is to support the agricultural development concerns of 40 developing countries 
through R&D, training and information exchange. The Philippines is the seat of two 
important IARCs, namely the International Rice Research Institute, and the International 
Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM). PCARRD has forged 
collaborative agreements with 13 CGIAR centres, including IRRI, ICLARM, International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), International Potato Center (CIP), 
International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), International Irrigation 
Management Institute (IIMI), International Network for the Improvement of Banana and 
Plantain (INIBAP), International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT), International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRA), International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Centro International de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), and International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute (IPGRI).94
The R&D network of the Philippines has also collaborated with some advanced 
research institutes that have no formal affiliation with the CGIAR. These include the Asian 
Vegetable Research and Development Centre (AVRDC), Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
International Board for Soil Research and Management (IBSRAM), and the Southeast 
Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA). The 
NARRDN enters into collaborative arrangement with these organisations on research areas 
of their mutual interest. Collaboration comes in the form of germplasm exchange, joint 
research and development work, scientists exchange, technical assistance, training, and 
R&D equipment support.
The extent to which these international agencies have influenced the structure and 
activities of the agricultural R&E system in the Philippines is discussed in section 4.7.
93 Dar, op. cit., p. 32.
94 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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4.5 Interrelationships Among Agencies
The preceding discussions illustrate the complexity of the research and technology 
transfer system of the Philippine agriculture sector. It involves many agencies or entities, 
the majority of which are not administratively and organically related.
This section examines the system in terms of the interrelationships among the 
various agencies and groups involved. Figure 4.3 shows the relationships of these agencies 
at the national, regional and field levels. There are weak linkages at various points in the 
system: between researchers and extension agents; between researchers and the clientele; 
between extension agents and the clientele; between the LGUs and researchers; and 
between SCUs and the private sector. For instance, research and extension units are highly 
interdependent but their relationships have always been problematic. The R&D community 
relies on the extension group for the promotion and dissemination of their research outputs. 
The success of the extension and technology transfer service is contingent on its access to 
technologies generated by the R&D community.
4.5.1 National and Regional Targeting
National targeting and planning for agriculture development is led by the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) with sectoral departments concerned, 
namely DA, DENR, DOST, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of 
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), and 
representatives from the private sector and NGOs. The overall national development plan 
for the period 1994-1998 is embodied in the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 
(MTPDP). The Sustainable Agro-Industry Development section of the MTPDP specifically 
addresses agricultural concerns. The different sectoral departments translate the MTPDP 
into action agenda and flagship programs. In the case of agro-industry related departments, 
these include the Key Production Areas (KPA) Development Program of the DA, the 
Science and Technology Agenda for National Development (STAND) of the DOST, the 
Integrated Social Forestry Development of the DENR, the Countryside Agro­
industrialisation Development Strategy (CAIDS) and others. One of the most recent 
statements of policies and programs on agricultural development was issued by the DA in
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1998 through its Framework for Agricultural Development and the implementing rules and 
regulations pursuant to the ‘Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997’.95
While the various programs mentioned above have complementary ideas and 
parallel goals, they are independently pursued. Mechanisms for linkages at the policy level 
have been established, but these are generally limited to ad  hoc interagency committees or 
representation in the planning board of a particular department or national agency. There is 
no built-in mechanism as of yet that will link the national programs together. The DA 1998 
rules and regulations identify how linkages for R&D complementation with other 
government agencies, NGOs, LGUs and the private sector will be implemented.96 Other 
departments and agencies concerned have also started to be more specific about their plans 
to unify their activities with other entities concerned. However, it is too early to judge if 
these mechanisms are feasible and effective.
The programs outlined here are further translated into the national agricultural 
R&D agenda for agriculture, forestry and natural resources, with PCARRD largely 
coordinating the process. At the subsector level, the DA develops the R&D and extension 
program for agriculture and fisheries, while the DENR develops those for the environment 
and natural resources. The DA, in 1998, changed its National Agriculture Research and 
Extension Agenda (NAREA) into the National R&D System in Agriculture and Fisheries 
(NaRDSAF) and the National Extension System for Agriculture and Fisheries. The 
NaRDSAF aims to integrate the agriculture and fishery components of the DA-NAREA 
and the DOST-STAND. It intends to consolidate the overall management of, and 
responsibility for R&E system in agriculture and fisheries under the DA at the national 
level and under the LGUs at the local level.97
The R&D consortia pursue the same ‘focusing exercise’ at the regional level 
through what is called an ‘Integrated Research and Development Program (IRDP) . 
Through IRDP, consortium member-agencies agree to direct most of their efforts to one or 
two commodities of greatest importance to the regions. The IRDP has the following 
integrative components: research; technology transfer and commercialisation, applied
95 Department o f Agriculture Administrative Order no. 06 Series o f 1998, pursuant to Republic Act 8435.
The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997, 10 July 1998.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 41.
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communication and development; information management; resource management and 
institution development; and linkages, cooperation, and complementation.
In general, the national and regional R&D and extension plans are developed with 
little participation of the clientele. The identification and prioritisation of R&D areas and 
technologies for extension are mainly carried out by the research and academic 
institutions.98 This exercise often results in R&D outputs or technologies that do not fit the 
needs, resources and environment of the farmers.
4.5.2 R&D and Extension Implementation
The NARRDN implements the R&D activities based on the national and regional 
R&D agenda. The DA-BAR and DENR-ERDB monitor and evaluate the R&D activities 
within their respective subsectors. On the other hand, PCARRD provides the overall 
coordination of both subsectors (except fisheries) and the R&D activities of the rest of the 
NARRDN member-agencies. The regional consortia perform the overall coordination task 
at the regional level. The regional consortium’s position in the research and technology 
transfer system is strategic. The consortium could serve as conduit between the national 
and regional or field components of the system. It could provide the venue where research­
extension linkages at various levels can be established and operationalised. However, its 
coordination work is constrained by limited resources and other reasons explained in 
section 4.4.3.
Some NGOs carry out independent R&D and have their own technology transfer or 
extension initiatives that address the needs of their specific service areas. Their direct 
involvement with the clientele makes them suitable technology transfer agents and a 
reliable source of information about farmers’ feedback on rural needs and problems. 
Although lacking in scientific and technical capabilities, the NGOs are generally competent 
in participatory development planning and community organising. These are social 
preparation techniques that provide a favourable environment for technology interventions.
The private sector’s R&D work is generally demand-driven, geared toward product 
development, in answer to specific technical needs of companies, and aimed at 
strengthening their market positions. Some private agribusiness companies have their own
98 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization - Standing Committee on Technology, 
Committee Report: First Draft, op. cit., p. 16.
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extension staff. However, as discussed in section 4.4.6, this is part of their promotion and 
selling strategies.
Other members of the NARRDN, such as agencies under the DENR, SCUs and 
DOST, maintain their own technology transfer activities that are directed towards the needs 
of both small farmers and private companies.
With agricultural extension decentralised to the LGUs, the DA has redefined its 
role in extension through the National Extension System for Agriculture and Fisheries 
(NESAF). NESAF is composed of three subsystems: the national government through DA- 
ATI; LGUs; and the private sector." With NESAF, the role of DA-ATI is now limited to 
the provision of technical assistance to the LGUs through its national, regional and 
provincial training centres. The municipal governments are responsible for direct 
agriculture and fisheries extension services. The provincial governments are tasked to 
integrate the operations of the municipal extension services. Under the NESAF, the DA 
can commission and provide funding to farmer associations and co-operatives, NGOs and 
other private entities for training assistance and other related extension services.9 100 The 
SCUs are expected to support the LGU extension personnel by providing degree and non­
degree training programs, technical assistance, extension cum research projects and 
information support services.
A survey conducted by PCARRD101 in 1995 about ‘research and extension linkages 
under the local government units’ highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the extension 
system under the LGUs. With this system, the problems and needs of farmers are expected 
to be immediately addressed and the ‘bottom-up approach’ in agriculture program planning 
becomes more realisable. The major weakness of the agricultural extension system under 
LGUs can be political in nature. The Local Government Code lacks the standard on how 
discretion by local executives should be exercised. The attention given to agriculture 
depends on the orientation of local government leaders. Some officials give more priority 
to other concerns such as infrastructure projects in which results are more tangible. Studies 
cited by Cabanilla102 indicate that poor municipalities tend to have poorer extension
99/&</., p. 48.
100 Such as community organising, use o f participatory approaches, popularisation of training materials, and 
agribusiness, marketing and management skills.
101 PCARRD-PAG, ‘A survey o f the research and extension linkage under the local government code’,
unpublished paper by PCARRD, 1995, pp. 45-47. ^
102 Liborio Cabanilla, ‘Devolution o f agricultural extension to LGUs: A socio-economic analysis , Local 
Government Academy, Department o f the Interior and Local Government, Philippines, 1995, p. in.
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service. They have few resources to provide the necessary incentive system to extension 
workers, resulting in a less productive extension workforce. Ironically, it is in these poor 
municipalities where agricultural land areas are bigger. Overall, the LGUs lack the 
technical, infrastructure and financial assistance to carry out their extension mandate.
Under the previous set-up, research and extension activities of the DA were 
administratively under one roof. But, studies reveal the weak linkage between research and 
extension functions within the department and within the whole research-extension system 
in general. This problem is not unique to the Philippines. Kaimowitz103 cites the common 
findings of the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, and 
Food and Agriculture Organisation. Accordingly, the weak linkages between research and 
technology transfer are the most serious constraints of the research-extension systems in 
developing countries.104 With the present agricultural extension function under the LGU, 
the linkage between research and extension may be further jeopardised because research is 
completely separated from extension. This is where the role of the DA regional offices and 
the regional R&D consortia becomes even more important. The DA regional offices, in the 
absence of extension linkage between the national agencies and LGUs, are expected to 
serve as feedback and monitoring centres for the national agencies, and provide the 
research and resource support to the LGUs.105 The R&D consortium with its basic 
interagency coordinating functions at the regional level could serve the technology and 
information needs of the LGUs. It could provide the venue for active participation of the 
LGUs in regional R&D planning for agriculture.
The farmers and their organisations have limited participation in agricultural R&D 
and extension despite the adoption of location-specific and small farm-centred R&D 
strategies such as the farming systems research approach. In the few cases where farmer 
participation was strong, farmers and co-operatives have been observed to excel in farmer- 
to-farmer type of technology transfer approach. The government agencies concerned have 
only recently experimented on farmer-scientist partnerships in agricultural R&D such as 
the MASIPAG and Farmer-Scientist Bureau approaches discussed under section 4.6.
103 David Kaimowitz (ed.), Making the Link: Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in Developing 
Countries, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, published for the International Service tor National 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR), 1990, p. xi.
104 Ibid.
105 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization - Standing Committee on Technology, op. cit, 
pp. 34-35.
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The R&D system receives support services from a wide variety of government, 
non-government and private agencies/entities as indicated in section 4.4.8. However, the 
delivery of such services are oftentimes independently undertaken, and uncoordinated. As 
illustrated in section 4.4.9, the linkages of the NARRDN with the international agricultural 
research institutions have been well established.
There are many points in the research-technology transfer system where linkage 
mechanisms have been established, such as the consortium arrangement, interagency 
committees, joint planning and reviews, on-farm research and others. However, the 
necessary linkages—which are generally lacking—must be those at the grassroots level. 
The research-extension system has undergone major reorganisations over the past years 
with the decentralisation of agricultural extension as the more recent major change. But in 
general, linkages in the research and technology transfer system are weak. While the 
devolution of extension service to the local government units have aggravated the R&E 
linkage problem, there are indications that it has facilitated the linkage between the 
extension group and the farmers.
4.6 Technology Transfer Approaches and Strategies
4.6.1 Government Initiatives
Technology transfer strategies in Philippine agriculture vary according to the 
proponent (government, NGO, SCUs and the private sector), the development objectives 
and concepts that they advocate, specific development programs they promote, their target 
clientele, and the type of technologies involved. These strategies are generally ‘top-down’ 
in approach, in which technologies generated by national or regional or international 
research centres flow downstream to the target clientele in a linear process.
There are various ways in which the different technology transfer mechanisms for 
agricultural development could be examined. There are the more sophisticated mechanisms 
that are focused on the industrial sector (agribusiness), those that are more grassroots- 
oriented, and those in between. The ‘industry or private sector focus’ approach is best 
exemplified by the technology promotion and transfer programs of the DOST-TAPI, some 
of which are listed below. The small farmer oriented mechanisms are discussed later in this 
section.
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Agribusiness and Small and Medium Enterprises Focused
a) Technology-Based Enterprise Developm ent
This program includes the DOST Technology Training Center (DTTC), the DOST- 
Academe technology-based enterprise development (DATBED), Special Technology 
Financing (STF) Program and Technology Business Incubators.106 The DTTC provides 
technology training courses for aspiring entrepreneurs and continuing professional 
development courses for scientists, academicians and technologists. It extends technical 
expertise through actual demonstrations and pilot plant visits. DATBED trains students for 
enterprise development, taps available expertise and facilities of selected state colleges and 
universities (SCUs), and assists these SCUs in developing a strong entrepreneurial course. 
Through the STF, the DOST makes arrangements with financing institutions, such as the 
LandBank, TLRC and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), to provide 
technology-based enterprises access to financing assistance. With endorsement from DOST 
through TAPI, firms can borrow funds from any of the participating institutions at interest 
rate ranging from 6 percent for R&D loans to 18 percent for establishing technology-based 
enterprises.
DOST -TAPI also provides venture/equity financing to small associations or co­
operatives for the application of emerging technologies with high commercial potential. 
With no interest required, DOST shares the risks of putting up a technology-based 
enterprise whose viability is not yet proven. Funding is limited, however, to only $10,000 
per venture. DOST-TAPI intends to continue this financing program until the Philippine 
Technology Development Corporation (PTDC), a newly established private venture 
company, is fully operationalised.
The technology business incubator (TBI) encourages and nurtures new technology 
business ventures by providing common service facilities, access to DOST laboratories and 
technical services, business spaces, access to various DOST programs and promotion 
activities. Housed in several DOST institutes and regional offices, the TBIs not only 
showcase some of the DOST-generated technologies but also help identify gaps for further 
R&D. The TBI concept is however difficult to apply in the case of agricultural 
technologies that do not operate well within a controlled environment set-up.
106 Republic Act no. 7459, the Republic o f the Philippines.
154
b) Technology Prom otion and Com m ercialisation
Pilot plant assistance is included in this component.107 108Pilot plant assistance 
mechanism allows for a technology to be tested on a pilot scale before being launched into 
commercial operation. Through this scheme, improvements and adjustments are made to 
address technical problems encountered at the pilot stage. Funds to purchase the 
technology, initial working capital of at most three months, training expenses for 
cooperators, and technical assistance during the start-up period of the demonstration plant 
are provided through this program.
Other programs included under this technology commercialisation component are 
the following:
• Technology Packaging Program. This involves the production of feasibility or 
prefeasibility studies, investment packages and flyers for selected technologies.
• Investors Forum and S& TF airs. Annual technology fairs and investors fora at national 
and regional levels are sponsored to feature various technologies and inventions 
developed by DOST and other agencies in the R&D network (such as the NARRDN). 
The fair attracts potential investors and provides opportunities for technology 
marketing and business negotiations between the technologists and entrepreneurs.
c) Consultancy Services^08
This component includes the following programs:
• S& T Experts Volunteer P o o l . This program links technology generators directly with 
the users. It taps the skills and expertise of both active and retired S&T experts 
affiliated with the SCUs, private industries and research institutions.
• M unicipal S& T A dvisory Program . The program enlists the active involvement of 
selected SCUs in technology assistance to the rural sector. Each participating university 
forms a core team that set directions for project implementation at the 
provincial/municipal level. It serves as a link between municipal/LGU government 
planners and the S&T community.
• M anufacturing Productivity Extension fo r  Export Promotion (MPEX) Program. This 
assists small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector to achieve 
productivity by about 20 to 30%. Through this program, study teams composed of
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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industrial engineers and educators are sent to the requesting firm or co-operative’s plant 
site. The teams recommend productivity-enhancement measures for immediate 
implementation by the firm or co-operative. The most common areas of consultancy 
include plant layout, production planning and control, quality control and materials 
handling. The co-operative in Case 2 of this thesis (chapter 8) was a beneficiary of 
MPEX program.
• Consultancy fo r  Agricultural Productivity Enhancement (CAPE) Program. CAPE 
promotes effective farm management strategies to improve agricultural productivity. It 
provides consultancy teams to conduct productivity studies of qualified small- and 
medium-scale agricultural enterprises.
As can be observed, the above mentioned strategies are (in the case of agriculture) 
generally directed toward the agribusiness industry. These strategies promote and 
encourage collaboration or partnership between the S&T sector and the private sector in 
technology commercialisation. The S&T sector is acknowledged as the technology 
generators for enterprises while the job of technology packaging is best accomplished by 
the private sector. This private sector bias is understandable considering the modernisation 
and industrialisation objectives of the DOST. The department leaves the downstream 
technology transfer activities to the NARRDN under the coordination of its planning 
council for agriculture which is PCARRD, LGUs, DA-ATI, DOST regional and provincial 
offices, and NGOs.
Small Farmers and Rural Enterprises Focused
Agricultural extension is associated with the more rural or farmer-oriented type of 
technology transfer. The extension service system in the Philippines has undergone many 
changes throughout the years—from the central government control to regional and later to 
local level of management.109 Appendix 4.2 summarises the evolution of the agricultural 
extension in the Philippines.
The early history of agricultural extension in the Philippines was characterised by 
the conventional ‘training and visit (T&V) approach ’ to extension. The T&V system was 
hierarchical and highly structured, in which extension staff were tasked to deliver technical
109 Santiago Obien, ‘Some observations on the acquisition and transfer of agricultural technology , Paper 
presented during the 6th Philippine Productivity Movement Conference on ‘Quality through appropriate 
technology’, DOST, Bicutan, Metro Manila, 02 September 1987. p. 2.
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information only. There was clear delineation of responsibilities among the different 
components of the system. The subject matter specialists (SMSs) were responsible for the 
content of technical ‘messages’ and training of extension workers on such technologies. 
Village extension workers (VEW) were responsible for communicating these information 
or technologies to the farmers. Extension workers visited selected ‘contact farmers/leaders5 
on a regular basis.
While the system had intended to improve efficiency in the extension service, the 
lack of proper incentives and conditions for extension workers (such as low salaries and 
lack of logistic support) to enable them to operate effectively in their assigned areas had 
rendered the extension system weak. There were other failures in the T&V system. For 
instance, information extended to farmers were not often relevant to their problems. The 
T&V structure was not flexible enough to address the complex and varied nature of 
farming systems and resources. Feedback system was made difficult by the very 
hierarchical nature of the system. The ‘contact-leader’ focus of the T&V system appeared 
to be biased against resource-poor farmers. What was not realised then was that the 
‘contact leader’ concept had a lot of political implications affecting the existing power base 
among the farmers. According to Kaimowitz,110 the T&V system failed in the aspects of 
relevance and responsiveness.
What followed after the T&V approach were various attempts to improve research­
extension linkage. Prior to 1992, the Department of Agriculture (DA) used the following 
research-extension linkage mechanisms: in-house reviews on research, extension, training 
and communication program s , conducted every semester and involving the DA agencies, 
SCUs, NGOs, Regional Applied Communication Offices, and the Agricultural and Fishery 
Council; annual reviews o f  the NARRDN , where the field offices of the DA participate; and 
training o f  extension workers.
The DA adopted the concept of ‘technology continuum’ in its technology 
generation and diffusion activities. The ‘technology continuum’ model views technology 
as a progression from technology generation, through to technology adaptation, technology 
verification, and finally technology dissemination.
Technology generation (TG) involves fundamental research that focuses on the 
development of component technologies, improvement of plant varieties and animal
110 Kaimowitz, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
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breeds, and production systems toward enhancing the efficiency and economic viability of 
agriculture and natural resources. TG is generally conducted by SCUs in research stations.
Technology Adaptation (TA) is designed to evaluate the stability and replicability of 
the performance of component technologies over space and time. TA is replicated in more 
locations and uses far fewer treatments than TG. It is research-managed and conducted by 
DA and DENR.
Technology Verification (TV) is the testing of TG and TA research results under 
actual field conditions using farmers’ resources. It involves research on comparative 
performance of improved POTs versus farmers’ practices. TV is conducted with farmers as 
research partners in their own farms under the supervision of NARRDN member-agencies 
and extension workers.
Technology D issem ination  (TD) involves pilot-testing programs, information 
packaging, and extension of technologies that give consistent outstanding performance in 
TG, TA, or TV.
This ‘technology flow continuum’ is further illustrated by Bernardo in his 
‘research-extension process’ model (Figure 2.13).111 The model explains the stages which 
most agriculture and natural resources R&D undergo and the interface between research 
and extension activities. As the technology moves downstream into the early stage of 
piloting and dissemination, research activities diminish while extension activities increase. 
The whole process is not necessarily sequential with some technologies finding their way 
directly from technology generation to utilisation. 112 The Bernardo model captures the 
general trend for most research and extension activities in agriculture although actual 
tracing of technologies along the continuum is easier for crop technologies. As pointed out 
in chapter 2, while this technology continuum model is useful in defining interfaces 
between research and extension, its linear flow concept does not capture the complexities 
in the R&E system.
The ‘TG-TA-TV-TD’ continuum has found expression in the policy framework of 
DA, the farm in g  system s approach. The farm ing system s research approach (FSR) 
involves a system for multidisciplinary and location-specific field research, the 
intermediary (extension) system, and the user (farmers) system. The location-specific
111 Fernando Bernardo, Report o f the consultation meeting of agricultural research and extension experts, 
SEARCA, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1986.
m Ibid.
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system with emphasis on farm management (such as rice-based farming system, upland 
crop-based farming system and animal-based farming system) is the basic research­
extension strategy rather than the commodity approach.
FSR gained wide prominence in the Philippines through the implementation of the 
World Bank funded project in 1983, entitled ‘Agricultural Support Services Project’. More 
specific discussion of FSR is found in chapter 2 and its basic principles shown in 
Appendix 4.3.
In 1983, the DA, then referred to as the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) 
established a nationwide network for the conduct of on-farm trials.113 The network 
consisted of the regional integrated agricultural research systems (RIARS) for each 
political regions and provincial technology verification teams (PTVTs). The RIARS was 
responsible for providing on-farm specific technologies while the PTVTs involved 
extension workers trained on the FSR methodology. The PTVT was assisted by a core staff 
of an agronomist, soil technologist, livestock specialist, economist and extension 
specialist.114 The FSR model used by MAF is based on the TG-TA-TV-TD continuum 
concept.
In 1991, a further re-structuring of DA’s research stations and facilities took place 
in anticipation of the Local Government Code and in consideration of the farming systems 
development framework. Four levels of research stations were set-up: national research 
centres (NRCs); regional integrated agricultural research centres (RIARCs); research 
outreach stations (ROS) to represent the major development zones or sectors of the region; 
and provincial service stations (PSS) for crops, livestock and fisheries.115
With agricultural extension function devolved from the DA to LGUs since 1992, 
changes in the extension service are expected. However, based on PCARRD-PAG survey, 
there is little difference between the technology sourcing and dissemination practices 
before and after the devolution.116 This can be explained by the fact that most extension 
workers under LGUs are devolved personnel from the DA. However, changes are noted in 
the manner by which technologies for dissemination are selected.
113 Virginia Cardenas, E. Rosario and A. Gomez, ‘Farming systems research-extension in the Philippines , 
Proceedings: Regional Consultative Seminar-Workshop on Farming Systems Research, SEARCA, Los 
Banos, Laguna, Philippines, June 30 - July 2, 1986, p. 36.
114 Obien, op. cit., p. 7.
115 DA-BAR, On-farm Research Manual: Overview and Directions o f Agricultural Research, Bureau of 
Agricultural Research (BAR), 1991, pp. 4-5.
116 PCARRD-PAG, ‘A survey o f the research and extension linkage....op. cit., pp. 15, 52-53.
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Under the DA system, the general practice was that the majority of technologies for 
extension come from the DA offices either from central, regional, or provincial levels and 
research stations. Accordingly, these technologies were provided to the extension workers 
through memoranda and directives.117 This ‘top-down’ orientation was observable despite 
the farming systems or participatory research and extension framework of the DA in the 
past.
Under the LGU system, there is an observed increase in the participation of fanners 
and NGOs in the choice of technologies for extension in particular and setting the mral 
development plan in general. Therefore, there is a good chance that a real ‘bottom-up 
approach’ to agricultural development planning and implementation can be 
operationalised. However, there are areas of serious concern, if not properly addressed. 
While extension-farmer linkage has improved under the new system, research-extension 
linkage is minimal if not absent because of the institutional separation of extension from 
research. Also, there are indications that the technical expertise of extension workers may 
weaken because of lack of training and promotion opportunities under the new system. 
These concerns are however not without solutions. Given proper attention, they will 
complement the strength of the new extension system—its potential for more participative 
approach to rural development.
By way of ending the discussion on agricultural extension, ‘Masagana 99’, claimed 
to be one of the most successful technology transfer programs in the Philippines, will be 
examined. ‘Masagana 99’ was the Philippine version of the green revolution in the 1970s. 
It was considered to be the most massive integrated rice production program in terms of 
government and private sector participation, farmer participation, area of coverage, use of 
trained extension workers, mass communication of information by the broadcast and print 
media, and diffusion of HYV technology developed by IRRI and local counterparts.118
Specifically, Masagana 99 had the following major elements:
• A package of modem rice production technology119 with fertiliser subsidy;
117 Ibid., p. 9.
118 Joseph Madamba, ‘Masagana 99: A success story in food production in the Philippines , Paper prepared 
for Technical Advisory Committee Meeting o f the Food and Fertiliser Technology Center, Taipei, 
Taiwan, 6-7 March 1978, p. 4.
119 16-Step Package Of Modem Rice Production Technology— choosing the rice variety and securing 
certified seeds; raising seedlings; plowing or rotavating; harrowing operations; basal fertilisation and 
leveling; treating seedlings; transplanting; rat control; water management; replanting and weed contro , 
protection from insect pests and diseases; nitrogen topdressing; sustained irrigation and rat baiting, 
intensive insect pest monitoring and control; harvesting and threshing; and cleaning and drying.
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• Non-collateral, supervised production credit (however farmers who availed of loans 
were organised into ‘seldas’ or groups, and each member guaranteed for his fellow 
members);
• Extension supervision by rice technologists;
• Incentives to extension workers (such as provision of motorcycles under vehicle loan 
fund);
• Price support to farmers and ceiling price to consumers;
• Support of public and private mass-media through free promotion of the program as a 
public service contribution;
• Organised national leadership from the President to village leaders; and
• Linkage with SCUs and research institution vital in the training of extensionists.120
The extension delivery component was basically a T&V system characterised by 
the following features: technicians observed the Masagana 99 systems and procedures and 
followed a pre-packaged technology—technical recommendations emanated from a 
national committee and technicians were trained on them and were supposed to follow a set 
of instructions; technical training of government extension workers in rice production at 
IRRI and through mobile training teams; and motor vehicle loan fund as incentive for 
extension worker.121
The program was successful in terms of increasing the rice production level in the 
Philippines. However, studies have shown that the Masagana 99 program and the T&V 
approach that promoted it failed to meet the needs of the majority of the farmer population 
in the Philippines.122 Instead of farmers acquiring and gaining control over the introduced 
technologies, they became dependent on imported inputs such as fertilisers and 
pesticides.123 This dependence on chemicals increased the farmers’ cost of production, 
hence only the richer farmers could afford the recommended package of technology. The 
program also contributed to the damage of agricultural and forestry resources because of 
the excessive use of chemicals. It was laden with subsidies that eventually could not be 
sustained by the government.
m Ibid., pp. 5-9.
121 Rogelio Cuyno, ‘The extension delivery system of the Masagana 99 program , p. 3.
122 Zamora and Villareal, 1995 and MODE, 1995 quoted in Virginia Cardenas, Extension paradigm shift for 
sustainable development, Professional Chair Lecture, UPLB Alumni Association, University o e 
Philippines Los Banos, Philippines, 1995, p. 7.
123 EBON Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
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The NARRDN and PCARRD, in exercising their development and/or extension 
mandates, implement various mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer and 
commercialisation. These are as follows:
Action or D evelopm ent P rojects
Through action or development projects, PCARRD coordinates the pilot-testing of 
improved technologies (component or POT) to demonstrate their technical feasibility and 
viability in farmers’ fields. Technologies are verified and fine-tuned on a semi-commercial 
scale. With action projects, farmers are provided with relevant support services such as 
credit, market, extension and training. In recent years, the concept of action or 
development projects in agriculture have been expanded to emphasise the business nature 
of technology application. This change in orientation is in response to the national 
development goals of global competitiveness and people empowerment. Such principles 
are embodied in the Medium Term Plan for National Development (MTPDP) and further 
translated into the Science and Technology Agenda for National Development (STAND).
Comprehensive Com m ercialisation Program s
Comprehensive commercialisation programs are designed and directed to fewer but 
very strategic commodities such as mango, pineapple, banana, coconut and ornamental 
crops. Comprehensive commercialisation is an approach that integrates the aspects of 
production, processing, financing and marketing for each priority commodity. It 
necessarily involves strong linkages and collaborative work between the R&D community 
and private sector in the generation, identification, selection and utilisation of improved 
technologies.
Bottom-up Technology Transfer Approaches
The new initiatives of PCARRD to promote technology transfer are more bottom- 
up in orientation and are sensitive to local knowledge. These include the following. 
Development Support Communication (DSC); Rural-based Enterprise Development 
(RED); F arm ers’ Information and Technology Service (FITS); and Farmer-Scientist 
Bureau (FSB).
The concept of D S C  originated from the programs of the UN and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO-UNDP) starting in the late 1960s and was first introduced
162
in the Philippines in 1989. As indicated in the PCARRD-FAO/UNDP DSC documents,124 
the DSC Philippines aims to promote active participation of the community in 
development projects through the systematic use of need-based technologies packaged 
through appropriate communication techniques and channels.
FAO125 identifies four essential stages of the DSC process: needs assessment or 
information gathering; decision making or strategy development; implementation; and 
evaluation. In the needs assessm ent stage , key development priorities are determined 
through field surveys such as rapid rural appraisal (RRA), community consensus, and 
interviews with field specialists and subject matter specialists. Media channels available to 
potential target groups are assessed and technology transfer inputs are checked if available. 
The decision making or s tra tegy developm ent phase leads to the identification of target 
groups and conduct of baseline knowledge, attitudes, practices survey and focus group 
sessions. During this phase, specific communication campaign objectives are set and multi­
media mix and message design determined. The implementation stage  is when an action 
plan is drawn up; prototype media materials are field tested, revised according to results 
and finalised; and training of field staff is conducted on the use and distribution of media 
materials and monitoring of the DSC process. During the evaluation stage , field evaluation 
at strategic points and impact evaluation surveys are carried out.
Appendix 4.4 gives a more detailed illustration of the DSC process featuring the 
specific case of DSC in Barangay Tacunan, Davao, Philippines. The DSC Philippines pilot 
projects use the community audio-tower system (CATS) as the lead medium in a multi­
media communication campaign. CATS is a community-based communication facility 
managed and controlled by local broadcasters organised in each barangay.126
The RED  process has been introduced and pilot tested by PCARRD in selected 
regional R&D consortia since 1992. RED aims to provide sustained developmental 
interventions in the countryside and facilitate the delivery of techno-based, market-led, 
environment-friendly and ‘not dependent on dole-out’ enterprises.
Based on the old concept of rural enterprise development and incorporating the 
experiences of the private sector, PCARRD, through a technical assistance project in 1991­
124 DSC, ‘Project Document: PHI/87/006: Development support communication for selected agricultural
technology transfer project in the regions’, PCARRD, Philippines.
125 FAO, ‘Communication strategies for rural development: A case study of the use o f campaigns in 
Lesotho’, Development Communication Case Study, FAO, Rome, 1990.
126 Barangay is the smallest local government unit in the Philippines.
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1992, developed a conceptual framework for RED strategy in the countryside (Figure 4.4). 
In this framework, the process of putting agribusiness in rural areas is seen as involving 
technology development or R&D, technology packaging, and enterprise building. The 
RED framework emphasises that three requisites must be in place to establish a rural-based 
enterprise. These include the following: a production system with established input system 
and technology base (both indigenous and generated by R&D community) which has 
proven to be socially, technically, economically, environmentally and politically feasible; 
an organisation and management system, preferably a co-operative which can ensure the 
viability of the enterprise; and the necessary linkages such as credit, market, infrastructure, 
extension and training.
With the RED framework as guide, the RED delivery process provides three 
interrelated tools for enterprise planning, monitoring and evaluation. These include a gap 
identification tool called Quick Resource Appraisal (QRA), an intervention identification 
and decision-making tool called Risk Management Process (RMP), and Backward 
Resource Inventory System (BRIS) which is a tool for identifying basic assumptions for 
business plan. Appendix 4.5 describes in more detail these RED tools.
The conduct of QRA, RMP and BRIS actively involves the target clientele and is 
facilitated by an interagency, interdisciplinary team organised by the regional consortia. A 
localised project management system is an essential component in the delivery of the RED 
process especially where co-operatives with limited loaning track record are involved. 
Through a localised project management office (LPMO), assistance is extended to target 
co-operatives or farmers’ organisations in the packaging of business plans or feasibility 
studies, networking, and initial managerial start-up of the enterprises. Sustainability of the 
delivery systems can be assured by having LPMO mobilised and funded through a certain 
amount from the total enterprise cost (for example, 10% management fee if funding is from 
loans, or 10% administrative expense if coming from grants). The LPMO continues to 
provide interventions to the target co-operative until sustainability indicators jointly set by 
the two parties are achieved. With LPMO, co-operative members are having hands-on 
training on enterprise management. In terms of funds coming from grants, the seed fund 
concept assures the return of borrowed funds by co-operatives for use in creating new 
enterprises.
A. Rural-Based Enterprise Development Process
Technology
Generation
Technology
Commercialization
Enterprise Building
B. Sectors/lnstitutions Participants
Figure 4.4 Conceptual Framework of the Rural-Based Enterprise Development
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The delivery of the RED process requires the active participation of the NARRDN 
from where inter-agency and interdisciplinary teams of RED interveners could emerge, the 
private sector, co-operatives or farmers’ organisations, LGUs and support institutions. An 
example case of RED application is discussed in Appendix 4.6.
The FITS and FSB were first launched by PCARRD in 1997.127 FITS is a one-stop 
shop for research information and technologies, expert advice, and technology exhibits on 
agriculture, forestry and natural resources. It serves as a referral system for information on 
production inputs, credit, marketing and technical assistance. FITS caters to the 
information and technology needs of farmers, entrepreneurs, traders, processors and other 
clients in areas that are difficult to reach by extension services. FITS centres can be 
established at the provincial, or the municipal/city level, with the strong support of 
PCARRD and its regional consortia, through different modalities, namely the DOST- 
PSTC, the DA, the DENR, LGUS and the agricultural colleges and universities in the area. 
The FITS centres are provided with communication facilities, equipment, materials and 
experts. As of late 1997, there were 11 municipalities where FITS centres have been 
established.128
The FSB program involves the partnership between farmers, and scientists and 
other experts of PCARRD in research and technology development. It serves as a 
mechanism by which farmers are directly involved in the planning and implementation of 
agricultural breakthroughs. Through the FSB, demonstration farms will be established to 
showcase the successful experiences of model farms. These demonstration farms will be 
managed and operated by a group of outstanding farmer-leaders. FSBs will be established 
at the provincial level to manage the various model farms. They will be implemented 
closely with the 14 regional consortia, the Regional R&D Information Services (described 
under Databases in this section) and FITS.129 During the last quarter of 1997, PCARRD 
was evaluating proposals for FSB from the regions.130
127 William Dar, The Philippine National Agricultural Research System: A Catalyst for Economic Growth 
and Sustainable Development, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1997, pp. 86-89.
128 PCARRD, Strategy to enhance technology adoption, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1997, 
pp. 1-2, unpub.
129 Dar, The Philippine National Agricultural Research System, op. cit., p. 87.
130 PCARRD, Strategy to enhance technology adoption, op. cit., p. 2.
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Applied Communication Strategy
The more traditional approach to disseminate technology transfer is the use of 
applied communication techniques. These include among others, technology publications, 
press releases, broadcasts, audio-visual production, trainings and seminars, and technical 
assistance. In addition, PCARRD develops instructional or ‘how-to’ materials to reinforce 
training programs for extension workers and farmers. Through PCARRD’s Scientific 
Literature Service (SLS), it attends to the information needs of the research network, the 
SCUs and extension workers by providing document delivery services to 120 libraries in 
the network.
An innovative approach related to applied communications for technology transfer 
is the Regional A pplied  Communications Program  (RACP). With the RACP concept 
introduced by PCARRD in 1979, Regional Applied Communication Offices (RACOs) 
have been established in the 14 regions of the country. RACO is a decentralisation strategy 
that allows R&D consortia to implement more localised communication activities to meet 
communication needs of specific regions. The RACOs produce publications and 
instructional materials, manage regional scientific and literature service, conduct training 
and establish mass media linkages to disseminate technologies generated by member- 
agencies. The RACOs are now institutionalised within the regional R&D consortia and as 
such operate through interagency sharing arrangement (in terms of manpower, skills, 
funds, communication facilities). PCARRD provides training and workshops to develop 
the communication skills and technical capability of RACO members.
Databases/Information Systems and other Support Systems
PCARRD has developed information systems that assist researchers, policymakers, 
planners and research managers in developing their strategies for R&D management and 
technology transfer. It has also introduced information systems that directly support the 
needs of the extension workers and agricultural producers such as the database in FITS.
The Agriculture and Resources Management Information System (ARMIS) 
provides the details of all the agriculture sectoral activities nationwide. The Research and 
Development Management Information System (RDMIS) highlights information on the 
new, ongoing and completed agricultural R&D programs and projects. The Research 
Information Storage and Retrieval System (RETRES) compiles the abstract bibliographies 
of all completed agricultural R&D projects. The Agriculture and Resources Regional
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Technology Information System (ARRTIS) traces the levels of technologies generated by 
the NARRDN.
In support of the regional integrated R&D programs, PCARRD has provided and 
piloted a model for regional data gathering, processing, synthesis and integration. This 
information system, referred to as Regional Research and D evelopm ent Information 
Services (RRDIS) or one-stop-inform ation-shop , has been institutionalised, since 1995, 
within the 14 regional consortia to be hooked up to the national databases at PCARRD. As 
part of the institutionalisation process, the consortia were equipped by PCARRD with the 
necessary skills and equipment for the implementation of information management and 
data conversion strategies for sustained technology transfer activities and decision making. 
RRDIS involves the establishment of a Regional Information Service Office; the 
installation and maintenance of technology transfer related softwares and databases;131 and 
the production of technology transfer materials. They complement the RACOs of the 
consortia. While the RRDIS are based in the regions, their counterpart units in the 
provincial and municipal levels are the FITS.
Other information technology (IT) programs include the Agricultural and Natural 
Resources Information Network (AGRINET) and the Mango Information Network (MIN). 
AGRINET, established in 1999, is an IT-based communication and information network 
nationwide. It is intended to electronically connect the NARRDN member institutions and 
PCARRD to facilitate information and technology exchange. MIN is a computer-based 
network with a central node at PCARRD Headquarters and four satellite nodes located in 
four provinces where mango is most abundant.132 It is an information system specifically 
for the mango industry, the third most important finit industry in the Philippines.
The DA has its own information systems and marketing support service for the 
agriculture sector. In 1998, the DA declared its plan to establish the National Information 
Network (NIN). The NIN intends to provide information and marketing services in 
agriculture and fisheries such as supply and demand data, price and price trends, product 
standards, directory of co-operatives, traders, key market centres, processors and business 
institutions involved, international, regional and local market forecasts and resource
131 May include information on R&D activities, manpower, facilities and technologies; statistical baselme 
databases; and information on producers, processors, market outlets, trainers and training pac ages.
132 William Dar, Building Partnerships and Capacities: A Centennial Achievement o f PCARRD, PCARRD 
DOST, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1998, p. 86.
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accounting data.133 It will also include information on R&D activities and current available 
technologies in agriculture and fisheries.
Some other support mechanisms for technology transfer include the Regional 
Symposium on Research an d  D evelopm ent Highlights (RSRDH) and Regional Techno 
Forum. The RSRDH was started in 1989 and coordinated by the regional consortia. It 
involves the annual review and discussion of technologies and significant information 
generated by the NARRDN. RSRDH serves as a venue to facilitate dissemination of 
technologies to farmers, and significant information to policy makers. This activity has 
been recently replaced by the Regional Techno Forum. The regional forum has basically 
the same objectives as the RSRDH but its implementing strategies are different. It is still 
organised by the regional consortium, but this time in collaboration with the local 
government units, and the regional and provincial agriculture and fishery councils. It 
focuses on the mature technologies generated by the consortia member-agencies. It is a 
mechanism for validating with the prospective clients the acceptability of the technologies 
presented.
Section 4.6 reveals the pervasiveness of the linear approach to agricultural research 
and extension in the Philippines. It points to the ways in which the government—having 
realised the limitations of the earlier versions of this approach (such as the T&V 
approach)—have gradually shifted to an R&E framework that considers farmers’ 
participation in research and extension (such as the farming systems research approach). 
Despite these changes, the practice of research and extension has remained largely top- 
down in orientation. It seems that it is easier for these top-down approaches to fit the 
bureaucratic structure of agricultural R&E. It is only in recent years that the government 
agencies concerned have introduced approaches, such as RED, DSC and FSB, that provide 
clear mechanisms and a deliberate space for farmer participation, rather than just talk of 
participation with no mechanism. However, it is unrealistic to assume that these 
participatory approaches alone can meet the needs of the various clientele groups of the 
agricultural R&E system.
133 Department o f Agriculture Administrative Order no. 06, Series of 1998, op. cit., p. 28.
168
4.6.2 The Private Sector and NGO Experience in Technology Generation and 
Transfer
The Private Sector
The private sector’s involvement in agricultural development is generally profit- 
motivated, concentrating on activities in one or two or more aspects of the production 
process (such as primary production, processing and marketing). However, there are 
corporations that are also engaged in socially-motivated activities, where they support 
projects that intend to ‘generate goodwill with no direct impact on corporate 
profitability’.134
Technology transfer and extension are not the deliberate intention of private 
agribusiness companies but often the outcome of product promotion and marketing. For 
instance, this can be done through the promotion of their products such as seeds and 
chemicals. To illustrate, San Miguel Corporation (SMC), one of the leading local 
agribusiness firms in the country, is engaged in the hybrid com business. It has established 
a hybrid seed research centre and seed conditioning plant in Mindanao. After four years of 
research, it has released its first com hybrid product line to com growing areas in the 
country. As part of its promotion activities, it holds demonstration trials in farmers’ fields 
and sponsors harvest festivals to showcase the benefits of growing hybrid com. SMC 
conducts regular classes to update farmers on technological developments such as 
improved cultural practices.
Both local and transnational agribusiness corporations have introduced the practice 
of contract farming.135 Contract farming can be considered as a form of technology transfer. 
As production units for agribusiness companies, farmers have access to the company s 
package of production technologies and are assured of a market for their produce. 
However, there are studies that show that little technology transfer takes place in this kind
134 Rolando Dy & Pacifico Orna, ‘Private corporations in the Philippines: Their linkages with agricultural 
producers’, in Aida Librerò & Pablito Villegas (eds), The Economics and Prospects of Agro-industria 
Development in Southeast Asia, Proceedings of the 7th Biennial Meeting o f the Agricultural Economics 
Society o f Southeast Asia (AESSEA), Makati Metro Manila, 25-28 May 1988, p. 129.
135 In contract farming or growing, agribusiness corporations transfer the farm production process to 
independent farmers or agricultural co-operatives. Contract farming is an arrangement bound y a con^ac 
that stipulates the quantity and quality o f a particular crop, the price for which the corporation wi uy 
the harvest, and the right o f the corporation to reject products that do not meet the standards, 
corporation is usually in charge o f marketing, financing, technical supervision, and provision o arm 
inputs while farmers are contracted to provide land and labour and to rent machinery. i e in 
Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, pp. 3-4.
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of arrangement. The corporation’s technologies are usually designed for intensive, large 
scale production system that are not suitable for independent farming.136
There are some companies which have strong developmental and societal concern. 
For example, some companies sponsor the education in agriculture of deserving students 
from the rural areas. Others enter into partnership with farmer groups so that farmers will 
increasingly become integrated into industry. This is done by slowly involving the farmer 
groups into more value-added production such as semi-processing while the company 
engages in final product processing or moves up into higher value products. Private 
companies of this type are, however, very few in the Philippines.
Private marketing techniques are quite similar to those employed by public 
extension, namely farmers’ meetings, demonstration plots and on-farm trials, field days, 
short courses for farmers, training of distributors and dealers, radio programs and 
information bulletins.137
Dy and Chua138 presented illustrative examples of ‘private sector-farmer linkages’ 
in the Philippines. The following discussions focus on some of these cases.
The Ayala Agricultural Development Corporation (AADC) is one of the first 
companies to introduce a contract growing scheme in the Philippines. It has contract 
growing arrangements for hybrid com seed production with farmers in Mindanao. AADC 
provides the technical know-how, supervision and inputs to its growers, who in turn render 
their labour and land for seed production. The basic research function is done by Pioneer 
Overseas Company. AADC buys all the harvest of contract growers at a pre-set price, from 
which advances on inputs, personal loans and interest were deducted.
Nestle Philippines Inc. is a joint venture between local investors and Nestle. As part 
of its Agricultural Assistance Program, coffee clonal garden and soya outgrowers scheme 
have been set up in Mindanao. Nestle propagates superior varieties of robusta coffee and 
sells them to interested farmers at cost. It provides free technical advice, training and 
educational/printed materials to farmers. Nestle also develops soya varieties that are 
adaptable to local climate and farming practices. Soya seeds, other farm inputs and 
technical assistance are then provided to cooperating farmers at cost.
136IBON Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, op. cit., p. 119.
137 Ibid., p. 208.
138 Dy & Chua, op. cit., pp. 135-141.
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RFM Corporation is one of the largest poultry integrators in the country. Starting as 
a flour milling company in 1957, it diversified into the feedmilling business and later 
expanded into breeding day-old chicks when it acquired exclusive franchise agreement 
with Peterson Industries, Arkansas, USA. Since then, the company has embarked on 
contract growing of poultry. RFM provides chicks, feeds, technical support and marketing 
assistance to farmer cooperators while the farmers provided land, buildings, light, water 
and medication.
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) is the largest food and beverage company in the 
Philippines. Its agricultural products include dressed chicken, animal feeds, hybrid com 
seeds and shrimps for export. In the case of the shrimp farming industry, SMC trains 
growers and technicians in semi-intensive and intensive grow-out technology and serves as 
ready a market for their produce. Its extension staff and technicians provide advice to 
cooperators on farm design, construction and pond management.
The Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is the largest and only 
fully-integrated pulp and paper mill in the country. It maintains three forest concessions 
with a combined area of about 183,000 hectares in four provinces in Mindanao. PICOP 
relies on its forest concessions and independent farmers for raw materials requirements. It 
implements reforestation program that sustain the company’s source of raw materials and 
maintain fertility of the forest lands. At one time, PICOP promoted the growing of fast 
growing tree species among its independent farmers by providing them with seedlings, 
technical know-how, and assistance in acquiring credit from the banks.
Pilipinas Shell Group of companies established the Pilipinas Shell Foundation in 
July 1982. Through the Foundation, scholarships are provided for the training of poor out- 
of-school youth to improve small farm productivity and management. The Foundation has 
established linkages with agencies involved in rural development to facilitate re-entry of 
graduates into their rural communities.
Much can be learned from the private sector research and promotion efforts. The 
strength of the private sector lies in its market-oriented research and extension. Private 
companies are more efficient in developing and promoting new products because of the 
active participation of their marketing personnel in all aspects of the business.
The private sector is credited for introducing a contract growing scheme that is 
claimed to be beneficial to the farmers in terms of access to market, credit and new
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technologies. However, there may be problems with this kind of private sector-farmer 
linkage. Under contract farming, the relationship between a corporation and farmers is 
reportedly biased in favour of the corporation because it controls the production, 
technology and pricing of products.139 Under this arrangement, corporations are said to 
make huge profits from the sale of prescribed farm inputs (such as feeds, chemicals and 
seeds) to the farmers, from cheap contract market price and from the one-sided quality 
control standards and procedures.140 Other issues with the private sector-farmer linkage 
include bias of corporations for areas close to the markets, bias of some firms for large 
farmers because of the needed product volume and quality, and the perpetuation of 
monocropping.
TheNGOs
The NGOs have their own technology transfer initiatives for countryside 
development. They have the ability to disseminate technologies to rural areas since they are 
the nearest grassroots contact. There are various umbrella organisations or federations that 
serve as networks of NGOs all over the country. As cited by Cacho,141 in 1989 there were 
91 members of the Association of Foundations (AF), 500 proponents of the Philippine 
Business for Social Progress (PBSP), and 47 members of the PhilSA (whose forte is 
research and training of labor organisations). Here, the cases of the Center for Rural 
Technology Development (CRTD) and the Foundation for Resource Linkage and 
Development, Inc. (FRLD) are discussed.
The CRTD was established by PBSP to promote and disseminate appropriate 
technologies to poverty groups. The PBSP is a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental 
organisation supported and funded by Filipino corporations as their response to the social 
and economic problems of the country. It develops and assists private voluntary 
associations and rural NGOs to serve as the implementing arm of its socio-economic 
activities, one of which is CRTD.142 CRTD’s mandate involves technology testing and
139IBON Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, op. cit, p. 123. 
1 4 0 pp.  123-128.
141 Myma Cacho, ‘Concluding remarks’, PCARRD Book Series no. 101/1990: Technology /or
Sustainable Development, Proceedings o f the Dialogue among the Association ° f  Foundations, DUb i 
PCARRD, and PCAMRD on Technology Transfer for Sustainable Development, PCARRD, Los Banos, 
Laguna, Phils., 15 November 1989, p. 73.
Development Academy o f  the Philippines, ‘An attempt at poverty alleviation: The PBSP Samar lsland 
Program’. Countryside Development: The Journal for the CD Professional, vol. 1, no. 1, ry ,rogra ’, ountryside evelop ent: 
pp. 83-84.
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verification and ensuring that poverty groups gain access to technology information, 
technical skills and resource institutions. It has become both a technology source and a 
resource, a source because of the results and experiences it has generated through 
technology testing and verification, and a resource because of its accessibility to poverty 
groups and their organisations. The various programs of CRTD include financial and 
technical assistance to NGOs and beneficiary organisations, training of officers and leaders 
of people s organisations in project organisation and technology management, provision of 
management consultancy to people s organisations, and publication and distribution of 
technical manuals.143
The FRLD assists small farmers, and small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs to 
form into economically viable producer associations. It provides management and 
technical assistance in business development, agro-processing, project feasibility studies 
and other business endeavours. It implements market promotion, market information 
dissemination and market linkage development programs.144
4.6.3 The State Colleges and Universities Experience
State Colleges and Universities (SCUs) in the Philippines perform three major 
functions: education, research and extension. There are two ways in which research 
findings or technologies generated by universities are disseminated and transferred to the 
end users. Technology transfer is done through extension and rural development programs, 
and/or technology commercialisation activities. Extension programs generally involve 
training, information dissemination (such as publications), action research (initiatives 
designed to produce both social change and research insights) and technical assistance 
through university experts and specialists.145 The rural sector or small agricultural 
producers are the main target clientele. The technology commercialisation approach is 
more business-oriented and is directed towards the industrial sector—the agribusiness 
sector and small- and medium-scale enterprises. The technology transfer strategies of two 
leading agricultural universities in the country, the University of the Philippines Los Banos 
(UPLB) and Central Luzon State University (CLSU), are discussed in this section.
143 Ramon Derige, ‘NGOs strategy for technology verification, packaging, and dissemination: The CRTD 
experience’. Keynote speech, LBSC-NSTW Celebration, PCARRD, Los Banos, Laguna, 1991.
144 FLRD Brochure.
145 Corazon Azucena (ed.), Rural Development Designs and Approaches: UPLB Experiences, Office of the 
Director for Extension, UPLB, College Laguna, Philippines, 1991, p. 3.
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In UPLB, the Office of the Director for Extension is responsible for coordinating 
extension activities.146 The different colleges and departments perform the actual extension, 
promotion or dissemination activities for their respective technologies. Each of these units 
allot a certain proportion of their annual budget for extension purposes. Through extension 
projects, faculty and staff-members work directly with the rural people in pilot testing and 
demonstrating innovations. Technologies and extension techniques that proved successful 
in the pilot stage are usually recommended for wider adoption by appropriate government 
and non-government agencies. Extension projects include among others formal and non­
formal training, communication media utilisation, formation of co-operatives, marketing, 
integrated rural development with focus on economic and social development of selected 
area, specialist support services, and others.
One example of UPLB’s innovative extension approach is called Farmers and 
Scientists for the Development of Agriculture or what is locally called MASIPAG. The 
MASIPAG approach links farmers and scientists in the development of improved 
traditional rice varieties. It was first introduced in 1986 to develop traditional-based rice 
varieties that required less chemicals at acceptable yield levels.147 MASIPAG was an 
attempt to lessen the dependence on the high yielding rice varieties widely distributed 
during the Masagana 99 period. Through the MASIPAG, 100 improved traditional 
varieties of rice seeds have been developed. It was observed that there was better 
acceptance by the farmers of the technologies developed.148 Conversely, the scientists 
involved gained a better understanding of the farmers’ needs.149
UPLB promotes the commercial use of its technologies through the Business 
Affairs Office and the UPLB Foundation.150 The Business Affairs Office is responsible for 
managing the various income generating projects of UPLB. It performs market research 
and pre-feasibility studies to confirm the commercial viability of technologies generated by 
university units. The UPLB Foundation is a non-stock, non-profit organisation that 
initiates, manages, finances and conducts technology commercialisation activities.
146Ibid,pp. 2-3.
147 Congressional Commission on Agricultural Modernization - Standing Committee on Technology, 
‘Committee Report: First Draft, op. cit., p. 33.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Louie Divinagracia, M. Garcia and H. Custodio, ‘Commercialisation of the results of research projects at 
the UPLB through strategic alliances with industry’, Research Management Components, vol. o, nos
2, December 1992, pp. 46-73.
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Technology commercialisation in UPLB is implemented through the following 
mechanisms: joint-venture with the private sector; tie-up with government agencies; and 
direct extension to small and medium-scale enterprises.151 Most technologies 
commercialised through joint venture with the private sector are in the areas of agro­
biotechnology. The UPLB Science and Technology Park, which is currently under 
construction, is a 22 to 42 hectare S&T complex that will offer spaces for companies and 
technology-based businesses. It is intended to facilitate the transfer of UPLB technologies 
to the private sector. These companies will have access to UPLB’s scientific and 
technological expertise and laboratory equipment and facilities.
CLSU has its own technology dissemination and utilisation mechanisms, three of 
which will be cited in this section.152 The Barangay Integrated Development Approach for 
Nutrition Improvement (BIDANI) is a social innovation implemented at the grassroots 
level via an organisational machinery which allows greater participation of the different 
sectors of the community. It utilises multi-disciplinary, bottom-up planning and an 
integrated development approach at the community level. It mobilises the indigenous 
agents of change who act as liaison of the program in their respective barangays. Through 
the Regional Applied Communication Office (RACO), the following technology transfer 
activities are being pursued: localised publications; preparation and production of 
instructional materials; development of audio-visual production; radio broadcast; 
indigenous media production; trainings; and workshops related to communication and 
social research projects. Through the Volunteers Experts Program, free expert advisory and 
consultancy services are provided by the university’s scientists and technologists to 
municipalities within the service area of CLSU. The scientific and technological experts 
help identify development constraints and opportunities, and assist in the planning and 
implementation of livelihood projects in various municipalities.
4.7 Impact of International Research and Donor Agencies on Technology 
Transfer Approach
International research and donor agencies have a strong influence over the structure 
and activities of the national agricultural research and extension system. These institutions
151 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
152 Bessie Burgos & Aurora Paderes, Utilising information for extension in agriculture and natural 
Some insights from the Philippines, Information Dissemination: From Researchers to Users, 
Proceedings no. 13, Bangkok, 1994, pp. 9-11.
175
have provided considerable resources in terms of loans and grants153 (often with Philippine 
counterpart funding) to various agricultural research and extension institutions in the 
Philippines. For instance, approximately US$40 million worth of loans and grants were 
generated by the PCARRD from various foreign sources during the period 1972-1992 in 
support of research and development activities of the NARS.154 The USAID provided 
US$6 million loan for the Agricultural Research Development Projects from 1972 to 
1984.155 These were projects that developed the capability of major research centres of the 
NARRDN and selected regional R&D consortia. Counterpart funds from the Philippine 
government for these projects amounted to US$10 million. As for more specific examples, 
the World Bank has assisted the Philippine government in the development of research and 
extension services starting in 1978 when it approved a loan for the National Extension 
Project (NEP). It provided another loan of US$20 million for the period 1981-1991 to the 
DA for smallholder agriculture development through the project entitled ‘Agricultural 
Support Services Project (ASSP).156 The USAID supported the integrated social forestry 
program of the Philippines (ISFP). In 1989, it provided US$25 million to the DENR for the 
implementation of the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP)!57 Appendix 4.7 
describes other major agricultural R&E programs and projects of the NARRDN that were 
outcomes of the bilateral funding arrangements between the Philippine government and the 
foreign donors.
Funding or donor agencies have much say on the institutional structure, direction 
and activities of the recipient agencies in the Philippines. USAID, for example, granted 
another US$25 million (spaced over five years starting 1992) to the Philippine government 
to fund a major institutional innovation—the creation of an environmental foundation 
called the Foundation for the Philippine Environment.158 In the case of the World Bank
153 Loans are funds provided by donors with a commitment by the recipients to repay while grants are funds 
that do not involve commitment to repay. Cited in S. Tisch and M. Wallace, Dilemmas of Development 
Assistance: The What, Why, and Who o f Foreign Aid, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1994, p. 
43.
154 PCARRD, ‘Resource generation for agriculture, forestry and natural resources R&D , Information 
Bulletin, no. 27, Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources Research and 
Development, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1993, p. 3.
155 PCARRD, ‘Resource generation for agriculture, forestry and natural resources R&D , Information 
Bulletin, no. 11, PCARRD, 1986, p. 6.
156 Operations Evaluation Department, WB, ‘Draft performance audit report re: Philippines—Agricultural 
Support Services Project (Loan 2040-PH)’, World Bank, October 1995, p. 5.
157 Frances Korten, ‘Questioning the call for environmental loans: A critical examination of forestry lending 
in the Philippines’, World Development, vol. 22, no. 7, pp. 978.
158 Ibid., p 979; The Foundation for Philippine Environment’s mandate is to make grants to environmentally 
oriented NGOs, communities, and training institutions.
176
funded ASSP project, it influenced some major structural changes in the DA and 
NARRDN in general. Regional Integrated Agricultural Research Centers (RIARCs) and 
their satellite research stations were established. Provincial research teams of research and 
extension personnel were organised and had been conducting on-farm research with 
farmers until they were dissolved during the reorganisation of the DA in 1987.
The farming systems research approach is an external concept that have been 
institutionalised as a result of this bilateral program funding arrangement. FSR concepts 
and strategies were institutionalised within the DA’s policies, programs and projects. 
Through the same project, the Farming Systems and Soil Resources Institute (FSSRI) and 
National Seed Foundation were created under the UPLB. The National Seed Foundation is 
an income-generating unit that could finance its operations from the sale of seeds and 
vegetative material. During the ASSP re-design in 1985, the WB pushed for the 
implementation of the T&V extension methodology which was started under NEP in 1978. 
This was promoted by WB despite the lack of interest on the part of the DA. Consequently, 
this project component became unsuccessful as it did not gain local support.159 Likewise, 
frequent changes in the national government officials and structure had seriously affected 
the progress of ASSP project. Local funding constraints also hindered attempts at 
sustaining some of the activities and maintaining facilities related to the project.
Merill-Sands and Kaimowitz160 refer to Bernardo’s case studies of 1989 about the 
impact of foreign donors on technology development and transfer in the Philippines. In the 
case of seed potato production, there were two foreign agencies involved in developing and 
funding seed production technologies. They had their own respective national partner 
agencies. Accordingly, the ‘uncoordinated support’ provided by these foreign agencies to 
their counterparts resulted in ‘competition rather than collaboration or linkage’ between 
institutions.161 Another example presented was on ‘soil improvement and erosion control 
program’. In this case, the foreign donor helped a local university to prepare a farming 
systems development project’ through Cornell University. Cornell worked closely with the 
local university and relevant government agencies. The product of this collaboration was 
the creation of a Farm Resources Management Unit within the local university. This unit 
now serves as a venue in which linkage between agencies concerned are sustained. This
159 Operations Evaluation Department, WB, op. cit., pp. 11, 14, 39.
160 Merill-Sands & Kaimowitz, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
161 Ibid.
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study illustrates the need for foreign donors to carefully study the national R&E system to 
determine their appropriate entry points and the necessary linkage mechanisms that must 
be put in place. It is also important to investigate other foreign donors’ projects to avoid 
duplication of efforts.
The NARRDN has benefited from partnerships with the national agricultural 
systems (NARS) of other countries through programs such as exchange of scientists and 
training, and joint R&D projects. However, there were experiences of lop-sided 
relationships where benefits accrued more to the outside NARS.162 This was a lesson that 
led PCARRD to devise a more systematic procedure for prioritising the areas covered by 
the linkages.
Collaborations with IARCs and the CGIAR have contributed to the building up of 
research capabilities of R&D manpower in the Philippines through workshops, 
conferences, study tours and training. Other benefits derived from these linkages are the 
following: germplasm exchanges and improvements (such as the case in which the superior 
com genetic materials collected from CIMMYT have increased the yield expectations of 
UPLB breeders); improvement of R&D activities; and sharing of knowledge and 
information through scientific journals, research papers, scientific literature service, direct 
scientist-to-scientist consultations and other formal and informal channels of 
communication.163
The partnerships of the Philippine NARS with the advanced research institutes 
(ARIs) have generally contributed to the country’s agricultural development. For instance, 
one of the most successful linkages with ARIs is with ACIAR. It resulted in the 
development of technology for ‘drying in bulk storage of high moisture grains’ in tropical 
climates; transfer of new technologies in rice-based farming systems; and the development 
of technologies in banana, mango and other tropical fruits, and coconut-based farming 
system.164 Linkages with ARIs also resulted in the development of information systems for 
specific commodities and technical assistance. The ARIs and their host countries have also 
benefited from the linkages with the Philippine NARS as would be expected of 
international mutual collaborations.
162 Dar, State o f Affairs o f PCARRD Partnerships with National and International R&D Institutions, op. cit., 
p. 26.
163 Ibid., pp. 46-50.
m Ibid., p. 52.
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4.8 Major Commonalities and Differences of Technology Transfer 
Approaches and Strategies
As an initial attempt at comparing the different technology transfer approaches, this 
section focuses on three mechanisms, namely the farming systems approach, DSC and 
RED as strategies for agricultural research and technology transfer.
4.8.1 Commonalities
These three mechanisms adhere to common concepts and principles, namely a 
participatory or need-based approach to development, an interdisciplinary/interagency 
team approach, a holistic or systems-oriented approach, and integrated resource 
management. They all employ rapid appraisal methodologies for needs assessment (such as 
rapid resource appraisal in the case of FSR and DSC, quick resource appraisal in RED). All 
three mechanisms apply the strategy of providing intervention but differ in the level of 
intervention and manner by which this is delivered. They also consider training of 
interveners and beneficiaries as a major component of their respective delivery systems. 
Both RED and DSC acknowledge the importance of farmers’ organisations or co­
operatives in providing a strong base for enterprise building and community development, 
respectively.
4.8.2 Differences
Differences among the three approaches are noted in terms of their focus, purpose, 
direct beneficiaries and interventions and potential impact (Table 4.4).
There are also differences in terms of the sustainability of the approaches. FSR is 
adopted by the DA and other research institutions in their programs. But these efforts 
remain government initiated and funded. The ‘weaning’ process seemed to be inadequate if 
not lacking. With DSC, when people are trained and socially prepared for changes or 
progress, sustainability in the hands of the community may be assured. The RACOs are 
expected to continue giving support and technical assistance. In RED, there is a system for 
providing sustained intervention to co-operatives through localised project management 
office (LPMO). With LPMO, co-operative members could serve as ‘under-studies’ of the 
LPMO staff.
Table 4.4 Differences among FSR, RED and DSC.
Area/Approach FSR DSC RED
Direct
beneficiaries
Farmer and his 
family
Whole community or 
co-operative
F armer-co-operati ve s/ 
associations
Partner private sector (if 
any)
Direct
interventions
On-farm research­
extension
Need-based
communication
strategies
Enterprise development
Purpose Develop and test 
site-specific 
technologies to 
improve efficiency 
of the farming 
systems of the 
whole farm
Develop social skills 
and values of the 
whole community 
thru appropriate and 
effective 
communication 
strategies
Develop and improve 
rural-based enterprises 
which are techno-based, 
market oriented, and not 
dependent on dole-outs 
thm the RED integration 
process
Potential Impact Increase in yield, 
productivity and 
income
Create positive 
changes in all aspects 
of the rural people's 
lives
Create savings that will 
increase local capital build­
up
Sustained economic 
intervention
Source: B. del Rosario, B. Burgos, L. Oliva, and N. Llemit, Complementation between the farming systems 
approach and some new initiatives for rural development: The Philippine experience, paper presented 
during the International Symposium on ‘Systems-oriented research in agriculture and rural 
development’, Montpelier, France, 21-25 November 1995, p. 22
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4.8.3 Possible Complementary Areas
The three approaches can complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses. The 
DSC approach is a social preparation process that makes a community ready to take 
responsibility over livelihood projects. The success of RED or enterprise building will be 
enhanced in this kind of situation. Farming systems research makes available location- 
specific technologies that can support the technological needs of enterprise building. The 
farming systems approach and DSC can provide a favourable and conducive environment 
for rural enterprises.
There are areas of complementation among the other technology transfer 
approaches and strategies. The FITS, other support databases and information systems, and 
the marketing information service described in section 4.6.1 will facilitate the development 
and improvement of rural-based enterprises. The information technology-based systems 
installed at the provincial and municipality levels have the best potential for providing the 
information needs of the small farmers and rural enterprises. The experiences in the 
implementation of action projects, and the UPLB’s MASIPAG approach have contributed 
to the shaping of the farmer-scientist partnership concept of FSB.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter illustrates that innovations in agriculture have vast potential to 
increase agricultural outputs. However, there exists a wide gap between the potential yields 
based on research, and the actual farm outputs. I have argued that appropriate extension 
and technology transfer activities are important to narrow these gaps. This chapter shows 
that agricultural R&D and extension alone will not lead to agricultural development. Other 
imperatives to improve the rural sector include credit, irrigation systems, rural roads and 
transport, postharvest facilities, market information, an effective IPR system and others. 
However, as argued in chapter 3, the government policies in the past were biased against 
expenditures on these agricultural productivity enhancing services, including R&D and 
extension. This bias reflects the present condition of the agricultural sector and support 
services discussed in section 4.2.
The history of the Philippine agricultural R&E system has been dominated by the 
top-down approaches to research and extension, where technologies and information were 
assumed to flow from the R&D community to the users in a linear fashion. However, in 
recent years, there has been a growing consciousness among key agencies involved to
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develop and use innovative approaches to agricultural R&D and extension. Therefore, new 
approaches to agricultural R&E, such as RED, DSC, FITS, FSB and other similar 
strategies and policies, have emerged. This consideration of new approaches by the 
government agencies concerned is in part caused by the repeated failures of the top-down 
R&E programs to help achieve broad-based agricultural development.
Recent agricultural R&D and extension policies and strategies introduced by 
government agencies concerned have more room for participatory or bottom-up 
approaches. However, the speed with which these approaches have gained recognition and 
adoption by the agricultural R&D system has been constrained by funding and the 
institutional complexities and difficulties within the system. New linkage mechanisms to 
overcome these difficulties have been recently instituted. However, their implementation 
has not been long enough to impact on the delivery of agricultural R&D and extension.
A closer scrutiny of some of the technology transfer approaches in this chapter 
reveals possible areas of complementation among them. These elements tend to converge 
towards the development of rural-based enterprises. A new dimension in agricultural 
support services that can enhance the performance of rural enterprises is the provision of 
enterprise management support to co-operatives. This strategy gives credibility to co­
operatives that are otherwise viewed by financial institutions as generally non-bankable. 
The chances of co-operatives obtaining loans from banks will be increased if there is this 
kind of management or mentoring support.
An analysis of the extent to which the theories and models covered in chapter 2 
explain the technology transfer strategies of institutions involved in the R&E system is 
presented in chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 5
AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES: ISSUES, DILEMMAS AND
CHALLENGES
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters dwell on the theoretical, political economy and structural 
contexts of technology transfer with emphasis on the agriculture sector in the Philippines. 
They consider the global and national landscape within which technology transfer operates. 
This chapter extends the contextual analysis of technology transfer by examining the 
history, nature and behaviour of agricultural co-operatives. Agricultural co-operatives are 
practical sites for the study of technology transfer in the context of organisations and 
interorganisational relations. They have been involved in major development programs of 
many developing countries. Since the 1950s, agricultural co-operatives in the Philippines 
have participated in the implementation of rural credit programs, agrarian reform policies, 
and other agricultural development programs of the government. They have rich 
experiences from which lessons can be drawn on agricultural technology transfer. In this 
thesis, three co-operatives are the subject of empirical studies of technology transfer at the 
field level. These studies are presented in chapters 7 to 9. This chapter examines 
agricultural co-operatives to better understand the organisational complexities of co­
operatives in the case studies.
This chapter includes the following: a brief history of the development of co­
operatives; a discussion on the extent to which governments accept and support these 
forms of organisation in developing countries; selected experiences on agricultural co­
operatives of developing countries in general, and the Philippines in particular; the factors 
influencing the success and failure of agricultural co-operatives; the various motives of 
sponsoring or intervening institutions in the formation of co-operatives; and the dilemmas 
and challenges faced by agricultural co-operatives. The question of whether co-operatives 
in the Philippines measure up to the universally accepted ideals of co-operatives is partly 
dealt with in this chapter. Examples from my case studies in the Philippines are highlighted 
in certain parts of this chapter to clarify some of the discussions and arguments put 
forward.
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Agricultural co-operatives in the developing countries are in general initiated and 
coordinated by their governments. This chapter observes that when government programs 
and policies encourage participation and democracy, co-operative members tend to be 
more responsible. When the activities of agricultural co-operatives are controlled directly 
and in detail by the government, they do not develop into independent rural organisations.
In the Philippines, a flawed framework dominates the history of co-operative 
development. Agricultural co-operatives during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were mainly 
used as channels for credit delivery and for collecting land amortisation from farmers 
covered by the agrarian reform program. There was little consideration for whether the co­
operatives were developing their capabilities to manage their own affairs. This practice did 
not encourage the co-operative members to develop a sense of ownership and 
accountability for their organisations' operation and activities. In general, co-operative 
members became credit-oriented and had developed the dole-out mentality, characteristics 
that would not make their co-operatives suitable vehicles for technology transfer.
I contend that whether initiated and/or funded by public, private, non-government 
organisations, farmer organisations, or foreign donor, agricultural co-operatives are better 
instruments for rural development and technology transfer when they focus on building the 
capability of members/communities to make their own decisions, to solve their own 
problems, and to translate or absorb technologies into productive enterprises. The role of 
government remains crucial to co-operative development. Their laws, policies and 
programs can either facilitate or constrain the growth of co-operatives. These policies must 
be enabling and facilitating of the co-operatives ability to become independent, more 
capable, more sustainable local institutions. These would prepare the co-operatives to carry 
on and sustain rural development long after any project or program is finished.
Overall, this chapter argues that the durability or fragility of agricultural co­
operatives as mechanism for rural development is contingent on government policies 
(whether enabling or constraining), the attitude of service providers or interveners (whether 
that of assistance or dominance), the degree of commitment and participation of members, 
the management capability of co-operative officials, and access of the co-operative 
members to resources.
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5.2 Background and History
Co-operatives of different kinds and types have played a significant role in the 
quest of many developed and developing nations to achieve economic growth, and a more 
equitable and democratic society. Agricultural co-operatives, in particular, have been 
instrumental in the success of both government-directed and revolutionary agrarian reform 
programs. They have become common institutional forms in the agriculture sector of many 
developing countries. The creation of co-operative organisations seems to favour the 
marginalised status of many farmers and agricultural workers in these countries. Such 
institutions are generally considered as vehicle through which small farmers can take 
advantage of economies of scale and compete with capitalistic enterprises.1 However, in 
the long history of co-operative development, there have been many discouraging results, 
for reasons that vary from the internal dynamics of co-operatives to the decisions and 
actions of agencies that introduce and sponsor them. Despite the many failures of various 
co-operatives, this organisational form has prevailed and continues to be regarded as a 
viable option for broad-based social and agricultural development. Co-operatives involve a 
large number of people in development and are difficult institutions to organise and 
manage but, when they succeed, can lead to more equitable distribution of developmental 
benefits and national wealth.
Co-operation is defined as any joint or collaborative behaviour that is directed 
towards an end and in which everyone involved has common interest or hope of reward.2 
Co-operatives are organisational forms that have developed from the social philosophy of 
co-operation. Defined by the International Co-operative Alliance, a co-operative is ‘an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically- 
controlled enterprise’.3
1 June Nash and Nicholas Hopkins, ‘Anthropological approaches to the study o f co-operatives, collectives,
and self-management’, in June Nash, Jorge Dandler & Nicholas Hopkins (eds), Popular Participation in 
Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives and Nationalized Industry, Mouton, the Hague, ic es 
published for the 9th International Congress o f Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences he m 
Chicago, 1973, p. 12.
2 Robert Nisbet, ‘Co-operation’, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 1 , 1968, p. 384,
quoted in John Craig, The Nature o f Co-operation, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1993, p. 11.
3 International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), ‘What is a co-operative’, gopher://gopher adp.wisc.edu.70/00/
.info-source/.coop/.def-hist/.defy.what-is, 08 January, 1996, accessed on 02 June 1998.
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The co-operative movement started in Europe in the early part of the nineteenth 
century in reaction to the socio-economic problems existing during this period.4 The 
European working class was confronted with problems of low wages, rising cost of living, 
unemployment, and inequitable distribution of income and wealth. These conditions in 
Europe led its leaders and intellectuals to search for solutions, with co-operation explored 
as one of the approaches. Various co-operative organisations and communities were 
established to put the co-operative principles in practice. Since then, co-operatives have 
evolved around the world and varied considerably in form. Co-operatives have been 
proposed or regarded as alternative organisational forms to promote greater social 
participation in a range of different societies and historical settings. For instance, many 
consumer co-operatives were created during the height of consumer movements in Europe 
between 1844 to World War I. These co-operatives were established to meet the desire of 
members to obtain necessary goods at lower prices. Agricultural marketing co-operatives 
and savings and loans co-operatives were also started during this period in Germany. These 
credit co-operatives were meant to solve the problem of usury and act as agents for the 
bulk purchase of agricultural requirements. Worker-organised production co-operatives 
were also set up, particularly in France.5
The period from World War I to the 1950s saw the development of co-operative 
communities as people experimented with new ways of working and living together.6 
Examples of these comprehensive co-operative communities are the K ibbutz or collective 
settlement, and M oshav or co-operative smallholders’ settlement, both in Israel.7 In the 
Kibbutz, private property was abolished; thus everything was owned by the organisation. 
Agricultural land was rented on a leasehold basis and cultivated, with the produce sold 
collectively. Cash was then shared equally among those who cultivated the land. In the 
Moshav, the individual family units formed the basis of the co-operative.
After World War II, co-operatives were established by many independent 
governments as one of the means by which their countries could attain socio-economic 
development. Co-operative organisations were created by most of these governments with 
assistance from ‘outside experts’ through bilateral aid programs and volunteer groups
4 John Craig, The Nature o f Co-operation, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1993, p. 1.
5 Ibid., p. 33.
6 Ibid., pp. 34-35. .
7 Co-operative Development Authority (CDA), ‘Module III - Beginnings and philosophy of co-operatives,
Training Manual’, CDA, Philippines, 1994, p. 46.
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including Church missionaries from the USA and other countries.8 By end of the 1960s, 
service co-operatives in most industrialised countries formed ties with the international 
business community.9 Studies of co-operatives, such as those undertaken by the United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), showed that by end of the 
1970s, most government-directed co-operatives tended to reflect the government’s 
ideology, and there was no sense of ownership among the members.10 During the period of 
the 1980s to the present, many forms of co-operatives have emerged out of people’s 
initiative. The move towards privatisation of many government-sponsored activities and 
reductions in government spending in the 1980s encouraged the formation of people- 
initiated co-operatives as a way of continuing services no longer provided by the 
government.11
5.3 Co-operative Values and Principles
The ‘value base’ of co-operatives is shaped by the inherent principle of co­
operation and the aspirations of the people who organise them.12 In the 1960s, an attempt 
was made by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA)13 to review the values and 
principles of co-operatives in different types of societies in different political and economic 
conditions.14 The review identified the common values and principles as they were 
advocated and applied by co-operatives all over the world. In 1995, during the ICA 
congress and general assembly held in Manchester, the 1966 statem ent o f  co-operatives ' 
values and prin cip les  was updated and adopted by ICA members. Co-operatives, based on 
this new document, are said to be founded on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, 
democracy, equality and solidarity.15 The current universally-recognised principles by 
which such co-operatives put their values into practice are the following: voluntary and
8 Craig, op. cit., p. 38.
9 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
10 Ibid., p. 39.
11 Ibid., p. 40.
12 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
13 The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) is a non-government association that acts as catalyst and
coordinator o f the co-operative movement in most o f the world. It gathers, assists and represents the 
interests o f some 226 organisations or more than 760 million people from more than 101 countries. Ihe 
Philippines is represented in ICA by the National Confederation o f Co-operatives.
(Sources: ICA, ‘What is the ACI?’, http://coop.org/fr/introF.html, accessed on 02 June 1998; J. M. Rana, 
‘ICA Membership from developing countries’, gopher://wiscinfo.wisc.edu:70/00/.info-source/ 
.coop/.orgs/.ica/.pubs/.review/.vol-88/.member, accessed on 02 June 1998)
14 Ibid., p. 41.
15 ICA, loc. cit.
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open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy 
and independence; education, training and information; co-operation among co-operatives; 
and concern for community (Appendix 5.1).16 Co-operation is a social process and 
therefore is influenced by the socio-economic perspectives and cultural background of the 
co-operative sponsors, co-operators, and members. This issue is dealt with later in this 
chapter.
5.4 Types, Kinds and Categories of Co-operatives
Different types of co-operation may emerge under various social settings.17 These 
types of co-operation have been identified by Craig18 as follows: a) automatic co-operation, 
that is joint efforts of an impersonal nature which take place between individuals in 
physical proximity to each other;19 b) spontaneous co-operation within close personal 
forms of association such as within a family or neighbourhood; c) traditional co-operation 
based on the customs of the people;20 21d) directed co-operation, which is facilitated by an 
organisational hierarchy such as the government; and e) contractual co-operation, in which 
co-operation is both voluntary and formalised among a group of individuals who agree to 
work together towards the achievement of a common goal.
Co-operatives can be classified by the functions and services they perform, as 
follows: credit; consumer; producer; marketing; service and multipurpose. Credit co­
operatives, or savings and loans associations, encourage thrift among their members by 
paying interest on members’ savings. They create funds in order to provide loans to 
members for productive and provident purposes. Credit co-operatives are particularly 
important in agriculture where financial institutions are not available and informal sources 
of credit are exploitative. Consumer co-operatives procure and distribute commodities to 
members and non-members. These co-operatives can lower prices by bulk buying of 
commodities or services. Producer co-operatives undertake joint production with the 
product of organised work divided on some equitable basis among the member-workers. 
Marketing co-operatives engage in the supply of production inputs to members and try to
16 Ibid.
17Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 385-386, quoted in Craig, op. cit., p. 11.
18 Craig, op. cit., pp. 11-14.
19 e.g. People queuing at bus stops.
20 e.g. Rice terraces estimated to be more than 100 square miles in area in Ifugao, Philippines, developed
since 3,000 years ago as an outcome o f the co-operative work of the indigenous people m Iragao.
21 Nash and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 11.
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provide better prices for members by grading, processing and transporting products in 
common, or by storing and selling them when the price is more favourable.22 Service co­
operatives are involved in medical and dental care, hospitalisation, transportation, 
insurance, housing, labour, electric and power, communication and other services. 
M ultipurpose co-operatives combine two or more activities of the aforementioned types of 
co-operatives. Multipurpose co-operatives are now fairly common in the agriculture sector, 
handling credit, agricultural inputs and marketing, and in some cases including consumer 
goods. In the Philippines for instance, almost 66% of registered co-operatives nationwide 
in 1994 were classified as multipurpose, agriculture-based co-operatives.23
Co-operatives can also be categorised by structure or scope, ranging from simple 
organisations operating independently, called ‘primaries’, or they can be federated into 
larger more complex organisations linking primary co-operatives together, termed as 
‘secondary’ or ‘tertiary’.24 They can also be classified according to the main objectives. 
Co-operatives can have purely economic objectives with material gain of their members as 
primary consideration, or they can have socio-political goals such as the use of co­
operatives as instruments for social change or advancement of political reforms. Co­
operatives also vary according to type of membership. They can be exclusive to a 
particular group of people (e.g. farmers’ co-operative) or they can be open to anybody who 
agrees to accept the terms of membership such as contributing a specified share to become 
a member. Co-operatives can be categorised according to whether they were initiated by 
their members on a voluntary basis or by government or private voluntary groups. While 
there are many studies indicating that co-operatives initiated by the people have been 
generally more successful than government-directed ones, it is difficult to draw boundaries 
on this basis. Co-operatives formed by their members may become co-opted by the 
government through some economic or legal means, while those set up by government 
may become quite independently run by its members.25 Whether co-operatives are initiated
22 Norman Uphoff for the Rural Development Committee Cornell University, ‘Local institution developmen 
for agriculture’, Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook with Cases, Kumanan Press, 
Connecticut, 1986, p. 128.
23IBON Philippines, ‘Co-operatives: At the grassroots o f development’, IBON Facts and Figures, vol. 18, 
no. 4, 1995, p. 2. .
24 Primary co-operative is composed o f individual members; secondary co-operative involves the partnership
of two or more primary co-ops; and tertiary co-operative refers to co-operative federations and unions.
25 Uphoff, loc. cit.
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from the ‘top’ or ‘below’ does not matter as much as accountability, whether members see 
themselves as responsible for their own actions or not.26
5.5 Why Co-operatives?
Co-operatives have been established for a variety of reasons—as alternatives to 
private businesses and state-owned enterprises in Western countries, as instruments for 
involving people in new economic activities, and for securing local ownership of industries 
from colonial control in developing countries. During the early days of co-operative 
development in Europe, many co-operatives were formed by social movements out of 
shared discontent and frustration over their harsh living conditions. Co-operatives in a 
variety of structures and purposes were created for immediate self-help. They played a 
major role in rebuilding the economies of Europe and North America. Their contributions 
to these economies were as follows: breaking monopolies and international cartels; 
elimination of windfall profits by returning surplus back to users of the business rather than 
to owners of capital; elimination of middlemen; decentralisation of decision-making; more 
equitable distribution of wealth; and less vulnerability to market manipulation (e.g. transfer 
pricing) by multinational corporations as co-operatives have a share of the industry at each 
stage in the processing chain.27 In some countries of Africa and Asia, co-operatives were 
introduced by colonial governments as part of the colonialist policy of social change or to 
keep existing forms of local institutions intact.28 For example, in Singapore, co-operatives 
were formed by the British Colonial government through the Straits Settlements Co­
operative Societies Ordinance in January 1925. The main purpose of this policy was to 
help out the employees of the colonial government whose morale and work efficiency were 
seriously affected by the indebtedness problem brought about by inflation. Thrift and loan, 
and credit co-operatives were thus encouraged.29
In the long history of the co-operative movement, central governments of many 
countries have promoted the formation of co-operatives for various motives. Some 
governments saw in co-operatives a bureaucratic structure through which the central
26 Ibid., p. 129.
27 Craig, op. cit., pp. 93-100.
28 Fals-Borda et al., ‘The crisis o f rural co-operatives: Problems in Africa, Asia and Latin America , in Nash,
Dandler & Hopkins, (eds), op. cit., p. 452.
29 R. O. Daniel, Co-operative Societies in Singapore 1925-1985, Singapore National Co-operative 
Federations Ltd., 1986, p. v.
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government could reach and increase control over the rural areas. Other governments 
encouraged co-operatives to ensure that the excess production of agriculture would be 
channelled to the national capitalistic society. In other cases, co-operatives were envisioned 
as means through which rural people could be mobilised against some enemy of the 
government (e.g. monopolistic business, either foreign or domestic).
Co-operatives could also be promoted for broad-based social change.30 For example 
in China, during the rule of Mao in the 1950s, Chinese peasants were collectivised.31 Their 
agricultural lands were pooled together into directed production co-operatives with farm 
work done collectively by teams. In 1958, during the ‘great leap forward’, these co­
operatives were integrated into large rural communes combining the political and 
economic organisations in the rural areas. Each commune was conceived as a microcosm 
of China’s transformed society.32
Conversely, there were cases in which a successful local level co-operative 
structure could be used by the community against the national government’s tendency to 
interfere.33 A case in point was the Benduguba co-operative in the Kita area of Mali, an 
association of men active in farming. This co-operative succeeded at the village level 
because it was an accepted village institution that fitted into already existing local 
structures. It was a defence mechanism of the villagers against the Kita or central 
government’s intention to transform the village into a co-operative of production. The 
villagers were opposed to this set-up because traditional methods of agricultural production 
placed considerable power with the head of a household. A shift from the household to the 
village as the unit of production would require a major reorganisation of their system.34
In other cases, the co-operative movement was also used to advance the political 
aims of its prime movers or sponsors. A case in point was the Co-operative Store Society 
that emerged in 1946 after the re-occupation of Singapore by the British from the Japanese. 
It attracted a lot of support from the community because of its objective to combat 
profiteering and racketeering in the black market’. However, it soon became evident that
30 Nash and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 14.
31 Craig, op. cit., p. 146. ,
32 John Dixon, ‘The community based rural welfare system in The Peoples Republic o f China. 1949 1979 ,
Community Development Journal, voi. 17, no. 1, 1982, quoted in ibid.
33 Nash and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 15.
34 Nicholas Hopkins, ‘Participatory decision-making and modem co-operatives m Mali: Notes towards a
prospective anthropology’, in Nash et al. (eds), op. cit., pp. 106-107.
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the movement was being used by its prime movers—later proven to be pro-communist 
activists who ran the Malayan Democratic Union—for their own political purpose. The Co­
operative Store Society was dissolved in 1951 after the arrest of many of its prime movers 
by the British government on the charge of being members of the Communist-led Anti 
British League.35
5.6 Experiences of Co-operatives in Developing Countries
The formation of co-operatives in the developing countries has been promoted by 
the United Nations (UN) since the 1950s, when many of these countries had gained their 
independence from colonial rule. The UN has always recognised the potential of co­
operatives to alleviate poverty, declaring in 1995 that the International Day of Co­
operatives be celebrated every year by governments in collaboration with their national co­
operative movements.36
Soon after World War II, the governments of many newly independent states, with 
the encouragement of the UN, organised and incorporated thousands of co-operatives. The 
successful co-operatives formed by peasants in British India and Africa by the end of 
World War II inspired the leaders of these independent states. Co-operatives were seen as 
one of the reform mechanisms to build ‘modem independent economies’ out of the 
agriculture sector.37 The governments of the developing nations were directly involved in 
organising and managing co-operatives to ensure that the desired economic changes were 
achieved.
But by the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were reports of massive failures in 
rural co-operatives, although some success stories were identified. The first ten years of co­
operative development attempted by the UN were judged as a failure.38 A 1975 UN study
of rural co-operatives in developing areas concluded that ‘rural co-operatives....bring little
benefit to the masses of poorer inhabitants’.39 But in 1987, the then Secretary-General 
Perez de Cueller said to the UN General Assembly that there was ‘sound evidence that co­
35
36
37
38
39
Daniel, op. cit., pp. v-xi. ?
ICA, ‘Message from the International Co-operative Alliance: Co-operatives for sustainable development, 
74th International Co-operative Day, 6 July 1996, gopher://wiscinfo.wisc.edu.70/00.info-source/.coop/. 
orgs/.ica/.events/.coop-day/.Co-operative-, accessed on 02 June 1998.
Craig, op. cit., p. 132.
Ibid., p. 133. . .
Bruce Thordarson, ‘Grassroots co-operatives in the developing world’, from North-South Institute Bnefrng 
Paper, 1990, To the CUSO ‘Common-Sense Economics’ Ideas Bank Index, http://www.ccn.cs.dal.ca/ 
CommunitySupport/CUSO/cse gcdw.html, accessed on 20 June 1998.
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operatives are an invaluable institution for promoting social and economic development, 
and achieving a more equitable distribution of income’.40
There seems to be contrasting opinions about the effectiveness of co-operatives in 
developing countries. For instance, ICA statistics on agricultural co-operatives in 
developing countries look very impressive: India has become self-sufficient in milk 
because of its network of dairy co-operatives; a major portion of India’s milk production is 
marketed by the AMUL dairy co-operatives; the sugar co-operatives in India own some 
106 factories representing 53% of the whole sugar industry in the country;41 25% of India’s 
fertiliser is processed in co-operative factories; co-operatives dominate the marketing of 
coffee in Kenya; and 40% of cotton in Brazil, 60% of chickens in Bolivia, and 87% of 
pyrethrum in Kenya are marketed through co-operatives.42 These figures look very 
impressive on the surface, but the fact remains that many of these co-operatives operate as 
government-sponsored monopolies with limited participation and commitment of co­
operative members. Some have benefited from capital infusion from foreign donors, but 
many of these co-operatives could not even maintain and manage their assets once outside 
support has finished.
In view of this, it is tempting to conclude that co-operatives must be started and 
fully managed by the people in a community in order to be effective. However, success or 
failure of co-operatives depends on many factors internal and external to the co-operative. 
It is not just a matter of putting the blame or credit on the interveners or co-operative 
officers and/or members. A closer look at the conditions that favour or inhibit the success 
of co-operatives is necessary for better understanding of their behaviour and the reasons for 
their poor or good performance. For this purpose, selected case studies on co-operatives in 
developing countries are examined in this chapter.
India has a rich experience in co-operative development starting from the year 
1904 when agricultural credit co-operatives were first established. Subsequent attempts to 
introduce co-operatives in the country were mainly through the Indian government s 
efforts. Co-operatives have been a major part of India’s national development programs.
40 Ibid.
41 Craig, op. cit., p. 139.
42 Michael Cracknell, ‘Co-operatives in the context o f globalisation and liberalization’, SD Dimensions/Rural
Administration and Co-operatives/Analysis, http://www.fao.org/sd/rodirect/ROan0001.html, posted on 
March 1996, accessed on 22 June 1998.
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The government invested heavily in co-operatives’ formation with the condition that it 
could appoint up to three directors on the board of each co-operative sponsored.43
Co-operatives were organised by government employees and quickly grew into a 
huge bureaucracy such that by 1976, statistics on co-operatives showed the following: 
135,000 local multipurpose credit societies with total membership of more than 40 million 
families or 45% of the rural population; 19 state co-operative Land Development Banks 
(LDBs) and 1870 primary LDB with some 15.7 million members; 25 general-purpose apex 
marketing federations at the state level, 3,278 general-purpose primary marketing co­
operatives, and 590 specialized commodity marketing societies; 133 cold storage plants, 
2,112 agricultural processing plants, and 721 rice mills owned by co-operatives; 27,000 co­
operatives owning the Indian Farmers Fertilisers Co-operative Ltd.; 4,560 fishermen’s co­
operatives representing 20% of all fishermen in India; and tens of thousands of non­
agricultural co-operatives.44
However, behind this rosy picture of co-operative structure in India were many 
problems and weaknesses. Many of these co-operatives were operating in name only, 
constrained by government and bureaucratic controls and with members not having 
internalised the co-operative principles. More specifically, the major weaknesses of co­
operatives in India were observed by Craig45 46 as follows: lack of local leadership; 
complicated rules and procedures; lack of resources; lack of innovative management 
techniques; and a general lack of commitment among members because their perceived 
needs were not being met.
One conclusion that can be drawn is that the co-operative superstructure in India 
appeared to stand on shaky ground—that if government support were to be withdrawn, 
very few co-operatives would survive. It seems that the existence of a massive state- 
sponsored co-operative structure had inhibited the development of grassroots self-sufficient 
groups. However, there were some co-operative institutions in India that have been 
successful in terms of increasing agricultural production and improving the lives of their 
members. The dairy co-operatives in India, following the Anand model, under the aegis
43 Ibid., p. 136.
“ Ibid., pp. 137-138.
45 Ibid., p. 139. .
46 The co-operative in Anand bought all the milk o f the dairy farmers, paid on the basis of quahty, gave 
honest measures, supplied high quality feed for cows, and provided veterinary services and me lcines a 
no cost to members.
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of the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), elected their boards of directors from 
the local co-operative chairpersons; hence these directors were not government officials.47 
The AMUL Dairy and other dairy co-operatives developed trainers who provided three-day 
workshops on animal husbandry offered exclusively to women in the villages. The NDDB 
trained their managers on co-operative values and principles at the Institute for Rural 
Management.48 The sugar co-operatives in the state of Maharashtra controlled 53% of the 
sugar industry in India. The members had a free hand in the selection of board of directors 
who were trained locally and not from the government.49
In China, two major reforms in 1978, namely the separation of political and 
economic functions and the responsibility system, led to the development and 
reorganisation of co-operatives.50 These reforms provided economic rewards for 
performance and gave peasants greater freedom of choice about which farming system to 
adopt. Through these reforms, some communes were replaced by individual and group 
initiatives organised around co-operatives. Agricultural Production Co-operatives became 
the unit of agricultural production instead of the giant rural communes. Co-operative 
members were allowed to choose their leaders (rather than the state appointing them) and 
to make production decisions, as long as these did not conflict with collective production.51 
Co-operative membership had become voluntary and all members had equal voting 
powers. Production surplus went to taxes, special reserve funds, increased production and 
payments on shares. State planning still existed but excessive bureaucratic control and 
centralised management had been lessened. The state gave some support to the co­
operatives in the form of investment funds, loans and credits, tax incentives, and priority 
for state supplies of raw materials. These policies encouraged the formation of new co­
operatives, such that in 1985, there were some 35,000 basic supply and marketing co­
operatives at the commune level representing 132 million members. These co-operatives
47 Craig, op. cit., p. 140.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 139.
50 Ibid., p. 146.
51 Some observers o f China’s agriculture sector argue that ‘free choice of farming system did not hold for
most o f the country. For instance Hinton (in W. Hinton, ‘More on China’s new family contract system , 
Monthly Review, vol. 35, April 1984, p. 43) claims that peasants who had a choice were in the minority 
and most o f them areas controlled by the large municipalities o f Beijing, Shanghai, and Canton. Hmton 
maintains that city party committees took various steps either to protect old collective forms or to ensure 
that contracting did not interrupt large-scale farming, mechanisation, etc.
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were federated at the country and regional levels; they constituted the All China Federation 
of Co-operatives, which was accepted into ICA membership in 1985.52
In Latin America, co-operatives were generally imposed by the government, the 
church, the United States AID or other private individuals and organisations. The state- 
directed co-operatives were multipurpose in nature involving marketing, credit and 
distribution of consumer goods. They were usually associated with land reform and were 
part of larger government development programs.53
In Nicaragua, for example, the co-operative movement evolved from that which 
was formed by a rebel leader who fought for land reform in the 1930s; to one which was 
endorsed by the Sandinista government in the 1980s, with the government gradually 
prioritising land reform and co-operative assistance from 1980 to 1985 under the 
coordination of a government ministry; to the organisation of the national farmers and 
ranchers’ union by the Sandinista party, which was later granted more autonomy; to the 
end of public assistance to the co-operatives in the 1990s after the change in government 
and the increase in structural adjustment measures.54 Until 1985, the government, through 
centralised policies and bureaucratic process, exercised control over the co-operatives 
including decisions about production, use of farming techniques, inputs, prices, marketing, 
and even criteria on co-operative membership and other organisational matters.55 With the 
1985 policy shift, the co-operatives were allowed to organise their own production, and 
official controls on grain marketing were removed. Since then, the co-operatives increased 
in number with over 3,300 agricultural co-operatives formed in the 1980s.56
Elsewhere in much of Latin America, the development of social organisations that 
represent the interests of rural people, such as co-operatives, had been stifled by the 
political and economic influence of the traditional rural elites and by strict state control. 
However, under certain circumstances, the rural people were able to overcome these 
constraints by mass action leading to organisational forms that were more autonomous 
from the state.
52 Craig, op, cit., pp. 145-151.
53 Fals-Borda et al., op. cit., pp. 440-441.
54 Caroline Kroeker, ‘The co-operative movement in Nicaragua: Empowerment and accompaniment of 
severely disadvantaged peasants’, Journal o f  Social Issues, vol. 52, no. 1, Spring, 1996.
55 Marvin Ortega, “ The state, the peasantry and the Sandinista Revolution’, The Journal of Development 
Studies, vol. 26, no. 4, July 1990, pp. 129-135.
56 Kroeker, op. cit.
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In Africa (northern, western, and eastern), rural co-operatives were sponsored by 
various groups, including the national governments, churches, World Bank, the USAID, 
political parties, and private individuals and organisations. The governments’ task of 
organising co-operatives was facilitated in African countries where there were local 
development programs such as community development and ‘animation rurale’.57 The 
basis of co-operative leadership in Africa was diverse but the real decision-making powers 
on general policies and operation of the co-operatives rested with government officials 
rather than with the elected leaders.58
5.7 Agricultural Co-operatives in the Philippines
Co-operative development in the Philippines, like in many other developing 
countries, has been generally through government efforts and initiatives. Co-operatives 
have been historically viewed by the Philippine government as instruments for attaining 
social and economic reforms. Specifically, the development of agricultural co-operatives 
has been linked with the implementation of the country’s agrarian reform laws.
There were about 41,000 registered co-operatives in the Philippines in 1996, 62% 
or 25,575 of which were classified as agricultural-based co-operatives.59 Of the 45,000 co­
operatives registered in 1998, one-third was found to be inactive.60 For instance, in my 
study of the Integrated Jalajala Federation of Co-operatives (INJAFEDCO) located in the 
province of Rizal in the Philippines, it was noted that five out of its ten member-primary 
co-operatives were not fully operational as of 1996. In this case, some reasons for the 
inactivity include the following: huge debt due to high cost of maintaining their irrigation 
facilities; management problems; inability to sustain operations when the credit support of 
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LandBank) ended; and lack of knowledge of farmer-
‘Animation rurale’ is one o f the methods for promoting education, dialogue, and popular participation in 
the mral areas. Cited in Fals-Borda et al. op. cit., p. 440.
For examples, refer to the development o f co-operative movement in Senegal with peanut production as 
their major concern, and in Tanzania involving the cotton and coffee co-operatives, ujamaa villages, an 
others. (Craig, op. cit., pp. 141-145; Gabriel Gagnon, ‘Co-operatives, participation and development: 
Three failures’ in Nash et al (eds), op. cit., p. 366; M ’Baye Diao, ‘Participation of rural popu a ons in 
development in African countries: the Senegalese experience’, in UNESCO, Participate in Developmen , 
Paris, UNESCO, 1986, pp. 352-355; Louis Putterman, ‘Extrinsic versus intrinsic problems ot agnculturai 
co-operatives: Anti-incentivism in Tanzania and China’, The Journal o f Development Studies, , PP- 
181-185.) .
Leandro Rola, The role o f  agribased co-operatives in the agro-industrialisation and food_security 
development programs of the Philippines, paper presented to the on A c
Management Approaches for Sustainability and Economic Growth, PCARRD, Los Ban , g , 
November 1996.
60 Clarissa Militante, quoting CDA Chief Verzosa in ‘Globalisation threatens co-ops: Will government 
help?’, Manila Bulletin, 14 August 1998.
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members on the activities and goals of the federation and their co-operatives. Before the 
INJAFEDCO was formed, there were 34 co-operative societies in the province of Rizal, 
the majority of which were inactive due to lack of funds, facilities and guidance.61
Co-operatives in the Philippines are organised according to the general 
classification recognised worldwide or by the International Co-operative Alliance. They 
may fall under any of the following types: credit; consumer; producer; marketing; service 
and multipurpose co-operatives. As of 1994, the majority of the 32,766 co-operatives were 
multipurpose, totalling 21,688 (66%) for the agriculture sector and 6,391 (20%) for the 
non-agriculture sector.62 This is understandable since a multipurpose co-operative is more 
flexible in operations than the other types. Co-operatives in the Philippines may also be 
classified according to their scope—primary, secondary and tertiary.63
Most agricultural co-operatives took the form of a rural association64 first before 
becoming full-fledged co-operatives. Many of them that started as single or double-purpose 
co-operatives would later expand to a multipurpose organisation. Almost fifty percent of 
agricultural co-operatives received production loans from the LandBank in 1990. Many of 
the rural co-operatives of today were created due to the LandBank’s credit program in 
support of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program that was launched in 1988. For 
instance, most of the 34 co-operatives in the province of Rizal were organised to avail 
loans from the LandBank and other funding agencies. Specifically, 5 out of 10 member-co­
operatives of INJAFEDCO started as credit co-operatives, with financial support mostly 
coming from the LandBank.
The co-operative movement in the Philippines formally started when the 
government had begun to pass laws for the organisation of co-operatives. The first co­
operative legislations were passed during the American Regime (1900-1934). They 
focused on the organisation of agricultural and rural-based co-operatives.65 During this 
period, two major laws on co-operatives were enacted, namely Agricultural Credit Co­
operative Act (Republic Act 2508), in which rural credit co-operative associations were
61 Leticia Damole, ‘Institutional development to sustain a rice processing complex: The case of the Integrated 
Rural Development Project, Philippines’, MS thesis, Asian Institute o f Technology, 1995, p. 127.
62IBON Philippines, loc. cit., citing CDA statistics as o f 1994.
63 See section 5.5 for the definition o f types, kinds and categories o f co-operatives.
64 Rural associations are pre-co-operatives or informal groups o f people not yet incorporated into the 
officially-sanctioned co-operative system.
65 Jacinto Batoon, ‘Legislation on co-operatives in the Philippines: A historical perspective ,_Inaugural
lecture delivered at University o f the Philippines Los Banos, Laguna, Philippmes, December , , P­
79.
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organised in the provinces,66 and Co-operative Marketing Law, in which the Bureau of 
Commerce was appointed to organise farmers into marketing co-operatives.67 Republic Act 
2508 exempted co-operatives from payment of all types of registration fees and income 
tax. Aside from these privileges, the government did not give any other forms of support 
such as financial and technical assistance. Despite the minimal support given to co­
operatives, the government interfered heavily into the internal affairs of the co-operatives. 
For instance, the Director of the Bureau of Commerce selected and determined the salary 
of the treasurers in the co-operatives. There was also lack of manpower from the Bureau of 
Commerce to oversee the implementation of the law.68
During the Commonwealth Period (1935-1946), legislations were directed towards 
agricultural financing and the formation of non-agricultural co-operatives.69 The Co­
operative Law (Commonwealth Act 565) provided for the formation of all types of co­
operatives, the creation or designation of a government agency to supervise the co­
operatives, and the establishment of a National Co-operative Fund. The law allowed 15 or 
more persons to form a co-operative, which for the first five years would be exempted from 
all taxes and government fees.70 However, the same law was observed to be lacking in 
comprehensiveness. For instance, there was no clear demarcation between co-operative and 
corporation, and there was lack of a basic working framework in the co-operative 
program.71 The co-operative movement was beginning to gain momentum but was cut 
short by the outbreak of World War II.72
The co-operative laws after the war were focused on the Filipinization of co­
operatives, in which privileges and rights granted to foreigners in the previous laws were 
abolished; and the utilisation of co-operatives for relief goods distribution. A series of laws 
that organised and re-organised institutions authorised to promote and supervise co­
operatives ensued.73
66
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69
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Ibid., p. 71.
Co-operative Development Authority (CDA), ‘Module III - Beginnings and philosophy of co-operatives , 
Co-operative Development Authority Manual, Philippines, 1994, p. 111.
Batoon, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
Ibid,  p. 79.
CDA, op. cit., p. 50.
Batoon, op. cit., p. 73-74.
Ibid., p. 79.
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Republic Act 821 or the Agricultural Credit and Co-operative Financing Act was 
promulgated in 1951. It was a large-scale program of rural financing where credit was 
extended to farmers without collateral other than their productive capacity.74 This ‘non­
collateral-credit program’ was considered as one of the radical moves of the government 
during that time. It was expected to considerably improve the living conditions of farmers 
in the Philippines. Loans were extended only to members of the Farmers’ Co-operative 
Marketing Associations (FACOMAs). FACOMAs were promoted and organised as 
channels for liberal credit to farmers. The FACOMAs grew in number very quickly such 
that in 1956, there were about 453 FACOMAs representing some 260,000 farmers all over 
the country.75 However, almost half of the FACOMAs collapsed a few years later. The 
debt-repayment rate by borrowers was very low, leading to the decline of the credit 
program. With the failure of the credit program, the marketing operations also suffered. 
Delinquent borrowers did not deliver their produce to their FACOMAs. Therefore, the 
volume of the marketing business of the FACOMAs dropped enormously.76
The government attributed the failure of the FACOMAs to operational and 
organisational problems of the co-operatives, such as lack of management skills, and lack 
of dedicated and well-educated leaders. However, observers of the co-operative movement 
in the Philippines had a common explanation of the fall of the FACOMAs. According to 
them, since the FACOMAs were simply used as conduits for credit delivery, the farmer- 
members perceived them as credit agencies not as the marketing arm of their produce. The 
members became loan-oriented, with their participation dependent on the availability of 
loan funds. The government’s credit assistance was directed to individual members, and 
the co-operatives were used only as channels of the credit package. The government 
controlled the credit package including decisions on the loan limit per member, interest on 
loan, and required documents. It did not give the co-operatives the opportunity to decide on 
how the credit package would be loaned out to members.77 *
Another interesting explanation of the failure of the FACOMAs was the conflicting 
policies of government, to the disadvantage of co-operatives. For example, in the 1960s,
74 CDA, op. cit., p. 52.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 53. . 5
77 Leandro Rola, ‘The integrated co-operative system of the Philippines: Status, thrusts and directions ,
Philippine Co-operative Review: Technical Journal o f the Co-operative Movement, vol. 1, no. , u y
1988, p. 53.
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the government allowed huge importation of rice (resulting in a drastic decline of the price 
of rice) when the FACOMAs had yet to sell their produce.78
Legislation during the Martial Law period attempted to integrate all co-operative 
laws. The Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippine government or Presidential Decree 
(PD) No. 27, implemented after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, accelerated the 
establishment of agricultural co-operatives as corporate farms were divided into smaller 
production units.79 The law (PD 27) mandated co-operative formation through the ‘no­
coop, no-title policy’. Land ownership was transferred to tenant-farmers from the landlords 
on the following conditions: that the farmers pay for the lands in 15 yearly instalments; 
that they be members of co-operatives; and that their co-operatives must guarantee their 
land repayment amortisation.80 This provision practically disregarded the voluntary nature 
of farmers’ co-operatives.
By end of 1980, the co-operative movement was revived. It consisted of more than 
17,000 pre-co-operatives called Samahang Nayons (SNs), 110 full-pledged agricultural co­
operatives, 78 Area Marketing Co-operatives, and 29 Co-operative Rural Banks.81 As in the 
case of the FACOMAs, many co-operatives failed during this period with only 2,381 SNs 
reported to have remained active by 1987.82
The failure of the SNs can be explained by the following factors. Like the 
FACOMAs, the SNs were just conduits, rather than the focus and object of the 
government’s development program. Their organisation was imposed to ensure that land 
reform beneficiaries would pay amortisation for their lands. Furthermore, since the land 
reform program was not successful, the co-operatives that were based on their 
implementation were correspondingly unsuccessful.
Another reason for the failure of the co-operatives was the fact that those who were 
not beneficiaries of land reform were allowed to become members. It was observed that the 
managerial positions of the co-operatives were usually occupied by landowners, the same 
group of people whom the small farmers wanted to be emancipated from.83
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IBON Philippines, op. cit., p. 3.
CDA, op. cit., p. 57.
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During the Aquino Administration (1986-1990), the role of co-operatives was made 
more important. The 1987 Constitution in Section 15 of Article XII states that ‘Congress 
shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of co-operatives as instruments 
for social justice and economic development’. Two major ‘co-operative-related’ laws were 
enacted in 1990, namely Republic Act 6938 or Co-operative Code of the Philippines, and 
Republic Act 6939 which created the Co-operative Development Authority (CDA).
The Co-operative Code of the Philippines proclaims that ‘the state shall foster the 
creation and growth of co-operatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and 
harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social
justice’ and ....  ‘the state shall encourage the private sector to undertake the actual
formation and organisation of co-operatives and shall create an atmosphere that is 
conducive to the growth and development of these co-operatives’.84 Through this law, all 
government agencies were encouraged to provide technical guidance, financial assistance 
and other services to co-operatives to help them become viable and responsive economic 
enterprises.
Co-operative development in the Philippines had experienced many failures in the 
past that these newer laws have tried to correct. For instance, it was observed that more co­
operatives organised through private initiative were able to successfully continue their 
operations than government controlled co-operatives. Therefore, RA6938 gave emphasis 
on private initiative and resources, self-help, and democratic control. It allowed more self­
initiative and autonomy for co-operatives. However, this was the same policy that some 
observers claimed to have led to the neglect of co-operatives by the government in terms of 
incentives and other support services.85
The governments after Aquino have just continued to enforce the co-operative laws 
passed during the Aquino administration. However, the co-operatives encountered 
problems with government taxes, both during and after the Aquino administration. The Co­
operative Code of the Philippines (RA6938) declares that tax exemption privileges will be 
given to co-operatives as long as they do not transact business with non-members and the 
general public. The Code further stipulates that even if co-operatives make transaction with 
both members and non-members, they can be exempted from government taxes provided
84 Co-operative Code of the Philippines.
85 Rola, ‘The integrated co-operative system o f the Philippines...’, op. cit., p. 12.
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that they do not have US$400,00086 in accumulated reserves and undivided net savings. 
However, these stipulations did not seem to have taken effect. Instead, two major tax 
policies that were unfavourable to the co-operatives were instituted by the government 
Executive Order 93 of the Aquino government withdrew the tax privileges of the co­
operatives, which were later granted to foreign investors registered with the Board of 
Investments.87 The government also did not exempt co-operatives from the Expanded 
Value Added Tax (EVAT) law of May 1994.88
From the foregoing accounts, it can be observed that while the Philippine 
government has officially recognised the importance of co-operatives in national 
development, its policies have not been all that helpful. In the early history of co-operative 
development, legislation served to control or interfere with the co-operatives’ operation. 
Then much later, the co-operative laws were reformed in a way that co-operatives would 
have more autonomy. However, as explained earlier, the government has been inconsistent 
in its written laws, and practice and actions. While its expressed and official objective for 
promoting co-operatives was to achieve social justice and economic development through 
these organisations, it appeared to hold other motives. These unofficial motives may 
include the use of co-operatives as channels of credit to farmers, and use of co-operatives 
to facilitate the collection of land amortisation from land reform beneficiaries. It was also 
observed that the government used co-operatives as counter-insurgency tools or to make 
peace with the rebel groups in the rural areas.89 For instance, FACOMAs were observed to 
have been established in areas where rebel groups of the 1950s and 1960s were 
concentrated. The present-day rebel returnees have also been promised assistance in setting 
up their own co-operatives.90
Other sectors of society had their own agenda in setting up co-operatives. For 
instance, there were cases of co-operatives organised based on the true principles of co­
operatives, mostly initiated and managed by the people themselves or non-government 
organisations. There were cases of co-operatives ‘in name’ only to get money from funding 
agencies, corporations assuming the title of a co-operative in order to avoid their tax
86 Exchange rate: US$1.00 = 25 pesos
87IBON Philippines, op. cit.
88 Ibid., p. 5.
89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 Ibid.
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responsibility, or corporations organising co-operatives among their workers to induce 
them not to form unions.
In recent years, the government has reduced its direct intervention to co-operatives. 
Many government instrumentalities have promoted and implemented their own rural 
development programs involving co-operatives. The degree and nature of intervention by 
the involved government agencies depended on the approach and strategies that they were 
using. Likewise, the degree of participation of co-operative members in the specific rural 
development programs of government depended on whether the approach and strategies of 
these interveners facilitated or constrained the members’ participation.
This variation within government-initiated co-operatives can be illustrated by the 
two case studies in the thesis, namely the TABARGA Multipurpose Co-operative (MPC) 
engaged in bamboo and rattan production, and the INJAFEDCO, a federation of 10 
primary co-operatives involved in rice production, processing and marketing. Both co­
operatives were organised through government projects that had definite timeframe and 
objectives. Upon completion of the projects, the co-operatives were expected to fully 
manage and run the co-operatives themselves.
In the case of TABARGA, one government agency—the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources Region 6 (DENR-VI)—served as conduit of all 
interventions to the co-operative. The TABARGA MPC was one of the project sites of a 
national program on bamboo and rattan. With INJAFEDCO, there was a tripartite linkage 
between one government agency—the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)—and two 
non-government organisations in implementing the project called the Integrated Rural 
Development Project (IJRDP). The IJRDP was mainly funded by the Japanese government 
through the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). It consisted of two 
components, namely infrastructure development and institutional development. The project 
was heavily biased toward physical infrastructure. The local institution-building 
component was originally overlooked and later included in the project packaging, but it 
lagged behind the infrastructure construction. Institution-building activities were critical 
for projects such as IJRDP, whose beneficiaries were previously credit-led co-operatives m 
the form of SNs or other type of imposed organisations. Co-operatives that existed 
previously as FACOMAs or SNs were most likely to have developed the dole-out
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mentality and dependent attitude among its members. The failure of these earlier 
government programs could make them suspicious of the newer development programs.
With TABARGA, while the general areas of intervention were set at the national 
level through the national bamboo and rattan program, the approach used by DENR-VI at 
the grassroots level was bottom-up. The details of the project for TABARGA were 
identified and packaged with the active participation of the local community. With the 
guidance of the DENR-VI, the project beneficiaries participated in defining specific needs, 
formulated plans to address these needs, and undertook necessary actions to achieve their 
goals and plans, all within the boundary of the national program. The DENR-VI employed 
the combined strategy of local institution-building and technology training. The emphasis 
was on local institution-building during the initial stage of the project, then gradually 
phasing-in technology transfer activities until it became the major focus at a later stage of 
the project.
With INJAFEDCO, the manner of intervention was generally top-down from 
project planning, packaging, to implementation. There was an observation that the IJRDP’s 
design was more a reflection of JICA’s perception of the local situation. The infrastructure 
component, which was almost ninety-nine percent of the total project, was contracted 
mainly to Japanese firms. This includes the preparation of the detailed engineering plans 
and designs, and construction of infrastructure.91 There was limited participation of the 
local community in all stages of project packaging and implementation. At one point, the 
DAR had a difficult time convincing farmers to donate lands for roads and irrigation 
because the farmers were not informed beforehand of the extent of the construction work 
that would be made and the damage to crops and properties expected. There was also a 
major problem in maintaining the irrigation facilities put up through the project, 
specifically in paying the high cost of electricity used to run the facilities. Had the intended 
beneficiaries been carefully consulted, the project proponents would have installed a more 
simple irrigation facility that would meet the available resources of the farmers.
Similar to the experience of many co-operatives in other developing countries, the 
co-operative movement in the Philippines had been confronted with the situation in which 
members were lacking in commitment to the activities of the co-operatives. In this case,
91 Contracting o f the preparation o f feasibility study and detailed engineering and plans, an e 
infrastructure construction itself to Japanese firms was a common practice in the Japanese n e
projects.
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members could not identify themselves with the co-operatives, especially if a particular 
government agency or other sponsoring entities involved were directly controlling the 
affairs of the co-operatives.
In the case of INJAFEDCO, the co-operative members did not patronise the Rice 
Processing Complex (RPC) managed by the federation. Most of them did not bring their 
rice produce to the federation for processing and marketing. This lack of support by the 
members badly affected the operations of the RPC. The co-operative members could not 
see the RPC and the federation as belonging to them. The problem in this regard was that 
the institution-building activities of the project actively involved the co-operatives’ officers 
but were unable to reach most of the members. Therefore, most of the co-operative 
members were unaware of the federation and how it could serve their interests. 
Furthermore, the operation of the RPC, which was turned over to the federation after the 
project ended, was closely identified with the project implementers. On the contrary, the 
members of TABARGA MPC had developed a strong sense of ownership for the co­
operative because they were involved in all aspects of the project.
Various studies made about the co-operative movement in the Philippines reveal a 
range of problems confronting the co-operatives. A study of the Philippine rural 
organisations after the 1950s concludes that rural organisations failed to serve the interest 
of rural people and even resulted in greater inequalities between the rich and the poor. The 
study claims that services and resources made available, in a top-down manner, through 
these institutions benefited the better-off members rather than the needier ones.92
Other studies on co-operatives emphasise problems related with the organisation 
and management of co-operatives, such as haphazard organisation; inadequate resources; 
lack of proper understanding of the principles, aims and purposes of co-operatives; lack of 
participation by members; lack of highly trained and experienced management personnel; 
leadership problems; high dependence on government support; lack of adequate safeguard 
against corrupt officers; lack of co-operative education and training; members 
unwillingness to patronise the co-operative due to high price and cost of services compared 
to other establishments;93 and many other internal problems.
92 Blondie Po and Cristina Montiel, ‘Rural organisations in the Philippines’, Quezon City, Institute of 
Philippine Culture, 1980.
Manuel Bonifacio, ‘Strengthening rural-based organisations (RBOs) as a strategy towards higher 
productivity’, a suggested research outline for studying RBOs submitted to the Socioeconomic esearc 
Department, PCARRD, 23 June 1998.
93
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Such studies also pinpoint political interference and stiff competition with big 
agribusiness enterprises as difficulties encountered by co-operatives. The latter can be 
illustrated by the following example. The Lutucan Multipurpose Co-operative (MPC) 
located in Southern Tagalog, Philippines, was engaged in coconut fibre manufacturing94 
and was planning to expand its operations to include the production of compacted dust95. 
The dust compacting proposal was approved for funding by the Department of Science and 
Technology (DOST) but the project did not materialise. The co-operative found out that 
the market for compacted dust was dominated and controlled by one of the biggest coco­
fibre producers in the country. There was no way that the co-operative could penetrate the 
market unless it would agree to purchase the dust compacting machine from this big 
manufacturer, the cost of which was three times higher than what was offered by a local 
fabricator.
The proliferation of organisations conducting audit of co-operatives without clear 
delineation of roles is also cited as a problem.96 Other studies on co-operatives focus on the 
problems related to the capability of co-operatives to integrate and sustain production, 
processing and marketing of products as well as supply and distribution of inputs. The 
factors necessary for attaining this capability were access to credit, production inputs, 
technology, information, training, processing facilities and market. Several problems were 
noted in this regard, as follows: lack of a comprehensive financing program covering all 
financing needs of co-operatives and federations from production to processing to trading 
or marketing activities; high rates of loan interests from lending institutions; non­
bankability of small farmer-borrowers; difficulty on the part of farmer-borrowers to pay 
their loans; absence of a national co-operatives agro-industrial development plan; difficulty 
in marketing the products; and lack of market and technological information; and 
inadequate processing facilities.97
Regarding problems with credit, the government’s policy of not lending directly to 
co-operatives except through the banking system left the co-operatives with little access to
94 Coconut fibre manufacturing involves the production of fibre from coconut husks through the process of
decortication.
95 Compacted dust is used as fertiliser component, soil mulcher or conditioner, trellises, pelletised fuel, and
others.
96 Agricultural Credit and Co-operatives Institute, Bureau of Co-operatives Development, and Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries, Proceedings o f the multisectoral conference/workshop on Strengthening t e
Co-operative Movement in Region IV’, ACCI Auditorium, University o f the Philippines Los Banos,
Laguna, Philippines, 29-31 January 1987.
97 Rola, ‘Credit and co-operatives....’, op. cit.
206
production funds. Commercial banks could not be forced to lend to small farmers if it 
would not profitable for them. The economic incentives to participate in the credit program 
of the government were too small for these banks. To the banks, lending to small fanners 
was not only tedious but also expensive. Not even the government’s policy of requiring the 
banking industry to allocate 25 percent of their loan portfolio to agriculture and agrarian 
reform had improved this situation because the law was not strictly enforced. The 
government’s credit programs were also covered by a lot of restrictions such as rules and 
regulations of the Commission on Audit.98
5.8 Factors for Success and Failure of Co-operatives
The preceding sections of this chapter demonstrate that too much government 
control or bureaucracy inhibited the success of co-operatives. In instances where 
government officials were directly controlling the affairs of the co-operatives, the co­
operatives did not develop into self-reliant organisations. The members of these co­
operatives were lacking in commitment, participation, accountability and responsibility 
over the co-operatives decisions, activities and achievements. However, when the 
governments gave more freedom and incentives to co-operatives through more suitable 
policies, the co-operatives were observed to have performed better.
Clearly, the role of governments and other service providers in the development of 
co-operatives must be that of assistance rather than dominance. In other cases, factors 
observed to contribute to the failure of co-operatives were the external pressures from big 
landowners or rural elites who were threatened by the co-operatives’ existence; rebel or 
revolutionary groups that brought forward their political agenda into the co-operatives; and 
the attitudes of service providers such as whether they had complete understanding of the 
community and accorded the co-operative leaders and members with respect.
The internal dynamics of co-operative leaders and members and their relationship 
with other people and entities in their community affect the performance of co-operatives. 
In some cases outlined above, co-operative leaders were generally lacking in managerial 
capabilities and were observed to be autocratic. The co-operative management styles were 
mostly imported from Europe leading to the problem of incompatibility with local culture.
98 Ibid.
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In some countries of Africa and Asia, the introduction of co-operative policies became part 
of the colonialist policy of social change."
It could also be noted that co-operatives work well if members have shared values 
and principles; are clear about the co-operatives’ objectives and goals; and possess the 
necessary knowledge and skills to be able to exercise their rights to participate in decision 
making. This implies the importance of continuous education and training of co-operative 
leaders and members to improve such knowledge and skills. A group of experts on co­
operatives, (during a conference in Washington D.C. in 1984) identified a list of reasons 
why co-operatives fail (see Appendix 5.2).
There is also an observation about the efficiency and competitiveness of co­
operatives in relation to the form of organisation. In a study by Deininger9 100 covering seven 
countries, namely Israel, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Peru, China and Vietnam, agricultural 
production co-operatives were observed to be less efficient and competitive than service 
co-operatives. Production co-operatives’ activities were limited to joint agricultural 
production while service co-operatives provide services in the areas of input supply, 
marketing, credit and technology. Service co-operatives were observed to be more 
beneficial because they utilised economies of scale (e.g. bulk buying of production inputs), 
could increase competitiveness of agricultural markets, and facilitated technology 
dissemination and rural credit formation.
5.9 Dilemmas and Challenges of Agricultural Co-operatives
Most agricultural co-operatives, being both social and business organisations, are 
caught in a dilemma between satisfying the needs of their members and dealing with the 
realities of the market economy. They exist in an economic and politicised environment 
whose values and principles of operation are likely to be different from their own. In 
principle, co-operatives eliminate the profit motive by applying fixed interest on capital. 
This provision discourages capitalists from investing and ensures the division of profits in 
proportion to participation.101
However, co-operatives must accumulate capital and operate as a business 
organisation in order to serve the common economic needs of their members. They must be
99 Fals-Borda et al., op. cii., p. 452.
100 Klaus Deininger, ‘Co-operatives and the breakup of large mechanized farms: Theoretical perspectives and
emnirical evidence’. World Bank Discussion Paper no. 218, The World Bank, Washington . •
101 Craig, op. cit., p. 54.
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able to compete successfully in both domestic and international markets in order to 
survive, especially with increasing globalisation. This calls for increased efficiency and 
growth, demands that sometimes compromise the general interests of co-operative 
members.
For example, Japan’s agricultural co-operative system or the ‘nokyo’ has become 
one of the country’s most powerful business organisations, dominating rice distribution 
and fertiliser and farm-machinery trades. However, the Japanese government’s 
investigation of the ‘nokyo’ determined that it has become too profit-oriented. It has 
bloated and failed in its duty to look after its farmer-members in providing bulk purchases 
of farm supplies and credits. More specifically, the government found that the ‘nokyo5 
charged excessive fees for providing goods where their position as a near-monopoly 
provider is sustained by law.102
The challenge for co-operatives, therefore, is to accumulate capital or to aim at 
being a successful business institution without contradicting their own principles. In this 
regard, co-operatives must see to it that member-workers or producers are not exploited 
and disadvantaged, that alternative employment is available for labour that will be 
displaced if more advanced technologies are used, and that its actions do not lead to 
unequal distribution of returns. This requires more innovative management techniques and 
creativity on the part of the co-operative’s leaders and members.
The growth of the co-operative movement in developing countries, including the 
Philippines, has often resulted in bureaucratisation. In order for central governments to 
promote, coordinate and control the expanding movement, more bureaucratisation has 
occurred. However, too much bureaucracy often defeats the co-operative’s basic principles 
of democratic member control, and autonomy and independence. In some instances, 
governments or politicians are unwilling to see co-operatives develop into independent 
organisations for fear that these co-operatives will pose a political threat to them.
In the context of globalisation and liberalisation, agricultural co-operatives are 
facing increasing competition. Co-operatives that are heavily dependent on government 
support and foreign donors are most likely to be affected. They will be unprepared for 
competition, considering that their own leaders have little exposure to decision-making and
102 ‘Knocking the nokyo. (Japan’s agricultural co-operative system)’, The Economist, vol. 307, no. 7555 
June 18, 1988, p. 73.
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experience in managing their own resources for increased efficiency. Co-operatives that are 
mainly involved in agricultural production are highly vulnerable to competition. 
Economies of scale can be improved if co-operatives expand their operations through 
vertical and horizontal business integration to include processing, marketing, credit and 
input supply, or by undertaking more value-added activities.
Given the scenario outlined above, it might be more practical for co-operative 
federations (secondary and tertiary) to assume the previous roles of central governments in 
promoting, developing and supervising primary co-operatives. The co-operative 
federations, being directly accountable to their member-co-operatives and whose board of 
directors are elected by primaries, are in a better position to support, educate and 
strengthen primary co-operatives. The role of the government in this regard is to create a 
favourable legal and policy environment in which genuine co-operatives can develop, and 
focus technical assistance and available financial support on building local co-operative 
management and organisational capabilities.
5.10 Future of Co-operatives in the Philippines
Despite the difficulties within the co-operative movement in the Philippines, 
agribased-co-operatives have remained indispensable in advancing the national goals of 
agricultural development. Recent developments within the agribusiness sector in the 
Philippines present new opportunities and threats for agricultural co-operatives. New 
partnerships between big agribusiness corporations and agri-based co-operatives are 
emerging in the form of joint ventures, new forms of contract growing, management 
contracts, build-operate systems and other arrangements. These new arrangements are 
attractive to both MNCs and local agribusiness corporations because they do not have to 
invest in land, hire labour, or manage large-scale farming operations.103 With these 
corporation-farmers partnership schemes, the corporations are able to avoid issues on 
labour and land ownership.
The problem with these arrangements is that the farmers could easily be exploited 
by the corporations. Furthermore, there is no room in these arrangements for the farmers to 
incorporate their indigenous practices, since the corporations dictate the technologies to be
103 IBON Databank and Research Center Peasant Desk, Contract Growing: JW C  of
Philippine Agriculture, IBON Books, Metro Manila, Philippines with the assistance o f World Council o
Churches, p. 5.
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used in production. It is necessary that the agricultural co-operatives and their federations, 
with assistance of government agencies concerned, carefully study the conditions of the 
agreements and become fully aware of their rights before entering into contract with the 
corporations. Joint ventures have the better potential for benefiting the small farmer- 
landowners and agribusiness corporations. In this set-up, farmer-co-operatives and partner 
firm put in their respective equity to a joint venture company (in processing or marketing) 
or joint venture commercial farm. The corporation provides the infrastructure, technology 
and training while the farmers provide the labour. The profit is divided between the 
corporation and the co-operative.
The role of co-operative federations is important especially with increasing 
globalisation and liberalisation. Agricultural co-operatives in the Philippines will face more 
competition when quantitative restrictions and tariffs are removed in the year 2004. Since 
most co-operatives in the Philippines are very small, they may easily be weeded out by big 
competitors. However, co-operatives’ smallness can be overcome through linkages and co­
operation with each other and by organising themselves into federations that will take 
advantage of the economies of scale in production, processing and marketing operations 
including the application of more efficient technologies. Federations are increasingly 
engaging in the procurement and distribution of inputs and in the buying, processing and 
marketing of the produce of member-co-operatives.
The role of the local government units (LGUs) is important in co-operative 
building. The LGUs are directly in touch with the local communities. With the 
responsibility for agricultural extension devolved to the LGUs, they are in the best position 
to assist the co-operatives.
5.11 Conclusion
Co-operatives in the Philippines generally have adhered to the principles of co­
operation. However, the voluntary nature and democratic member control principle of co­
operatives were often compromised, as in the case of the FACOMAs in the 1950s and 
1960s, and the SNs in the 1970s. In these programs, membership in co-operatives was 
made a prerequisite for land ownership and credit availment. Moreover, the government, at 
that time, exercised direct control over the co-operatives in the implementation of these 
programs. Many agricultural co-operatives today in the Philippines were previously 
FACOMAs and SNs. This is the case for INJAFEDCO (see chapter 9). Having had the bad
211
experience with these programs, such co-operatives need training and other activities that 
will increase awareness of their members about the true values and principles of co­
operatives.
The experiences presented in this chapter demonstrate that the actions of 
governments are crucial in the success and failure of co-operatives. The co-operative laws, 
policies, programs and projects of governments can either facilitate or constrain the growth 
and development of co-operatives. When government programs and policies promote 
participation and democracy, co-operatives tend to be more successful. In cases where 
governments directly control the activities of co-operatives, the latter may not develop into 
independent self-help organisations. However, this is not to say that governments should 
no longer intervene in co-operative development. Governments have an important role to 
play in co-operative building especially in developing countries where many small and 
poor farmers exist. I argue that the government policies and strategies must help to increase 
the co-operatives’ access to resources and support services such as credit, information, 
technology, market, education and training. Such policies must be enabling and enhancing 
of the co-operatives’ capability to manage their own organisations and enterprises.
With this background on the nature of agricultural co-operatives, and the issues, 
dilemmas and challenges confronting them, I present in the next four chapters case studies 
in which three co-operatives are examined.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES: A SUMMARY
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter examines the nature and behaviour of agricultural co­
operatives in the developing countries with the aim of helping to understand the case 
studies in this thesis. This chapter summarises the basic information about the three co­
operatives studied in the Philippines. It systematically outlines the general features of these 
co-operatives in terms of their background and form, the intervening agencies involved, the 
source of funding, manner of linkages observed among the key players, effectiveness of 
linkages, and the technology transfer approach identified in the case studies (Table 6.1). 
This summary emphasises the manner and effectiveness of linkages among the various 
actors in the co-operatives, and the technology transfer approach employed by the 
dominant intervening agency. The summary is set out this way because, as discussed in 
chapter 1, the objective of the case studies is to examine the interrelationship of a co­
operative with its interveners and the degree of coordination among these intervening 
agencies. The case studies analyse the extent to which these linkages and the technology 
transfer approach used by the dominant interveners have contributed to the success and 
failure of the co-operatives.
The effectiveness of linkages (point 9 in Table 6.1) is evaluated based on the 
indicators described in chapter 1, namely responsiveness to the needs of the target clients 
or how well it facilitates the flow of information on farmers needs to researchers, capacity 
to transfer relevant technology or how well it facilitates the flow of information and 
techniques from the research system to the farmers; sustainability of the linkage 
mechanism given various institutions involved; and capacity to increase farmers access to 
available resources.
6.2 Similarities and Differences
In Cases 1 and 3, the combined strategy of local capability building and technology 
training was employed. Cases 1 and 3 were both ‘project-type in nature with definite
T able 6.1 Sum m ary features o f  the three case studies.
Feature Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
1. Co-operative under 
study
Taminla Bamboo and Rattan Growers Association 
Multipurpose Co-operative (TABARGA MPC)
Lutucan MPC Integrated Jalajala Federation of Co­
operatives (INJAFEDCO) with focus on 
Alibangbangan Multipurpose Farmers 
Co-operative, Inc. (AMFCI)
2. Major enterprise Bamboo and rattan production Coconut fibre processing Rice production, processing and 
marketing
3. Form
-Function Multipurpose Multipurpose Multipurpose
-Objective Economic Economic Economic
-Structure Independent primary co-operative Primary co-op but member of two big 
Federations in Quezon
Federation and primary co-operative
-Membership 22 members, 68% farm owners and 32% labourers 4,000 with 80 to 85% coconut farmers Federation - 10 co-operatives o f almost 
1,000 total membership 
AMFCI - 70 members, all farmers and 
agrarian reform beneficiaries
-Initiative Government Private Government
4. Case study site Dueñas, Iloilo province, Visayas Sariaya, Quezon province, Luzon Jalajala, Rizal province, Luzon
Feature Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
5. Dominant 
intervening agency
Government line agency - Department o f Environment 
and Natural Resources Region 6 (DENR-VI)
Private Sector - machine fabricator and 
banks (Land Bank of the Philippines and 
United Coconut Planters Bank)
Foreign donor - Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and 
tripartite relationship among one 
government line agency Department o f  
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and two non­
government organisations (one academic 
and one training centre for co-operatives)
6. Other intervening 
agencies
Local government units (provincial and municipal 
government units)
Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural 
Resources o f the Department o f Science and Technology 
(PCARRD-DOST)
Regional R&D Consortium 
State, Colleges and Universities
Philippine Coconut Authority 
Department of Science and Technology 
Region 4
Local government unit (provincial 
office)
Department o f Trade and Industry
National Irrigation Administration 
Local government units
7. Major source of 
funding or credit
PCARRD-DOST Banks and co-operative’ s equity JICA and DAR
Feature Case 1
8. Manner o f linkages One government agency (DENR-VI) served as major 
conduit o f all interventions. It facilitated all linkages of 
the co-operative.
The relationships among the different intervening 
agencies and the co-operative were covered by MO As, 
with DENR-VI always included as signatory.
The co-operative took care o f its own 
linkages.
There was no one agency coordinating 
the interventions.
Services and projects of intervening 
agencies for the co-operative were 
largely independent o f each other. Some 
activities supported by different agencies 
had similar objectives and there could be 
duplication of efforts.
The linkage with the private 
manufacturer was formalised through a 
five-year marketing agreement.
Linkage with banks was covered by rules 
and procedures of these banks’ 
accreditation and lending programs.
Linkage with DOST 4 was formalised 
through the involvement of the co­
operative in the DOST’s interagency 
council for S&T.
Case 2
There was tripartite linkage among one 
government agency and two NGOs in 
the implementation of institutional 
development component o f the project.
The federation/co-operatives did not 
have direct linkage with the foreign 
donor that funded the infrastructure 
projects, of which the former were the 
beneficiaries.
The project was covered by ‘exchange o f  
notes’ between the Philippine and 
Japanese governments.
The intervening agencies drew MOA 
among themselves with very clear 
delineation of functions. The 
federation/co-operatives were not part of 
the MOA because they were not 
organised yet at the time of signing.
The activities o f the two NGOs were 
compartmentalised and not 
synchronised. The coordinating 
mechanism of the DAR was not 
sufficiently effective.
Case 3
Feature Case 1
9. Effectiveness of 
linkages
Linkage facilitated the flow of information on farmers’ 
needs to the research system through demonstration 
farms. With DENR as primary source of forest-related 
technologies and as dominant intervener, the flow of 
information from the research system to the farmers was 
assured.
In terms of sustainability of linkage with LGU, free 
access to land has been assured for 20 years through a 
MOA. The local government code gives the co-operative 
and the LGU legal basis to continue their collaboration.
Direct linkage with DENR-VI ended after completion of 
the project but the linkage provided the co-operative 
training on how to access technology, market, and other 
support services.
The linkage was not enough to enable the co-operative to 
acquire confidence in negotiating with financial 
institutions and the skill in packaging of business 
proposal required by banks.
Linkage among DOST, DENR and the co-operative 
provided the co-operative a chance to know the 
experiences of other co-operatives involved in bamboo 
and rattan production in other parts of the Philippines. 
Feedback from DENR on farmers’ needs was important 
input to the national R&D program on bamboo and 
rattan.
After the project, it is likely that future national 
programs on bamboo and rattan (e.g. processing aspect) 
will involve the co-operative because of its established 
bamboo, rattan and other forest-tree plantations.
Through linkage with the 
manufacturer, co-operative gained 
access to the market.
Since the co-operative has proven its 
credit-worthiness, the banks included 
the former in its priority list of 
borrowers.
The active involvement of the co­
operative in the programs of the 
banks enabled the former to grab 
lending opportunities as they arose.
Linkage of the co-operative with 
DOST’s interagency S&T council 
was not certain because of the ad hoc 
nature of the council.
Case 2
Linkage among DAR, SEARCA and 
NATCCO facilitated the flow of 
information among the IDC implemented 
through the coordinative mechanisms 
installed (e.g. management committee).
There was little direct interaction among 
them at the beneficiaries’ level so linkage 
was responsive only to the needs o f the co- 
operative/federation officers.
The tripartite linkage did not facilitate the 
flow of information and capability building 
of majority of co-operative/federation 
members.
The linkage has provided the co-operatives 
access to rice processing centre, new 
production technologies, market and link 
with other GOs and NGOs.
The responsibility of 
a) managing irrigation facilities was 
transferred to the primary co-operatives (but 
with lots o f problems); b) managing RPC 
was handed over to the federation and c) 
road maintenance transferred to the local 
government.
Linkage with NATCCO ended with 
completion of the project. SEARCA signed 
new MOA with the federation and LGU to 
sustain gains from the project.
Case 3
Feature Case 1
10. Technology 
transfer approach
Project approach with definite timeframe and objectives 
with project staff compliment.
Top-down at the national project level (the general areas 
of R&D were set at the national level).
Bottom-up at the grassroots level (the details of the 
project for the site were worked out with the local 
community)
DENR-VI used the community-based approach, where 
beneficiaries actively participated in defining specific 
needs, formulating plans to address the needs, and 
undertaking necessary actions to achieve goals and 
plans.
Technology transfer strategy incorporated farmers’ 
knowledge and indigenous practices. It encouraged 
innovations such that farmers had short-, medium- and 
long-term sources of livelihood. It had strong business 
and commercial orientation and clear identification of 
products to sell.
The dominant intervener employed the strategy of 
intensive institution-building during the initial stage of 
the project. It gradually phased in the technology transfer 
component, such as training, demonstration farms, etc. 
until it became the major component towards the last 
stage of the project.
Case 2 Case 3
Simple and direct technology 
transfer process; bottom-up 
approach with the co-operative 
taking the initiative based on what 
its perceived needs were.
Multi-sectoral project approach with two major 
components— infrastructure and institutional 
development, but heavily leaning on the former. 
Institutional development component was not 
originally part o f the project and lagged behind 
the infrastructure construction.
Generally top-down from project planning, 
packaging to implementation. There was limited 
participation of the local community in all these 
phases.
In terms of infrastructure component, there was 
practically no technology transfer from 
Japanese firms to the local community; only the 
skills in physically operating the rice processing 
complex were transferred.
Technology transfer approach under the IDC 
component was combination of the strategies of 
local capability building and training on 
technical aspect. However, since different 
agencies were responsible for these strategies, 
there was problem with synchronisation of 
activities at the field level.
Technology transfer was limited to the rice 
production technologies and the skills in 
managing the rice processing centre and 
benefited only the co-operative/federation 
officers and active members. The inactiveness 
of many farmers was an indication of the failure 
of the IDC component to fully harness the co­
operatives.
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duration and objectives. The project was the primary vehicle for technology transfer and 
other kinds of intervention. Technology transfer was intended to happen within the given 
timeframe. Afterwards the co-operatives should be able to manage or run their own affairs.
While Cases 1 and 3 had the same technology transfer strategy, they differed in the 
implementation aspect. In Case 1, there was one agency coordinating the interaction 
between and phasing-in of the strategy of local capability building and the strategy of 
technical training. In Case 3, two NGOs were separately responsible for the two respective 
strategies, and the coordinating agency failed to provide mechanisms for monitoring the 
activities of the NGOs at the field level.
Case 2 was mainly bottom-up in approach with the co-operative members 
identifying the kind of interventions that they needed. Case 1 was top-down at the national 
project level (where the general areas of R&D were set at the national level) and bottom-up 
at the grassroots level in which the local community was actively involved in determining 
the details of the project or intervention. Case 3 was generally top-down from project 
planning, packaging, to implementation with some consultation with the beneficiaries in 
the aspect of transfer of production technologies.
In Case 1, one government agency served as conduit of all interventions to the co­
operative. In Case 2, the co-operative took care of its own linkages. In Case 3, there was
tripartite linkage among one government agency and two NGOs.
In Cases 1 and 2, the co-operatives were signatory to the MO As while in Case 3 the 
co-operative or federation was not included in the MO A because they were not organised 
at the time of signing. This had an effect on the degree of participation of and importance 
accorded to the beneficiaries. In Cases 1 and 2, the co-operatives were seen as major 
participants of the project activities, while in Case 3 they seemed to be viewed only as 
objects of intervention rather than active participants.
The detailed discussion and analysis of the case studies are covered in chapters 7 to 
9 while the main threads of argument drawn from these studies are presented in chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE Is TABARGA MULTIPURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE 
Engaged in Bamboo and Rattan Production
7.1 Introduction
This case study looks at a co-operative whose dominant intervener in terms of 
technology transfer is a government line agency. In this modality, the dynamics of 
technology transfer involving a co-operative, a government line agency as dominant 
intervener, and other agencies providing support services was investigated.
The chapter begins with a description and background of the Taminla Bamboo and 
Rattan Growers Association Multipurpose Co-operative (TABARGA MPC). It describes 
the linkages and networking activities of the co-operative and analyses the nature of 
interrelationships among the key players in the case study. The concepts of coordination 
and resource dependencies are useful basis for analysing these interrelationships. 
Effectiveness of linkages is evaluated based on the indicators described in chapters 1 and 6. 
The chapter ends with an analysis of the technology transfer approach identified in this 
case study.
This case study highlights the successful linkage among a co-operative the 
TABARGA MPC, a national government agency—the Department of Science and 
Technology (DOST), a regional unit of a line agency—the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) Region-VI, and a local government unit—municipality of 
Dueñas. Their relationship revolved around a project entitled, 'Demonstration and Pilot 
Application of Technology Packages and Production Systems of Bamboo and Rattan. The 
project involved the transfer and commercialisation of technologies on the propagation and 
utilisation of bamboo and rattan for improved ecological and livelihood security of the 
community. The roles of each actor were well defined and coordinated. The DOST 
provided national guidance and linked TABARGA with other co-operatives and research 
agencies involved in the project. The DENR-Region VI facilitated all linkages for and 
provided technical and management assistance to the co-operative. The municipal 
government offered the use of a 10 hectare land for bamboo and rattan production and
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extended other important local government services to the co-operative. It linked the co­
operative to higher level local government units. The co-operative operated various techno­
based livelihood activities including nursery seedling production. It actively participated in 
the research component of the project through the demonstration farms, and in the 
technology transfer component through training on new practices and entrepreneurship.
This linkage mechanism facilitated the flow of information and technologies from 
the research group to the farmers because the co-operative had direct access to DENR, one 
of the primary sources of bamboo and rattan technologies in the Philippines. The 
demonstration farms, jointly managed and operated by the co-operative and the DENR, 
provided both parties first hand experience and knowledge on location-specific needs, 
information and technologies. The linkage outlined here also widened the co-operative’s 
connections to include research units and co-operatives from other parts of the country, and 
state colleges and universities, private entrepreneurs and other government agencies in 
region VI. It presented the co-operative with opportunities to develop its technical and 
management capabilities. For instance, the co-operative had the chance to train other 
farmers and entrepreneurs on bamboo and rattan production, and in the process increased 
their level of confidence and self-worth. The linkages mentioned here are observed to have 
produced positive results when there was commonality of purpose among the different 
stakeholders and clear understanding of the benefits that would be derived from such 
linkages.
The case study also demonstrates the effectiveness of a strategy that combines 
features of top-down and bottom-up approaches to research and technology transfer. The 
general areas for research and technology transfer were set at the national level through the 
national project on bamboo and rattan. Specific need-based and market-oriented plans and 
activities were formulated and implemented by the co-operative members and the 
community with the expert guidance and mentoring from DENR-VI. Several lessons can 
be drawn from the technology transfer strategy in this case study. Consideration of 
farmers’ knowledge and indigenous practices in the development and implementation of 
co-operative’s activities increased the members’ sense of project ownership. Research and 
technology transfer plans and activities that were locally determined, dynamic and flexible 
encouraged innovations that supported short-, medium- and long-term sources of 
livelihood. Technology commercialisation was facilitated when projects of the co-operative
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were market and product-oriented. The case study also illustrates the soundness of an 
approach that gives equal importance to local institution building, technology intervention 
and networking/linkaging with agencies providing support services.
7.2 Description of the Site and the Co-operative
Taminla Bamboo and Rattan Growers Association Multipurpose Co-operative 
(TABARGA MPC) is located in Barangay Taminla, Dueñas, Iloilo, Philippines (Figure 
7.1). Iloilo is one of the 5 provinces in Region 6 or Western Visayas region1 of the 
Philippines. It consists of six municipalities including the Municipality of Dueñas. 
Barangay Taminla is one of the 47 barangays in the Municipality of Dueñas. Appendix 
7.1 defines province, municipality, and barangay, all of which are political subdivisions of 
the local government units (LGUs). The town proper of Dueñas is 44 kilometres away 
from Iloilo City. Iloilo province has a total land area of about 471,940 hectares with 256 
hectares occupied by Barangay Taminla. Barangay Taminla has a total population of 180 
households or 872 people. TABARGA MPC is accessible by public utility jeepney from 
the town proper by taking a 3 kilometre ride to crossing called ‘Bangga Tonoy’ and nine 
kilometres of rough road from crossing to the site. The people in Taminla speak the dialect 
called ‘Karay-a’ among six dialects spoken in Western Visayas. There are two pronounced 
seasons in the area—dry from November to May and wet during the rest of the year. 
Barangay Taminla is generally flat to rolling and moderately sloping along the valleys with 
an elevation of about 300 to 500 feet above sea level. The place is suitable for growing 
rice, com, vegetables and bamboo. Up to this writing, the major portion of Barangay 
Taminla, including the TABARGA MPC site, has no public electricity supply yet.
The co-operative was bom out of the project entitled, ‘Demonstration and Pilot 
Application of Technology Packages and Production Systems of Bamboo and Rattan . The 
general objective of the project was ‘to transfer and commercialise technologies for the 
propagation and utilisation of bamboo and rattan for improved ecological and livelihood 
security’.2 The project was funded by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
1 The Region is an administrative district in which the field umts of national government departments and
bureaus are established. There are 14 regions in the Philippines and 3 major geographical areas name y 
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. They are not vested with political and corporate powers and therelore not 
considered local governments.
2 Francisco Binoya, A. Tiolo-Dalawis, N. Gigare, and Arturo Repospolo, ‘The integrated bamboo-rattan
livelihood project: The TABARGA MPC experience’, Techno Transfer Series, vol. 5, no. \  d u n k , 
Iloilo City, Philippines, November 1994, p. 1.
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Legend: Tabarga MPC site: Barangay Taminla, Dueñas, Iloilo Province. Philippines
Figure 7.1 Location map of TABARGA Multipurpose Co-operative (Case 1)
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through the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research 
and Development (PCARRD). It was implemented by the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources Region 6 (DENR-VI) in cooperation with the local government of 
Dueñas. It had two major components, namely long-term bamboo and rattan production or 
plantation establishment, and the integration of various activities for a medium-term and 
short-term livelihood component. The specific project activities included the following:
• site survey and selection;
• participative community appraisal;
• consultation with the community regarding the design of appropriate production 
systems and training modules;
• establishment of linkages with other government agencies external to the community;
• introduction of production and utilisation systems and technology packages;
• production of communication materials such as posters, manuals, primers and radio 
materials;
• conduct of community training sessions;
• actual demonstration of production and utilisation systems and technology packages;
• provision of technical assistance on planting stock production, nursery establishment 
and maintenance, harvesting and utilisation; and
• data and information collection and analysis, and process documentation.
It also had a built-in research component where bamboo and rattan production technologies 
were field-tested and improved as needed. Some of the research activities undertaken are 
shown in Appendix 7.2.
Through the project, the following production systems were established in 
Barangay Taminla: 6.48 hectares of rattan plantation (3 ha communal plantation and 3.48 
ha individual farms of co-operative members); 6 hectares of assorted bamboo species 
plantation (3 ha communal plantation and 3 ha farmer-owned); and commercial seedling 
production or nursery operation of bamboo, rattan and other fast-growing tree species such 
as mahogany and acacia mangium. Communal or compact forests were collectively 
established and managed by the co-operative members. These communal forests served as 
demonstration farms that gave the co-operative members the opportunity to learn together 
and transfer their skills to other clientele. The project began in January 1993, was 
completed in December 1995 and fully turned over to the co-operative in 1996. The
218
emphasis of the project was community organising during the early stage of 
implementation. The focus of attention shifted from community organising3 and social 
preparation4 to technical assistance at the ratio of 50-50 during the second year. Technical 
assistance was in full swing at the third year of implementation.
TABARGA MPC started as an association called, ‘Association of Farmer Co- 
operators5 before becoming a full-fledged co-operative in 1994. It did not precede the 
project in any form. Previous to the project implementation, there was no formal 
organisation in the site except the Barangay Council. The formation of the association 
followed after the project site and beneficiaries had been selected. The project site was 
chosen by DENR-VI, in consultation with the municipal council, after a thorough survey of 
the areas in the municipality, and upon approval by the mayor of the use of a ten-hectare 
lot for plantation establishment. Brainstorming sessions with the barangay officials and 
residents were conducted by the DENR-VI and representatives from the municipal office to 
identify the beneficiaries or co-operators of the project. Some of the criteria used to select 
the farmer co-operators were: proximity to project site, with own farm area for technology 
application, leadership potential, and household size in terms of working members. Before 
the project, the co-operators were mostly upland rice farmers earning an average annual 
income of P9,584.00 (US$370.00). A few others were employed as barangay officials and 
teacher, worked for daily farm wages, produced charcoal during the summer months, and 
did carpentry work. The average annual income of farmer co-operatives increased by 
almost 90 percent after three years of project implementation due to the various livelihood 
activities. The Association of Farmer Co-operators was initially headed by the barangay 
captain because of his educational background, experience and leadership quality. When 
the association became a co-operative, a new set of officers was elected.
The TABARGA MPC is composed of 22 members, 68% of whom are farm owners 
and 32% labourers. Ninety two percent of the members are married, with an average
3 Community organising is defined by the DENR (in DENR Memorandum Circular no. 77-01, 20 January
1997, p. 2) as ‘the process and the set o f activities aimed at mobilising the community, developing and 
strengthening their capabilities to plan, implement and manage a project through the community-based 
approach.
4 Social preparation is defined by Stuart (in Teresa Stuart, PCARRD Monitor vol. 22, no. 2, March-April
1994, p. 2) as ‘conditioning activities to any kind o f intervention’. Stuart explained that these activities 
include pre-planning that will identify from the start how ideas, problems, needs, pre-occupations and 
aspirations are inputted into the planning process. She added that ‘interactions in social prepara on 
activities will enable the local people and project facilitators to discover each others talents, draw ou 
potentials and establish friendships, establish new contacts with outsiders who could be instrumental in 
meeting their needs’.
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household size of 6.7 persons. In terms of educational attainment, 40% have reached 
primary level education, 32% secondary level, and 28% were graduates of either technical 
or Bachelor degrees. Almost all registered members were male.
The leading economic activity of TABARGA MPC was nursery operation of 
bamboo, rattan and other forest tree species such as mahogany, cacao, acacia mangium, 
gmelina, pilinut and citrus. Seedlings were planted in both the communal and individual 
areas of the co-operative members. The nursery operation contributed almost 75% to the 
co-operative’s total income. It was expected to be the major source of livelihood of the 
members until such time that bamboo, rattan and other forest tree species in their plantation 
areas would be ready for harvesting. Figure 7.2 shows some pictures of the co-operative’s 
nursery operation. Other activities and sources of livelihood of the co-operative included 
palay (unshelled rice), livestock and vegetable production; contract job for plantation 
establishment; sericulture;5 catering service during training conducted on site; rental of 
farming tools and equipment (such as sprayer and drying net/screen); rental of cellphone; 
and micro-lending for crop production.
The co-operative engaged in the production of swine and goats using the 
technology of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform-Integrated Social Forestry 
Agrilivestock program of DENR-VI. The technology consisted of improved animal breeds, 
and feeding and health management. Feeding and other activities were undertaken by the 
participating members in coordination with the project staff in-charge. Income from the 
enterprise was shared between the member-caretakers and the co-operative’s trust fund at 
20:80 for swine and 50:50 for goats. Upgraded breeds of chicken were obtained from the 
Northern Iloilo Polytechnic State College (NIPSC) and were used to improve the existing 
poultry stock of co-operative members.
The co-operative raised fish in a 750 sqm fishpond using the fish production 
technology—pond preparation, fertilisation, and stocking density of the Department of 
Agriculture (DA) in Iloilo. The fish project was supported by the Office of the Governor. 
The co-operative provided the DA-Iloilo with giant bamboo planting materials in exchange 
for fingerlings. A vegetable garden was also established by the co-operative with most of 
the produce utilised for home consumption by participating members.
5 Sericulture is the art o f raising silkworm for the production of raw silk.
Giant bamboo propagules in clonal chamber
Potted rattan seedlings
Figure 7.2 Bamboo and rattan  nursery operations: TABARGA MPC
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The co-operative and DENR-VI coordinated with the Southern Cultural 
Communities to help the cultural minorities in Barangay Taminla. They provided farming 
opportunity to cultural minorities called ‘Ati’ by allowing them to plant cash crops, such as 
rice and com, in the vacant spaces between bamboo plants. With the success of the giant 
bamboo nursery operation, the co-operative board of directors later decided to use these 
open spaces for expanding their bamboo plantation to include the giant bamboo species.
The contract planting business of the co-operative is an innovative income 
generating strategy that supported the tree planting and greening programs of private 
entrepreneurs and local government units (LGUs). The co-operative members acted as 
trainers and resource speakers during training activities for LGUs and the Department of 
Agrarian Reform. They also participated in an information campaign about bamboo and 
rattan production including guestings in radio programs within Western Visayas.
Through the bamboo and rattan project, the co-operative developed and adopted a 
scheme of capital build-up (CBU) formation to generate funds that they could use to 
support other business projects. As a matter of policy, the co-operative’s income was 
allocated as follows: 50% went to revolving fund; and 50% to individual co-operative 
members as their share in income. With the CBU, the co-operative was able to extend crop 
loans to members at 5% interest rate per month for purchase of farm inputs. The co­
operative and DENR-VI were responsible for the repair of the rough road leading to the 
project site through representations made with the local government units. The co­
operative has also been negotiating with the regional government, through the municipal 
LGU, for the electrification of their barangay.
With the involvement of some co-operative members in the Barangay Council and 
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, the co-operative had some degree of participation 
in the local decision-making process. Their concerns could be articulated through these 
persons. TABARGA MPC was active in social activities such as organising tree plantation 
project that involved teachers, students and other residents in the barangay. During these 
activities, the co-operative donated seedlings and coordinated the planting operations.
The co-operative, through the project, had instituted mechanisms to ensure the 
smooth operation of their enterprises. They had organised different working committees as 
responsibility centres for each of their business projects. The Board of Directors met every 
month to monitor the progress of their projects. As a strategy to encourage regular and
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punctual attendance to these meetings, three door prizes (1 st, second and third) were given 
out every meeting. Funds for this purpose were drawn from the co-operative’s income. The 
co-operative also kept a simple diary and logbook to record activities related to the 
communal and individual projects of members. The information recorded as well as 
financial records were open to all members to promote transparency within the co­
operative.
7.3 Linkages and Networking
The co-operative has established linkage with many government, non-government 
and private sector groups. This section describes the roles and manner of intervention of 
these entities with respect to the co-operative.
The DOST-PCARRD provided the largest financial support in the form of grant to 
the project of which TABARGA MPC was the beneficiary. Bamboo and rattan are two of 
the top priority commodity areas of PCARRD6 under the ‘Science and Technology Agenda 
for National Development (STAND)’. A national bamboo and rattan program, entitled 
‘Integrated R&D Project on Bamboo and Rattan (Phase III)’ was packaged by PCARRD 
through its National Bamboo and Rattan Team in support of STAND. The team consisted 
of experts in bamboo and rattan from both the government and the private sector. The 
program was extensively reviewed by groups working on other areas affected by bamboo 
and rattan such as furniture, environment, reforestation, and gifts, toys and housewares. It 
was developed as an offshoot of Phases I and II of the bamboo and rattan project that were 
supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
Through Phases I and II, various technologies and information on production and 
processing of bamboo and rattan (see Appendix 7.3 for list of technologies) were 
generated and sourced from other countries. Hence, the emphasis of Phase III was 
technology transfer and commercialisation. The project had four components: 
demonstration and pilot application of production systems and technology packages; policy 
and socioeconomic studies; technology improvement; and species improvement and
6 PCARRD manages the National Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Network 
(NARRDN) in the Philippines. The NARRDN is composed of 127 member-agencies from Schools, 
Colleges and Universities, DA, DENR station/centres, and other government and private agencies. The 
members o f the NARRDN conduct basic or applied research on specific commodity assignments to avoid 
duplication o f R&D efforts. A member-agency could be any of the following: national multicommodity 
R&D centre; national single commodity R&D centre; regional R&D centre; or cooperating station.
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conservation. Component 1 was the centrepiece of the program. It involved six cases7 
defined in terms of the existing resources and skills of the community and location of the 
area whether upland or lowland.
The project, of which DENR-VI and TABARGA MPC were involved, 
corresponded to Case #1 in which land resource was essentially wasteland and people were 
not really skilled in ways to rehabilitate or reclaim the land. Funds for this project was 
released by PCARRD-DOST to DENR-VI. The financial support covered expenses for the 
implementation of project activities and hiring of project staff who would assist the co­
operative members in their daily operations. PCARRD coordinated directly with the 
DENR-VI for monitoring and evaluation of the project. PCARRD-DOST’s support for the 
project was covered by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among PCARRD-DOST, 
DENR-VI and TABARGA MPC. The agreement provided for the joint undertaking of the 
project by these organisations. In this kind of set-up, PCARRD-DOST usually provided 
counterpart funding and DENR gave its own material contribution such as time and salary 
of staff, use of office facilities and others.
The municipal government of Dueñas offered the free use of a 10 hectare land in 
Barangay Taminla for the establishment of bamboo and rattan plantation, nursery seedling 
production space, and construction of staff and training house. This support was formalised 
through a MOA among DENR-VI, the local government of Dueñas, and TABARGA MPC 
when it was still an association. The MOA stipulates 20 years free use of land and a profit 
sharing scheme of 25:75 percent (in favour of the coop) on the bamboo and rattan harvest. 
The local government unit also provided grant, in kind and cash, for swine production 
expansion project, nursery commercialisation and the establishment of the two-hectare 
communal forest plantation. Their assistance to the co-operative graduated from the more 
‘material or physical support’, during the first two years of the project, to moral and 
linkage support such as acting as conduit to the higher local government units for 
representations made by the co-operative. The support extended by the municipality of 
Dueñas to the co-operative was consistent with their annual development plan, specifically 
the program on ‘environmental protection and tree planting .
Case #1: Wasteland/lowland; Case #2: Wasteland/uplands; Case #3: Degraded areas/lowland. Case ^ : 
Degraded areas/upland; Case #5: Resource rich areas/lowland and Case #6: Resource nch areas/upland
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The DENR-VI, as the implementing agency of the project, had the most extensive 
and direct assistance to the co-operative until its full withdrawal from the project in 1996. 
The project was consistent with DENR’s ‘Agroforestry Development Program’ and 
‘Agroforestry Curriculum Development Program’. Through the project, DENR-VI was 
able to facilitate the formation of the co-operative in coordination with the Co-operative 
Development Authority (CDA). The DENR-VI extended management and organisational 
assistance to the co-operative. Its leadership style was autocratic during year 1 ; democratic 
during year 2, and laissez-faire during year 3 of the project. It was a deliberate strategy of 
the DENR-VI to go through these stages (firm guidance in the beginning and loosening of 
the reins towards the end of the project) to ensure that activities were implemented as 
planned considering that the project period was limited to three years.
DENR-VI took the major management responsibility and provided leadership 
during the early stage of the project. While these tasks were supposed to be fully absorbed 
by the co-operative during the later stage of the project, the co-operative members seemed 
to have developed a dependent attitude on DENR-VI in the aspect of strategic planning, 
financial and linkage management. DENR-VI provided the co-operative with technical 
assistance on nursery operations and plantation establishment and assisted in market 
linkage, information dissemination, and other networking activities. Marketing of the co­
operative’s products was facilitated through the linkages, networking and information 
dissemination efforts of DENR-VI.
The technology transfer scheme of DENR-VI was anchored on community­
organising in which all activities, including the necessary technical skills, were undertaken 
as part of the strengthening process of the organisation. DENR-VI followed a ‘3 year, 
phase-in/phase-out scheme’ that was made clear to the co-operative from the beginning of 
the project. The strategy called for greater effort on social preparation during the first year, 
technology or technical skill focus during the 2nd year until the final turning over of the
project to the co-operative during the 3rd year.
Social preparation involved, among others, the following activities: various 
groundworking and brainstorming sessions with municipal and barangay officials and 
prospective co-operators; training on values re-orientation, team building, co-operative 
organisation and management, leadership, decision making, organisational and project 
assessment; and cross-visits to existing bamboo plantations in Region 6. While bamboo
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and rattan plantation was the major focus of attention, the co-operative engaged in other 
activities in the form of livelihood projects that would give them short to medium-term 
benefits. These livelihood projects are discussed in section 7.2.
The DENR-VI tapped its existing linkages with other government, SCUs, NGOs, 
and the private sector to put the other livelihood components of the co-operative on the 
ground. It guided the co-operative through the process taking into account the co-operative 
members’ indigenous knowledge and practices.
At one time, there was major disappointment over the sales of rattan seedlings as 
immediate source of income. Although there was the plantation to look forward to, the co­
operative needed income generating projects as source of immediate income.
It was during this time of the 2nd year project operation that DENR-VI introduced 
another bamboo species called ‘giant bamboo’. Since there was no natural stand of giant 
bamboo in Iloilo, DENR-VI ordered giant bamboo cuttings from DENR Region 10 in 
Mindanao8 and tried them in the co-operative’s nursery. After several failed attempts at 
getting the desired level of germination and just when they were ready to give up on giant 
bamboo, DENR-VI and the co-operative experimented on simple old technologies such as 
use of rooting hormone, clonal chamber and vermi-culture. The package of technology 
(Appendix 7.4) was very successful that they ended up getting 90 to 95 percent 
germination rate. This was very high compared to a level of 10 percent when cuttings from 
Mindanao were planted as they were. Soon, the co-operative was selling giant bamboo 
seedlings like ‘hotcake’ through the marketing efforts led by DENR-VI.
DENR-VI used its own linkages and membership in consortia and interagency 
group such as Western Visayas Agriculture and Resources Research and Development 
Consortium (WESVARRDEC)9—a group of government R&D agencies; and the Regional 
Agriculture and Forestry Council (RAFC)10—a group of representatives from both the 
government and private sectors, to promote the co-operative s products and services. 
Through these linkages, two of the consortia members became satellite nurseries of 
TABARGA-MPC with the co-operative providing the necessary planting materials.
8 Mindanao is one o f the three major geographical areas in the Philippines and located in the southernmost
part o f the country.
9 Refer to discussion about WESVARRDEC in later part of section 7.3.
,0 Regional Agricultural and Fishery Council (RAFC) is the Department of Agriculture’s maul.agency for 
coordinating private sector participation in the development o f the agncu'tural and fishey secto s m the 
regions. It aims to establish productive partnerships between government and the private sector, and 
between the DA and the local government units (LGUs).
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DENR-VI also linked the co-operative to its Agroforestry Curriculum Development 
Program.
In this scheme, agroforestry students of selected universities in Iloilo underwent on- 
the-job training on nursery operations under the supervision of the co-operative members. 
These students were given an incentive of five percent for every seedling grown and sold.
DENR-VI received two major awards in 1996 for their project with TABARGA. 
The first one, Best Development Paper Award, was conferred by PCARRD to DENR-VI 
for its entry entitled ‘Integrated Bamboo Rattan Community-based Livelihood Project’. 
The other award was given by WESVARRDEC during the 1996 Regional R&D 
Symposium for the paper entitled, ‘Demonstration and Pilot Application of Technology 
Packages and Production Systems on Bamboo and Rattan’. These papers were based on 
DENR-VI experience with TABARGA MPC. They discussed their efforts in community 
organising and technical training for the propagation and production of bamboo and rattan. 
These undertakings provided the co-operative with opportunities for alternative sources of 
income and access to other support services and market.
The Provincial government of Iloilo, through the Provincial Environment and 
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), provided the co-operative with some funds for the 
expansion of its municipal nursery. This support was in line with the Greening Program of 
the Governor. The amount granted to the co-operative was in the form of soft loan at 6% 
interest rate per annum payable after two years. TABARGA MPC was also a recipient of 
the fish dispersal project of the Provincial Agriculturist.
The Office of the Governor came to know of the co-operative through its close 
coordination with DENR-VI. The Governor’s office has promoted the use of bamboo and 
rattan to reforest the province and raise farmer’s income. It procured several planting 
materials from TABARGA for the rehabilitation of a major watershed area in Iloilo. It also 
hired the training, food and accommodation services of TABARGA MPC for on-site 
training on bamboo production of the technicians of the Office of the Governor. 
TABARGA MPC was invited during exhibits and fairs sponsored and organised by the
provincial government.
WESVARRDEC is a consortium of R&D institutions in Western Visayas of which 
DENR-VI was a member. It provides the venue, in which the different agencies concerned, 
can pool their resources together to support activities of their common interest.
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WESVARDDEC has identified and packaged bamboo and mango as their flagship R&D 
programs for Western Visayas. The applied communication group of WESVARRDEC 
assisted in the documentation of bamboo project based on the experience of TABARGA. It 
invited TABARGA members to join the ‘information caravan’ so that the co-operative 
could promote the bamboo production technology and market its nursery products. It 
facilitated farmer-to-farmer demonstration and dissemination of the bamboo nursery 
operations and plantation establishment technologies. WESVARRDEC has assisted 
DENR-VI and the co-operative in their information needs on bamboo since this 
commodity has been a major focus of the consortium’s ‘one-stop-information-shop’ 
project. WESVARRDEC is one of the 14 regional R&D consortia in the country that 
PCARRD had initiated and provided regional R&D management support.
The Fiber Industry Development Authority (FIDA), a government agency under the 
administrative supervision of the Department of Agriculture (DA), is responsible for 
providing continuous leadership and support for the integrated development of the fibre 
industry. Its authority involves the aspects of research, production, processing, marketing, 
trade regulation and fibre quality regulation. In line with FIDA’s National Integrated 
Sericulture Development Program in Western Visayas, it has assisted co-operators or co­
operatives interested in sericulture or silk production. TABARGA MPC was a recipient of 
FIDA’s financial and technical assistance. This support was intended for the establishment 
of a 0.5 hectare mulberry plantation and construction of cocoon rearing house. The co­
operative members provided the labour requirement for these activities.
FIDA knew TABARGA MPC through its association with DENR-VI officials. It 
provided the co-operative members hands-on training on mulberry plantation and cocoon 
rearing. FIDA fielded its own technician for this purpose. There was no repayment 
required of the co-operative, and after five years it could own the rearing house.
However, there was a problem with the sericulture project, and activities were 
temporarily suspended. The problem could be viewed from two perspectives. From the 
point of view of the co-operative, the problem was seen as irregular supply of eggs for 
rearing (thus monthly rearing as planned was not performed), non-appearance of FIDA 
technician for some time, and FIDA not fulfilling its promise to give cocoon drier for use
during the rainy days.
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On the part of FID A, the staff involved perceived the problems as non-compliance 
with the MOA and lack of interest by the co-operative to pursue the project. As one of the 
FIDA staff members put it, ‘maybe TABARGA preferred projects that yielded immediate 
cash’. To FIDA, this lack of interest by the co-operative was manifested by the following: 
use of rearing house for other purposes, such as training venue and accommodation, 
without permission from FIDA; and use of the area allocated for mulberry plantation for 
bamboo production. There was also a perceived lack of confidence of the co-operative to 
make decisions for itself and dependence on DENR-VI project leader and staff for decision 
making. These problems prompted FIDA to defer supply of eggs to the co-operative.
Apparently, there was conflict of expectations and objectives between the co­
operative and FIDA. The conflict of expectations could have been confounded by the fact 
that the co-operative experienced different kinds of system and incentives from one 
intervener to another. Based on the experience of FIDA, it would be easier to deal with 
individual co-operators than co-operatives.
The Northern Iloilo Polytechnic State College (NIPSC) is a member-agency of 
WESVARRDEC. The manner of linkage with TABARGA MPC was in the form of ‘barter 
trade’ in which NIPSC provided the co-operative with different strains of chicken for 
breeding purposes in exchange for rattan seedlings. NIPSC personnel also acted as 
resource speakers on livestock production.
The Dingle Agricultural and Technical College (DATEC) is also a member-agency 
of WESVARRDEC. DATEC came to know of the co-operative when they joined the 
training on bamboo production conducted by the co-operative for the Office of the 
Governor. There was exchange of information and technologies between TABARGA MPC 
and DATEC. DATEC established its own nursery of giant bamboo by procuring cuttings 
from Mindanao through TABARGA. It sought the assistance of TABARGA when they 
lacked agroforestry planting materials and vice versa. It was planning to rescue the 
sericulture project of the co-operative by providing them with eggs and by buying the 
cocoons that would be produced by the co-operative. DATEC brought their own visitors 
and students to TABARGA for field visits and on-the-job training.
Both NIPSC and DATEC are considered as satellite nurseries of TABARGA m 
which they buy planting materials from TABARGA and raise and sell them as seedlings. 
TABARGA has also created two satellite nurseries in Negros.
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MONPHIL, producer of bamboo tiles in Iloilo City, has been planning to procure 
bamboo seedlings from TABARGA and hire its services for plantation establishment if its 
plans to develop some 115 hectares land were pushed through. This expansion is 
envisioned to support MONPHIL’s growing bamboo tiles business.
7.4 Problems and Solutions
As perceived by the co-operative members, their most serious problems were the 
absence of electricity in their area and the poor road network condition. Unless electricity 
would be installed, the co-operative could not diversify into more value-added business 
projects such as semi-processing of bamboo products. Hauling of their products was also 
expensive and difficult because of the unpaved road network. For these reasons, the co­
operative has continued to negotiate with the local government units. The co-operative also 
cited their problems with the sericulture project as discussed in section 7.3.
The co-operative members expressed confidence in being able to manage the co­
operative themselves, but were apprehensive on the aspects of marketing and linkages. 
They were not too confident on their ability to sustain and expand linkages as these 
activities required special skill and resources. Therefore, they decided to hire their 
coordinator on consultancy and commission basis for one more year after the three-year 
project with PCARRD-DOST was completed. They would also rely on the established 
network and the linking experience gained through the project.
DENR-VI, the leading agency providing interventions to TABARGA MPC, 
experienced bureaucracy problems such as delays in the release of project funds and 
appointments of project staff. Release of project funds was delayed because of some 
administrative problems at DOST, the agency giving major financial support to the project. 
Delayed submission of the audited financial reports by the other implementers of the 
National Bamboo and Rattan project in other parts of the country also affected the release 
of funds to DENR-VI. In the release of project funds, an authority to hire project staff was 
required by DOST. However, authority had to be sought from the Civil Service Central 
Office instead of the Regional Civil Service Office because the regional office had 
different hiring procedures. Bureaucracy was counterproductive for technology transfer 
and commercialisation because time was of the essence in business related projects. The 
linkages with other government and non-government agencies initiated by DENR VI
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helped in ensuring the smooth implementation of the project while waiting for the release 
of funds from PCARRD-DOST.
The period of 3 years was observed to be inadequate for a community development 
project such as this. An official from DENR-VI said that based from experience with 
development projects, a co-operative needed more than three years to develop capabilities 
for long-range planning, linkages and financial management.
The co-operative members had developed a dependent attitude on the project staff 
in the areas of financial transactions, preparation of reports, conduct of meetings, planning 
and decision-making, marketing and linkages. To lessen this dependent attitude, the 
following strategies were instituted by the project team: assigning responsibility centres or 
committees for each co-operative activity; assigning the managerial planning task to 
members who had the capability to do so (the strong points of most members were in the 
manipulative skills not on managerial aspect); hiring of a bookkeeper outside the co­
operative members; and operating the under-study system in which the project staff trained 
capable co-operative members to handle the project activities. The Board of Directors were 
trained on how to deal with other people or agencies by bringing them along during 
business transactions, outside meetings, fairs and conferences, and letting them speak 
about their projects. The co-operative members were given a free hand in coordinating the 
bamboo and rattan production training programs offered to other agencies. They were 
encouraged to speak as resource persons during this training.
7.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of TABARGA MPC
The strengths of the TABARGA MPC were observed by the interveners as follows: 
members had a unity of purpose and self-discipline; were resourceful, hardworking and 
honest; and were very attentive to the agreed plan of activities. The co-operative members 
had internalised the spirit and values of a cooperative. On the other hand, the weaknesses 
of the co-operative were noted as follows: the level of education of the majority of 
members was quite low hence their absorptive capacity for new developments was slow, 
and the members were not yet fully equipped to handle and establish linkages with 
financial institutions.
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7.6 Future Plans of TABARGA MPC
The co-operative has drawn up the following plans to ensure the viability of their 
business:
• Link and work closely with the private sector to ensure market for their bamboo poles 
harvest.
It has been expected that demand for giant bamboo seedlings will decline before the 
year 2000. However, bamboos from both communal and individual farmers’ plantation 
will be harvestable by year 2000. Rattan will be ready for harvesting by year 2010.
• Entertain women members in recognition of the contribution of the wives of the co­
operative members to the implementation of their livelihood projects.
• Apply for a bank loan to expand forest tree plantation.
They have three options for expansion, namely acquire own land, lease land, or contract 
growing.
• Make representations with LGUs and other agencies concerned to develop the co­
operative into a Bamboo and Rattan Training Centre for Western Visayas.
The objective here is to introduce the integrated bamboo and rattan livelihood 
technologies to other interested entrepreneurs in the region utilising the expertise of the 
co-operative members.
7.7 Lessons Learned from the TABARGA MPC Experience
In the co-operative’s own perception, the most important lessons they have derived 
from the bamboo and rattan project is the realisation of the importance of working together 
to achieve a common goal, and the presence of committed and competent project staff, who 
provided the needed technical and managerial assistance to the co-operative.
From the point of view of the interveners, primarily the DENR-VI, the following 
are some observations from their TABARGA MPC experience.
It was easier to intervene in an area that had not been a victim of failed 
development projects before. For instance, the community was not involved in the 
Masagana 99 project,11 which was considered a failure in many respects. However, there 
was also some initial resistance on the part of the community because of what they 
normally heard about government programs. They had the impression that government
11 Refer to chapter 4, section 4.6 for the discussion about Masagana 99 program.
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development programs were generally not sustainable or what was locally referred to as 
‘ningas-kugon’.
The advantage of being an association first (ad hoc organisation without full legal 
entity) before becoming a co-operative was noted. The ‘association’ served as a trial run in 
which members could observe each other’s capabilities and commitment level. It gave the 
members an opportunity to adjust to the idea of working together. Starting an organisation 
from a manageable size was also observed to be an effective institution-building strategy. 
Manageable size, based on DENR’s experience, meant certain number of people that 
matched the intervening agency’s capability in terms of development staff and resources. 
In DENR-VI case, manageable size was around 30 people.
Planning and implementing project activities based on the needs of the community 
improved the sense of project ownership by the co-operative members. The needs of the 
community were assessed by the DENR VI and municipal council through the use of 
benchmark data and use of rapid assessment tools for problem identification such as Quick 
Resource Appraisal (QRA)12 and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA).13 These needs were 
constantly monitored through monthly meetings with the co-operative Board of Directors 
and in consultation with the members. Other strategies that the DENR-VI found useful 
were giving the co-operative bigger roles to play in the project and emphasising the 
secondary roles of the interveners.
The strategy of having short, medium and long-term sources of livelihood for the 
beneficiaries guaranteed their strong interest and commitment towards the co-operative. 
Short to medium-term supplementary projects were meant to provide immediate sources of 
income to the co-operative’s members. This was important because income from bamboo, 
rattan and other forest tree species plantations would only be realised starting year 2000.
Quick Resource Appraisal (QRA) is a quick and systematic method for evaluating technologies of then- 
potential to support or improve enterprises. The QRA guides the Rural-based Enterprise (RED) team in 
identifying and evaluating the gaps which may hinder the establishment of an enterprise, in enns o 
R&D, technology packaging, production system, organisation and management and linkages. QRA uses 
a specific rating system that requires the consensus of RED team members. Ratings base on earns 
consensus are determined and justified based on first hand information from the formers, e process 
deliberation, justification, and consensus on the ratings lead to the identification of gaps an e ex en 
which they prove limiting. .
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) is an assessment procedure with multi-disciplinary teams coll<;ct^  “at* 
from people in the community. The RRA concept expanded into participatory rura apprais ( )
focus on l ie  development o f techniques involving the commumty as partners m 
and analysis and the decision-making process (Source: Hugh Annett and
Rapid Participatory Appraisals to Assess Community Health Needs, Division o f Strengthening Hea 
Services, World Health Organisation (WHO), Geneva, 1995, pp. 2-4.)
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This strategy, vis-a-vis the development of compact or communal forest,14 was observed to 
have reinforced camaraderie among community members and promoted sustainable rural 
development.
Employing the different groups in the community, such as women and children, in 
the livelihood projects of the co-operative strengthened their relationship with the 
community. Since family solidarity was very strong in the community, the commitment of 
a family member (mostly a man) to the co-operative became the commitment of the whole 
family including wives and children. Women and children were most effective in raising 
seedlings of bamboo, rattan and other forest-tree species.
Establishing linkages and aggressive networking activities with government, 
NGOs, the private sector, and R&D consortium opened up a lot of opportunities for the co­
operative in terms of market, exchange of information and technologies, logistics, tenure 
and many others. These linkages were stronger when parties involved (i.e. co-operative and 
intervening agencies) mutually benefit from the relationship. Examples of such mutuality 
are discussed in section 7.8.
Focusing on products (such as seedlings) or services (such as contract planting) that 
sell helped the co-operative members achieve an appreciation for business. Generally, 
farmers are adept in production system management but this orientation limited their focus 
to increased yield as a measure of performance. Enterprise management required a product 
and profit-orientation. For instance, the bamboo and rattan project could have focused on 
bamboo and rattan plantation establishment alone. However, instead of doing that, the 
project treated bamboo and rattan production as enterprises and identified possible 
products that would give the co-operative short, medium and long-term income. For the 
short-term, in the case of bamboo, the co-operative engaged in bamboo and rattan seedling 
production with ‘seedlings’ as the product to sell. For the medium-term, the co-operative 
expected to harvest ‘bamboo poles’ from the bamboo plantation they established. And for 
the long-term, the co-operative was planning to produce semi-processed bamboo products.
Contract planting was also a viable business venture that the co-operative 
undertook. They offered their expertise and labour in plantation establishment and forest-
14 Compact or communal forest refers to the three (3) hectares each of communal rattan and bamboo 
plantations that the co-operative members collectively established and managed. It may a so re er 
common service facilities o f the co-operative such as: staff or training house, nursery with clonal and 
vermi chambers, water system, access road and trails, sericulture rearing house, poultiy house, g o a > 
piggery house, and guest shed. Some of these common facilities did not only benefit e co p 
members but the whole community as well like the access road and trails and water system.
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tree species seedlings to the private sector. Contract planting was observed to be a good 
vehicle for transferring the plantation establishment technology to the private sector and 
other co-operatives.
The national bamboo and rattan project framework did not limit local implementers 
such as the DENR-VI to ‘pre-set’ technology packages. Specifically, the national project 
document stated that ‘interventions will be designed participatively by the community and 
be allowed to evolve as the environment improves and peoples’ needs changes’. This 
provision encouraged and allowed room for the incorporation of indigenous knowledge 
and practices into the production system design of the project. In the case of TABARGA 
MPC, the use of indigenous knowledge and practices increased the relevance and 
appropriateness of the different activities of the co-operative. It enhanced the feeling of 
project ownership by co-operative members. For instance, the local people had the belief 
that the best time to cut bamboo were months without the letter ‘r’ (i.e., May, June, July, 
August). This practice was followed in the package of technology for bamboo production 
and harvesting. There was however, scientific explanation to this belief. These were the dry 
months in that part of the region, therefore the starch content of bamboo and incidence of 
bamboo pest (such as beetles) were relatively low. Another example was that the bamboo 
planting techniques in the package of technology in terms of bamboo pole length and 
planting distance were modified considering the practice of the local people. In terms of 
harvesting practices, the local people harvested bamboo shoots while the shoots were still 
under the soil to avoid its bitter taste.
Technological breakthroughs widened the options and opportunities of the co­
operative for increased income. For instance, the introduction of giant bamboo technology, 
which was not part of the original project plan, gave the co-operative considerable income 
opportunities at least in the short-term considering that the sale of giant bamboo seedlings 
earned a lot for the co-operative. Giant bamboo was not traditionally grown in Iloilo, but 
conscious effort on the part of DENR-VI to search for alternative sources of livelihood for 
the co-operative led them to the testing of the giant bamboo technology in Barangay 
Taminla. The original technology, as it is shown in Appendix 7.4, was modified to suit the 
local conditions.
The co-operative members, having gone through the experience of being trainers, 
contractors, and extension workers, have established their credibility to other agencies and
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their fellow farmers as well. Farmer-to-farmer training was observed to be a very effective 
method of technology transfer.
7.8 Analysis of Interrelationships
The interrelationships among the three major stakeholders in this case study are 
represented by Figure 7.3. Numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to roles of major interveners with 
respect to the co-operative and letters A, B ,C and D refer to the nature of interrelationships 
among the different entities involved in the case study.
7.8.1 Roles 
#1 DENR-6
• Association/co-operative formation
• Technical and management assistance
• Demonstration of production systems and technology packages
• Linkage assistance for market, policy support and other services
• Project monitoring and evaluation at the project level
• Information dissemination
#2 PCARRD-DOST
• Financial support
• Linkage with other bamboo and rattan project implementers
• Project monitoring and evaluation at the national level
#3 LGU
• Land
• Financial support
• Linkage with higher LGUs
#4 TABARGA MPC
• Bamboo and rattan plantation establishment
• Operation of nursery and other livelihood activities
• Co-operative management
• Capital build-up formation
Figure 7.3 Interrelationship among key players in TABARGA MPC case
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7.8.2 Interrelationships
A - Among DENR-6, LGU and Co-operative
Linkage was formalised through a tripartite MOA. The agreement was focused on 
the rules and responsibilities of DENR-VI as project implementer, LGU as conduit 
implementer and TABARGA MPC as beneficiary. This linkage facilitated the flow of 
information on farmers’ needs to the research system through the compact demonstration 
farm in the ten-hectare lot provided by the LGU. Through the demonstration farm, research 
problems and further needs of the farmers were immediately pinpointed and fed back to 
DENR-VI. The flow of information from the research system to the farmers was 
accelerated because the DENR-VI is one of the major sources of forest-related 
technologies in the Philippines. The relationship between the co-operative and DENR-VI 
provided the co-operative with hands-on training on how to access technology, market and 
other support services. However, this linkage was not able to develop the capability of the 
co-operative to package business proposals required by financial institutions and to 
negotiate with these institutions for credit. This skill is important to the co-operative for the 
planning and implementation of their future expansion and processing projects. The direct 
assistance of DENR-VI to the co-operative ended in 1996 and there are signs of weakening 
linkage between the two. In terms of sustainability of linkage with the LGU, the free access 
to land by the co-operative has been assured for at least 20 years. The local government 
code provides the co-operative and the LGU the legal basis to continue their collaboration.
B - Among DENR-6, PCARRD-DOST and Co-operative
The relationship among PCARRD-DOST, DENR-VI and the co-operative was also 
covered by a MOA. Detailed monitoring and evaluation of the TABARGA project were 
undertaken by DENR-VI. However, PCARRD-DOST conducted annual monitoring and 
evaluation of TABARGA as a built-in activity of the Integrated R&D Project Phase III, of 
which PCARRD was the National Coordinator. This linkage facilitated the flow of 
information from the farmers to the national research system and vice versa. Since the 
project involving TABARGA was part of a national R&D program in bamboo and rattan, 
access to information from other projects of the national program in other places of the 
country was made possible. Feedback from the project implementers on fanners needs to 
the national agency was done through regular monitoring and evaluation at all project
236
levels. This mechanism was no longer in effect beyond the project duration. However, the 
co-operative will likely be involved in future national programs on bamboo and rattan (for 
example bamboo and rattan processing) because its established plantations will become 
sources of raw materials for processing.
C - Co-operative and Major Interveners
TABARGA MPC was the point of convergence of all interventions. ‘C* represents 
the combination of all types of assistance provided directly and indirectly by intervening 
agencies to TABARGA MPC. DENR-VI served as the main conduit of these direct and 
indirect support to the co-operative. PCARRD-DOST did not have direct linkage with the 
co-operative and LGU. However, their common interest of seeing bamboo and rattan-based 
enterprise of TABARGA MPC succeed, served as their binding mechanism. With DENR- 
VI/PCARRD-DOST ending its management assistance and financial support to the project, 
the active linkage that will remain in Figure 7.3 will be that between the LGU and the co­
operative.
TABARGA’s linkage with other intervening agencies, such as FID A, 
WESVARRDEC, State Colleges and Universities (SCUs), and the private sector, stemmed 
from DENR’s networking efforts. However, the co-operative has its own indigenous 
linkages that hinged on the participation of some of their members in some local 
government units’ councils.
The intervening agencies benefited from their linkage with the co-operative in some 
way or the other. The greater their stakes were, the more benefits they seemed to derive. 
PCARRD’s gain from the linkage can be viewed from the perspective of bamboo and 
rattan in support of STAND. The TABARGA case has provided lessons that PCARRD- 
DOST can use as bases for assisting similar enterprises on bamboo and rattan in other parts 
of the country. Its linkage with TABARGA MPC was a mechanism by which technologies 
on bamboo and rattan can be validated.
The success of TABARGA has added credibility to DENR-VI as an implementer of 
integrated research and development project. The awards and recognition granted by 
PCARRD and WESVARRDEC to DENR-VI for their TABARGA experience were 
additional feathers to their cap. The success of TABARGA has proven the feasibility of 
their technology transfer strategy—that of social preparation cum technical training in 
varied ratio of combination at different levels of the project life.
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The LGU of the Municipality of Dueñas benefited from the linkage with 
TABARGA MPC in the sense that supporting the co-operative’s enterprise has boosted the 
morale of the local government’s constituents. It meant an additional source of income, in 
the form of tax collection, for the municipality.
WESVARRDEC s benefit from the linkage was indirect. The co-operative has, in a 
way, contributed to the realisation of the consortium’s development objectives related to 
the bamboo flagship program.
In the case of FID A, although the sericulture project had stalled, there were many 
lessons that FIDA and the co-operative could derive from the experience.
The SCUs (DATEC and NIPSC) gained from their relationship with the co­
operative in terms of their agroforestry students getting first-hand experience in nursery 
operation and plantation establishment, and exchange of information and technologies.
The TABARGA MPC case demonstrates the successful interaction of the co­
operative with various intervening agencies, with DENR-VI facilitating these linkages. 
Where there was commonality of purpose, these linkages produced positive results. 
However, failure in linkage occurred when there was major conflict of purpose such as in 
the case of the sericulture project with FIDA. In this situation, the sericulture project 
competed for the valuable resources used by the co-operative for its leading economic 
activity, which was bamboo and rattan nursery operation and plantation. In the case of the 
SCUs, their linkage with the co-operative can be described as ‘symbiotic’. There was 
reciprocity between the co-operative and the SCUs in the sense that whatever gains each 
one had from the linkage benefited both parties.
7.9 Technology Transfer Process
The technology transfer approach identified in this case study can be represented in 
Figure 7.4. It was organised around a project with defined timeframe and objectives and 
with project staff complement. Its purpose was for an implementing agency to facilitate 
technology transfer and withdraw from the project after three years when the targeted 
project activities had all been completed. The approach was a combination of top-down 
and ‘bottom-up’ technology transfer efforts. The top-down approach was employed at the 
national level, and the bottom-up strategies were more pronounced at the ground or 
beneficiary level. At the national level, a bamboo and rattan program guided the general 
areas of R&D and technology transfer activities that would be implemented by different
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participating institutions. At the ground or beneficiary level, DENR-VI used the 
community-based approach on technology transfer and commercialisation. Through this 
scheme, the beneficiaries actively participated in defining the specific needs in their 
community; formulating plans to address these needs; and undertaking the necessary 
actions to achieve their goals and plans.
The strong support of the local government unit during this stage accelerated the 
community organising efforts of DENR-VI. The project went beyond the promotion of 
bamboo and rattan technologies and extended its coverage to include other opportunities 
for livelihood and community development. The technology transfer strategy did not 
adhere to technological fixes but incorporated the ‘farmer’s knowledge and indigenous 
practices’. It encouraged innovations, such as the breakthrough on giant-bamboo seedling 
production and commercialisation, which was not part of the original project activities. 
Innovations were done in such a way that beneficiaries had short, medium and long term 
sources of livelihood to ensure sustainable development of the community. Another 
characteristic of the technology transfer approach in this case study was the business or 
commercial orientation of the project and the clear identification of products to sell.
To further demonstrate the technology transfer approach in this case study, a 
sample technology is discussed in terms of the following aspects: what the technology was 
about and what would be transferred; where it originated; by what organisational route it 
came; the manner by which the technology was extended to TABARGA MPC; and 
adaptation or non-adaptation of the technology by the co-operative.
A package of technology (POT) on bamboo plantation establishment was available 
as a result of phases I and II of the National Integrated R&D Project on Bamboo and 
Rattan, which was funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
Specific technologies in this POT, as presented in Appendix 7.3, were locally generated 
and others were sourced from abroad through this IDRC funded project. With these 
technologies available, PCARRD packaged a national project focused on technology 
transfer and commercialisation for local funding by the DOST. The project was 
implemented in three sites representing the following conditions: lowland community 
which was essentially wasteland; upland community that was poor in resources in skills 
of community members, available raw materials and land that was quite degraded, and 
community that was rich in raw material resources but community members had low skill
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levels. The TABARGA case in Iloilo was represented by the first condition. Bamboo was 
found to be adaptable in various biophysical conditions even in submarginal areas such as 
Barangay Taminla. It could provide the basis for an industry since bamboo had many uses 
and applications and could be processed into high value products such as furniture.
In particular, the bamboo plantation establishment technologies included the aspect 
of propagation techniques (e.g. culm cuttings), field planting or appropriate planting 
distance (e.g. 7m x 7m), and care and maintenance in terms of weeding and fertilisation. 
These technologies were introduced to the co-operative by DENR-VI via the project 
described earlier. The establishment of a communal demonstration farm facilitated the 
transfer of these technologies from the national integrated project through DENR-VI, to the 
co-operative members, and to the rest of the community and the private sector. The 
package of technology introduced by the DENR was re-designed considering the local 
people’s beliefs and practices such as the proper time of planting, planting distance and 
node cutting length. Information on the local practices was obtained as a result of the 
participatory project planning conducted with the community. The technologies used by 
the co-operative were continually improved based on the results of the built-in research 
component of the project. The design of training modules was custom-made to the needs of 
the revised package of technology and the training needs of the co-operative members. The 
DENR-VI, as the leading intervening agency of the co-operative, employed the technology 
transfer strategy of combining community organising and institution-building with 
technology training activities (Figure 7.4). This was done at different levels of 
combination such that focus was greater on community organising at the early stage of the 
project and on technology training towards the middle and end of the project. The objective 
here was to prepare the co-operative for the changes expected of the introduction of 
technologies and be ready with the responsibility of enterprise development and 
management.
Utilisation of the bamboo plantation establishment technology was reinforced by 
the success of the co-operative’s giant bamboo nursery operation. Anticipating an increase 
in demand for giant bamboo poles by the furniture and fishing industries, the co-operative 
was encouraged to expand their bamboo plantations by integrating the giant bamboo 
species. Adaptation of the bamboo plantation establishment technology was also 
strengthened when the co-operative engaged in the contract planting business. Assimilation
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of the technology by the co-operative members was evident when they applied the skills 
and techniques gained from their plantation establishment experience to the private sector 
and LGU reforestation areas. By acting as resource speakers and trainers on bamboo 
production systems for students and visitors, the TABARGA MPC members have become 
more adept at the technology and more confident of their skills and knowledge of bamboo 
plantation establishment.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE 2: LUTUCAN MULTIPURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE 
Engaged in Coconut Coir Manufacturing
8.1 Introduction
This case study looks at a co-operative whose dominant intervener in terms of 
technology transfer is from the private sector. This allows investigation of the dynamics of 
technology transfer involving a co-operative and the private sector as dominant intervener, 
with other agencies providing support services.
The chapter begins with a description and background of the Lutucan Multipurpose 
Co-operative (MPC). It describes the linkages and networking activities of the co-operative 
and analyses the nature of interrelationships among the key players in the case study. The 
concepts of coordination and resource dependencies are useful basis for analysing these 
interrelationships. Effectiveness of linkages is evaluated based on the indicators described 
in chapters 1 and 6. This chapter ends with an analysis of the technology transfer approach 
identified in the case study.
Unlike TABARGA MPC in Case 1, Lutucan MPC directly managed its own 
linkages. The advantage of this arrangement is that it eliminated a lot of bureaucratic 
procedure in the delivery of information, technologies and other services to the co­
operative. However, it also resulted in some duplication of services provided by various 
institutions because there was no independent body that performed checks and balances of 
the linkages of the co-operative.
This case study emphasises the advantage of a self-reliant, well-established and 
resourceful co-operative in obtaining access to technologies, credit, and other important 
services. It shows that a co-operative that has established its credit-worthiness with banks 
become attractive to various support service institutions. The case study also points to the 
importance of networking and building coalition with other co-operatives through 
federations and other interagency boards. These linkages enabled the co-operative to seize 
opportunities as they occurred. However, the case study also indicates that no matter how 
strong and independent the co-operative was, there were some forces beyond its control
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that could hamper its business decisions and implementation. For instance, the co­
operatives plan to expand its coconut by-product production enterprise was hindered by 
two big coconut fibre corporations that dominated and controlled the market for the said 
product. It illustrates the strong influence of those who controlled the technology and 
market on the decisions and viability of the business of the co-operative. The technology 
transfer approach in this case study was straightforward and direct. Therefore, the flow of 
information and technologies from the private sector to the co-operative was quick and 
need-based.
8.2 Description of the Site and the Co-operative
8.2.1 The Site
The Lutucan Multipurpose Co-operative’s office is located in Barangay Lutucan, 
Municipality of Sariaya, Quezon Province (Figure 8.1). Its coco-coir decorticating plant,1 
which is the focus of this study, is situated in Barangay Montecillo, about 3 kilometres 
away from the co-operative’s main office. The Municipality of Sariaya is one of the 40 
municipalities of the province of Quezon and is located 126 kilometres south of Metro 
Manila and 12 kilometres from the Provincial Capital City of Lucena. Barangay Lutucan, 
one of the 43 barangays of Sariaya, is approximately 2 kilometres away from the main 
highway. The road leading to Lutucan from the main highway is asphalted and accessible 
by public utility vehicle. The municipality of Sariaya has a total land area of 24,530 
hectares with Barangay Lutucan occupying 5.6 percent or 1,381 hectares. The total 
population of Lutucan as of 1990 was 6,767 or 7.1 percent of the total population of 
Sariaya (91,081 people).
Sariaya is relatively dry from the months November to April and wet during the rest 
of the year. It is basically an agricultural municipality with coconut plantation occupying 
75% of total land area. The major economic activities in Sariaya include copra2 making, 
rice farming, fruits, vegetables and rootcrops production, cattle and poultry production, 
bakery products, cottage industry (such as hat making and wood carving) and others.
1 Refer to appendix 8.1 for the definition o f coco-coir decortication.
2 Copra is dried coconut meat processed into coconut oil.
Legend: Lutucan MPC site: Barangay Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon Province, Philippines
Figure 8.1 Location map of Lutucan Multipurpose Co-operative (Case 2)
Source: Conrado Lancion, Fast Facts About Philippine Provinces, Tahanan Books, Manila, 1995, p. 131.
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8.2.2 The Co-operative
The Lutucan Barangay Credit Co-operative was incorporated on 20 May 1981 
through the initiative of Mr. Higino H. Atienza, the co-operative’s Executive Director. 
Before the co-operative s formation, Mr. Atienza organised a core group of fifteen persons 
consisting of school teachers, other professionals and members of the community. He 
introduced to them the idea of forming a credit co-operative as a strategy to control the 
proliferation of usurers in Sariaya. The core group of 15 persons laid down the foundation 
and made the initial arrangements necessary for organising the co-operative. The co­
operative started as a purely credit co-operative with thirty five members. Its goals were to 
give members easy access to credit at rates lower than those prevailing in banks and among 
usurers, and to encourage thrift and savings mobilisation among members. The co­
operative re-registered itself on 24 May 1992 into Lutucan Multipurpose Co-operative 
(Lutucan MPC). It has expanded its operations to include other economic, social and 
educational services and activities. In 1996, Lutucan MPC had more than 4,000 members 
which included 10 percent of the population of Barangay Lutucan and had more than 
$US680,0003 4 worth of assets. About 80 to 85 percent of co-operative members are coconut 
farmers.
The co-operative has diversified its operations and services into the following:
1. Loaning and relending (loans for personal, housing, and agricultural and livestock 
production purposes)
2. Social services (including pension plan, health fund and scholarship grant)
3. Training services (pre-membership education seminar, project orientation seminar, 
management training, officers and staff training program)
4. Communication and transport services (cellular phone and two-way radio rental, truck 
rental)
5. Trading (groceries, feeds, fertiliser and pesticides)
6. Manufacturing (coco-coir decorticating plant, laundry soap making and hollow blocks 
production,5 and others)
3 One who lends money at an exorbitant rate of interest.
4 Conversion rate used in this chapter—US$1 = 26 pesos
5 Temporarily stopped in 1996-1997.
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The co-operative has built a three-storey multi-purpose building which was 
completed in December 1996. The building houses the co-operative’s office, a warehouse, 
and a space for seminars and training. Lutucan MPC has also operated a medical clinic and 
provided high school scholarship grants on a limited basis as part of its social service 
program.
The Lutucan MPC started to venture into coco-coir processing in 1994 by putting 
up a coco-coir decorticating plant.6 Lutucan MPC’s decorticating plant consists, among 
other things, of two decorticating machines to extract fibre from the husks, drying area, 
baling machine, soaking tank, stockroom and maintenance house. The plant layout is 
shown in Figure 8.2. Mr. Atienza’s attendance in various interagency and multisectoral 
seminars and meetings gave him the idea of procuring a decorticating machine and 
engaging in coco-coir fibre production. His interest in coconut by-product manufacturing 
was reinforced by his long experience in chemical processing as Head Operator and later as 
Production Supervisor of companies such as Caltex Refinery, Coco-Chemicals Philippines, 
and Colgate Palmolive Philippines.
The coco-coir processing proposal was welcomed by the co-operative’s Board of 
Directors (BOD) because of the abundance of coconut husks in their community and 
nearby areas. Coconut husks are waste materials from copra making. The co-operative’s 
BOD evaluated two proposals for a decorticating machine, namely:
1) $US38,000 worth of machine offered by Mr. Soriano, owner of Soriano Fiber 
Corporation, one of the biggest coconut-fibre producers in the Philippines; and
2) $US11,000 worth of machine fabricated by Mr. Mariano Sazon.
Mr. Sazon is an independent manufacturer of various coconut processing equipment, 
whom Mr. Atienza met in one of the seminars they both attended. The proponents 
discussed their respective offerings to the board. The BOD finally settled for Mr. Sazon s 
machine because it was more affordable and had almost the same capacity and capability 
as with Mr. Soriano’s machine. Lutucan MPC procured one decorticating unit in 1994 and 
another unit in 1995 from Mr. Sazon. Appendix 8.1 describes the technology of coconut- 
coir fibre production as applied by Lutucan MPC. Figure 8.3 shows pictures of the
6 A coco-coir decorticating plant produces fibre from coconut husks. See appendix 8.1 for details of the 
process.
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Figure 8.2 Plant Layout: Coco Coir Production of Lutucan MPC, 
Sariaya, Quezon, Philippines
Source: S. Medina, E. Matienzo, C. Medina, D. Manalo, and E. Aguilar, Documentation and 
Assessment of Successful Coconut Production, Processing and Marketing Enterprises in Luzon, 
UP Los Banos, College Laguna, PCARRD and FSSRI, Philippines, 1997, p. 8.
Coir fibre decorticating machine
Baled coir fibre
Figure 8.3 Coconut coir fibre manufacturing: Lutucan MPC
Source: S. Medina, E, Matienzo, C. Medina, D, Manalo, and E. Aguilar, Documentation and
Assessment of Successful Coconut Production, Provessing and Marketing Enterprises in Luzon, 
PCARRD and Farming Systems and Soil Research Institute, Los Banos, Laguna. Philippines. 
1997, pp. 13, 15.
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decorticating machine, the finished product (baled coco fibre), and the dust produced from 
the decortication process.
The co-operative derived almost 25 percent of its total income from coco-coir 
processing in 1995-1996. The coco coir plant has been generally funded out of the co­
operative s equity and bank loans. It has been under the supervision of Mr. Atienza, but the 
day to day operation and the implementation of plant activities are the responsibilities of 
the plant manager and leadman. The organisational structure of the coco coir plant in 
relation to the overall structure of the co-operative is shown in Figure 8.4. The General 
Assembly is the highest body of the co-operative. It selects the members of the Board of 
Directors, whose main function is policy formulation.
Lutucan MPC was recipient of four prestigious national awards: Best Co-operative 
award for exceptional membership expansion, granted by Land Bank of the Philippines 
(LandBank) in both 1993 and 1995; Best N G O  award in terms of socioeconomic 
contribution to the community, accorded by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 
1995; and B est Co-operative award for having the largest number of members who had 
improved their living conditions due to the co-operative, given by LandBank in 1994.
8.3 Linkages and Networking
Lutucan MPC has established a good track record with banks, has strong 
representations in various federations or groups of co-operatives, and has good linkage 
network with government agencies, other NGOs and the private sector. The following 
entities have provided interventions to the co-operative.
8.3.1 Mr. Mariano Sazon, Private Manufacturer of Decorticating Machine
Mr. Sazon specialises in the manufacture of different coconut processing 
equipment. His machine shop is located about 5 kilometres away from the co-operative’s 
office. He designed and fabricated the decorticating machines of Lutucan MPC. Before 
fully turning over the machines to the co-operative, Mr. Sazon trained the co-operative’s 
plant personnel and workers on how to operate the machines. Lutucan MPC’s coco-coir 
plant was patterned after Mr. Sazon’s own plant layout. The expected life span of the 
decorticating machines is 10 years if important parts are regularly replaced and if engines 
are regularly checked-up. Mr. Sazon performed this regular service and repaired the 
machines as the need arose. Lutucan MPC has signed a 5-year marketing contract with
ADMINISTRATIVE
Figure 8.4 Organisational Structure of Lutucan MPC
Source: S. Medina, E. Matienzo, C. Medina, D. Manalo, and E. Aguilar, Documentation and 
Assessment of Successful Coconut Production, Processing and Marketing Enterprises in Luzon, 
UP Los Banos, College Laguna, PCARRD and FSSRI, Philippines, 1997, p. 7.
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Mr. Sazon. Through the contract, at least 3 tons of baled fibre have been collected by Mr. 
Sazon from the co-operative’s coco coir plant every week. The rest of the co-operative’s 
fibre output can be sold to other buyers. Mr. Sazon has sold the collected fibre to Asia 
Fiber Corporation, a Taiwanese-owned company in Batangas, Philippines. Whenever 
Lutucan MPC’s equipment needed major repairs, Mr. Sazon tried to immediately attend to 
them, otherwise, he would jeopardise his own delivery contract with Asia Fiber 
Corporation. In early 1997 however, Mr. Sazon and the Asia Fiber Corporation gave 
Lutucan MPC the authority to directly sell its fibre output to Asia Fiber Corporation. With 
this arrangement, the co-operative benefited from the buying price of Asia Fibre 
Corporation which was 10 percent higher than the price offered by Sazon, but at the same 
time incurred additional costs in terms of hauling and transportation. Overall, the benefits 
from this new marketing arrangement outweighed the costs incurred by the co-operative.
8.3.2 Land Bank of the Philippines
The LandBank was created by the Philippine government in 1963 in connection 
with the implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Its main function then was 
to purchase vast tracts of private agricultural lands and distribute these to small farmers. In 
1988, when the government launched the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
(CARP), LandBank spearheaded the co-operative movement and extended support services 
to communities in the rural areas. In 1995, the law increased LandBank’s authorised capital 
and amended its charter so that it could perform vital financial and developmental 
assistance to small farmers and fishermen nationwide. LandBank has been by far the 
largest contributor to rural credit delivery in the Philippines. It has an extensive 
countryside network with over 300 branches and field offices nationwide. It has linkages 
with some 8,000 co-operatives and about 400 rural financial institutions all over the 
country.
LandBank offers three types of service programs, namely:
a) LandBank Agrarian Sector handles operations related to CARP such as land transfer 
financing and forming or strengthening of co-operatives whose members are CARP 
beneficiaries.
b) The Countryside Lending Program  provides short and long-term credit facilities to co­
operatives of small farmers and fishermen. The program covers loans for agricultural crop 
and livestock production, cattle importation, livestock breeding and dispersal financing,
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mechanisation, post-harvest processing, irrigation facilities, fishery activities, and 
operating or working capital.
c) LandBank s Technical A ssistance Program  extends technical support services in 
cooperation with other GOs/NGOs. The assistance covers project identification and loan 
packaging, capability building of co-operatives or federations, technology transfer training, 
fanner-coop-market linkages, and ecosystem rehabilitation and development.
The LandBank-Lucena branch started to have linkage with Lutucan MPC in 
September 1991 when it granted the co-operative with livestock production and 
rediscounting or relending loans.7 According to LandBank-Lucena representative, the co­
operative had proven itself to be a responsible borrower. This led to more projects between 
Lutucan MPC and the bank. These projects were as follows: construction of office building 
and warehouse; financial support for the coco-coir processing business in terms of working 
capital and hauling truck; office equipment grant such as computer units and filing 
cabinets; and training of other LandBank supported co-operatives by Lutucan MPC. 
Through LandBank, the co-operative was granted financial assistance from the 
Countryside Development Fund (CDF)8 of some officials from the Senate and House of 
Representatives for livelihood projects (such as hog and cattle fattening). The LandBank- 
Lucena invited Lutucan MPC representatives to some of its sponsored training on 
entrepreneurship and coconut production and processing-related topics either as 
participants or resource speakers. The coco-coir decorticating plant was generally funded 
out of the co-operative’s equity and LandBank-Lucena’s support in terms of working 
capital and hauling truck.
The bank links with other agencies such as the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) 
in identifying potential co-operative-borrowers. In like manner, other agencies refer to 
LandBank-Lucena for ‘certification of good standing’ of its supported co-operatives. The 
bank also has joint projects with the local government units (LGUs). For instance, in the 
Rebel Returnee project,9 the bank endorsed co-operatives that will be supported by the 
LGUs. Lutucan MPC was being eyed as one of the recipients (not yet implemented as of
7 Loans granted by the bank to borrower institutions at discounted or lower interest rates than regular loans
so that the borrower can relend this amount to its members.
8 Countryside Development Fund (CDF) are amounts appropriated to each member of the House of
Representatives and the Senate o f the legislative branch o f the Philippine government. These are intended 
for funding some development projects in their respective provinces and areas of responsibilities.
9 Rebel returnee project is part o f the comprehensive peace program implemented by the government of the
Ramos government.
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1996) because some of its members used to be part of the left-wing movement. LandBank 
also acts as a conduit in the rural areas for selected members of the legislative branch of 
government for managing and disbursing the Countryside Development Fund.
8.3.3 Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)
The PCA is a government agency under the Department of Agriculture. It is 
mandated by law to formulate and implement policies and programs for the development 
of the coconut industry and other palm oils in the country. Its functions also include 
research on coconuts, and development and regulation of domestic and foreign markets for 
coconut and other palm oil products and by-products. It consists of three research centres, 
each headed by a manager; eight regional offices around the country, each headed by a 
regional administrator; 55 provincial offices; and one extension and training centre.10
Lutucan MPC has linkages with both the national office of PCA in Manila and PCA 
Region II in Lucena City. The PCA Manila invited Mr. Atienza and other co-operative 
representatives on several occasions to talk about the operations and activities of Lutucan 
MPC. Mr. Atienza is also President of the Federation of Small Coconut Farmers 
Organisation in Sariaya under the aegis of PCA. PCA Region II started to have linkage 
with Lutucan MPC when the co-operative, being an entity engaged in coconut-related 
enterprise, sought accreditation from the PCA. The assistance provided by PCA Region II 
to Lutucan MPC were: coconut planting materials under PCA’s replanting or rehabilitation 
program; spare parts needed in the repair of equipment in the coco-coir plant; and general 
market information and linkage. The Head of PCA Region II admitted that their agency has 
not yet provided the co-operative with significant interventions. PCA staff members have 
visited the co-operative once every semester for their regular coconut production survey.
8.3.4 Department of Science and Technology-Provincial S&T Center (DOST- 
PSTC)
The provincial S&T centres are extensions of the thirteen regional offices of the 
Department of Science and Technology (DOST). They are tasked to identify the needs and 
opportunities in S&T in the provinces; implement the DOST’s programs or projects such 
as technology demonstration and transfer, S&T promotion, and information dissemination,
10 PCA, Primer o f the Philippine Coconut Authority, The Public Information Office, PCA, Quezon City, nd.
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and develop institutional linkages with other government and non-government agencies in 
the provinces.
The DOST-PSTC for Quezon province, through its Officer Mr. Luis Cervantes, 
first met the officials of Lutucan MPC during one of the meetings of the Federation of Co­
operatives of Quezon province. The DOST-PSTC invited the co-operative to join the 
Provincial S&T Coordinating Council (PSTCC). The PSTCC is the first grouping of 
government, non-government, and private agencies in the province of Quezon involved in 
S&T, trade and industry, agricultural R&D, and economic planning. The DOST-PSTC 
endorsed the co-operative for Manufacturing Productivity Extension (MPEX) assistance 
program of the DOST-Technology Application and Promotion Institute (DOST-TAPI). 
The MPEX Program assisted small and medium-sized enterprises in the manufacturing 
sector to attain higher productivity. Through the program, a study team composed of 
industrial engineers and educators was commissioned by DOST-TAPI to assess the coco­
coir decorticating operation of Lutucan. The team recommended productivity improvement 
measures for immediate implementation by the co-operative.
The recommendations made by MPEX were related to the co-operative’s 
organisational structure and factory systems and procedures. These recommendations were 
as follows: hiring of a full-time production manager to supervise coco-coir production; 
acquisition of another unit of decorticating machine; improvement of factory lay-out and 
process workflow to maximise time, materials, labour and space; and use of forms such as 
finished goods monitoring sheet, daily quality inspection report and others. Most of these 
recommendations were followed by the co-operative. During the validation activity 
conducted by DOST-TAPI, they were convinced that the level of production of the co­
operative had increased when the co-operative followed the MPEX recommendations.
It was also during the assessment that the potential for utilisation of coir-dust 
waste material from decortication—was identified. It was agreed that a pre-investment 
study of dust compacting machine would be prepared by the co-operative through the help 
of DOST-PSTC. All the required documents and the feasibility study were submitted to 
DOST-TAPI for consideration under its joint venture financing scheme.11
11 Joint venture financing is one o f the technology promotion programs of the Department of Science and 
Technology (DOST), which provided equity financing with no interest required to small associations or 
co-operatives for the application of new technologies with high commercial potential.
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Under the venture financing program, DOST-TAPI was expected to put up the 
amount for machine fabrication while the co-operative’s counterpart would be land, 
building and working capital. Lutucan MPC had an agreement with other coco-coir fibre 
producers in Quezon for them to supply dust to the co-operative if the project would be 
approved and implemented. Mr. Sazon was being eyed to fabricate the compacting 
machine. The proposed compacting machine would press and mould the dust into three 
design features (12x12x12 in., 6x6x6 in., and 1x6x6 in.) to suit the specific needs of the 
market. Some of the uses of coconut fibre dust are as follows: fertiliser component; soil 
mulcher or conditioner; trellises; medium in growing plants; pelletised fuel; and for golf 
area landscaping.
When the proposal was finally approved and the budget for machine fabrication 
was released to the co-operative by DOST-TAPI, the co-operative discovered an 
information that was very critical to the business. When Soriano Fiber Corporation learned 
that the co-operative was contracting the services of Mr. Sazon for dust compacting 
machine fabrication, Mr. Soriano approached the co-operative and offered his US$77,000 
worth of equipment with an accompanying offer to buy all of the co-operative’s output. At 
that point, it became clear to the co-operative that the market for compacted dust was 
dominated and controlled by Soriano and another big coco-coir producer in the Bicol 
Region. This meant that if the co-operative would pursue the dust compacting project using 
Mr. Sazon’s machine, market for its products would be uncertain.
The interventions provided by the DOST-PSTC to Lutucan MPC were as follows:
• scientific or technical assistance (for example, DOST-PSTC made sure that the fibre 
output had the right moisture content by recommending the purchase of moisture tester);
• assistance in the preparation of pre-investment study of dust compacting machine; and
• providing the venue in which the co-operative could link with other GOs and NGOs 
through the Provincial S&T Coordinating Council (PSTCC).
These services were in line with the technology transfer, promotion and commercialisation 
program of DOST’s S&T Agenda for National Development (STAND) 2000.12 They were 
in support of the flagship programs of the province of Quezon focusing on coconut by­
products utilisation and coconut industry rehabilitation.
12 DOST STAND 2000 is a list o f goods and services in which superior technology will be concentrated on 
to realise the vision o f Philippines 2000. It outlines the areas which will be the focus of S&T ettorts Irom 
1994 to 1998.
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The performance of the DOST-PSTC was limited by the following problems: few 
staff members to perform its functions; and low budget allocation for counterpart funding 
of technology commercialisation projects recommended for implementation by the 
PSTCC. Therefore, depending on the nature of the project, member-agencies concerned put 
their resources together to implement these projects. But this system put a strain on the part 
of the member-agencies since the financial requirements of the projects were not pre­
programmed in their budgets. An alternative action of the PSTCC was to endorse projects 
to financing institutions such as banks.
The DOST-PSTC monitored the technology commercialisation projects it 
supported through the monthly meeting of PSTCC. In the case of compacting machine, a 
management committee composed of representatives from the co-operative, PSTC and 
DOST-TAPI would have been organised to monitor the progress of the project.
When Mr. Atienza was asked about its perception of the PSTCC, he said that the 
Council can be an effective venue for linking with other GOs and NGOs on matters related 
to their scientific and technological needs. However, he expressed concern about the 
limited resources of DOST-PSTC to facilitate and mobilise the Council. Many member- 
agencies could not attend the monthly meetings because of budget constraints.
8.3.5 Local Government Unit
The Office of the Governor of Quezon Province supports the development and 
enhancement of co-operatives in the province. Twenty percent of its Internal Revenue 
Allocation13 has been earmarked as a development fund to assist co-operatives. Financial 
assistance is in the form of soft loans which are free of interest but with collateral. Aside 
from financial assistance, the Office of the Governor, through its Provincial Planning and 
Development Office, coordinates with other provincial offices on the following: training 
for strengthening of co-operatives in coordination with the provincial Co-operative 
Development Authority; assistance in the preparation of feasibility study of co-operatives, 
market matching in cooperation with the provincial Department of Trade and Industry, 
skills training in cooperation with the Technical Education and Skills Development
13 Internal Revenue Allocation is the share o f the local government units (LGUs) in the national revenue 
taxes based on the collection o f the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows: on the 
first year o f the effectivity of the Local Government Code, thirty percent (30/o); on the second year
thirty five percent (35%); and on the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40 /o).... (Section 284, Local
Government Code). The share o f the LGUs shall be allocated in the following manner: provinces-35/o, 
cities-23%; municipalities-34%; and barangays-20%.... (Section 285, Local Government Code).
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Authority (TESDA), infrastructure development, extension service through the Provincial 
Agriculturist; and funding of seedling bank.
Lutucan MPC was one of the first co-operatives to avail itself of assistance from the 
Countryside Development Fund of the Governor. This happened after the Office of the 
Governor informed the co-operatives of its assistance program for community development 
during one of the meetings of the Federation of Co-operatives in Quezon Province. A 
financial loan was extended to the co-operative for the purchase of the second unit of 
decorticating machine. The loan was payable in five years without interest. The Governor’s 
Office had not experienced any difficulty in collecting the quarterly amortisation or 
payment from the co-operative.
Proposals that the Governor’s Office received from co-operative-applicants are 
referred to government agencies concerned for comments and recommendations, then 
endorsed to the Provincial Development Council14 5 for final approval. However, the Office 
of the Governor directly acts on proposals costing less than US$7,700.
8.3.6 United Coconut Planters Bank
Lutucan MPC sought accreditation from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) 
Foundation Inc. in 1990 to be able to avail itself of the services extended by the bank under 
its Countryside Economic Development Program. Lutucan MPC was one of the first co­
operatives that applied for accreditation to the foundation. The UCPB Foundation Inc. 
offers the following services16 to its accredited co-operatives, whose coconut farmers- 
members constituted at least 30% of total membership:
• Funding of training programs of co-operatives whether in organisational development, 
livelihood skills of value formation seminars;
• Market linkages to UCPB clients who are in local or export business and to the network 
of integrators or processors which are under the marketing desk of the bank;
14 TESDA is a government agency mandated to develop and implement skills development programs with
the participation o f the industry groups, trade associations, employers and workers.
15 Provincial Development Council or Sangguniang Panlalawigan (in Pilipino) is the legislative body of the
province. It has the power and authority to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate tunds
for the general welfare o f the province...... It shall generate and maximise the use o AP
revenues for the development funds, program objectives and priorities of the province....w p
attention to agro-industrial development and.......(Section 468, Local Government Code). ^
16 UCPB-CIIF Foundation, Inc., information sheet on ‘Countryside Economic Development Program and
‘Coop/Non-Traditional Financing Organisations (NTFO) Accreditation Program
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• Funding livelihood programs of co-operatives through loans at a subsidised rate of 
interest;
• Scholarships; and
• Participation in the Adopt-a-School program by accredited co-operatives.
The Foundation, Inc. financed part of the working capital requirement of Lutucan 
MPC’s coco-coir fibre business. The co-operative also availed itself of their training 
program and marketing linkage services. The Foundation approved the co-operative’s loan 
for building construction. However, the co-operative deferred taking up of loan because the 
foundation required collateral in addition to the building. The co-operative finally took a 
loan from LandBank that did not require collateral other than the building itself. For 
projects funded by UCPB Foundation, Inc., the co-operative submitted quarterly progress 
and financial reports. The Foundation visited Lutucan MPC once a month to check the 
status of their projects and examined the co-operative’s book of accounts.
The UCPB Foundation, Inc. coordinates with other agencies in the delivery of their 
services. It works closely with the DOST-PSTC for their technological information needs. 
The Foundation refers its accredited co-operatives to DOST if these co-operatives needed 
technical information and assistance. The DOST-PSTC, on the other hand, endorses 
proposals made by some of its client-co-operatives to the Foundation for funding. There 
are many projects being implemented by DOST-PSTC which are being coordinated with 
the foundation but none in the case of Lutucan MPC. Also a member of the PSTCC, the 
Foundation through Mr. Gucilatar, felt the importance of the Council for interagency 
collaboration. However, he emphasised the PSTCC’s limitation, that it had no direct staff 
and no full time secretariat to do the necessary work or services. The Foundation also 
collaborates with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on a project to project basis 
as the need arose. It also establishes linkage with PCA in terms of implementing the 
coconut replanting program. The Foundation facilitates the distribution of PCA s coconut 
planting materials to its accredited co-operatives.
8.3.7 Department of Trade and Industry
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is mandated to be the primary 
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the Executive Branch of 
government in the area of trade, industry and investments. It promotes and develops an 
industrialisation program to accelerate and sustain economic growth through the following.
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comprehensive industrial growth strategy; a progressive and socially responsible 
liberalisation program; policies designed for the expansion and diversification of trade; and 
policies to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade 
practices.
DTI operates regional and provincial offices in each of the country’s administrative 
regions and provinces. DTI-Quezon province branch identified Lutucan MPC as one of the 
qualified NGOs eligible for its ‘NGO micro credit project’. DTI-Quezon refers to the Co­
operative Development Authority (CDA) Regional Office for the list of co-operatives in 
Quezon province that can be included in DTI’s assistance program.
The ‘NGO micro credit project’ involves the following components:
• credit for NGOs for relending to beneficiaries for micro-enterprises and livelihood 
projects;
• NGO strengthening through assessment of needs, provision of training in livelihood 
project management, market development and other related activities; and
• beneficiaries or self-help groups strengthening through assistance in the identification of 
viable micro-enterprises, entrepreneurship development and market development.
As for Lutucan MPC, DTI-Quezon extended credit for livelihood projects of co­
operative members at an interest rate much lower than prevailing commercial bank rates. 
DTI also disbursed a US$40,000 grant to the co-operative from the Countryside 
Development Fund of Quezon Province’s 2nd District Congressman. The grant was 
intended for the construction cost of a Training Center in the 3rd floor of the co-operative s 
new building. The DTI-Quezon monitored their projects quarterly to check if loans were 
used properly and conducted a regular assembly of beneficiaries (at least three times a 
year).
DTI is also a member of the PSTCC and coordinates with other agencies such as 
T anHRanlf for credit investigation of borrowers and with NGOs for joint conduct and 
sponsorship of training related to trade and industry.
8.3.8 Other Linkages
During the early life of the co-operative, it obtained assistance from an NGO called 
Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP). Through the Small Enterprise Assistance
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Program of PBSP, seed fund17 was extended to the co-operative for livelihood projects 
such as cattle fattening and palay (unshelled rice) production. The National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA) made the co-operative a conduit for funding of livelihood 
projects of seventy non-coop members belonging to the ‘poorest among the poor’ in the 
community.
The Lutucan MPC has maintained linkage with other government agencies such as 
the Department of Agriculture Region 4 and Fiber Development Authority (FIDA). 
However, Lutucan MPC expressed concern that seldom did extension workers, both during 
the time that they were under DA and recently under the LGU, visit them. The co-operative 
also observed that while FIDA visited them from time to time, it was only for the purpose 
of collecting data and monthly fees on fibre sales.
The co-operative, through its Executive Director, has actively participated in 
different interagency organisations in Quezon such as: Quezon Federation and Union Co­
operatives (as member of Board of Directors); Quezon Co-operative Development 
Foundation, Inc. (President); Provincial Co-operative Development Council (one of the 
two representatives of the 2nd district of Quezon); Federation of Co-operatives in Quezon 
Province coordinated by LandBank (President); Provincial Agrarian Reform Committee 
(member); and LGU Pre-Bid Awarding Committee for infrastructure projects in the 
barangays (member). The involvement and active participation of Lutucan MPC in these 
venues made it possible for the co-operative to take advantage of opportunities as they 
occurred.
8.4 Problems
According to Lutucan MPC management, their coco-coir business did not perform 
very well in 1996 compared to previous years, hence proposals for expansion could not be 
recommended to the Board of Directors. The coco plant’s lower production or financial 
performance could be attributed to frequent machine breakdown and some problems with 
the plant manager and workers. The co-operative realised that some of the repairs were 
minor that could be fixed without waiting for the availability of Mr. Sazon, the machine 
fabricator, to attend to them. Hence, the co-operative acquired a welding machine for the 
purpose. Lutucan MPC was aware of the fact that too much dependence on Mr.
17 Amount loaned to members with repayments used to support other projects.
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Sazon for repairs and other technology needs was risky since Mr. Sazon was growing older 
and his fabrication business relied heavily on his expertise. Only one of two decorticating 
machines was functioning because the engine of the newer unit (one year old) broke down 
and had not been replaced yet. According to Mr. Atienza, the engine used by the fabricator 
was observed to be of inferior quality. The co-operative stopped its decorticating 
operations for two months because its major market outlet (Asia Fiber Corporation) 
stopped buying from Mr. Sazon due to oversupply of fibre in the country. The Asia Fiber 
Corporation resumed its buying operations two months later.
Coco-coir dust had accumulated in the co-operative’s plant because the 
decorticating process produced 10 percent fibre and 90% dust. Coir dust could not be 
disposed of economically. The co-operative tried to sell it to cutflower producers in another 
town but it was too bulky. Furthermore, there was too much competition with coir dust 
producers who were nearer the market. The dust compacting machine proposal was thus 
packaged with the assistance from DOST. However, lack of proper market scanning 
resulted to the project being shelved and the money for machine fabrication refunded to 
DOST-TAPI. The co-operative discovered this marketing problem only when it started 
negotiating for the fabrication of the dust compacting machine.
The co-operative used a solar drying technique to dry the coco fibre output. 
Therefore, the decorticating operation stopped during rainy days to prevent further 
accumulation of fibre for drying. This work stoppage had significantly reduced the co­
operative’s revenue from coco fibre.
In terms of linkages, Lutucan MPC did not encounter major difficulty because of its 
credibility and active participation in both NGO and government-based committees or 
councils. However, Mr. Atienza, the Executive Director, felt that the Local government 
units especially the municipality of Sariaya were still lacking in their efforts to strengthen 
the co-operatives. For instance, officers of the Provincial Co-operative Development 
Council mostly came from government and if there were officers from co-operatives, they 
occupied the lower posts. Mr. Atienza also noted the absence of a Municipal Co-operative 
Development Council that could promote the interests of co-operatives at the municipal
level.
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8.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Lutucan MPC
When Lutucan MPC officials were asked about their positive qualities, they claim 
that members are generally honest, responsible borrowers and very religious, majority of 
whom were Catholics. The intensive ‘pre-membership education seminar’ and ‘ownership 
seminar’ are two of the co-operative’s mechanisms to instil among prospective and 
incoming members their rights, duties and responsibilities as co-operative members.
Mr. Atienza closely coordinated with the Board of Directors on every aspect of the 
co-operative. He closely supervised the management staff and saw to it that they follow the 
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standard. To Mr. Atienza, this Code embodied everything 
that a community servant must observe for an honest, sincere and sound delivery of 
service.
When people around the neighbourhood, most of whom were co-operative 
members, were asked on their opinion about the co-operative and its management staff, 
they expressed their high regard for Mr. Atienza and staff members specifically mentioning 
their virtues of honesty and commitment. When asked what improvements in the 
community could they attribute to the co-operative, they mentioned the following: a clinic- 
pharmacy was established and operated by the co-operative; small businesses were put up 
through loans from the co-operative (including bakery, wood carvings, small grocery 
stores, footwear making); there were increasing numbers of college graduate children; and 
co-operative manufacturing businesses, such as coco-coir plant, provided employment 
opportunities to people in Sariaya.
According to the co-operative’s interveners, Lutucan MPC is credit-worthy, 
resourceful, risk-taker and willing to diversify activities, dynamic and pioneering, highly 
motivated, with ‘word of honour’, with strong leadership, good management and planning 
ability, and with well-trained personnel and able Board of Directors. Having been an 
awardee by LandBank and DTI as one of the best co-operatives in the country, Lutucan 
MPC is well-known among GOs and NGOs and other co-operatives. Guests from other co­
operatives in the country and foreigners interested in coconut by-product utilisation have 
visited the co-operative and observed its coco-coir plant operation.
Some weaknesses that were observed of the co-operative are lack of second 
generation leaders who can take over Mr. Atienza s role in case something will happen to
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him, and increasing difficulty of monitoring the more than 4,000 members (and still 
growing).
8.6 Future plans of Lutucan MPC
The co-operative decided not to pursue the dust compacting project because of 
reasons cited earlier. Other plans, such as acquisition of a fibre stitching machine, 
mechanical drier, and twining machine (for use in doormat making), were put on hold 
because of the unstable performance of the coco-coir plant in 1996.
8.7 Lessons Learned from the Lutucan MPC Experience
A major lesson inferred from the Lutucan MPC experience is the strategic 
importance of the following: strong leadership; clear vision of end-goals; clear 
understanding by the co-operative of the concept of development (i.e. taking the initiative 
and ‘no dole-out’ mentality); establishing credibility to invite assistance programs and 
expand membership; and involving the community and nearby localities in its various 
projects. For instance, the coco-coir decorticating plant provided a market for the coconut 
husks of coconut farmers and provided additional income to coconut farmers who were 
members of Lutucan MPC. Another observation in this case study is the strong influence of 
those who controlled the technology and market on the decisions and viability of the 
business of the co-operative.
8.8 Analysis of Interrelationships
The interrelationships among the three major stakeholders in this case study are 
portrayed in Figure 8.5. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 refer to roles of major interveners with 
respect to the co-operative and letters A, B, C, D, E, F refer to nature of interrelationships 
between and among major stakeholders in the case study.
8.8.1 ROLES
#1 Private Manufacturer
• Technology and technical assistance
• Market
• Repairs and regular equipment servicing
Figure 8.5 Interrelationship among key players in Lutucan MPC case
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#2 LandBank-Lucena/UCPB Foundation, Inc.
• Financial support
• Facilitation of linkage with other LandBank/UCPB supported co-operatives 
#3 DOST-PSTC
• Scientific and technical assistance
• Assistance in pre-investment study preparation
• Linkage with other technical GO, NGOs and private sector
#4 LUTUCAN MPC
• Production system
• Organisation and management
• Linkages
• Capital build-up formation
8.8.2 Interrelationships
A - Private Manufacturer and Lutucan MPC
The co-operative depended on Mr. Sazon for technologies needed in its coco-coir 
decorticating plant and future projects related to coconut by-product utilisation. This 
linkage and exchange of information between them in terms of technology needs and 
opportunities were facilitated by the proximity of the co-operative’s site to Mr. Sazon’s 
office. However, this would not assure sustainability of linkage between the co-operative 
and Mr. Sazon. Mr. Sazon was getting older and he was the only person in his company 
who had the fabrication expertise. Through linkage with Mr. Sazon, the co-operative 
gained access to the market for coco-coir fibre and this was formalised through a five-year 
marketing agreement. However, the case of the shelved coco-dust compacting project 
proved that both Mr. Sazon and the co-operative could be easily pushed out of business by 
the big coconut by-products manufacturers who controlled the technologies and market in
the industry.
B - LandBank-Lucena/UCPB Foundation and Lutucan MPC
The relationship between the banks and the co-operative was covered by specific 
rules and procedures of the banks’ accreditation and lending programs for co-operatives.
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Both banks were responsive to the credit needs of Lutucan MPC because the co-operative 
had proven its credit-worthiness and was engaged in activities that were included in the 
banks priority list of projects. The active involvement of the co-operative in the lending 
programs of the banks facilitated the flow of information between them. This enabled the 
co-operative to seize opportunities as these were presented at certain point in time.
C - DOST-PSTC and Lutucan MPC
The co-operative’s linkage with DOST-PSTC was formalised through the 
involvement of the co-operative in the PSTC Council which was covered by a MOA. The 
participation of the co-operative in the PSTC Council provided it easy access to services 
provided by other government agencies, local government units, state colleges and 
universities, and NGOs in the province of Quezon that were members of the Council. 
However, the sustainability of this linkage with the Council was not certain because the 
Council was a d  hoc in nature.
The major interveners of the co-operative had direct relationships with each other 
that were not centred on the co-operative. For instance, in relationship D, the DOST-PSTC 
had direct interaction with LandBank and UCPB through the PSTC Council. In 
relationships E and F, the private manufacturer had its own relationship with the DOST- 
PSTC in terms of fabrication of machines of the DOST’s clientele including the co­
operative, and the LandBank/UCPB in terms of the manufacturer’s own commercial loans 
for his business.
Lutucan MPC was the point of convergence of all interventions provided by the 
different GOs, NGOs and private sector concerned. However, the services and projects of 
these entities/agencies were largely independent of each other. There was no deliberate 
effort on the part of the interveners to jointly plan and support collaborative projects for the 
co-operative. There were a few exceptions such as the joint DTI-LGU (Countryside 
Development Fund) project and the LandBank-National Housing Authority (NHA) co­
operative housing program. The intervening agencies separately pursued activities that 
sometimes had similar objectives. There were instances when banks would compete for the 
co-operative’s attention in terms of lending since banks normally had to meet certain quota 
for co-operative’s lending. While this was good for the co-operative in terms of availability 
of credit, there could be duplication of efforts. The DOST-PSTC Council could have been 
the mechanism that would bring the different stakeholders together for joint project
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planning and implementation. However, the Council was lacking in clout, budget and full­
time secretariat. At best, this group provided the venue for information exchange and 
referral system among the different entities or agencies involved.
The different intervening agencies in this case study derived benefits from the 
interrelationships outlined here. On the part of the private manufacturer, Mr. Sazon’s 
dealings with the co-operative has assured him of a client of his coconut by-product 
processing equipment and services. The co-operative, having been frequented by visitors to 
observe its operation has, in some ways, promoted the products and services of Mr. Sazon 
to other entities or agencies. Through the marketing agreement with the co-operative, Mr. 
Sazon has been assured of fibre supply for at least 5 years which he sold to an exporter. In 
the case of LandBank and UCPB, their interest in the relationship with Lutucan MPC was 
in terms of meeting their quota for co-operative lending, fulfilling their rural service 
mission, and the financial return on their investments. With DOST-PSTC, the benefit it 
derived from the relationship with the co-operative was the contribution to the realisation 
of the S&T Agenda for National Development (STAND) and the provincial flagship 
program, of which the coconut industry was a priority area.
8.9 Technology Transfer Approach
The technology transfer approach in this case study is a simple and direct process 
(Figure 8.6) with the technology generator using the technologies (equipment plus 
decorticating process) on a commercial basis himself and selling the technologies to the co­
operative. The process is bottom-up in the sense that no other agency dictated the co­
operative in pursuing the coco-coir fibre project. The co-operative acted on its own volition 
based on various ideas it derived from the interagency and interco-operative meetings. It 
has the capability of assessing business opportunities vis-a-vis its own resources and 
capabilities (i.e. Mr Atienza’s previous work experience contributed to the motivation). 
Unlike the TABARGA case, Lutucan MPC managed and controlled its various linkages 
with the different GOs, NGOs and the private sector.
Private
Manufacturer
Credit:
-LandBank
-UCPB
-LGU
Scientific & technical
assistance
-DOST
Market information other 
than from Mr. Sazon 
-DTI 
-PCA
Figure 8.6 Technology transfer approach: Lutucan MPC case
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CHAPTER 9
CASE 3: THE CASE OF THE INTEGRATED RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, JALAJALA, RIZAL
Rice Production, Processing and Marketing
9.1 Introduction
To understand the case of the Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Project 
(IJRDP), presented here are its history and background; its beneficiaries; and the 
interrelationships of the different entities involved in its conceptualisation, funding and 
implementation. In terms of the project beneficiaries, the case focuses on the 
Alibangbangan Multipurpose Farmers Co-operative, Inc. (AMFCI) and the Integrated 
Jalajala Federation of Co-operatives (INJAFEDCO) of which AMFCI is a member. The 
AMFCI has been one of the nine co-operatives in Jalajala, Rizal, Philippines that has 
benefited from IJRDP funding derived from both the Japanese and Philippine 
governments.
The nature of interaction and linkages among the key players in the case study are 
assessed based on the indicators discussed in chapters 1 and 6. The technology transfer 
approach employed in the case study is analysed and presented towards the end of the 
chapter.
This case study illustrates the organisational, institutional and technical issues and 
challenges surrounding a multi-sectoral and foreign-funded rural development project. The 
project had two components, namely infrastructure development, such as construction of 
rice processing complex, farm-to-market roads and irrigation facilities; and institutional 
development, including local institution building and technology transfer. The Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) funded the infrastructure development 
component, which was 99 percent of the total project cost. JICA awarded the construction 
work mainly to Japanese companies. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) provided 
funds and coordinating mechanism for the institutional development component of the 
project. It contracted the services of two non-government agencies for the implementation 
of institutional development activities, namely the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education 
Organisation Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA)
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for the technology transfer aspect, and the National Confederation of Co-operatives 
(NATCCO) for the co-operative development part. The beneficiaries of the project were 
the members of the co-operatives under INJAFEDCO.
The linkage between the infrastructure and institutional development components 
was demonstrably weak. The institutional development component was not included in the 
original project package. When finally considered in the project, its implementation lagged 
behind the infrastructure construction. There was lack of integration between the activities 
of the two components because, in the first instance, they were not planned together. There 
was evidence to show that the infrastructure outputs, identified and constructed mainly by 
the JICA-contracted companies, were not consistent with the capacities and resources of 
the beneficiaries for learning, repair and maintenance. The Japanese companies did the 
engineering plans and construction with little input from and participation by their local 
counterparts and the rural community.
The case study shows that the tripartite linkage among the institutional 
development implementers did not develop among the members of INJAFEDCO co­
operatives a sense of appreciation, ownership and accountability of the project outputs 
especially of the rice processing complex. This linkage facilitated the flow of information 
from project implementers to officers of the co-operatives and the federation. However, it 
failed to reach and facilitate capability building of the majority of project beneficiaries. The 
field activities of SEARCA and NATCCO were not synchronised and were not well 
coordinated. The co-operative development activities of NATCCO were delayed and were 
not in tandem with SEARCA's attempts at transferring technical and management skills to 
the project beneficiaries. On the positive side, the linkages outlined here provided the co­
operatives with access to market, irrigation facilities, rice processing plant and new 
production technologies. Overall, this case study argues that a complex rural development 
project such as the one featured here requires a strong coordinating agency that can 
adequately orchestrate the project activities of various agencies with different biases and 
work practices.
The technology transfer approach in this case study is generally top-down from 
planning, packaging, to implementation except in the aspect of transfer of production 
technologies. Similar to Case 1, the strategies of local capability building and technology
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training were used. However, these strategies were properly phased-in in Case 1 and less 
coordinated in Case 3.
9.1.1 Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Project (IJRDP)
In 1988, the municipality of Jalajala was chosen by the Department of Agrarian 
Reform (DAR) as a model area for the promotion of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP).1 The CARP involved two major components: land tenure improvement 
through land acquisition and distribution; and CARP beneficiaries’ development through 
strengthening of the agrarian reform beneficiaries’ organisations and co-operatives, 
enterprise development, and physical infrastructure support.
The DAR is the lead agency in implementing CARP. In 1988, it started to negotiate 
with the Japanese government through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
for the funding of a model CARP development project. The project known as Integrated 
Jalajala Rural Development Project (IJRDP) was thus conceived. The IJRDP model was 
envisioned to develop an ‘organised self-reliant and productive community’ that shared 
resources and applied technology in a commercial environment for their collective benefit.2 
The IJRDP was a comprehensive package of physical and social support services for the 
agrarian reform beneficiaries in Jalajala, Rizal. It involved infrastructure development with 
US$18.5 million3 grant coming from the government of Japan. This infrastructure 
development component included road networks, irrigation and drainage facilities, potable 
water supply, power supply system and a rice processing complex with drying and milling 
facilities, warehouse and transporting facilities.4
The other component of the project was institutional development with a budget of 
almost US$225,777. This component was funded by the Philippine government as its 
counterpart or equity to the project. The institutional development component was not 
originally part of the project proposal. However, it was included before the project 
documents were finalised. The reason for its inclusion was the realisation by both the DAR 
and JICA that local capability building of the beneficiaries was important to sustain the 
physical infrastructure component of IJRDP.
1 Refer to chapter 3 for more details about CARP.
2 Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Project Documents, DAR.
3 Conversion rate— US$1.00 = 27 Pesos
4 Conversion o f power supply from single phase to three phase system.
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Under the institutional development component of the project, the DAR engaged 
the services of two non-government organisations (NGOs): SEAMEO-Regional Center for 
Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA); and the National Confederation 
of Co-operatives (NATCCO). SEARCA was tapped to establish an integrated rice 
production, processing and marketing program for the project beneficiaries. On the other 
hand, NATCCO was assigned to handle the organising and strengthening of co-operatives. 
The objectives of the institutional development component of IJRDP were as follows:
• to establish and strengthen co-operative organisations that would be responsible 
together with the partner agencies for implementing IJRDP and would eventually be 
independently responsible for the operation and maintenance of facilities constructed 
through the project;
• to establish a program for operating the rice processing complex as a commercial 
enterprise that would integrate rice production with the processing and marketing of 
milled rice; and
• to prepare the basis for an agro-commercial development of commodities in the 
municipality of Jalajala.
During the initial stage of IJRDP conceptualisation, between the period September 
1989 to September 1990, the DAR assigned a team to conduct a project feasibility study in 
Jalajala. The farmers’ associations, irrigators’ association and other people’s organisations 
existing in the project site before the IJRDP were consulted as to what their most pressing 
problems were. Some of the problems expressed by these groups were absence of good 
road network, inadequate irrigation facilities, lack of electricity service, low farm 
production output, and need for potable water.
The feasibility study was submitted by the team to DAR in December 1990. After 
making some revisions and refinements, the DAR submitted the IJRDP proposal to JICA 
because irrigation and rice processing were included in JICA s priority areas for assistance. 
JICA sent a ‘Basic Design Team’ to Jalajala from October to November 1991 for field 
investigation and to confer with the project proponents. Upon recommendation of JICA s 
Basic Design Team, the infrastructure sub-components were identified as follows: four 
communal pump irrigation and drainage facilities capable of irrigating 430 hectares of 
agricultural land; 18.1 kilometres concrete trunk road and 14 kilometres gravel-metallmg 
feeder road; 16 units of manual operated water pumps and 2 units communal faucet and
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distribution pipeline (electrical power driven); power supply system;5 and 2.5 ton per hour 
capacity rice processing complex.
The formal signing of agreement or ‘Exchange of Notes’ between the governments 
of the Philippines and Japan was done on 23 October 1992. Detailed engineering plans and 
designs for the project components were prepared in Japan by engineers and consultants 
from Nippon Koei Co., Ltd.6 after they underwent survey work in Jalajala from 19 October 
to 21 November 1992. With these engineering designs ready, bidding for the project 
ensued. It was done in Tokyo, Japan in December 1992. Signing of the civil contract 
between DAR and the winning bidder, Taisei Corporation,7 was done in February 1993. 
Afterwards, construction of the physical infrastructure started.
The land area of about 359 hectares as site for the rice processing complex was 
negotiated by DAR with Meralco Foundation8 for donation to the project beneficiaries. The 
DAR also negotiated with the local people for donation of land as ‘right of way’ for the 
road network component. It had a difficult time convincing farmers to donate lands for 
roads and irrigation. The farmers or project beneficiaries were not informed beforehand of 
the extent of the construction work that would be done and the damage to crops and 
properties expected from it, hence the initial resistance to cooperate. For the electrification 
component of the project, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DAR and Manila 
Electric Company was signed in November 1991.
The IJRDP infrastructure component was contracted mainly to Japanese companies. 
This meant that materials and parts used in the physical infrastructure were mostly made in 
Japan and therefore had implications on the maintenance of the facilities by the local 
people. The Japanese firms subcontracted some of the infrastructure work to Filipino 
companies. However, the local companies were under the close supervision of the Japanese 
firms. The DAR provincial engineers were involved in the project only to monitor the
5 Required to convert power supply from single phase to three phase system to run the rice processing
complex, water supply system and irrigation facilities. The power supply system improvement was 
financed by the Philippine government through the Manila Electric Company.
6 The company whose engineers made the detailed engineering design of the physical mfrastmcture and
supervised the technical aspects o f the construction. Their field office was located at the project site m
Jalajala. .
7 The contractor in-charge o f the construction work in accordance with the technical specifications of the
infrastructure. It had the same field office as Nippon Koei Co., Ltd.
8 Meralco Foundation, Inc. is a non-government organisation established in 19J 3 ^  s. ^ eJ ^  ^eed
capability building o f Filipinos (especially the disadvantaged) m the areas o f technical education and 
framing, entrepreneurial development, values education, agricultural and aquatic training and community
development.
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work-in-progress. JICA did not allow any change in the engineering plans although there 
were suggestions to do so during the construction work. Construction work was carried out 
between March 1993 to April 1995, as scheduled. The completed infrastructures were 
turned over to local organisations that would be responsible for their operation and 
maintenance as follows: irrigation facilities to the farmer associations or co-operatives in 
the barangays involved; roads and potable water systems to the local government of 
Jalajala, and rice processing complex to INJAFEDCO.
With regards the institutional development component, as soon as it was agreed to 
be included in the proposal, the DAR through the Bureau of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries 
Development (BARBD) met with the local leaders of Jalajala in November 1991. An 
assessment of the various farmer organisations, irrigators association and co-operatives 
was made on February 1992. Soon, the institutional development framework was 
developed by DAR-BARBD. On the basis of this framework, NGOs were invited to submit 
proposals for institutional development activities. SEARCA and NATCCO were selected 
on the basis of the following criteria: involvement in rural development projects; track 
record in co-operative organising and strengthening; expertise in integrated rice 
production, processing and marketing; previous or current linkage with government 
organisations; and financial resources to implement the project activities in case there was 
delayed release of funds. The MOA among the DAR, SEARCA and NATCCO was signed 
on 16 August 1993.
Overall, the IJRDP was a project of almost 99 percent physical infrastructure 
component. The institutional development part was included only after the issue of 
sustainability of the infrastructure was realised. It was a project conceptualised from the 
top with little participation of the local community or intended beneficiaries during the
planning stage.
9.1.2 Project Site
The municipality of Jalajala was chosen as the project site because it was classified 
as one of the most economically depressed areas in the Philippines. Almost 80 ̂  of its total 
land area was under CARP coverage and around 74% of farm households were agrarian 
reform beneficiaries.9 Jalajala is one of the 15 municipalities in the province of Rizal, 5*
5 Leticia Damole, Institutional development to sustain a rice processing complex: The cast
Jalajala Rural Development Project, Philippines, a thesis submitted m partial lulfilment ol the
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Region IV (Figure 9.1). It is located 75 kilometres southeast of Metro Manila and lies 
along Laguna Lake.* 10 It consists of eleven barangays and had a total population of 20,255 
people or 3,886 households as of 1997.
The total land area of Jalajala is 4,930 hectares with 30% or 1,440 hectares 
classified as agricultural land and 63% upland areas. The climate in Jalajala is hot and dry 
from December to April and rainy from May to November. The place is accessible by a 
concrete paved national road that leads to Metro Manila. Land transportation includes light 
buses or jeepney from Jalajala to another town of Rizal called Tanay, and bus service from 
Tanay to Metro Manila. Water transportation system is available for travels across Laguna 
Lake from Jalajala area to other towns of Laguna and Rizal provinces. Before IJRDP, there 
were 40 kilometres barangay roads but these were unpaved and impassable during rainy 
season.11 After the IJRDP, the road network within Jalajala has significantly improved with 
some thirty kilometres trunk and feeder roads constructed.
Before the project, there were 15 communal irrigation systems constructed by the 
National Irrigation Administration (NLA). Irrigators associations were organised by NIA to 
systematise the operation and maintenance of these irrigation facilities. The major 
economic activity in the municipality is agricultural, with rice, maize, rootcrops, vegetables 
and fruits as major products. The other sources of livelihood in Jalajala are fishing, duck 
egg production, cattle fattening and garments making.
9.1.3 The Integrated Jalajala Federation of Co-operatives (INJAFEDCO)
INJAFEDCO is a secondary agricultural co-operative composed of ten primary co­
operatives (Appendix 9.1) from various barangays of the municipality of Jalajala. It was 
organised on 16 September 1994 and was officially acknowledged by the Co-operative 
Development Authority (CDA) on 22 June 1995. Before its incorporation, an ad hoc 
committee composed of two representatives from each of the primary co-operative s Board 
of Directors drew up the Federation’s Article of Cooperation and By-laws in consultation
with their respective co-operative members.
Before IJRDP and INJAFEDCO, most of the primary co-operative members pre­
existed in different forms. They were either any of the following: Samahang Nayons (SNs)
requirements for the degree o f Master of Science, Asian Institute o f Technology, Bangkok, Thailand, 
August 1995, p. 127.
10 Laguna lake is the largest and the shallowest lake in Southeast Asia.
11 L. Damole, op. cit., p. 36.
Legend: INJAFEDCO site: Jalajala, Rizal Province, Philippines
Figure 9.1 Location map of INJAFEDCO (Case 3)
Source: Conrado Lancion, Fast Facts About Philippine Provinces, Tahanan Books, Manila, 1995, p. 135.
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organised under the land reform program of the Martial Law regime;12 134credit co-operatives 
assisted by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LandBank); multipurpose co-operatives 
initiated by a private foundation called Meralco Foundation; or irrigators associations 
formed by the NIA. Only one of the ten co-operatives has been newly created during the 
IJRDP implementation.
The formation of INJAFEDCO was one of the objectives of the IJRDP institutional 
development component. INJAFEDCO was intended to take over the management of the 
rice processing complex (RPC) built through the project. Mr. de Guzman, chairman of 
INJAFEDCO, claimed however that there was an initial interest to form a federation even 
before IJRDP and its creation was facilitated by the project.
The management of RPC was officially turned over to INJAFEDCO by SEARCA 
in August 1996. The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the federation a loan of 
US$185,000 at six percent interest rate per annum to operate RPC. Ownership of RPC will 
be transferred to the federation as soon as the federation has paid the loan to DAR. The 
federation will start amortising the loan in year 1998.
Mr. de Guzman told the federation members that it was proper to recognise the help 
of the DAR but they should not allow it to dictate the federation. He cited one instance 
whereby the federation was not happy with the DAR’s action. The JICA donated vehicles 
(truck and land cruiser) for use in the operation of RPC. However, the DAR pulled out the 
land cruiser from RPC for use by DAR Central Office officials. Mr. de Guzman felt that 
this was not fair.
In a survey conducted by Damole, et a l.u in February 1995, they note that the 
federation was still lacking in basic organisational capability, such as in planning, 
facilitating meetings, record keeping and financial management. They observe that during 
that time, the basic finance and records management systems had not been in place. In the 
same survey made by Damole, et a l.,u they note that five of the member-co-operatives of 
INJAFEDCO were not fully operational and were debt-ridden, thus affecting the 
federation’s viability. The survey also reveals that the federation was highly supported by 
its committed and well-informed officers. However, the majority of members were not
12 See chapter 5 for details.
13 L. Damole, C Austria, and Ma. S. Peralta, Initial findings o f the survey 16
February 1995. This formed part o f Damole’s masteral thesis entitled,Tripartite institution-building to 
sustain a rice processing complex-evidence from the Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Projec .
14 Ibid.
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supportive because they were not fully aware of the federation’s existence or operations. 
The members commitment and support for the federation have implications on the 
operation of the RPC. The RPC has been operating below its maximum capacity because 
not many farmer-members have been patronising it in terms of bringing their palay 
produce to RPC for milling and marketing.
According to a SEARCA official, there was an attempt on the part of the federation 
to assume the responsibility of managing RPC one year before the management contract 
between SEARCA and DAR expired. This was triggered by ‘personality problems’ 
between the federation and some of the people hired by SEARCA to manage RPC. 
However, this early takeover did not happen because, according to Damole, et a l.,ls the 
federation was not yet ready in terms of organisational capability. Furthermore, the 
federation staff members were expected to have completed their hands-on management 
training under SEARCA, covering wet-season 1995 and dry-season 1996, before the 
turnover of RPC management responsibility to INJAFEDCO.
In terms of the profile of INJAFEDCO’s officers and members,16 Damole et a/.’s 
survey shows that most officers and members were between the ages of 41 to 50 and that 
no officer or member was below 20 years old. The same survey indicates that there were 
many female members (58%) but very few female officers (16%). In terms of educational 
attainment, most of the officers were either college graduates or had reached college level 
(39%), 25% were elementary graduates, and 23% were high school graduates. The 
members, on the other hand had mostly reached elementary level or were elementary 
graduates (42%), 26% high school level or graduates, and 29% had reached college level. 
In terms of occupation, most of the officers and members were engaged in farming and 
some 25% members and 13% officers were government or private employees.17
In terms of local community participation, the INJAFEDCO’s member-co­
operatives rallied behind the incumbent mayor of Jalajala during the 1994 election because 
they believed that he could advance their cause. The incumbent mayor used to be the 
Chairman of one of the member-co-operatives. The mayor would usually consult
15 Ibid.
16 INJAFEDCO’s members were
et al. used purposive sampling in the case 
17 Damole, et a l o p .  cit.
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representatives from INJAFEDCO when there were laws or regulations pertaining to co­
operatives that need to be discussed or settled.
The INJAFEDCO was still in the process of planning its activities in support of the 
member-co-operatives during the time when the survey was made. The services of 
INJAFEDCO, during that time, were as follows: market outlet for farmers’ produce, 
through RPC; and retail rice trading, in which the federation encouraged the member co­
operatives to get rice from RPC and sell them by retail in their locality. The federation has 
intended to support rice production needs of the members by providing them production 
loans. It has also planned to develop other income generating projects for the members. 
However, this could not be implemented because of limited funding. The US$185,000 loan 
from DAR could not be used for this purpose because it was meant to be RPC’s source of 
operating capital.
9.1.4 The Rice Processing Complex (RPC)
The RPC has been managed by INJAFEDCO starting August 1996. The policy 
making function of RPC is vested on the federation’s Board of Directors. The day to day 
operation is supervised by a General Manager. The RPC has five sections, namely 
administrative and finance, credit and collection, procurement and marketing, traffic and 
warehouse, and processing and maintenance.
The full-load capacity of RPC is 1,920 tons of clean and dry palay (unshelled rice) 
per season. However, based on the experience of SEARCA, its rated capacity is only 1,200 
tons of palay per season. It has the following specific performance capabilities: two 4-ton 
trucks; four parallel units of dryer with batch capacity of 5 tons each (each unit had a 
drying rate capacity of 0.5 to 1.0% moisture reduction per hour); sun drying pavement with 
30.0 tons per day capacity; one-line rice milling plant with a palay husking rated capacity 
of 2.5 tons per hour; 400-ton palay warehouse; and 100-ton milled rice warehouse. Figure 
9.2 presents some pictures of the RPC.
The RPC has sourced palay from the members of the primary co-operatives, with 
the co-operatives serving as buying stations. The RPC has encouraged non-INJAFEDCO 
farmers’ associations in Jalajala to sell their produce through the buying stations in their 
locality. Palay procurement has extended to the nearby towns of Jalajala and nearby 
provinces of Rizal to maximise the use of RPC s capacity.
Figure 9.2 The rice processing complex: INJAFEDCO
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9.1.5 Alibangbangan Multipurpose Farmer Co-operative, Inc. (AMFCI)
The AMFCI started as an association under the Free Farmers Federation in August 
1973 in connection with Presidential Decree no. 27 or the land reform law of the Marcos 
government. It was then called Palaypalay Samahang Nayon, Inc. The farmers in Jalajala 
have been one of the earliest beneficiaries of this land reform program. The association was 
reorganised into a co-operative in April 1990 when the DAR under the Aquino 
administration encouraged agrarian reform beneficiaries to form themselves into co­
operatives. The AMFCI members have been amortising payment for their lands to 
LandBank. They have been given thirty years to complete the payment. Some members are 
fully paid already.
AMFCI is located in Barangay Palay-palay of the municipality of Jalajala. The co­
operative has a seven-member Board of Directors and three working committees. The 
committees cover the areas of education and training, finance and development, and audit 
and inventory. The co-operative has 58 members as of 1997, 12 of whom were women, 
mostly widows who have assumed their husbands’ membership. All members of the co­
operative are farmers and agrarian reform beneficiaries. AMFCI members have been 
cultivating a total of 140 hectares of rice farmlands. The farm size of members ranges from 
0.5 to 3.0 hectares. Some of the members are also fishermen, their location being near the 
Laguna Lake. In terms of level of education, 10 members are high school graduates and the 
rest have reached elementary level. One member is a barangay captain and another one is a 
member of the Barangay Council. The co-operative has no office space but has kept their 
records in the houses of their treasurer and secretary. The co-operative members have built 
a resting shed, that they have used as site of their informal meetings. They have also used 
the barangay hall as a meeting place.
The co-operative chairman, Mr. Julian Balakit, has been a farmer leader since 1965. 
Mr. Balakit has been highly regarded by the co-operative members who described him as 
hardworking and self-confident. The members have admired him for his ability to talk to 
and negotiate with high officials from both the government and private sector regarding 
their concerns.
The following instances give an indication of the leadership and management style 
of Mr. Balakit. He did not sign right away in the MOA between DAR and AMFCI 
effecting the turnover of irrigation facilities to the co-operative. The MOA stipulates that if
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in three years the co-operative will not be capable of managing the irrigation facilities, the 
DAR will take over. The co-operative would like to avoid the situation whereby DAR 
would dictate to them specific policies with regard to their irrigation fees. The policy of the 
co-operative pertaining to irrigation fees was that each member would pay 14 cavans18 
during the dry season and 12 cavans during the wet season to defray the co-operative’s 
electric bill for use of the irrigation facilities.
Mr. Balakit wanted to try the capabilities of the co-operative members to work 
together in managing the irrigation facilities before signing the MOA. In addition, the co­
operative was not happy with the work done by the company that constructed the irrigation 
canals. The company could not be fully paid for their work until the co-operative signed 
the MOA. However, the co-operative did not want to sign the MOA until the company 
removed the rocks it piled up in their farms during the construction work.
Mr. Balakit also strictly enforced among co-operative members the policy of selling 
palay produce to RPC. The penalty for not complying with the policy was non-supply of 
irrigation water. He also instructed RPC not to accept palay of a member who made a deal 
outside RPC but for some reason did not pursue it and instead offered them to RPC. This 
was done to teach such members a lesson. The usual reason of members for not selling 
their produce to RPC was that they could get a better price outside.
The following examples illustrate the extent of local participation of AMFCI. 
During a meeting among the Cabinet Members of the Philippine government held in the 
province of Rizal, Mr. Balakit was able to express the co-operative’s concern about 
electricity problem to the Secretary of DAR. Mr. Balakit has been negotiating with 
authorities (i.e Department of Energy, DAR) since 1994 for the conversion of the 
electricity rate from commercial to agricultural rate, because so much electricity is required 
to operate the irrigation facilities. The problem in the Philippines is that, there are only two 
classifications of electricity rate: commercial and residential.
The AMFCI articulated their concerns and problems to the local government (up to 
the provincial level), through the membership in the co-operative of two local officials, and 
through the leadership of Mr. Balakit, to the extent that they could influence local policies. 
For example, in the municipality of Jalajala, there used to be a law about stray animals that 
‘whoever owned the farms were expected to put a fence on their properties but they
18 One cavan is equivalent to 50 kilograms of palay (unmilled rice)
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requested for a change in the law that ‘whoever owned the animals were expected to 
restrain or leash them’. Most of the barangays in Jalajala changed their ordinance in favour 
of this suggestion.
On electricity problem, another issue is that the co-operative could not pay the 
electric bill on due dates because these dates did not reconcile with the harvesting season. 
The co-operative, through Mr. Balakit and other members who were also local officials, 
requested the help of the Municipal Council19 to negotiate with the electric company for 
delayed payment of the electric bill.
The result of this initiative was that the Governor prepared a resolution addressed to 
the Head of the electric company. The Head agreed to their request. But there was a change 
in the management of the electric company due to the privatisation program of 
government. The previous agreement on delayed payment of electric bill was no longer 
honoured. With a written endorsement from the former Head of the electric company, the 
co-operative through Mr. Balakit negotiated with the new management to allow them to 
give down payment first then the full payment later during thé harvest season. With some 
hesitation, the new management finally agreed to this temporary arrangement. Mr. Balakit 
advanced money for down payment of electric bill from the RPC to be returned later when 
the members have paid their irrigation fees.
9.2 Linkages and Networking
9.2.1 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
JICA, upon the request of the Philippine government through the DAR, provided 
funding for the infrastructure development component of the Integrated Jalajala Rural 
Development Project (IJRDP). To understand the nature of JICA assisted projects like 
IJRDP, Appendix 9.2 presents an analysis of Japan’s official development assistance.
The IJRDP was packaged on the basis of the request-based system of the Japanese 
aid program described in Appendix 9.2. The critics of Japanese aid claim that this system 
provides the opportunity for Japanese firms to influence, in their favour, the recipient 
country’s requests. The project was apparently ‘tied’ in the sense that Japanese firms won 
the bids and that facilities and equipment used for the project were generally procured from
19 Legislative body o f the municipality. It enacts ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for 
the general welfare o f the municipality.
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Japan. With the IJRDP case, the contract for the conduct of field survey and preparation of 
the detailed engineering design of the infrastructure component of the project (such as 
irrigation facilities, road network, rice processing facilities) was awarded by JICA to a 
Japanese firm. Upon completion of the engineering designs, bidding for the construction 
work was held in Japan. A Japanese firm won the bid and sub-contracted some of the work 
to Filipino companies. However, the local companies were closely supervised by the 
Japanese firm with assistance of the DAR provincial engineers. The RPC contractor trained 
the local people or representatives from the primary co-operatives to operate RPC before it 
was turned over to SEARCA for management. However, the project beneficiaries had very 
little control over the design and construction of the facilities put up by JICA.
Although the municipality of Jalajala has benefited from the basic infrastructure put 
up by JICA,20 the system outlined above has implications for the operation and 
maintenance of the project outputs. There have been early signs of difficulty in maintaining 
project facilities. Since supplies and materials used in building the infrastructure were 
made in and procured from Japan, spare parts are not easily available in the Philippines. 
For instance, all water pumps and their parts were made in Japan. Most of the potable 
water units were out of order because the design of the pumps was such that it used a 
‘sapatilla’ (rubber stopper) which was not durable and to maintain it, a replacement was 
needed every three months. Motors have low efficiency, which according to the local 
power company’s computation is only 70%.
There was also dissatisfaction on the design of the RPC constructed by the Japanese 
firm. The local expert hired by SEARCA to initially manage the RPC noticed the defect on 
the designs. For instance, the expert observed that the machines and equipment were 
installed in such a way that the whole process of storing, drying, milling and bagging was 
circuitous. In the opinion of one DAR staff member I interviewed, there are more motors 
installed than necessary and this has contributed to unnecessary power consumption. The 
rice whitener machine is also observed to be inefficient since there is a need to pass the 
grains into the machine twice to meet the market demand for white rice. The RPC staff 
members have also observed cases of grain breakage.
20 e. Roads that facilitated marketing o f the farmers’ produce, potable water supply that provided the local 
people safe drinking water, and irrigation that allowed farmers to mcrease their nee production.
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9.2.2 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
The DAR leads eleven other government line agencies in the implementation of the 
CARP. It is mandated to improve land tenure through more equitable distribution of land 
and to promote the welfare of the agrarian reform beneficiaries. The DAR consists of the 
Central or Head Office, staff offices, five staff bureaus located at the Central Office, and 12 
regional, 75 provincial and 1,500 municipal agrarian reform offices all over the country.21
The Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Project (IJRDP) was conceptualised by 
the DAR to make it a model project of CARP. On behalf of the Philippine government, the 
DAR made arrangements with JICA for the funding of IJRDP-inffastructure component. 
The DAR also negotiated with the proper authorities and the local people for the donation 
of lands necessary for the construction of road network, irrigation facilities, and RPC. It 
signed a MOA with the Manila Electric Company for the conversion of power supply from 
single phase to three phase system. This electricity conversion was necessary to be able to 
run the irrigation facilities that were put up in Jalajala.
For the implementation of IJRDP, the DAR created a Project Management Office 
(PMO) based in the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)22 of Jalajala. The PMO 
involved staff members of DAR Regional Office for Region IV (Southern Tagalog 
Region),23 DAR Provincial Office24 and MARO. There were two divisions under PMO: 
Physical Infrastructure and Social Infrastructure Divisions. It had the following functions: 
formulate operating and management systems; initiate and coordinate project execution 
activities; periodically monitor and validate project performance; recommend policies and 
strategies on the overall project implementation; and supervise implementation of the 
institutional development component. The DAR Regional Director was designated as the 
Project Manager of IJRDP and leader of PMO. Based on the study made by Damole, et 
al.,25 the PMO existed as an office but the personnel (for example Project Manager, 
engineers, Institutional Development Officer) who were assigned to perform the PMO’s
21 Damole, et al., op. cit., p. 130.
22 The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) for the municipality o f Jalajala was responsible for
directly implementing agrarian reform programs at the municipal level. The MARO development 
facilitators (DFs) were the direct link between the agrarian reform beneficiaries and the DAR. They 
monitored the implementation o f CARP at the farmers’ level.
23 The DAP.-Region IV supervised the implementation of laws, policies and programs, projects, rules and
regulations o f the DAR in Region IV, Southern Tagalog Region which was composed of 11 provmces.
24 The Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) for Rizal Province directed and coordinated the 
operations and activities o f the Municipal Agrarian Reform Offices (MARO) in the province of Rizal.
25 Damole, et al. op. cit.
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functions were holding office either in the DAR Region IV Office or in PARO not in the 
project site.
The Bureau of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development (BARBD), one of 
DAR’s staff bureaus, provided technical assistance to the field implementers of IJRDP- 
institutional development component. The DAR realised its limitations in terms of 
institutional development capability. Therefore, it engaged the services of two NGOs that 
have the experience of working with rural communities, namely SEARCA and NATCCO. 
In effect, there was tripartite relationship among the DAR, SEARCA and NATCCO in the 
implementation of IJRDP-IDC.
This strategy was consistent with the DAR’s objective of establishing partnership 
programs with government, NGOs, people’s organisations and agribusiness organisations 
to facilitate the development of viable agrarian reform communities. The National 
Irrigation Administration (NIA) was also involved to provide technical and organisational 
development assistance in areas covered by the pump irrigation systems. It coordinated 
with SEARCA as regards farm production and with NATCCO on organisational 
strengthening.
With different agencies of different backgrounds participating in the project, 
coordinating mechanisms to ensure the smooth implementation of IJRDP-IDC were put in 
place by DAR. These were as follows:
• Management Committee (ManCom) composed of DAR Region IV Director as Project 
Manager of IJRDP, DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Rizal, 
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Jalajala, BARBD Director, NATCCO 
General Manager, and SEARCA Team Leader. The ManCom was responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the IJRDP. It had a regular meeting of once every two 
months to assess the progress of the project and to settle issues and constraints in project 
implementation. The ManCom was chaired by the DAR Region IV Director and 
BARBD served as the secretariat.
• Implementers’ Meeting held once a month at the project site and attended by all field 
implementers to assess and synchronise project activities and settle any related issues 
and concerns. During the meetings, representatives from other government agencies and 
the local government unit in the municipality were invited as the need arose. The
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Implemented’ Meeting was headed by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of 
Jalajala with the Project Management Office (PMO) serving as the secretariat.
• RPC-ManCom was also formed to oversee the operational management of RPC as a 
business. It was composed of representatives from INJAFEDCO, DAR Central Office, 
DAR-PMO, NATCCO and SEARCA. It was chaired by the Director of SEARCA and 
the meeting was scheduled once every two months.
These coordinative mechanisms were operational until the completion of the 
IJRDP-IDC activities as planned and until RPC management was turned over to 
INJAFEDCO and the irrigation facilities to the co-operatives concerned. With the project 
finished, the MARO, through the help of DAR Region IV, was directed by DAR Central 
Office to continuously assist and identify the needs of the IJRDP beneficiaries including 
the AMFCI. The MARO’s development facilitators (DFs) would carry on this monitoring 
function as part of their regular activity under the CARP Beneficiary Development 
Program. The objective of the program was to strengthen agrarian reform beneficiaries and 
develop them into co-operatives. The DFs were the ones in direct contact with the agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. They were provided motorcycles for mobility purposes. Sometimes, 
the DFs received complaints from farmers because of the many surveys that the DFs were 
conducting.
During the implementation of the IJRDP-IDC, the DAR was found to be lacking in 
its efforts to monitor field activities undertaken by SEARCA and NATCCO. This 
monitoring activity should have been the responsibility of the DAR-PMO. However, it 
gave more focus on the physical infrastructure and less attention on the progress of 
activities undertaken by SEARCA and NATCCO in the field level. The Project Manager 
and Head of the PMO, being the Regional Director of DAR Region IV, had little time to
personally check the details of the IDC activities.
The DAR-BARBD, on the other hand, did not have enough personnel to assume the 
responsibilities of the PMO. With the DAR-PMO not controlling the direction of the IDC 
activities as it should, it failed to alert NATCCO when there were delays in co-operative 
strengthening activities26 and when the frequent turnover of NATCCO s project personnel
affected its field performance.27
26 For example, delayed registration o f federation, delayed submission of reports.
27 Damole, op, cit., p. 91.
279
9.2.3 National Confederation of Co-operatives (NATCCO)
NATCCO started as an education and training centre for co-operatives of the 
Southern Philippines in 1966. The concept of a training centre for co-operatives expanded 
in the Visayas and Luzon between 1970 and 1976. It became a national organisation called 
the National Association of Training Centers for Co-operatives, Inc. in 1977. Renamed 
later as National Confederation of Co-operatives (NATCCO), its programs and services 
cover not only education and training but other areas such as research and publications, 
audit, extension work, women in development, co-operative insurance promotion, inter­
coop trade and linkage building. As of 1990, NATCCO has affiliated 918 primary 
municipal-based co-operatives in various categories (credit, multi-purpose, consumers, 
marketing and producers’ co-operatives) and has a total membership of 550,800.28
As far as the IJRDP-IDC is concerned, NATCCO’s major responsibilities were 
strengthening of primary co-operatives in Jalajala and organising of a secondary co­
operative in the form of a federation which was INJAFEDCO. Specifically, its activities 
were as follows:
• training co-operative leaders and members in the aspect of team building and leadership, 
basic co-operative management, accounting, audit and financial management, and credit 
management;
• installing financial and management systems and procedures for various operations of 
the co-operatives;
• facilitating the establishment of linkages with other co-operatives, government agencies 
and NGOs; and
• establishing a monitoring and evaluation system that would identify and assess
beneficiaries’ responses, perceptions and needs.29
By end of the project, NATCCO had assisted nine primary co-operatives in Jalajala 
in terms of providing them various organisational and management related training. It 
facilitated the review of existing co-operative by-laws, and the development and 
incorporation of irrigation policies to the by-laws of the three co-operatives who were 
beneficiaries of communal irrigation pumps. It installed financial and management systems 
and procedures and introduced strategies on how to generate capital build-up. NATCCO
28Damole, op. cit., p. 128.
29IJRDP documents, DAR.
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conducted a consumer survey for the water systems in two barangays of Jalajala, and 
facilitated the conduct of orientation on the operation and management of the water system 
facilities in these two barangays.
NATCCO also assisted in the formation and registration of INJAFEDCO; helped in 
the formulation of the federation’s vision-mission-goal statements through a planning 
workshop; conducted management training for INJAFEDCO officers and members; and 
evaluated the federation’s viability as an organisation.
After the completion of IJRDP, the co-operative-beneficiaries of the project, 
including the AMFCI, have coordinated with the Tagalog Co-operative Development 
(TAGCODEC),30 for their organisational training needs. However, the linkage with 
TAGCODEC has been on a co-operative to co-operative basis. For instance, invitation for 
training was directed by TAGCODEC to member-primary co-operatives and not to 
INJAFEDCO.
The NATCCO experienced some delays in the conduct of its activities. One of the 
reasons cited for these delays was the poor foundation or base of most of the existing co­
operatives before IJRDP. They were formed hastily to be able to avail themselves of the 
LandBank’s credit program in the 1970’s. NATCCO’s performance and credibility with 
the local people were also affected by the frequent turnover of its area coordinator and 
community organisers, and the lack of proper orientation of the new personnel. This 
problem reflected on the fact that many co-operative members were not aware of the 
IJRDP activities and were lacking in commitment to the federation. The community 
organisers were in close contact with the federation and co-operative officers but not the 
co-operative members.
9.2.4 Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) 
Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research In Agriculture
(SEARCA)
The SEARCA is the oldest of the twelve SEAMEO regional centers that have been 
established to promote regional cooperation through education, science and culture among 
nine countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. SEARCA began operating in 1967 and 
became a permanent centre of SEAMEO in 1969. Serving the agricultural and rural
30 A secondary organisation o f NATCCO in charge with Region IV co operatives.
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development needs of the nine SEAMEO member states, the SEARCA manages one 
hundred scholarships each year, conducts research, and disseminates information through 
training and publications. It also provides advisory, consultancy and project 
implementation services to government agencies and NGOs in the region to promote 
technology dissemination. The centre is hosted by the Philippine government and located 
in the University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB) campus.
SEARCA’s expertise was sought by the DAR in the implementation of IJRDP-IDC. 
Its major responsibility in relation to the project was to establish an integrated rice 
production, processing and marketing program centred on a rice processing complex 
operating as a commercial business. It was tasked to transfer the technical operation and 
business management capability of RPC to INJAFEDCO; to train the project beneficiaries 
in the application of appropriate production and post-production technologies; to integrate 
farm production with value-added processing and marketing activities; and to develop an 
agro-commercial farming system to meet the livelihood needs of the beneficiaries. To carry 
out these tasks, three groups were organised under the SEARCA component as follows: 
Rice Production Group;Rice Processing Group; and Rice Marketing Group.
Before the IJRDP-technical component was started, SEARCA conducted a 
benchmark survey of Jalajala. They were not supposed to do this because the feasibility 
study sub-contracted by JICA included some basic data about Jalajala. However, this 
information were not detailed and comprehensive enough for SEARCA’s purpose. In terms 
of accomplishments during the project, SEARCA had prepared a feasibility study 
including a market study on the commercial operation of RPC. It established systems and 
procedures in operating and managing the rice mill. It trained the INJAFEDCO and its ten 
member-co-operatives on rice farming and on RPC’s business and technical operations and 
management. SEARCA prepared all the necessary manuals for the federation s guidance.
The SEARCA’s link or contact with the farmers was through their Rice Production 
Group composed of agriculturists and extension workers. The Rice Processing Group on 
the other hand involved agricultural engineers and rice processing experts. The production 
group coordinated with the processing group and the Rice Marketing Group in the aspect 
of what rice varieties to recommend to the farmers for planting. It was important to control 
the variety office that entered the rice processing complex for milling. It was not efficient 
to accept many different rice varieties. For instance, during the first procurement attempt of
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the RPC, 23 varieties were procured. This led to the underutilisation of capacity because it 
was not feasible to process them at the same time. Otherwise, the final product would be 
milled rice with uneven thickness. There were adjustments to be made in the machines for 
every variety of rice that was processed. Therefore, the Rice Production Group had to 
recommend to the farmers two to three rice varieties for planting based on the results of the 
market research.
The following production technologies were introduced to the project beneficiaries: 
high yielding and good eating quality rice varieties; integrated pest management; 
utilisation of organic with inorganic fertilisers; and cultural management practices such as 
straight planting, use of rotary weeder, seed production and purification. These 
technologies were chosen based on the assessment by SEARCA’s Rice Production Group 
(RPG) of farmers’ existing practices during a focussed group discussion involving key 
informants. Appendix 9.3 shows the common rice production practices of farmers in 
Jalajala and the corresponding technologies recommended by the RPG. SEARCA directed 
their rice production efforts to the four barangays in Jalajala with irrigation systems.
Vega and Asirot31 studied the factors that hinder or facilitate adoption of the 
technologies introduced by SEARCA-RPG to irrigated rice farmers in Jalajala. Some of 
these factors were identified as follows:
• The common notion among male farmers and extension workers that farming was a 
man’s world influenced the selection of participants in the training, demonstration and 
other activities conducted by SEARCA and farmer leaders.
• Absentee landowners and part-time farmers lack the motivation to improve farm 
productivity because they did not have full control of the management of their farm.
• Purified seeds were more expensive than the traditional practice of farmers in Jalajala.
• The availability of irrigation water affected seed production and purification and the
adoption of new rice varieties. ‘
• Farmer field school training, demonstrations and farmer-to-farmer method of 
technology transfer significantly influenced the adoption of technologies.
• Farmers’ knowledge, participation in their organisation, and degree of interaction with 
the SEARCA extension staff significantly influenced adoption of technologies.
31 R Veea and J Asirot ‘Study on the adoption of sustainable rice production technologies in irrigated 
lowland rice o f Jalajala’, SEARCA-IJRDP in collaboration with the Farming Systems and Soil Resources 
Institute, University o f the Philippines Los Banos, n.d.
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• Non-adopters of technologies were mostly unaware of the technologies and non­
members or inactive members of farmer organisations.
• More non-adopters did not know the positive and negative effects of the technologies.
On RPC personnel, SEARCA hired them based on the co-operatives5 
recommendation. During the time that the Japanese were managing the plant, the hiring of 
personnel was political in nature such as hiring those whom the mayor had recommended. 
When SEARCA s contract was over and RPC became INJAFEDCO’s responsibility, the 
same local people operated the plant. Therefore, there was continuity of people directly 
involved in the physical operation of the plant.
After completion of IJRDP, SEARCA has renewed its commitment to support the 
project beneficiaries. It has initiated the drawing up and signing, in March 1997, of a MOA 
among the DAR, INJAFEDCO, and the local government of Jalajala, Rizal. The MOA 
stipulates that SEARCA and the other signatory organisations will cooperate in identifying 
areas for future collaboration in applied research and agribusiness entrepreneurship in 
Jalajala. The Parties have agreed to work together in the identification and development 
and fund sourcing of mutually agreed agro-industrial projects that will sustain the benefits 
derived from IJRDP. The local government of Jalajala are expected to spearhead the 
formulation of an agricultural development plan for the municipality. The DAR, on the 
other hand, will be actively involved in this agreement through their development 
facilitators.
Initially, SEARCA deployed an Agro-industrial Community Development 
Assistant (AICDA) in Jalajala to undertake the following activities: document the co­
operative enterprise experience of IJRDP; conduct a survey among the project beneficiaries 
(Federation and Primary Co-operative levels) on their views about problems, issues and 
concerns related to IJRDP implementation; provide extension services on the continued 
application of farming systems technologies introduced by SEARCA s Rice Production 
Group; assist in identifying suitable crops with large market potential, and coordinate with 
the local government, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Municipal Agriculture Officer, 
and INJAFEDCO and other agencies in identifying potential village-level production and 
processing systems. INJAFEDCO has committed to provide office space for SEARCA’s
AICDA.
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Some of the problems encountered by SEARCA during the IJRDP implementation
were:
• The technical consultants hired by SEARCA to manage RPC were very businesslike in 
the way that they dealt with the project beneficiaries. They alienated the local people 
because they were technical in the true sense and lacking in the human side factor. 
However, there was no similar problem in the case of the Rice Production Group who 
were well liked by the people because they were extension workers trained to deal with 
farmers.
• The JICA specified that changes could not be made on the design and layout of the 
plant. Therefore, the SEARCA consultants could not make any changes as they saw fit 
and were obliged to operate the plant based on these specifications.
9.2.5 National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
The National Irrigation Administration (NLA) is a government agency under the 
Department of Agriculture. It was created on 22 June 1963 to oversee the irrigation 
development and management in the Philippines. Its major objectives are to develop 
irrigation systems in support of the national food production program; provide adequate 
level of irrigation service; and provide technical assistance to local government units in the 
development of their irrigation systems. The NLA has 14 field offices located in the 
different regions of the Philippines.
The NIA supported IJRDP in terms of providing technical and organisational 
development assistance in areas covered by the pump irrigation systems in Jalajala. It 
modified its usual program for communal irrigation systems to suit the objectives of 
IJRDP. Instead of organising separate Irrigators’ Associations, the NIA complemented the 
organisational development activities of NATCCO. It conducted training on water 
management, irrigation system organisation, and the like. The NIA assigned a Coordinator 
and three Institutional Development Officers in the barangays where the irrigation facilities 
were installed.
9.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of AMFCI
93.1 Strengths
The following observations were noted by the Development Facilitator of the 
AMFCI: the co-operative had good leadership; there was, in general, good rapport and
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unity among members, and they had respect for their leader. The co-operative members 
were described by the board members of AMFCI as generally responsible. For instance, 
most of the members would pay the irrigation fees without being reminded during harvest 
season. Their voluntary help could easily be sought when the need for collective effort 
arose like when they had to clean the pumphouse of big volume of sand. Nobody went 
home until the job was finished.
9.3.2 Weaknesses
There was a general perception among the members that RPC was a responsibility 
(i.e. it was an obligation to sell their harvest to RPC) rather than having a sense of 
ownership over it (i.e. that RPC belonged or would eventually belong to them). This was 
observed during the interview with the co-operative members. There was also 
misconception among the members (not only from AMFCI) that RPC and INJAFEDCO 
were one and the same. The co-operative members were perceived by the SEARCA 
representative I interviewed as being used to being told what to do.
Most of the members of AMFCI practised rice monocropping and only a few 
engaged in other economic activities like fishing. However, the fish supply in Laguna de 
Bay lake had been dwindling. Despite the increase in rice cropping season due to irrigation 
facilities, the farmers in Barangay Palay-palay still lived in subsistence level farming. This 
meant that after paying all their debts, including loan for production inputs and irrigation 
fee, any surplus would just be enough for their food consumption for about three months.2 
There was little or none left to buy other necessities and to fund their children s education.
The co-operative did not have a good record keeping system such that in one 
instance they could not find the list of members who owed the co-operative. The records of 
the co-operative were kept by the secretary and the treasurer in their respective houses 
because it did not have an office space yet. However, one member of the co-operative 
offered to donate part of his land for the office and the co-operative needed to put up the 
money for building construction cost. In the report of Bueza on the results of his one- 
month immersion in Jalajala, he observed that the co-operative lacked group planning 
skills. They tended to be more reactive in terms of dealing with their problems and the 32
32 E. Bueza, Output o f the one-month immersion or interaction with the INJAFEDCO and farmers in Jalajala,
Report submitted to SEARCA Agro-Industrial Development Program, 17 March 1997.
33 Ibid.
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board of directors did not often meet to make plans for the co-operative. The chairman of 
the co-operative was also concerned that there seemed to be nobody among the members 
who could replace him as a leader. According to the Development Facilitator of MARO, 
the co-operative s working committees were lacking in the necessary organisational and 
management training. The Chairman of INJAFEDCO was concerned that the AMFCI 
members had limited education and that they needed to be given guidance in that respect.
9.4 Problems and Constraints of the AMFCI
The major problem of the co-operative was the very high cost of operating their 
irrigation facilities because the electricity rate was classified as commercial and not 
agricultural. This was aggravated by the billing schedule of the electric company. It did not 
synchronise with the harvest season, the time when farmers would be able to pay the 
irrigation fees. Another problem of the members was the lack of capital to buy the 
necessary farm inputs. Some of them resorted to borrowing from informal money lenders 
and would commit their harvest at a pre-set price. Normally, the farmers would be 
disadvantaged in terms of pricing. This kind of arrangement was not good for RPC’s 
business because they were having problems with palay sourcing. INJAFEDCO was 
planning to provide production loans to its members as soon as it would obtain financial 
assistance to implement this plan.
According to Mr. Balakit, the co-operative’s chairman, playing politics was very 
pervasive in Jalajala. In some occasions, they had become victims of politics, examples of 
which are as follows:
• The co-operative was supposed to be given seed fund in the form of loan without 
interest in the amount of US$22,000 by DAR to operate and maintain their irrigation 
facilities. The amount would be used to pay for electricity consumption and salaries of 
the water tenders and pump operators. The two other co-operatives in Jalajala with 
irrigation were previously granted by DAR with seed fund of US$18,518 each from its 
Direct Lending Scheme. The release of funds was facilitated since construction of the 
irrigation facilities of the two co-operatives were finished earlier during the time when 
JICA was still present. Construction of irrigation facilities in Barangay Palay-palay was 
completed much later. When AMFCI requested for the release of their seed fund, the 
provincial office of DAR promised the co-operative that fund release would be arranged 
with the office of the Congressman. The DAR-PARO was expecting a portion of the
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Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of the Congressman to be allocated for AMFCL 
Then Mr. Balakit went to see the Congressman to follow up their request but the 
Congressman asked him if he won in Barangay Palay-palay during the last election to 
which Mr. Balakit honestly answered ‘no’. Later on, AMFCI was told that there was no 
more funds for their request.
• During one seminar conducted by NATCCO, the policy was for two representatives 
from each of the nine co-operative-members to attend. However, it turned out that other 
co-operatives sent four to six people. Mr. Balakit claimed that there was ‘palakasan’ 
system (meaning some were more favoured than the others).
• The Australian government funded the construction of barangay centres for farmers in 
Jalajala barangays with existing farmers’ association. When the money was released for 
Palay-palay, the barangay captain had a hall built instead of a centre meant for the 
farmers’ association in the barangay.
Another potential problem of the co-operative was the maintenance of the irrigation 
pump in terms of spare parts, although JICA left some supplies. In one instance, the water 
gauge broke down and it was not fixed immediately because a replacement had to be 
bought from Japan.
In terms of technical problems, Mr. Balakit has claimed that he is an ‘expert-by­
experience’ himself. The co-operative members sought out his help on how to deal with 
crop infestation. Mr. Balakit referred to his book and recommended solutions like what 
chemicals to use for spraying. There was the perception among some of the co-operative 
members that the government was not doing enough to help them in terms of their 
technological problems. For instance, they cited the occasion when they approached the 
Department of Agriculture (DA) and referred their problem on infestation but the answer 
they got from the DA technician was—‘there was no available chemicals because the 
mayor’s office used them for other projects’. The co-operative members said that the DA 
technician could have visited the farm and have given suggestions instead of immediately 
giving a comment like that. Despite having this negative view of government offices, Mr. 
Balakit wanted the co-operative members to understand that there were government offices 
that provided them technical training and that it was up for the co-operative members to 
make an effort to use them.
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9.5 Lessons Learned and General Observations
For rural development projects like IJRDP, the local people or beneficiaries should 
have been involved from the time of project planning to implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. Participation of the community in every phase of the project is necessary to 
develop among the local people a sense of ownership and appreciation of the project 
activities and outputs. In one of the early meetings of the IJRDP-IDC implementers, they 
expressed their observation that the IJRDP’s design was based on JICA’s perception of the 
local situation.
The project was heavily biased toward physical infrastructure and originally 
overlooked the local institution-building component. Institution-building or building the 
capability of the local people and institutions to manage their own affairs and mobilise 
their own resources must be an integral part of a rural development project. It must be 
carefully planned vis-a-vis other project components. As it turned out, the institution­
building component was included later in project packaging and eventually lagged behind 
the infrastructure construction. The lack of sense of ownership of RPC among the members 
of the co-operatives in Jalajala was a clear indication that the institutional development 
efforts through the IJRDP-IDC had not yet seeped in among the co-operative members.
The JICA was surprised that despite all their physical infrastructure support, the 
local people did not patronise the RPC. What it failed to realise was that appreciation of the 
project activities and outputs and cooperation from the beneficiaries were not automatic 
responses, rather these must be cultivated through institutional development activities.
The farmers in Jalajala could easily recognise the benefits of roads, irrigation 
facilities and potable water system constructed through IJRDP as these had direct impact 
on them. However, they had difficulty identifying with or supporting RPC. 
Understandably, the farmers’ primary concern was their immediate survival. Therefore, 
there was strong desire to get better prices for their produce. Most of the time, RPC s 
buying price was lower than those offered by other traders. In other cases, the farmers had 
pre-contracted their produce in exchange for informal production loan at the expense of 
RPC.
The Chairman of INJAFEDCO realised the importance of being aware of their 
rights and responsibilities as federation so as not to become victim of ambitious people 
who had their own self-interest in the IJRDP resources.
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The members of AMFCI realised the need to diversify their products and look for 
alternative sources of livelihood since the income they derived from rice production was 
not enough for their daily needs.
9.6 Analysis of Interrelationships
The interrelationships among the major stakeholders in this case study are 
represented by Figure 9.3. Numbers 1 to 6 refer to roles of major interveners with respect 
to INJAFEDCO and its member-co-operatives including AMFCI. Letters A, B, C, D, E, 
and F refer to the nature of interrelationships among the different entities involved in the 
case study.
9.6.1 Roles 
#1 JICA
• Provide financial assistance for the physical infrastructure component of the IJRDP
• Conduct field investigation (in Jalajala) to identify specific infrastructure to be funded
• Contract to Japanese firms the preparation of engineering plans and designs, and the 
construction work of infrastructure
• Turnover the physical infrastructure upon their completion to the local community 
through the DAR
#2 Japanese Firms 
Nippon Koei Co., Ltd.
• Prepare detailed engineering designs of the physical infrastructure
• Supervise the technical aspects of the construction
• Maintain office in Jalajala during construction of infrastructure
Taisei Corporation
• Undertake construction work of the infrastructure in accordance with the technical
specifications made by Nippon Koei Co., Ltd.
• Maintain office in Jalajala during construction work
#3 DAR
• Overall coordinator of the IJRDP (supervision, evaluation and monitoring of IJRDP)
Figure 9.3 Interrelationship among the key players of IJRDP-INJAFEDCO case
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-Create project management office (PMO) to supervise project implementation 
-Institute coordinative mechanisms involving the project implementers for smooth 
implementation of the project
• Provide financial assistance for the Institution Development Component of IJRDP; 
release funds to SEARCA and NATCCO over a period of three years
• Provide technical assistance to the field implementers through its BARBD
#4 NATCCO
• Establish and strengthen co-operatives in Jalajala
• Assist the co-operatives in:
- formulating their articles of cooperation and by-laws
- institutionalising a capital build-up system among the co-operative members
- establishing linkages with other government and NGOs
- developing and installing financial and management systems and procedures
• Facilitate creation of secondary co-operative in the form of a federation—INJAFEDCO
• Develop a core group of local leaders
#5 SEARCA
• Operate rice processing complex as an enterprise and integrate with paddy production 
and rice marketing system
• Prepare systems and procedures for technical and financial operation of RPC
• Train the project beneficiaries in the application of rice production and post-production
technologies
• Integrate farm production with value-added processing and marketing activities
• Develop an agro-commercial farming system to meet the livelihood needs of the
beneficiaries
#6 Project Beneficiaries (INJAFEDCO and member co-operatives including AMFCI)
INJAFEDCO
•  Manage and operate the RPC
• Coordinate and facilitate the activities of member-co-operatives
• Generate funds and extend credit to the members for productive and provident purposes
• Provide goods and services and other requirements to the members
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• Develop expertise and skills among its members
.  Establish, own, lease or operate co-operative wholesale and retail complexes, insurance 
and agricultural or industrial processing enterprises and public markets
• Enter into joint ventures with other regional, national or international federation of co­
operatives in the manufacture and sale of products and/or service in the Philippines or 
abroad
Note: the last five roles had not been operationalised as of case study period because 
INJAFEDCO had been newly established then.
AMFCI
• Operate and manage the irrigation facilities put up by JICA in Barangay Palay-palay
• Support INJAFEDCO’s activities
• Market their produce to or through the Federation
• Capital build-up formation
• Co-operative management
9.6.2 Interrelationships
A - Among DAR, NATCCO, SEARCA and Project Beneficiaries
The DAR, NATCCO, and SEARCA executed one MOA in connection with the 
implementation of the IJRDP-institutional development component. Their roles and 
responsibilities, as indicated above, were clearly laid out in the MOA. The project 
beneficiaries, specifically INJAFEDCO and its member-co-operatives including AMFCI, 
were not part of the MOA signing. INJAFEDCO was not yet organised that time and co­
operatives for strengthening were not yet identified.
The way in which the DAR, SEARCA and NATCCO related and coordinated 
among each other beyond what were spelled out in the MOA and the extent with which 
they had integrated their activities for institutional development affected the activities of 
the project beneficiaries. Based on the in-depth study made by Damole34 on the tripartite 
nature of implementation of the IJRDP-IDC focussing on major IDC activities, these three 
institutions had clear role definitions. They performed their functions and activities at the 
field level according to what were stated in the MOA. This was facilitated by the fact that
34 Damole, op. cit., p. 91.
292
the tasks and responsibilities associated with the roles were also clearly defined for each 
agency. The coordinative mechanisms at the supervisors’ and implementers’ levels 
involving the DAR, NATCCO and SEARCA (for example management committee, 
regular implementers meeting, and RPC management committee) were well in place. 
They were effective in ensuring that the roles as stated in the MOA were adhered to by the 
different implementing agencies.
However, there was lack of direct communication between NATCCO and 
SEARCA at the implementers’ level. The activities of NATCCO and SEARCA at the 
project beneficiaries’ or field level were not synchronised and integrated. Their activities 
were highly compartmentalised. NATCCO’s progress in building the capability of the co­
operatives and the federation had great implications on SEARCA’s attempt to transfer 
technical and business skills to project beneficiaries. For instance, the failure of 
NATCCO’s community organisers to coordinate with and involve the co-operative 
members in its activities had influenced the operation of the RPC.
Most co-operative members were not supportive of RPC and the federation. They 
did not bring their produce to RPC for processing and marketing. The DAR had its 
shortcomings as well in terms of not providing detailed monitoring work on the activities 
of SEARCA and NATCCO. It could have extended its coordinative role to ensure that 
activities of SEARCA and NATCCO in the project beneficiaries’ level were in harmony 
with each other and that they were undertaken on schedule. As explained earlier in this 
section, the activities of NATCCO lagged behind the other activities of the project. The 
DAR could have exercised its prerogative and disciplined NATCCO in this regard.
The linkage among the DAR, SEARCA and NATCCO facilitated the flow of 
information among the project implementers through the coordinative mechanisms 
established. However, since there was very little direct interaction among them at the 
project beneficiaries’ level, their linkage was responsive only to the needs of the co­
operative and federation officers. It did not facilitate capability building of and flow of 
information to the majority of project beneficiaries or the co-operative members.
The official tripartite linkage among the DAR, NATCCO and SEARCA in relation 
to assisting the IJRDP beneficiaries ended with the completion of the project. However, the 
whole idea of the institutional development component was to build the capability of the 
beneficiaries to manage their own affairs and sustain the infrastructure built through the
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project. The federation or INJAFEDCO was organised through the project to manage the 
RPC and coordinate the activities of the primary co-operatives. The responsibility of 
managing the irrigation facilities was transferred to the primary co-operatives in the 
barangays concerned. The linkage of the beneficiaries with the DAR, NATCCO and 
SEARCA provided them access to the rice processing centre, new production technologies, 
market for their produce, and connection with other government and other NGOs.
B - Among the DAR, NATCCO and Project Beneficiaries
The DAR, NATCCO and project beneficiaries had linkage in addition to what was 
described in ‘A’. The DAR-BARBD provided technical assistance to NATCCO’s field 
implementers. After completion of the IJRDP, the development facilitators of the DAR­
MARO would continue to assist the project beneficiaries as part of their regular job 
responsibilities. While NATCCO’s assistance to the project beneficiaries within the 
boundary of the IJRDP was finished, it committed to provide help when their expertise 
would be needed by the local people. However, since there was the Tagalog Co-operative 
Development (TAGCODEC) that served the needs of co-operatives in the region from 
where Jajajala was located, the co-operatives in Jalajala would seek out their help first 
before NATCCO.
C - Among the DAR, SEARCA and Project Beneficiaries
After completion of IJRDP, the operation of RPC was turned over by SEARCA to 
the federation. The DAR in turn provided the federation a loan without interest to support 
the RPC operations. It would fully turn over the RPC to the federation and its member co­
operatives as soon as the federation could settle its loan with the DAR. In terms of 
sustainability of linkage among these entities, the SEARCA initiated the signing of a new 
MOA among the DAR provincial and municipal offices, SEARCA, INJAFEDCO and the 
local government of Jalajala. The purpose of this new linkage was to sustain the gains of 
IJRDP by jointly identifying, developing, fund-sourcing for, and implementing agro­
industrial projects for the municipality of Jalajala.
D - Between JICA and Japanese Firms
JICA’s relationship with the two Japanese firms, one that made the engineering 
designs of the IJRDP infrastructure and the other that constructed the infrastructure, was 
purely on a contractor-work provider basis.
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E - Among the DAR, JICA and Project Beneficiaries
The DAR and JICA represented the Philippine and Japanese governments, 
respectively as far as the IJRDP was concerned. The JICA turned over all the completed 
infrastructure to the project beneficiaries and the local government of Jalajala through the 
DAR. Although the DAR initiated the project packaging, it was JICA that finalised the 
infrastructure components and took charge of the detailed engineering designs of the 
infrastructure with very little consultation with the local people.
F - Among the DAR, Japanese Firms and Project Beneficiaries
The DAR made the necessary arrangements with the local people for the donation 
of lands as right of way for roads and irrigation facilities so that construction of 
infrastructure would proceed. The DAR and the construction company signed a ‘civil 
contract’ soon after the company was selected through bidding in Japan. The DAR-PMO’s 
Physical Infrastructure Division, together with the engineers of the Japanese company that 
prepared the engineering designs for the project, periodically monitored and validated the 
progress of infrastructure work of the construction company.
The IJRDP case illustrates the complexity of interrelationships among agencies 
from various sectors, such as government organisations (DAR), non-government 
organisations (SEARCA and NATCCO), people’s organisations (INJAFEDCO and 
member-co-operatives), and a foreign donor in implementing a big rural development 
project like IJDRP. This multi-sector project demonstrates the need for a strong 
coordinating agency that can orchestrate the project activities of the various agencies with 
different biases and different work practices and culture towards the attainment of project 
goals. The interrelationships among these institutions must be guided by different 
coordinative mechanisms at all levels—top, implementers, and project beneficiaries 
levels.
The different agencies involved in this case study have benefited from the linkages 
described above. Since IJRDP is meant to be a model comprehensive agrarian reform 
project, the DAR can draw valuable lessons from their experience for the packaging and 
implementation of similar projects in other CARP areas in the Philippines. For SEARCA, 
this IJRDP experience gives it an opportunity to transfer technologies and technical 
knowledge from the state colleges and universities to the local community. It also provides 
SEARCA’s Agro-Industrialisation Program (AIP) a good case for ‘enterprise modelling
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study,35 a non-traditional approach that SEARCA-AIP has intended to specialise in. For 
NATCCO and SEARCA, both NGOs, they can draw lessons from the IJRDP experience in 
terms of how best to work with government institutions, other NGOs and people’s 
organisations in the implementation of an integrated area development project. The 
AMFCI or the co-operative’s direct benefits from the IJRDP are the irrigation facilities that 
have made it possible to produce rice for two cropping seasons per year; roads that have 
increased their access to market and source of production inputs; rice processing centre; 
potable water supply; and electricity to run their irrigation facilities. However, given the 
co-operative’s problem with the electricity rate, the operation of irrigation facilities appear 
to be non-viable.
9.7 Technology Transfer Approach
In terms of the IJRDP-physical infrastructure component, there was virtually no 
technology transfer from the Japanese construction firms to the local community. Only the 
skills of physically operating the equipment in the rice processing complex were 
transferred by the Japanese engineers to representatives from the co-operatives. The 
feasibility of operating the irrigation facilities given the local conditions was not fully 
established. This was an oversight on the part of the project planners and engineers. This 
was an indication of lack of involvement of the local people during the planning stage of 
the project. Had they been consulted on the irrigation designs before the construction, the 
farmers could have expressed the need for simple irrigation technologies that did not 
require too much input considering their resources and farming conditions.
Technology transfer was supposed to have taken place under the institutional 
development component of the project. The approach for technology transfer in this case is 
a combination of two major strategies: building the capability of project beneficiaries by 
strengthening and/or forming local institutions such as co-operatives and federation of co­
operatives; and training them in the technical aspect of rice production, processing and 
marketing. This approach was carried out through a tripartite linkage among one 
government agency—DAR, as fund provider and overall project coordinator—and two
35 SEARCA-AEP defines enterprise modelling as deducing the success factors and reasons for failure in 
S t i v e Aen»“ s m a Z n a t.v e  set-ups® These enterprise modelscanprov.deagener^ f irew o rk  or 
guideline for ootential entrepreneurs, economic managers, and other institutions to have an iaea as to 
w^afstacmres^nd'processes will suit a specific enterprise given a specific scenario and what pitfalls to
avoid.
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non-government agencies NATCCO and SEARCA—responsible for implementing the 
first and second strategies, respectively. The activities of these institutions were supposed 
to be synchronised and complementing one another to be able to develop a community that 
would collectively manage its own resources and apply technologies in a commercial 
environment.
. Since the rice processing centre as a technology was ‘given’, the design of which 
was made by Japanese engineers, SEARCA’s responsibility was limited to the formulation 
of systems and procedures for the technical and financial operation of the RPC. It 
demonstrated to representatives of INJAFEDCO how to operate the RPC as a business and 
trained them on the technical aspect of rice processing, procurement, and marketing. The 
problem in this regard was that the delay in the federation formation and strengthening of 
member-co-operatives by NATCCO presented an unfavourable setting within which 
SEARCA could effectively transfer the RPC business management skills to INJAFEDCO. 
This situation was compounded by the fact that SEARCA’s technical experts assigned in 
RPC were not very popular among the local people.
The problem of lack of support and commitment by co-operative members to the 
RPC affected the operation of the centre. Many farmers did not bring their produce to RPC 
for processing and marketing because of reasons explained earlier in this section. 
Therefore, the RPC’s hands-on training of INJAFEDCO by SEARCA happened not under 
the best of circumstances.
SEARCA’s technology transfer efforts in the aspect of rice production were more 
successful. It developed rice farming systems in four barangays covered by the irrigation 
systems and established on-farm trials and demonstration plots of varietal trial, fertiliser 
and integrated pest management. It was successful as far as encouraging the farmers to 
plant two high yielding, good eating quality rice varieties was concerned. Limiting the 
varieties that the farmers would plant was important to the operation of RPC. The RPC
could not efficiently process rice of different varieties.
Among the technology transfer methods employed by SEARCA, farmer field 
school training, farm demonstrations and farmer-to-farmer methods were observed to have 
significant influence on the adoption of technologies introduced by SEARCA. Technology 
transfer in this aspect was done by SEARCA through the co-operatives or farmer 
organisations. The co-operative leaders and active members were the first recipients of
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training, field demonstration, and other activities of SEARCA. It appears that the status of 
participation of members, whether active or inactive, in farmer organisations affected 
adoption of technologies. Where farmers were inactive in their co-operatives, they were not 
aware of and therefore did not adopt technologies recommended by SEARCA. The 
inactiveness of many farmer members implies that the co-operatives had not been fully 
harnessed and strengthened through the institutional development component activities.
Overall, there was little technology transfer that transpired in this case study 
(Figure 9.4). It was generally top-down in approach from project planning to packaging 
and implementation. There was limited participation and knowledge of the local people on 
the project. Those who benefited the most from technology transfer in the institutional 
development component of the project were farmers who were either officers or active 
members in their respective co-operatives. Except for the rice production aspect, what were 
mainly transferred were the skills in operating and managing the rice processing complex. 
The combined strategies of co-operative strengthening or federation formation and 
technical training as an approach to technology transfer failed to achieve the desired 
integrated rice production, processing and marketing results among the project 
beneficiaries because of non-synchronisation of activities within the two strategies. 
Considering that the project was conceived and implemented on a top-down manner, 
technology transfer was difficult and limited because it was located within that ‘top-down’ 
environment.
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CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
10.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I pull together the key insights and lessons gained from the different 
levels of analysis done in the thesis. These insights provide the basis for rethinking the 
process of technology transfer. In section 10.2.1, I summarise the manner in which the 
analytical framework, based on Benson’s interorganisational theory, is applied in earlier 
chapters of the thesis. In section 10.2.2, I link the technology transfer approaches of the 
agricultural research and extension (R&E) system in the Philippines to the theories and 
models discussed in chapter 2. In sections 10.2.3 to 10.2.6, I outline the major findings 
from chapters 3 to 9 and discuss their implications for the agriculture sector and the 
agricultural R&E system. I conclude the chapter with suggestions for improving the 
technology transfer strategies of the agricultural R&E system in the Philippines.
10.2 Discussion
10.2.1 Interorganisational Theory as Analytical Framework
In this thesis, the interorganisational theory of Benson provides a useful framework 
for analysing technology transfer as a social and political process. To recap, Benson s 
analytical framework consists of three levels, namely the administrative structures and 
policy paradigms that determine the resource-dependent relations within a particular public 
policy sector, the interest-power relations within the sector, and the rules of structure 
formation that limit the actions of the sector. The public policy sector examined in this 
thesis is the agricultural R&E system, which is the immediate setting of the technology 
transfer process.
Chapter 3 deals with the larger context within which the agriculture sector and the 
agricultural R&E system operate. It demonstrates how the sector and the R&E system are 
shaped by the dynamics of the local and global political economy. Chapter 4 descnbes the 
administrative arrangements, the division of labour, the policy directions and the various 
interest groups within the agricultural R&E system in the Philippines. Chapter 5 examines 
the political economy of one of the demand groups of technology transfer, which is the
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agricultural co-operatives. Chapters 6 to 9 demonstrate specific interrelationships and 
resource dependencies between and among the different actors involved in the three 
agricultural co-operatives studied in the Philippines.
10.2.2 Theory and Practice: Agricultural Technology Transfer
The traditional models or concepts of innovation and diffusion are useful 
descriptions of the early history of agricultural R&E system in the Philippines. The training 
and visit (T&V) approach was influenced by the ‘technology-push’ model, in which 
centralism and linear progression in technology generation and transfer are the basic 
guiding concepts. Research and extension in this approach were highly dichotomised, with 
the subject matter specialist providing the linkage between the two.
The basic assumption in this approach is that technologies generated by the 
research sector and identified for transfer to the clientele are almost always relevant to 
these clientele. The T&V extension approach was an attempt to duplicate the success of 
diffusion strategies experienced during the height of the green revolution. The diffusion 
strategy in T&V is represented by the epidemics model, which underscores adoption rather 
than research-extension linkage, and use of contact farmer leaders as extension agents. In 
this context, success was judged on the basis of how many farmers were contacted, how 
many farm demonstrations were held, and how many contact leaders trained. As such, the 
strategy ascribed to the use of ‘generalised or fixed technological packages for ease of 
information delivery to as many clientele as possible. This strategy was applicable to areas 
where farmers operated in more favourable and homogeneous agroecological conditions. 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, the major weakness of the T&V extension approach 
was that the generalised package of technology was not applicable to a majority of the 
farmers in the Philippines. Filipino farmers are generally poor, have limited access to 
resources, and have diverse and complex farming conditions. Based on my analysis of the 
agricultural R&E system in chapter 4 and the study of the agricultural co-operative in Case 
3 (described in chapter 9), this top-down approach to agricultural development was
demonstrably inappropriate and unsuccessful.
The government agencies concerned, having realised the shortcomings of the T&V 
extension methodology, adopted the farming systems research (FSR) approach in their 
R&D programs. The objective here was to strengthen linkages between the R&D 
community and the farmers to ensure that research outputs are more relevant to the needs
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of the farmers. The FSR approach is associated with the ‘user perspective theory9 as a 
model for agricultural research and technology transfer. It departs from the static 
assumptions of the traditional innovation theories and brings ‘farmers’ knowledge’ to bear 
in technology development and transfer. It introduces the concept of technology 
development continuum technology generation, technology adaptation, technology 
verification, technology dissemination (TG-TA-TV-TD)—that defines the participation of 
researchers, extensionists and farmers at each stage of technology development. The 
influence of FSR approach over the R&E system was so pervasive that it effected some 
major institutional changes especially in the organisational set-up of the Department of 
Agriculture (DA). It also resulted in the development of a new research discipline called 
‘farm resources and systems’.
In actual FSR practice, however, the extent of farmers’ participation in technology 
development is still limited, mostly focusing on ‘fine-tuning’ of technologies generated in 
research stations.
New technology transfer initiatives such as the Rural-based Enterprise 
Development (RED), Development Support Communication (DSC), Farmer-Scientist 
Bureau, and Farmers’ Information and Technology Service (FITS) have tried to address the 
weaknesses of the traditional diffusion and FSR approaches. They adhere to the 
‘participation paradigm’, with the role of farmers viewed as more dynamic, and the role of 
outsiders more in terms of facilitation. However, these programs have only been recently 
introduced in selected areas of the country. Their implementation requires financial 
resources that institutions within the R&E system are lacking, and structural changes that 
they may not be ready to undertake.
The approaches to rural development of the non-government organisations (NGOs) 
are generally associated with this ‘participation model’, with people empowerment as an 
important goal. The NGO approach usually involves strengthening of local organisations 
such as co-operatives. It upholds the principle that technological change, if it is to be 
sustainable, must be supported by appropriate institutional change.
10.2.3 Political Economy Perspective
This section presents a historical summary of the major characteristics of the 
domestic and global political economy that have influenced or have had implications for 
the agriculture sector and the agricultural R&E system.
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Colonial Period
The long history of colonialism in the Philippines shaped the past and even the 
present structure of the agriculture sector. Both the Spanish and American colonial policies 
promoted the cultivation of commercial crops, such as sugar, hemp, tobacco and coconut 
for export to wealthier countries. Since then, sugar and other export crops have become 
major sources of economic and political powers for landowning oligarchy, who up to the 
present time have influenced agricultural policies in the Philippines because of their strong 
presence in the country’s political system.
During the US occupation, foreign firms started to invest in agriculture and 
extractive industries in the Philippines. There was little foreign and local investment in 
processing technologies (e.g. sugar mills, coconut refineries) because profits were already 
obtained from the production of raw materials and from trade. In particular, the sugar 
industry did not develop into an efficient, productive and competitive sector. It became 
complacent in terms of technological change because of the assured market from the 
colonial trade, and the preferential trade and quota system of the US long after the 
Philippines had gained its independence.
1950s and 1960s
The Philippine government shifted to the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
policy during the 1950s and the 1960s. The agriculture sector suffered immensely during 
these periods because earnings from traditional exports were used to develop the ISI 
industries. Public investments in agricultural R&D, rural education, agriculture-related 
infrastructure and forest management were drastically reduced. Many agricultural inputs 
such as fertiliser, seed and farm machinery were covered by high tariff and import ban 
policies.
Martial Law Period
The principal government policy during this period was the export-oriented 
industrialisation program (EOI). EOI-ffiendly policies such as the prohibition of labour 
strike, force reduction of wage levels and incentives for new foreign investments were 
implemented.
To ensure the availability of cheap food and to keep wages at low levels, the 
Marcos government introduced a massive rice and com production program using the
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green revolution package of technology (POT). The World Bank provided a large loan to 
the Philippine government to support the subsidised credit scheme that accompanied the 
rice and com production program. Subsidised credit was extended to farmers for the 
purchase of high yielding variety (HYV) seeds and other production inputs specified in the 
POT. The World Bank loan promoted the T&V approach that disseminated the green 
revolution POT nationwide. It enabled the DA to restructure the whole agricultural service 
bureaucracy to fit the requirements of the T&V delivery mechanism. The same loan 
contributed heavily to the foreign debt problem of the Philippines that started in the late 
1970s.
The agrarian reform law during the Marcos regime was carried out in tandem with 
the co-operative development program, in which farmer participation in co-operatives was 
imposed. Membership in co-operatives became one of the prerequisites for land ownership. 
Agricultural co-operatives were used merely as channels for credit delivery to ensure that 
agrarian reform beneficiaries would pay land amortisation. They were not given the 
opportunity to decide on how the credit package would be managed and loaned to their 
members. As a consequence, the co-operative members could not identify themselves with 
their organisations. They became loan-oriented with their participation dependent on the 
availability of loan funds.
The martial-law government directly participated in the agriculture sector by 
creating trade monopolies in sugar, coconut, rice, com and meat industries. These 
monopolies amassed resources and capital for the government at the expense of small 
fanners. For instance, the government agency established to look after the coconut industry 
collected a levy from coconut farmers supposedly for a replanting program, R&D, 
extension service and other development projects. However, the levy was channelled to an 
organisation of big landlords who used much of the money for their private use.
The Philippine agriculture sector became a large market for the agricultural 
products of multinational corporations (MNCs) because of the wide promotion of the green 
revolution POT. Since then, the MNCs have controlled the supply of HYV seed, fertiliser, 
pesticides and agricultural machinery. They have also participated directly in agricultural 
production, particularly in the fruit industry. The banana and pineapple plantation 
operations of MNCs have displaced many small farmers and indigenous people, especially 
in the southern part of the country. With assistance from the Marcos government, the
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MNCs acquired vast tracts of land and expanded their plantation areas. During the early 
years of the banana and pineapple industries, they were purely controlled by the MNCs. 
Through time, some local big landowning growers and agricultural co-operatives have 
adopted the MNC technologies and have developed their own banana plantations.
Trade Liberalisation Phase (1986 to present)
In recent years, there have been five major features of the Philippine political 
economy that have implications for the agriculture sector and the agricultural R&E system. 
These include agrarian reform law (or the lack of it), the huge foreign debt, the Local 
Government Code (LGC), the World Trade Agreement (WTA), and freedom of 
association.
If the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is eventually successful, 
the future of the Philippine agriculture sector will consist of more smaller farms. On the 
other hand, the inherent flaws of the agrarian reform law may increase the number of 
landless peasants. As pointed out in chapter 3, CARP is loaded with provisions that the big 
landowners and agribusiness corporations can use to maintain control over or to expand 
their landholdings. Smaller land units could mean diseconomies of scale and disincentives 
to innovate. On the other hand, because of the loopholes in CARP, more cases of land 
conversion and landgrabbing, could mean further shrinking of land resource base, more 
landless farmers and decreasing food supply.
Philippine governments, especially the Marcos administration, accumulated huge 
foreign debt from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international 
financial institutions in the 1970s and the 1980s. These governments were forced to 
implement structural adjustment measures in compliance with the World Bank s conditions 
for extending structural adjustment loans. These measures included the reduction in 
government spending for basic agricultural support services and infrastructure, including 
R&D and extension service.
Foreign loans and grants have been used to implement commodity (e.g. rice and 
com) and rural development programs. Most of these financial assistance measures are 
tied-aid in nature. This means that funding is given on the condition that the money will be 
used to buy items from the companies of the donor country. This also means that foreign 
consultants are hired through the program to prepare the feasibility studies and design the
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general proposal. Chapter 9 and section 10.2.6 (see below) illustrate the complexities of a 
rural development project funded by a foreign donor.
The LGC mandates the decentralisation of the extension service from the DA to the 
local government units. Now that the responsibilities for research and extension are 
completely separate, the R&E linkage problem has become more complicated. This issue is 
discussed further in section 10.2.4. Decentralisation, in principle, is a mechanism to 
accelerate the provision of timely technologies and other services relevant to the needs of 
specific localities. However, initial studies on decentralisation reveal some serious 
problems that affected the effective delivery of extension service. Some of these problems 
include differences in priorities and orientation between the national agencies and the local 
government units, and low morale of extension workers because aside from being poorly 
paid they received little recognition and skills upgrading or training.
As signatory to the WTA, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Uruguay Round (GATT-UR), the Philippine government binds itself to liberalise 
agricultural industries. However, the agriculture sector is faced with the problem of 
declining competitiveness. The economic policy bias against the sector—an insufficient 
allocation of investment in agricultural productivity and social reform-enhancing projects, 
and high interest rates of financing programs—has depressed initiatives and innovation in 
the mral sector. Although some degree of success has been attained by rural development 
programs in the past, these have not been sustained to a level where global competitiveness 
could be achieved. With increasing globalisation and liberalisation of agriculture, the 
sector must be technologically, financially and institutionally equipped for domestic and 
foreign competition.
In compliance with the WTA, the Philippine government is bound to change some 
of the major agriculture-related policies that are considered inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Agreement. For example, some aspects of the Magna Carta for Small Farmers 
viewed as subsidy-related, such as price support system and subsidised credit, are required 
to be amended. There are other laws and House Bills related to the agriculture sector and 
the farmers that the Philippine government is obligated to repeal or modify in observance 
of the WTA conditions. While the lifting of agricultural subsidies is detrimental to the 
agriculture sector at this stage, there could be some positive outcome in the sense that it
305
can change the dole-out mentality and stimulate self-reliance among the local community 
and the private sector.
The WTA is supposed to stimulate innovation and technology transfer because of 
the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS also provides 
for member countries to develop IPR protection policy for plant varieties. This provision 
can be viewed optimistically or negatively for the agriculture sector. On one hand, plant 
variety protection is anticipated to motivate agricultural researchers and scientists to 
become more productive and creative. On the other hand, granting plant variety patent or 
breeders’ rights is viewed as perpetuating the monopolistic activities of the MNCs over 
agricultural seeds and biotechnology products. The challenge for the agencies concerned is 
to be able to ensure that benefits from innovations and technology transfer are maximised 
in favour of the majority of the rural population.
The liberalisation program of the government has also promoted the establishment 
of growth areas to attract more foreign investments. This has contributed to the problem of 
increasing rate of land conversion from agricultural to commercial uses. Greater 
liberalisation can also intensify the activities of the MNCs in the Philippines. In response 
to the demands of the WTA and the threat of CARP or to avoid land issues, the MNCs and 
local agribusiness corporations have started to enter into alternative production 
arrangements with agricultural co-operatives, such as joint ventures and new forms of 
contract growing.
The post-Marcos political environment sanctions freedom of association and 
expression. This could mean that farmer organisations have more incentive to develop and 
operate economic activities. NGOs have been given more avenues to participate in the 
government policy-making process.
10.2.4 National System for Agricultural R&E: Some Inferences
Top-down Orientation o f Technology Transfer
My analysis of the agricultural R&E system in the Philippines confirms the 
dominance of the top-down approaches to agricultural innovation and technology transfer. 
This is the case despite the gradual shift by some government agencies to an R&E 
framework that aims for greater farmer participation in research and extension. The 
bureaucratic set-up of the agricultural R&E system favours the implementation of the top-
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down technology-delivery mechanisms. The decentralisation policy is a clear attempt to 
reduce the bureaucratic red-tape in the delivery of agricultural information and 
technologies to the farmers. It has the potential for a more relevant rural service because 
the local government units (LGUs) are directly in contact with the local communities. This 
could mean that extension will become more responsive to local needs and may provide 
the impetus for more innovative technology transfer mechanisms to proceed.
In recent years, the government agencies concerned have experimented with and 
introduced bottom-up or participatory approaches to agricultural research and extension. 
Some of these approaches, such as RED and Farmer-Scientist Bureau (FSB), provide clear 
mechanisms and a deliberate space for farmer participation. However, other attempts at 
participatory approaches have been generally limited to analysis, diagnosis and pilot 
testing. In most cases, proponents of the bottom-up approaches lacked the authority and 
funding to effect wide implementation of their activities. Other bottom-up strategies are 
just support mechanisms for the extension activities in the rural areas and are not expected 
to assume the overall thrusts of extension.
Weak Linkages Within the System
The analysis of the agricultural R&E system reveals weak linkages at various points 
within the system, more seriously between research and extension groups. This linkage 
problem can be attributed to the following limitations in the system. Research and 
extension functions are institutionally and administratively separate. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the mandates for both research and extension used to be under the responsibility 
of the DA. But even then, research and extension were lodged under different units and 
coordination between the two was problematic. The devolution of extension service from 
the DA to the local government units has aggravated the research and extension linkage 
because they are now completely separate. However, there are indications that the 
decentralisation policy has facilitated linkage between the extension group and the farmers.
The weak linkage between research and extension units can also be related to the 
incentive system for research and extension workers. This incentive system is not 
conducive for establishing meaningful linkages. For instance, the agricultural researchers 
and extension workers in the Philippines receive low salary rates compared to their 
counterparts in other countries. There is a wide gap in salary and training opportunities 
between the researchers and extension workers resulting in the low morale level of the
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extension group. The merit system for agricultural researchers is based mainly on scientific 
publications.
Other Observations
The introduction of information technology-based support systems such as the 
Farmers Information and Technology Service (FITS) has a big potential for speeding up 
the process of technology transfer. These information systems can link together the key 
actors within the agricultural R&E system.
International donor and research agencies will continue to play a major role in 
agricultural R&D and extension due to the limited government budget. The lesson here for 
the government agencies concerned is to make the most of the available international 
funding and linkages. However, careful assessment of these arrangements should be made 
to ensure that they are not lop-sided and are not disadvantageous to small farmers and their 
environment.
Lessons can be drawn from the experiences of the private sector in agricultural 
R&D and extension. The private sector’s strategies are focused on products to sell, target­
market and profit-maximising activities. These elements can be useful areas to consider in 
developing rural-based enterprises. The private sector’s involvement of farmer co­
operatives in their new production schemes can be beneficial to small farmers only if the 
terms of these arrangements are clearly non-exploitative of the farmers.
10.2.5 Potential of Farmer Organisations and Non-government Organisations
There has been a long tradition and distinctive development of NGOs in various 
forms in the Philippines. Likewise, there exists widespread co-operation in the rural areas 
in the form of farmer organisations such as co-operatives and people’s organisations. 
Despite some problems within the NGO and agricultural co-operative movements, as 
mentioned in chapters 4 and 5, they play important roles in agricultural development. The 
strength of NGOs is in community building. Their potential in providing extension support 
and training on value orientation for farmers and farmer organisations are areas worth 
further exploring in government rural programs. Agricultural co-operatives, on the other 
hand, have the potential for stimulating growth of rural enterprises. Their entrepreneurial 
capabilities may still be lacking, but given proper mentoring and training, they can become 
the hub of agricultural economic activities in the rural areas.
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10.2.6 Observations and Themes from Case Studies
A number of lessons and common themes identified in the case studies are 
discussed in this section.
Balance Between Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches
Case 1 demonstrates the successful combination of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to agricultural research and technology transfer (refer to Figure 7.4). In this 
case, the co-operative was involved in one of the projects under the National Program on 
Bamboo and Rattan. The general areas for R&D and technology transfer were identified at 
the national level by the national commodity team for bamboo and rattan. However, the 
specific design and activities of the projects were jointly developed by the implementing 
agencies and the communities involved in the project areas. This arrangement was 
beneficial to all concerned—national R&D planning agencies, the R&D institutions and 
the farmers. It facilitated the flow of information from the R&D agencies to the farmers 
and vice versa. The co-operative members in Case 1 had direct access to the technologies 
of its main intervening agency which is the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources Region 6 (DENR-VI). In addition, through DENR-VI, the co-operative gained 
access to information and technologies from other DENR regional offices and other 
research agencies participating in the national program. The technology on giant bamboo 
propagation and nursery operations of the co-operative was a mixture of technologies of 
DENR Regions 6 and 10 and the indigenous knowledge of the co-operative members. The 
co-operative learned from the experiences of other co-operatives in other parts of the 
Philippines that were involved in the program. The national agencies, on the other hand, 
received feedback from the co-operatives about problem areas encountered in the field that 
need to be considered in the national R&D program.
Complexities o f a Foreign Funded Project
Case 3 illustrates the complexities of a rural development project which was 
subjected to foreign intervention. The beneficiaries in Case 3 gained from the basic 
infrastructure such as roads, irrigation facilities and rice processing complex put up 
through the project funded by the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA). 
However, contracts for the preparation of the detailed engineering plan and construction of 
the infrastructure were awarded by JICA to Japanese firms. There was very little
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participation of the project beneficiaries in project planning and implementation. As a 
consequence, the federation and co-operative-members experienced problems in 
maintaining facilities designed and constructed by Japanese firms. The federation 
encountered difficulties with the design and operation of the rice processing complex.
The original project plan emphasised the infrastructure component. It overlooked 
the need to prepare and develop the local institutions that were expected to make 
productive use of and maintain the infrastructure once it was in place. The institution­
building component was added into the project later on through Philippine government 
funding. However, its implementation lagged behind the infrastructure component.
Institution Building and Farmer Participation
Cases 1 and 3 were both project-type in nature. The degree to which co-operative 
members developed a sense of project ownership was affected by their level of 
participation in various aspects of project planning, packaging and implementation. In Case 
1, extensive participation of target farmers improved their sense of project ownership. 
Conversely, limited participation of project beneficiaries in Case 3 meant they did not 
develop a sense of appreciation of the project activities and outputs. In Case 1, the 
deliberate incorporation of farmers’ indigenous practices into the co-operative’s production 
activities enhanced the process of technology transfer and improved the sense of 
identification by the farmers with the techno-based enterprises developed through the 
project.
The importance of implementing social preparation or social conditioning activities 
before the introduction of an intervention and during project implementation was 
demonstrated in Cases 1 and 3. In Case 1, the interfacing of local capability building and 
technology transfer activities was carefully planned and administered. Activities were 
concentrated on the institution-building component during the initial stage of the project. 
Technology transfer activities were gradually introduced until they became the major 
component of the project. The co-operative members gradually assumed increasing 
responsibility over the project activities. These strategies contributed to the success of the 
co-operative’s enterprise. In Case 3, the institutional-development component, which was 
not originally part of the project, lagged behind the other project components including 
technology transfer. This resulted in the co-operative’s lack of readiness and commitment 
for the responsibility over the rice processing enterprise.
310
Linkages
Linkages were observed to be strong when actors derived mutual benefits from the 
relationship, and when the beneficiaries were fully aware and knowledgeable of the 
benefits that could be derived from the linkages. In the first two cases, the co-operatives 
benefited from the direct linkage with the source of technology. The dominant interveners 
of these co-operatives undertook R&D work on areas which were significant to the 
development of the co-operatives’ enterprises. This type of linkage facilitated the process 
of technology transfer. The strong linkage of the co-operative with the local government 
unit in Case 1 assured the sustainability of the enterprise in terms of land as production 
input.
Economic Activities
Cases 1 and 2 were built around short-, medium-, and long-term technology-based 
economic activities. Both cases were characterised by strong business and commercial 
orientation and clear identification of products to sell. These strategies have contributed to 
the strong interest and involvement of the co-operative members. This was not the situation 
in the third case since the focus was only on the processing and production of rice, 
although there was a plan to look into other livelihood opportunities.
Farmer-to-Farmer Method of Technology Transfer
The farmer-to-farmer method of technology transfer—the strategy of farmers 
themselves training other farmers—was observed to be effective in all the three cases. This 
strategy benefits both the giver and receiver of technology training. It increases the 
confidence of the ones sharing their experiences and expertise. It also facilitates the 
understanding and absorption of new skills and knowledge by those being trained.
Entrepreneurial Capability
The successful operation of co-operative enterprises, especially after the project life 
ends, depends largely on continuing or new linkages with providers of support services and 
technologies, constant pursuit for business and social advancement opportunities, and 
human resource development. These activities necessitate specific management and 
entrepreneurial skills that the co-operatives in Case 3 were still lacking after completion of 
the project. In Case 1, although the co-operative was not fully capable of managing the co­
operative after the project, a contingency plan was prepared in which the co operative, out
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of its income, would hire a management consultant. In Case 2, the co-operative was well
experienced in terms of organisation and management, and fully capable of handling its 
own linkages.
Bureaucracy Problem
Bureaucracy associated with government projects, as in Cases 1 and 3, delayed the 
release of funds and implementation of project activities. In Case 1, delays due to 
bureaucratic problems were minimised because the intervener organised contingency 
measures.
Because the cases presented in this thesis are outcomes of their particular context, 
care must be taken in making generalisations. However, the findings in the case studies are 
probably robust enough to shed light on the process of technology transfer in the rural 
sector in the Philippines.
10.3 Conclusions
The thesis demonstrates the complexities involved in the agricultural R&E system 
and the usefulness of an analytical framework that deals with these actualities. The 
conceptual framework used in this thesis considers the specificity of the local and national 
conditions of the technology transfer process but at the same time grounds the process in a 
wider organisational structure.
The thesis confirms the fact that the actions of the different agencies/entities within 
the agricultural R&E system are influenced by the nature of their interrelationships and the 
policy directions within the system. It observes that such actions are limited by the need to 
support the economic development programs of the Philippine governments, which in 
recent years have been export-oriented and foreign investment-led.
The complexities outlined here suggest that a single or universal approach to 
technology transfer may not be appropriate for all types of conditions in the rural areas. 
However, the theoretical and empirical analyses undertaken in this thesis provide a better 
understanding of the technology transfer system so that a general framework aimed at 
accelerating technology commercialisation in the rural areas can be proposed.
I argue that technology transfer mechanisms can best help to achieve broad-based 
and sustained rural development when they embody the following elements.
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a) Target beneficiaries should actively and genuinely participate in a ll aspects o f  the 
technology transfer process.
The case studies show how important participation of target beneficiaries was to ensure the 
appropriateness and sustainability of technology transfer outputs. The analyses made on 
the agricultural technology transfer system in the Philippines and the literature on theories 
related to agricultural technology transfer reveal the inadequacy of the top-down approach 
and the growing awareness within the system of the benefits of participatory development.
b) Ways shou ld  be fou n d  to facilita te  access o f  beneficiaries to production inputs, 
including information, technology and critical support services such as market, credit, and 
post-h arvest facilities, extension, training, and enterprise management support. 
Information, technology and support services will enhance the decision-making and 
problem solving capability of farmers. Access to these services will enable the farmers to 
translate both indigenous and introduced knowledge or technologies into productive 
enterprises. The setting-up of computer-based information systems such as FITS in the 
rural areas is a step in the right direction.
c) A clearly  identified group o f  beneficiaries such as agricultural co-operatives should be 
the focu s o f  intervention.
Co-operatives are one way of overcoming the smallness of farms and helping farmers be 
more competitive in terms of the following:
• cost of production, e.g. buying of production inputs in bulk for members;
• processing, e.g. communal processing infrastructure;
• marketing, e.g. co-operatives will more likely meet the volume and regularity of 
produce required by the market;
• credit, e.g. banks would rather deal with groups of farmers to minimise transaction 
costs; and
• training and extension, e.g. service delivery costs by interveners are less if directed 
towards groups of farmers.
The farmers’ costs of forming and managing co-operatives will likely be compensated by 
the benefits described here and by the opportunity to increase their bargaining power and
influence policy.
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d) Technology-based enterprises with business or com m ercial orientation should be the 
centre o f  econom ic activity  o f  the beneficiaries.
Agricultural enterprises have the potential to create rural savings that can be reinvested in 
other productive activities. They have the potential to create jobs especially for other rural 
workers, most of whom are landless. It is worth considering some of the private sector 
strategies (e.g. focus on products to sell) when developing rural-based enterprises.
The participatory or bottom-up framework outlined above adheres to the principles 
of the bottom-up approaches to technology transfer. Although experiences with these 
approaches are still limited and fragmented, some of the new initiatives have great 
potential in terms of substance and relevance. For example, initial experiences with the 
rural based-enterprise development (RED) project showed that the bottom-up approach to 
technology transfer can lead to the identification and operation of viable agricultural 
enterprises. The RED strategy, unlike most participatory approaches, does not merely offer 
a concept. It provides mechanisms that go beyond diagnosis.
As discussed in chapter 4, some of the technology transfer approaches can 
complement each other. In areas where the Development Support Communication (DSC) 
program has been implemented, and where the FSB and FITS have been established, the 
chances that the RED approach will succeed will be greater. RED projects will benefit 
from the easy access to information and technologies provided by FITS, from the 
community building efforts of DSC, and from the indigenous knowledge tested in FSBs.
To enhance the prospects for bottom-up approaches such as those outlined above, 
the following measures are desirable.
i) The agricultural developm ent capability o f  LG Us should be strengthened. The support of 
the LGUs is central to an effective technology transfer system. The powers vested in LGUs 
through decentralisation will eventually influence all rural development programs. 
However, it is not enough to give LGUs the authority and power over local decision 
making and service delivery. It is important for the national government to provide the 
LGUs the necessary technical, infrastructural and financial assistance so that their potential 
and appreciation for agricultural development will be developed. It is also recommended 
that the national government act on the issues identified from initial studies of the impact 
of the decentralisation policy on the delivery of agricultural support services.
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ii) The in term ediaries and fa c ilita to rs  o f  linkages must be m obilised and their skills must 
be harnessed. The decentralisation policy resulted in the further separation of research and 
extension. This calls for a more active role of intermediaries and facilitators of linkages or 
avenues by which linkages are possible, such as the regional R&D consortia, agricultural 
technology training groups, the NGOs, regional applied communication groups, and other 
such mechanisms or groups. These facilitators, along with the researchers and extension 
workers, must be trained in skills appropriate for the promotion of participatory approaches 
in technology transfer.
Hi) There is a need  to change the incentive system within the research community. These 
incentives must encourage researchers to generate technologies more relevant to farmers’ 
needs and make an effort to see that these are utilised or commercialised. This incentive 
can be in the form of promotion or awards based on the number of research outputs utilised 
by the target clientele, in addition to the regular award system based on scientific 
publications. Incentives for the extension workers, including among others their salaries, 
continuing education and training, must be improved to increase their morale and their 
capability to deliver the agricultural extension service.
iv) Inter co-operative linkages are necessary to take advantage o f  new economic 
opportunities. By organising themselves into federations, agricultural co-operative can 
become more efficient and competitive and achieve greater bargaining power. Agricultural 
co-operatives or federations may benefit from partnerships with agribusiness corporations 
including MNCs through joint ventures or new forms of contract growing. However, the 
co-operatives/federations and agencies assisting them must ensure that arrangements with 
the corporations are not lop-sided and will not lead to the exploitation of the co-operative 
members and their environment. The federations/co-operatives and their intervening 
agencies must seriously consider lessons learned from past experiences in contract growing 
and other partnership schemes with the corporations. The co-operative members need to be 
informed of these experiences and the behaviour (mostly exploitative) of the agribusiness 
corporations. This way, they will be in a better position to negotiate for more equitable
terms and conditions.
v) The prom otion  o f  technology-based enterprises through co-operatives requires the 
expertise o f  interveners from  various disciplines. Most agricultural co-operatives, although 
experienced in their own production systems, are not yet skilful in planning, operating and
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managing business enterprises. Interdisciplinary and interagency teams from the research 
community, LGUs/extension group, applied communicators, agricultural technology 
trainers, and NGOs must be organised and/or mobilised. They need to improve their 
mentoring skills. They must be trained in how to assist farmer organisations in enterprise 
development and management along the principles of the bottom-up approach to 
technology transfer. Within the limitations of existing structures, their formation is 
envisioned to be initially a d  hoc and can be based in the regional R&D consortia or the 
LGUs, but funds should be specifically allocated by the national and local governments for 
this purpose. The team members must be given incentives to participate in the teams and 
be relieved from their regular work when the teams need to convene and support co­
operatives.
vi) On a m ore general note, the national government must aim fo r  p o licy  consistency to 
avoid confusion within the agriculture sector. It must correct its bias against the agriculture 
sector in its economic policies to improve market competitiveness of farmers and their 
organisations.
The framework suggested here becomes more relevant in the light of the recent 
changes in the Philippine political economy. It has the potential to deal with the 
opportunities and limitations posed by these political economic factors. The Local 
Government Code (LGC) aims to increase the relevance and improve the responsiveness of 
agricultural services to the needs of the rural sector. Participatory service delivery 
mechanisms are consistent with the objectives of the LGC. The agrarian reform law, if 
successful, could mean more smaller and fragmented farms, but the loopholes in the law 
could also mean more landless peasants. In either case, the problem of smallness of farms 
or landlessness is something that requires the collective and organised actions of the 
peasants. Grassroots approaches to agricultural R&E can support farmer groups by 
providing appropriate technology and training that will enhance farmers skills, knowledge 
and their bargaining power. The participatory approaches are appropriate especially with 
the advent of the WTA, whereby agricultural subsidies are no longer encouraged and the 
agricultural sector is expected to be more competitive domestically and globally. This 
situation dictates the need for greater farmer participation and commitment, actions that 
can be stimulated by the participatory R&E approaches. The 1987 Philippine Constitution 
provides the legal basis for the participation of NGOs and agricultural co-operatives.
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Ideally, this will create a more favourable environment for the implementation of bottom- 
up approaches that will promote farmer participation.
It is not practical to assume that the whole agricultural bureaucracy can be 
reoriented to generate and transfer need-based technologies through bottom-up approaches. 
As shown in Case 1, it is possible to strike a balance between top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to technology transfer and achieve satisfactory results. It is still necessary to 
maintain strong national direction especially in areas where national security is at stake. 
Furthermore, the grassroots or bottom-up approaches may not be appropriate for the 
promotion of some technologies and may not be applicable to other clientele groups 
serviced by the agricultural R&E system.
Because of the complexity of existing structures, major policy changes towards 
participatory agricultural development will most likely entail a very high cost, both 
financial and organisational. Therefore, most of the changes suggested in this thesis are 
those that can be realistically achieved within the limitations of the existing bureaucratic 
set-up.
Bottom-up technology transfer programs in the Philippines have been implemented 
only recently, so an in-depth assessment is not possible. The impact of these approaches on 
rural development can be the subject of future research. For instance, it will be interesting 
to study the factors affecting the success and failure of enterprises developed through the 
RED process and the impact of these enterprises on farmers’ lives and rural income.
To gain a wider international perspective on technology transfer, another area for 
further research is cross-country analysis of agricultural technology transfer systems. It will 
be worthwhile to compare and contrast the technology transfer experiences and practices of 
the Philippines with those of selected countries that are also agriculture-based.
To conclude, all the discussion points in this chapter are linked by the following 
central themes. Technology transfer mechanisms must consider the intricacies of the larger 
environment within which the agricultural R&E system operates inasmuch as they focus on 
what is happening within the system. Technology transfer programs whether initiated 
and/or funded by a government agency, the private sector or a foreign donor will have 
better chances of being successful when they focus on strengthening rural organisations 
inasmuch as they focus on R&D, technology and support services. Agricultural 
competitiveness can be enhanced if the development of technology-based rural enterprises
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through rural organisations such as co-operatives is encouraged. Their development must 
not be imposed but should be allowed to spring from the farmers themselves through the 
skilled facilitation and intervention of government agencies and NGOs. Rural institutions 
are the ones that will carry on agricultural development activities long after any 
government or other introduced programs and projects are finished.
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Appendix 1.1
L on glist o f  C o-operatives for Case Studies
CO-OPERATIVE/
ENTERPRISE/Site
“ CRITERIA------------------------------
Accessibility Ease of Info 
Getting
--------------
Priority
Dominant
Intervener
1. labarga Multi-purpose Co- 
operative/Bamboo/
Integrated forest nursery, 
swine, duck, poultry & goat 
production, sericulture, fish
production/ Dueñas, Iloilo
3 :> Export winner DOST---------
PCARRD/
DENR-VT
2. Iloilo burniture 
Manufacturing 
Association/Bamboo 
processing and technology 
training center/IFMA, Iloilo 
City
3 4 Export winner DUST-TAPI
3. BJDANl/Nueva Ecija 4 4 CLSU
4. Tribal group m Northern 
Luzon/Food Processing 
(forest fruits)/
Imugan, Nueva Viscaya
3 4 Ralahan
Educational
Fdn.
5. DAHON/Cuttlower 
production/San Pablo City
5 4 Export winner DOST-IV
6. KA1SA harm Workers Co­
operative/
Mango production/ 
Candelaria Zambales
4 4 Export winner PCARRD-
DOST
7. Bangad Irrigators 
Association/Certified rice 
seed production/ 
Milagros, Masbate
"3 3 Basic 
domestic 
needs (BDN)
Bicol
University/
DOST-TAPI
8. Bayombong Workers Co- 
operative/Hollow block 
prod’n. from rice hull 
ash/Bayombong. 
Pangasinan
4 4 BDN Pangasinan 
State Univ.
y. Lutucan Multi-purpose 
Coop./Coco-coir processing/ 
Sariaya, Quezon
5 4 yes Private
individual
(inventor)
1Ü. Uuimaras Ornali Coconut 
Farmers Multi-purpose Coop/ 
Integrated coconut oil 
mill/Concordia, Nueva 
Valencia, Guimaras
3 4 yes DOST-1AP1venture
financing
n / M ' T  T  A 111-----
11. Polangi-Somoge Small 
Farmers Co-operative/ 
Coco-husk decorticating 
plant/
Bgy. Somoge, Catarman, 
Northern Samar
3 3 yes DUS 1-1 APIventure
financing
319
12. Caluya Coconut farmers’ 
Multi-purpose Coop./Coco- 
oil production/
Caluya Antique
1 --------------------- yes TTFEB 
Foundation 
c/o Ernie 
Lozada13. ramiers coco-oil 
processing Multi-purpose 
Coop/Coco-oil 
production/Anahawan, 
Southern Leyte
3 yes TJPLB 
Foundation 
c/o Ernie 
Lozada
14. Christian banners 
Kilusang Bayan for Credit & 
Allied Services, Inc./Rice 
production-processing­
marketing, onion, garlic/ 
Homestead H, Talaverra, 
N. Ecija
4 ~A---------------- "BDF3------------ TBSF-----------
institution­
building & 
mechani- 
sation(trac- 
tors);
LandBank
credit
15. MASIFAU Project/ 
Rice breeding
------------ TTFEB----------
16. Bad-ayon Buguias 
Development Coop, Inc. 
(BABUDCO)/Vegetables and 
rootcrops/
Bad-ayon, Buguias,
Benguet
3 (5 hours from 
Baguio by bus)
4 "BBfl------------ TB3F-----------
17. Cavite Vegetables and 
Fruit Growers Development 
Co-operative/Compost- 
dryer/Tanza, Cavite
5 uncertain "BDlSl TTFEB----------
Foundation
18. United Sugar Planters Co- 
operative/Cattle 
production, fertiliser 
importation/
Digos, Davao
2 uncertain TJDls! LandBank
19. Rubber-based United 
Workers Agrarian Reform 
Beneficiaries Coop/Rubber/ 
Isabela, Basilan
1 uncertain yes LandBank
20. Integrated Jalajala 
Federation of Co-operatives, 
Rice Processing 
Complex/Jalajala, Rizal
5 4 BDN J1CA
SEARCA
DAR
NATTCO
Note: Accessibility - Scale of 1 to !) with 1 as least and 5 as most accessible
Ease o f getting information - Scale of 1 to 5 with 1 as least easy and 5 easiest
No. 20 added to the list at the later stage of fieldwork.
Refer to the list of acronyms for the abbreviated names of organisations.
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Appendix 1.2
Shortlist o f  C o-operatives for Case Studies
CO-OPERATIVE/----------------------------- ----------------
ENTERPRISE/Site
“ CRITERIA ---------------------------
Accessibility/ 
Ease of info 
getting
Dominant
Intervener
T ype of 
Benefi­
ciaries
1. Tabarga Multi-purpose Co-operative/ ' 
Bamboo/Integrated forest nursery, swine, duck, 
poultry & goat production, sericulture, fish 
production/ Dueñas, Iloilo
"375 DOST--------------
PCARRD/
DENR-VI
Upland
farmers
2. BlDANl/Nueva Ecija "474 TTSO -------------- Rural women
3. Inbal group in Northern Luzon/Eood Processing 
(forest fruits)/
Imugan, Nueva Viscaya
3/4 Kalahan
Educational
Fdn.
Inbal group
4. DAHUN/Cutllower production/San Pablo City 5/4' " "DOST-IV--------- Professionals
5. KA1SA harm Workers Co-operative/ 
Mango production/
Candelaria Zambales
“474 “PCARRD---------
DOST
Mango
growers
6. Bayombong Workers Co-operative/Hollow block 
prod’n. from rice hull ash/
Bayombong. Pangasinan
4/4 Pangasinan 
State Univ.
7. Lutucan Multi-purpose Coop./ 
Coco-coir processing/
Sariaya, Quezon
3/4 Private
individual
(inventor)
Coconut
producers
8. Chumaras ¡Small Coconut Farmers Multi-purpose 
Coop/
Integrated coconut oil mill/Concordia, Nueva 
Valencia, Guimaras
“373 'DOST-TAPI
venture
financing
Coconut
producers
9. Caluya Coconut Farmers’ Multi-purpose 
Coop./Coco-oil production/
Caluya Antique
3 UPLB 
Foundation, 
c/o Ernie 
Lozada
Coconut
producers
10. Farmers coco-oil processing Multi-purpose 
Coop/Coco-oil production/
Anahawan, Southern Leyte
3 TTPEB 
Foundation 
c/o Ernie 
Lozada
Coconut
producers
11. Christian Farmers Kilusang Bayan tor 
Credit & Allied Services, Inc./Rice 
production-processing-marketing, onion, 
garlic/Homestead H, Talaverra, N. Ecija
4/4 PBSP 
institution­
building & 
mechani- 
sation(trac- 
tors);
LandBank
credit
Rice farmers
12. MASIMU Proiect/kice breeding TTPEB Rice farmers
13. Integrated Jalajala Federation ot co-operatives, 
Rice Processing Complex/Jalajala, Rizal
5/4 JiCJA
SEARCA
DAR
Rice farmers
"Rote:— Accessibility-Scale oj 1 to 3 with 1 as least and J as most accessible ~  
Ease o f getting information-Scale o f 1 to 5 with 1 as least easy and 5 easiest
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Appendix 1.3
Names of Persons and Organisations Interviewed 
Case 1 TABARGA MPC
Abonador, Ver, Member Sangguniang Bayan, Office of the Mayor, Dueñas, Iloilo 
Adio, Eduardo, Chairman TABARGA Multipurpose Co-operative (MPC)
Agreda, Alfeo, Northern Iloilo Polytechnic State College 
Asuatigue, Rodolfo, TABARGA MPC
Binoya, Francisco, Chief, Technology Transfer Division, Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources Region 6 (DENR-VI)
Conejar, Rolando, TABARGA MPC
Encanto, Velma, Regional Applied Communication Office Coordinator, Western Visayas 
Agriculture and Resources R&D Consortium (WESVARRDEC)
Eradio, Gilbert, Fiber Industry Development Authority Region 6 (FIDA-VI)
Esmediana, Aurelio, Jr., Dingle Agricultural and Technical College
Gigare, Niel, DENR-VI
Lamery, Generoso, TABARGA MPC
Lames, Reynaldo, TABARGA MPC
Lamsin, Avelino, TABARGA MPC
Legario, Leonorico, J r .,TABARGA MPC
Licera, Ramon, TABARGA MPC
Monoso, Rudy, Bamboo tiles entrepreneur
Parcon-Teruel, Zinnia, Regional Director, Department of Science
and Technology Region 6
Pedregosa, Michael, TABARGA MPC
Porras, Godofredo, TABARGA MPC
Repospolo, Arturo, TABARGA Project Staff
Siapno, Adeluisa, Regional Technical Director, DENR-VI
Sotomil, Apolinario, Provincial Agriculturist, Office of the Governor, Iloilo
Sucaldito, Soledad, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, Office of the
Governor, Iloilo
Sunio, Remy, DOST-VI
Talabero, Val, DENR-VI
Violeta, Rosiben, FID A-VI
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Case 2 Lutucan MPC
Aklan, Ben, Plant Leadman, Lutucan MPC Decorticating Plant 
Atienza, Higinio, Jr., Executive Director, Lutucan MPC 
Cervantes, Luis, Provincial S&T Center Officer, DOST-IV 
Constantino, Lani, Department of Trade and Industry, Province of Quezon 
de Vera, Norayda, Lutucan MPC
Gucilatar, Jun, United Coconut Planters Bank Foundation, Inc.
Macarangal, Nerrie, Land Bank of the Philippines, Lucena 
Montalbo, Jim, Lutucan MPC
Paloma, Enrico, Regional Manager, Philippine Coconut Authority Region 4 
Perilla, Antonio, Jr., Provincial Planning and Development Office, Quezon Province 
Quincina, Anna, Department of Trade and Industry, Province of Quezon 
Mr. and Mrs. Mariano Sazon, Manufacturer of Coconut Processing Equipment
Case 3 INJAFEDCO
Alfredo, Boyet, Alibangbangan MPC
Bagoyo, Jun, Development Facilitator, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, JalaJala, Rizal 
Balakit, Fortunato, Alibangbangan MPC 
Balakit, Julian, Alibangbangan MPC 
Barria, Andres, Alibangbangan MPC
Bilog, Rexon, Development Facilitator, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, JalaJala, Rizal
de Guzman, Bar, Chairman, INJAFEDCO
Engito, Eliseo, Alibangbangan MPC
Gaseta, Ernesto, Alibangbangan MPC
Gaseta, Liza, Alibangbangan MPC
Laraya, Jaime, Alibangbangan MPC
Manalansang, Beatriz, SEARCA
Miranda, Jesus, Alibangbangan MPC
Pascual, Mario, Manager, Rice Processing Complex, INJAFEDCO
Reyes, Cenon, Alibangbangan MPC
San Juan, Ricardo, Chairman, Alibangbangan MPC
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1. Background Information about the Co-operative
a) Co-operative constitution and by-laws
b) When, why and how was the co-operative created?
c) What are the mission and objectives of the co-operative? What is the organisational 
structure of the co-operative? How often does the co-operative meet? Does the co­
operative have an office or meeting place?
d) Total number of members; profile of members (e.g. How many are men and women; 
level of education: how many of members are engaged in co-operative’s major economic 
activities)
e) Assets of co-operative.
f) What are the different activities and projects of the co-operative? How were these 
projects selected?
2. Production System
a) Technologies used and their sources (availability, affordability, and accessibility), inputs 
and materials, labor and capital, indigenous technologies
b) Agencies or entities approached in terms of technical problems?
3. Organisation and Management
a) Task assignment
b) Capability to manage co-operative
c) Training/cross visits attended
4. Linkages and Networking
a) What are the different agencies/entities providing intervention? How did you come to 
know of these agencies?
b) In what manner do they intervene?
c) How do they help achieve your goals? What are your obligations towards them?
d) Are there instances when two or more of these agencies have jointly packaged and
delivered an assistance project?
e) In your observation, are there any conflicts among the objectives of these interveners? 
How do these conflicts affect your performance?
Appendix 1.4
L ist o f  L ead  Q uestions and Basic Inform ation Collected from  Co-operatives
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f) In your own judgement, are these agencies strong, weak, average? Why?
g) . Which agencies are supporting you in terms of credit, post-harvest service, extension, 
market, infrastructure support.
6. Socio-political Environment
a) Do you participate in the local decision-making process? In what way? If not, why? 
How is your relations with the local government units? What is your opinion of the local 
government code?
b) What are your views about the following government policies and programs—e.g. 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform, S&T programs, agricultural input policies.
c) In your own judgement, how do these programs affect your performance?
d) How better off are farmer-members now than before interventions? (family income, 
housing, nutrition and health, increased capacity for self-sustained development)
7. Others
a) In your own perception, what are your strengths and weaknesses? Why?
b) What are your problems in managing co-operative and members? What are your 
production and post-production problems?
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Agency
List of Lead Questions and Basic Information Collected 
from Intervening Agencies
Appendix 1.5
1. How did you come to know of the co-operative?
2. What kinds of assistance (e.g. technical, credit, market matching, extension) do you 
provide to the co-operative? What are the general features of these assistance?
3. What specific programs/projects of your agency is the assistance associated/related 
with? What are the objectives of the programs/projects?
4. What agency resources, in terms of manpower, facilities, information materials, and 
others, are utilised to implement and accomplish your assistance to the co-operative?
5. What are the responsibilities of the co-operative as far as these resources are concerned 
(e.g. service charge, reports)
6. How does your agency administer or deliver the assistance in terms of: a) criteria used 
for selecting the beneficiary (ies); and b) monitoring and evaluation mechanisms?
7. What were the problems encountered in the delivery of assistance to the co-operative, if 
any? How did you overcome or solve these problems?
8.1) What agencies/entities do you cooperate with in the identification and delivery of this 
assistance? What are their roles? What were the problems encountered in these 
cooperations? What were the lessons learned in these cooperations or linkages?
9. In your own opinion, what are the positive and negative qualities of the co-operative?
10. What are your suggestions to improve
a) your agency’s performance in the delivery of assistance
b) the performance of the co-operative
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Appendix 3.1
Typology of Bureaucracies in the Philippines
According to Major 
Branch of 
Government
According to Level of 
Government
According to 
Functional Categories 
or Sectoral Concerns
As Provided for in the 
Constitution
Executive
Legislative
Judiciary
National
Regional
Local:
-Provincial
-City/Municipal
-Barangay
Health
Education, Culture and 
Sports
Agriculture
Agrarian Reform
Trade and Industry
Tourism
Power and Energy 
Social Welfare 
Justice
Foreign Affairs 
Finance
National Defence
Environment and 
Natural Resources
Public Works and 
Highways
Transportation
Labour and 
Employment
Interior and Local 
Government
Science and 
Technology
Commission on 
Elections
Civil Service 
Commission
Commission on Audit
Source: R. de Guzman, et a l , ‘The bureaucracy’, in R. de Guzman and M. Reforma (eds), Government and 
Politics of the Philippines, p. 186.
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Appendix 3.2
CARP Provisions in Favour of Big Landowners and Investors
Section 8, paragraph b and c - these provisions allow the indeterminate continuity of 
lease and management contracts executed with MNCs over lands already distributed to 
farmer-beneficiaries.
Section 11 - this provision defers, for ten years, the implementation of land distribution as 
to private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising, 
aquaculture such as saltbeds, fishponds and prawn ponds, fruit farms, and cacao, coffee, 
and rubber plantations.
Section 29 - in cases where it is not economically feasible to divide the land, this provision 
imposes upon collectivised agrarian reform beneficiaries the obligation to honour existing 
agreements/contracts covering the land.
Section 31 - this provision allows landowners and agribusiness corporations to substitute 
stock dispersal to their agricultural workers in lieu of actual land distribution.
Source: Sentro Para sa Tunay na Repormang Agraryo (SENTRA), ‘Market-oriented CARP: A recipe for 
failure’, Agrarian Trends, Special Issue, SENTRA, Philippines, September 1997, pp. 10-11.
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A ppendix 3.3
New World Trading Pact under WTA or GATT-UR
1. Increased Access to Markets
Import tariffs by industrial economies will fall by more than 30%; more than 40% of imports will be duty­
free; lower prices for consumers.
2. Opening Up of Farm Trade
Non-tariff barriers on farm imports will be converted to tariffs; tariffs will be cut by 36% over a 6-year 
period for developed countries, 24% over 10 years for less developed countries; poorest nations will be 
exempted; countries with closed markets will be required to import 3 % of their local needs, rising to at least 
5% after six years; value of agricultural export subsidies will be cut by 25% over a period of 6 years; volume 
o f subsidised farm exports will be cut by 21%; more leeway for developing countries.
3. Liberalisation of Textiles and Clothing Trade
Current system o f quotas under the 1974 Munich Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) will be abolished over 10 
years; GATT rates will apply after that period; importers will be allowed special safeguards against import 
surtax that threaten local textile industries.
4. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Copyrights, patents, trademarks, labels of origin, rights of performers and producers o f sound recordings will 
be protected; poorest countries will enjoy a 10-year waiting period before having to comply with GATT’s 
new intellectual property rights rules.
5. Liberalisation of Foreign Investment Codes
Foreign investment will not be subjected to restrictions that are not applicable to domestic firms; existing 
restrictions will be eliminated, ranging from two to seven years for the poorest countries.
6. Strengthening of Anti-Dumping Laws
Tougher limitations against dumping will be enforced so that countries will find it more difficult to use anti­
dumping measures to restrict imports, while offenders will find it harder to evade anti-dumping laws.
7. Efficient Settlement of Disputes
Trade disputes will be settled more speedily with tight deadlines and single countries being prevented from 
blocking decisions.
8. Creation of a New WTO
With a status equal to that of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organisation will have stronger powers to police world trade and settle disputes.
Source: Business World, 20 December 1993, p. 7, quoted in IBON Philippines, ‘Aint GATT what it takes’, 
IBON People’s Policy and Advocacy Studies Special Release.
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Summary of the negative consequences of GATT on agriculture and corresponding 
response/action of the Philippine Government as of 1995.
Appendix 3.4
Negative Consequences Government’s Response/Action
1. Small farmers’ produce will be pitted 
against cheaper, more competitive imports. 
Farmers will soon be wiped out from the 
economy in favour of big businessmen, 
exporters, processors and industrialists.
Dislocation of agricultural producers will be minimised by 
minimum tariff quotas and special safeguard provisions. 
Safety nets worth P28 billion (US$ 1.2 billion) for 1995 will 
cushion impact.
2. Production of local foodcrops will be 
compromised in favour of high value 
commercial crops.
The government, through its existing program called ‘Key 
Production Areas Approach’ intends to achieve both food 
self-sufficiency and export crops production by 
concentrating rice and com production to areas whose 
agro-climatic and market conditions are favourable for 
producing, processing and marketing such products. With 
this strategy, government support is focused from 5.0 M 
hectares to only 1.9 M hectares (but production is 
intensified) thus freeing some 3.1 million hectares for 
livestock and commercial crop areas.
A House Bill on High Value Crops proposes that farmers 
may be allowed to adopt the cooperative system in putting 
up economically-sized farms for high value crop farming.
3. Long-term food security is threatened by 
dropping all production and marketing 
subsidies.
Support services (e.g. R&D, pest and disease control 
programs, training and extension, inspection services, 
marketing and promotion services and infrastructure like 
irrigation) not directly paid to agricultural producers are 
still allowed under GATT.
4. The GATT provision on intellectual 
property rights will increase cost of 
production in agriculture due to additional 
patent rights and royalties on the price of 
agricultural inputs.
With more alternative agricultural input products coming in, 
farmers and entrepreneurs could make better choices and 
will have better access to more efficient and effective 
technologies. This could lead to improved productivity 
that could outweigh the increased cost of production.
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Provisions in the WTA (GATT-UR) Pertinent to the Environment
A ppendix 3.5
1. Article XII or ‘General Exceptions’ of the GATT which states that:
Subject to requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’
2. Preamble of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade which provides that:
‘No country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive 
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement’.
3. Preamble of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures which 
provides that:
‘No Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal, 
or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same 
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. The same Preamble also provides for the 
desire to further the use of harmonised sanitary and phytosanitary measures between Members, on the basis 
of international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant international 
organisations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics and the 
relevant international and regional organisations operating within the framework of the International Plant 
Protection Convention, without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health.’
4. The Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment that provides that:
‘The Council for Trade in Services would request the Committee on Trade and Environment to examine and 
report, with recommendations if  any, on the relationship between services trade and the environment in order 
to determine whether any modification of Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services is 
required. The same Decision provides, that the Committee on Trade and Environment shall also examine the 
relevance of inter-govemmental agreements on the environment and their relationship to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services.
Source: Ricardo Umali, Brief on GATT-UR in relation to environment, paper presented during the DENR 
National Management Conference, Davao Insular Hotel, Davao City, Philippines, 25 August 1994, pp. 3­
5.
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Examples/Cases of Environmental Damages Associated with Free
T rade/Industrialisation
Appendix 3.6
1. Promotion of Export Agriculture
The export-oriented banana industry that developed rapidly in the 1970s in Mindanao, Philippines converted 
some 25,000 hectares of land into banana plantation reducing some of the settlers and members of 
indigenous ethnic communities into either plantation wage earners or landless rural workers. The industry is 
a major user o f agricultural chemicals, endangering health and safety of the workers and families living in 
the plantation. In 1976, it spent about US$30 per hectare on pesticides.
2. Fishery Modernisation
The modernisation and commercialisation of the fisheries industry resulted in the marginalisation of small- 
scale fishery found all over the Philippines’ coastlines. The big commercial fishing boats are dominating the 
wide fishing areas, pushing the smaller operators to the coastal areas where over-fishing is prevalent. Some 
Japanese and Filipino commercial fishing boats are engaged in the highly destructive trawling and purse 
seine fishing.
3. Kawasaki Sintering Project, (Misamis Oriental, Philippines)
The sintering of iron ore is an energy-intensive, pollution-causing process. From the beginning of its 
construction in 1974 up to the present, the sintering plant has been strongly opposed by environmentalists in 
the Philippines and abroad. Kawasaki has been accused of ‘poisoning’ Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao with clear 
indications of water and air pollution around the 144 hectare sintering site.
4. PASAR’s Copper Smelting and Refining Project
The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) was constructed in 1980-83 in 
Isabel, Leyte, Philippines. It processes most of the copper concentrates produced in the country. A survey 
made by a science professor from Nagoya University in 1990 revealed that the sea water around PASAR is 
strongly polluted with acid, with pH value o f 2.8 similar to that of Vinegar. It is likewise polluted with heavy 
metals especially zinc, copper and arsenic. The mud of 18,100 ppm of copper would be useable again as ore 
material.
5. Van Melle Phils, Inc.-Confectionary Factory
This firm has been discharging untreated waste water with unacceptable levels o f pollutants into the Laguna 
de Bay, Philippines. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has discovered that it was not meeting 
pollution standards set for factories which dump their waste water.
6. Coca-Cola Plant in San Fernando Pampanga, Philippines
Coca Cola does not have a treatment facility for their waste disposal. The plant has been inspected on 3 
occasions from 1973-1987.
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7. Dole Philippines
Dole Phils is a la r ç  pineapple and banana TNC controlling vast tracts of Mindanao’s arable land. Dole used 
bulldozers to eject B laan families, a tribal community from their homes at the foot o f Mount Matutum in 
bourn Cotabato. Original creeks were bulldozed to flatten the area and diverted into big creeks and then into
nv.frs\ When heavy rain comes the rivers rush enormous force into the sea, bringing huge amounts of eroded 
soil with them. © & &
8. The Philippine Forests
During the 1980s, out of total exports of US$57.064 billion, a cumulative average of 61.2% was accounted 
for by resource-based exports mainly forest products, wood manufactures and furniture and fixtures and 
mineral products. From the period 1972 to 1988, the Philippine logging industry earned US$42.85 billion by 
levelling 8.57 million hectares o f forest. In 1991, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR) issued in order banning logging in the remaining virgin forests of the Philippines. Recently, the 
DENR has banned the exportation of lumber and logs.
Sources:
R. Offeneo, ‘Japan and the environmental degradation of the Philippines’, in M. Howard (ed.), Asia’s 
Environmental Crisis, Westview Press, 1993, pp. 211-216; C. Aldana-Benitez and C. Posadas, TNCs: In 
the Thick of Everything, IBON TNC Book Series, IBON Philippines Databank and Research Center, 
1994, pp. 80-87; R. Broad with J. Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in 
the Philippines, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, pp. 35-36; J. Teehankee, ‘The state, 
illegal logging, and environmental NGOs in the Philippines’, Kasarinlan: Philippine Environmental 
Politics, vol. 9, no. 1, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, Q3 1993, pp. 21, 31-32.
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Appendix 4.1
The Research and Development Consortia in the Philippines
BICARRD - Bicol Consortium for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development 
CCARRD - Caraga Consortium for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development 
CEMARRDEC - Central Mindanao Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
CLARRDEC - Central Luzon Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
CVARRD - Cagayan Valley Agriculture and Resources Research and Development 
CV-CIRRD - Central Visayas Consortium for Integrated Resources Research and Development 
HARRDEC - Highland Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
NOMCARRD - Northern Mindanao Consortium for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development 
SMARRDEC - Southern Mindanao Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
STARRDEC - Southern Tagalog Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
WESMARRDEC - Western Mindanao Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium 
WESVARRDEC - Western Visayas Agriculture and Resources Research and Development Consortium
Source: William Dar, The Philippine National Agricultural Research System: A Catalyst for Economic 
Growth and Sustainable Development, PCARRD-DOST, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1997.
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Appendix 4.2
Evolution of the Agricultural Extension System in The Philippines
17th Century - Spanish missionaries introduced changes in the cropping patterns in the country through the 
establishment o f ‘Granjas Modelos’ or model farms (e.g. Negros Occidental for sugarcane, Pampanga for 
rice, Isabela for tobacco). These model farms became Farm Schools or demonstration centres for farmers. 
1902 - Formal extension service was first introduced with the creation of the Bureau of Agriculture by the 
Americans.
1910 - A demonstration and extension division was created within the Bureau.
1929 - Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) and Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) were organised; agricultural 
extension was placed under BPI.
1936 - Provincial Agricultural Extension Service were established.
1952 - Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAEx) was created upon the recommendation of the United States 
Economic Survey Mission.
1963 - BAEx was renamed Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC) and placed under Office of the 
Philippine President. APC was tasked to support the agricultural reform program and intensified the 
promotion and development of Agricultural Co-operatives.
1967 - Decentralisation Act authorised the local government to provide agricultural extension service 
alongside centralised extension service.
1972 - APC was reverted back to BAEx.
1978 - Ministry o f Agriculture was reorganised converting the line bureaus (BPI, BAI, Bureau of Soils, and 
BAEx) into staff bureaus.
1980 - Agricultural extension service was directed to transfer appropriate technologies using the farming 
systems research and extension approach and tasked to accelerate institutional and human resource 
development.
1987 - Ministry o f Agriculture and Food regionalised and reorganised into Department of Agriculture (DA) 
and BAEx transformed into the Agricultural Training Institute. Some important aspects of the reorganisation 
included the following: the DA will provide comprehensive extension service and training to farmers and 
other agricultural entrepreneurs; ATI will be responsible for the multi-level training of agricultural extension 
workers and their clientele with emphasis on technology transfer techniques.
1992 - The Local Government Code (LDC) has devolved major functions and powers from national central 
agencies to local government units (LGUs). Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities 
were among those transferred to the LGUs’ responsibility. Specifically, examples of these services include 
the following: distribution of planting materials, demonstration farms, prevention and control of plant and 
animal pests and diseases, operation of animal breeding stations and artificial insemination centres, 
assistance o f farmer co-operatives, and others.
Sources: ATI, Managing Municipal Agricultural Extension m the Philippines Manual, pp. 8-9; S Obien, 
Some observations on the acquisition and transfer of agricultural technology, paper presented during the 
6th Philippine Productivity Movement Conference, 1987, pp. 3-5; E. Brown and A. Librero, Agncultural 
and rural sector: agricultural extension and training system (Philippines), Country report during the 
Training Course on Agricultural Extension Methodologies, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1991, pp. 2-3.
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Appendix 4.3
Basic Features of The Farming Systems Research Approach
1. The problem-solving approach. This component of the FSR seeks to identify priority problems and needs 
of the target clientele through exploratory survey or rapid resource appraisal (RRA).
2. Inter-disciplinary approach. Implementation of FSR seeks to involve an inter-disciplinary collaboration 
among researchers or implementors. This will enable them to look at the systems interaction of the FSR 
issues under consideration.
3. On-farm research or establishment of adaptation/verification trials in farmers ’field. Technology 
adaptation or verification trials or on-farm research makes possible the identification of appropriate location- 
specific technologies. It tests if  a technology for dissemination in a given location is better than the existing 
farmers’ practices.
4. Participatory approach. All FSR-related projects promote farmers’ participation. Farmers give feedback 
on proposed new technology and help plan on-farm trials. They themselves implement cropping pattern trials 
under the supervision of site staff.
5. Strengthen linkages and interfacing among farmers, extension workers, and researchers. In FSR, the 
farmer contributes his knowledge about his farming system. The researcher and extension worker provide 
economic and technical knowledge that may supplement or explain the process involved in the farming 
system. Together they decide on what activities need to be done, need testing or more research work.
6. Feedback mechanism. This is enhanced through farmers’ involvement in the field trials and other FSR- 
related activities. Feedbacks are relayed to on-station and on-farm researchers for improving or modifying 
alternative technology options more suitable to location-specific conditions.
7. Holistic. Most FSR advocates the holistic approach to farming system. However, CIMMYT approach 
argues that the restricted form is more applicable because farmers find it difficult to adopt a number of 
technologies at the same time.
Source: B. del Rosario, B. Burgos, L. Oliva, andN. Llemit, 1994.
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Appendix 4.4
DSC Case in Barangay Tacunan, Davao, Philippines
Based on the DSC process flow, the following activities were undertaken in Tacunan:
Needs assessment
Rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and Key Informant Panel (KIP) were conducted by the DSC staff and RACO in 
Southern Mindanao. These activities initially determined the picture of the community. 
Development/project objectives
People in the community identified and articulated their problems through the problem tree analysis. Three 
maps were made by the community: topography, hydrology, and social/enterprise maps. The problem tree 
exhibited the community’s own analysis of their situation and provided cues on what development project 
should be focused on.
Situation Analysis
Communication resources in Tacunan and media access and preferences of the people were analysed.
Target Audience Analysis
The DSC staff together with RACO conducted the baseline knowledge, attitude, practices survey. To further 
get informal data from the community, focus group interviews were conducted. Three technologies needing 
development support communication were identified, namely ‘bunchy top’ control in Banana, soil sampling 
technique, and Rhinoceros beetle control.
Objective Setting, Preparation and Pre-testing of Prototype Materials
DSC communication campaign objectives were set; communication approaches, messages, media materials 
were identified in consultation with local leaders.
For communication strategy, a community audiotower system or CATS was put up in Tacunan 
accompanying trainings on script writing, broadcasting, and operating CATS. Community leaders were 
identified representing six sectors, namely farmers, women, youth, barangay health workers, barangay 
council, and co-operative.
The community leaders bound themselves into the Radyo Tacunan organisation. The organisation 
mobilised the community to co-share in terms of labour and construction materials in putting up the radio 
station to house CATS equipment. Radyo Tacunan became the nucleus for which all community 
development activities are channelled. Along with CATS are the use of demonstration farm on banana 
seedling bank, printed materials production, and video/personal interaction of DSC staff with farmers. The 
use of field trips and educational tours enhanced cohesiveness of the community.
Source: B. del Rosario, B. Burgos, L. Oliva and N. Llemit, 1994.
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Appendix 4.5
Tools Employed in the RED Process
1. Quick Resource Appraisal (QRA) is a quick and systematic method for evaluating technologies of their 
potential to support or improve enterprises. The QRA guides the RED team in identifying and evaluating the 
gaps which may hinder the establishment of an enterprise, in terms of R&D, technology packaging, 
production system, organisation and management, and linkages. QRA uses a specific rating system that 
requires the consensus of RED team members. Ratings based on team’s consensus are determined and 
justified based on first hand information from the farmers. The process of deliberation, justification, and 
consensus on the ratings lead to the identification of gaps and the extent to which they prove limiting.
2. Risk Management Process (RMP) is employed to determine the risks associated with gaps identified in 
QRA. RMP determines whether these risks are manageable (pure) or uncontrollable (speculative). A risk is 
said to be pure if  this is predetermined and therefore can be managed with known interventions. A risk is 
classified as speculative if it is indeterminate and if at certain point in time, there is no known intervention 
for it or one does not have the capability to intervene. On this basis, an enterprise is judged as a viable 
proposition if  most if  not all of the risks identified are pure and if most if not all speculative risks can be 
made into pure risks. RMP provides the basis for pinpointing interventions, for intelligently making a choice 
to where interventions will be sourced, and finally for determining whether there is an enterprise or none. It 
gives the go signal to proceed with the bigger tasks of business plan or feasibility preparation.
3. Backward Resource Inventory System (BRIS). The choices of potential enterprises may be narrowed down 
or focused through QRA and RMP. Thereafter, BRIS becomes a useful tool for systematically identifying 
the basic assumptions that will be considered in the business plan preparation. It is a reverse type of analysis 
considering the resource inventory o f the clientele relevant to the production of specific products.
QRA, RMP and BRIS are established based on first hand information from the clientele themselves, 
through ocular inspection and complemented by secondary data about the target co-operative and community 
where it is located. The conduct of QRA and RMP in the field is guided by the rules of ‘no role playing 
(letting go o f official designations)’; no note taking; cross-checking information; creativity; and teamwork. 
These rules encourage effective listening and spontaneity of discussion that result to more meaningful 
information for QRA and RMP. Biases (if any) are avoided if QRA and RMP results are validated with the 
target co-operatives by a RED team different from the first who conducted them.
Sources: D. Gorrez, J. Baltazar, and B. Burgos, The rural-based enterprise development (RED) process in support to Philippines 2000, 
paper presented during the PHILARM’s National Forum on ‘Contributing to Philippines 2000 through Research Utilisation’, IRRI, 
Los Banos, Laguna, 26-27 May 1994; A. Aquino and B. Burgos, Development-oriented research in agriculture and natural 
resources in the Philippines, working paper for the International Course on Development-oriented Research in Agriculture , ICRA,
Wageningen, The Netherlands, 10 January-28 July, 1994.
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Appendix 4.6
RED Case: Wood-based Integrated Development Of Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) 
Areas in Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental, Philippines
The business plan for the project was packaged by RED teams o f  Northern Mindanao 
using the RED process and m ethodologies. It was submitted to and funded by USAID. Through 
the ‘seed fund concept’, the amount granted to the project will be paid without interest and shall be 
put under a trust fund. The amount recovered will be used to create and fund new enterprises. The 
business project involves the production and processing o f an endemic species known as Mamalis, 
an important source o f  woodworks in Bukidnon, Northern Mindanao. It brings together in 
partnership a private sector engaged in the manufacture o f  wood-waste products; farmers' co­
operative involved in the production o f  Mamalis and other fast-growing tree species to provide 
raw material supply (twigs and branches) o f  the private sector; and RED teams to provide 
localised project management and interventions. The private sector is now producing fashion 
accessories, home office decors, and toys for export (80%) and local market (20%). While waiting 
for the farmers' trees to grow to their harvestable stage, wood supply for the processing plant 
comes from existing natural stands. The private sector intends to provide a more equitable profit 
sharing schem e with the farmers through the introduction o f  a first-line wood processing 
technologies right in the upland area to produce more value-added products.
Source: B. del Rosario, B. Burgos, L. Oliva, and N. Llemit, 1994.
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Foreign Funded Agricultural Development Programs
1. Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP) was funded by the World Bank (through the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) from 1981 to 1991 with total support of 
US$19.9 million, during which period the concept of farming systems research was popularised in 
the Philippines. ASSP was aimed at improving support services in the agricultural sector to raise 
agricultural productivity and improve nutrition. The project originally provided funding for 
agricultural research, crop, and livestock regulatory services and agricultural planning and 
management through 24 components. The project redesigns added new components, namely 
agricultural extension and soil services (first re-design) and later eight more components—sugar 
R&D, ramie R&D, construction of additional regional research centre, tribal agriculture, and 
support for the National Post-Harvest Institute for Research and Extension and three headquarters 
units of the DA (second redesign).1
2. Rainfed Resources Development Project (RRDP) was jointly implemented by DA, DENR, and 
PCARRD. Funding for the project amounting to US$7.1 million was sourced from USAID and 
counterpart funds from the Philippine government. Its main objectives were to develop 
institutional capacities and policy frameworks to support community-based approach to land and 
water resources management in the settled upland forest, rainfed agricultural areas and coastal 
zone.2 Through the RRDP project, huge investments were poured into the NARS to build up its
R&D capability.
3. Accelerated Agricultural Productivity Project (AAPP) a USAID funded project, aimed at 
restoring and accelerating agricultural growth and increase rural investments, income and 
employment through strengthening of agricultural planning, economic and policy analysis, and 
market information systems, and the improvement of irrigation and marketing services. The 
project’s estimated cost was US$27.0 million and implemented by DA in collaboration with the
NARS.3
4. Integrated Social Forestry Program o f  the Philippines (ISFP) was implemented by DENR and 
supported jointly by USAID and the Philippine government. ISFP was a people-focused forestry
Appendix 4.7
1 Operations Evaluation Department, WB, op. cit., p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid.
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development program which is premised on the assumption that forest occupants are an integral 
part of the forest ecosystem and therefore must be properly considered. It encouraged active 
participation of the forest occupants in project planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation.4
5. Natural Resources Management Program (NRMP)-Technology Development and Transfer 
(TDT). The NRMP is a result of a bilateral agreement between the governments of USA and the 
Philippines. NRMP has five components of which TDT is tasked with technology 
commercialisation, product research, directed research and training. With DENR as the lead 
agency, NRMP is implemented in focal regions of country where residual forests remain intact. 
The major concept of TDT is the integration of the production sector with the processing sector to 
manufacture products or good for an identified market. The production sector are upland dwellers 
in Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) and CARP areas who produce raw materials from local sources 
for processing while at the same time conserving and even expanding the forest base. The interim 
enterprises are meant to address the immediate needs of the upland dwellers for viable sources of 
income, while the growing of tree species is for sustainable utilisation of the resources on a long 
term economic rotation basis. The private sector provides the processing capabilities for wood or 
non-wood-based products, with the added value being equitably shared with the upland sector. The 
NRMP-TDT applies the RED strategy, a concept/model developed and pilot tested by local 
experts. Major innovations introduced into the program include the RED tools and the provision of 
seed fund, localised PMO, and S&T networking system.5
4 Ibid.,p. 104.
5 David Gorrez, op. cit., pp. 67-69.
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Appendix 5.1
Co-operative Principles
1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership
Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept 
the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination.
2nd Principle: Democratic Member Control
Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting 
their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are accountable to 
the membership.
3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part 
of that capital is usually the common property of the co-operative. They usually receive limited 
compensation, if  any, on capital subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for 
any or all o f the following purposes: developing the co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of 
which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co­
operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership.
4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they enter into 
agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do 
so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy.
5th Principle: Education, Training and Information
Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and 
employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They inform the 
general public—particularly young people and opinion leaders—about the nature and benefits of co-operation. 
6th Principle: Co-operation Among Co-operatives
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working 
together through local, national, regional and international structures.
7th Principle: Concern For Community
While focusing on member needs, co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities 
through policies accepted by their members.
Source: ICA, 8 January 1996
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Appendix 5.2
Summary of Important Factors Contributing to Co-operative Success or Failure
a) Orientation factors (within the co-operative)
Leadership - the ability to articulate, motivate and stimulate others.
Sound management - the ability to deploy resources in such a way as to serve needs and create more 
resources.
Training - learning skills required to operate an organisation.
Education - the continual flow of information to develop members’ capacities to participate effectively in 
decision-making.
Linkages - the need for relationships with other institutions and co-operatives.
Variety - the adaptation of the ‘co-operative model’ to the particular community context.
Individualised planning - the co-operative addressing situation specific needs in a phased manner.
b) Membership Characteristics
Participation - full and direct involvement in the planning of the co-operative’s activities.
Open membership - membership open and voluntary.
c) Government Environment
Favourable climate - conditions that allow co-operatives to flourish.
Sensitisation - education of the co-operative logic by government officials and others.
Legal status - legal recognition through legislation which grants co-operatives the right to exist and to 
function.
Integrated development - co-operative development seen as a part of overall socio-economic development 
plans.
Harmonisation of objectives - co-operatives must work together for political or legislative ends.
Adequate time frame - new activities undertaken must not exceed the co-operatives’ ability to absorb them.
Source: ‘Why co-operatives succeed or fail: A compendium of views by International Co-operative Experts , 
Washington D.C., USAID, 1984, quoted in Craig, 1993.
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Appendix 7.1
_____________ Local Government Units (LGUs) In The Philippines
There are four political subdivisions of local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines, namely: 
The Barangay
The barangay is the smallest political unit of LGUs. Based on Presidential Decree No. 86-A issued on 5 
January 1973, the barangay shall ‘constitute the base for citizen participation in governmental affairs and the 
collective views o f the people in the barangay shall be considered in the formulation of national policies and 
programs and whenever practicable shall be translated into concrete and specific decisions’. The barangay 
serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government programs, projects and activities and 
the venue through which the government directly interacts with the people. It is only the barangay that has 
been expressly given the role of interest articulation, but the decisions of the people only serve as guides for 
action by the national government.
The Municipality
The municipality consists of a group of barangays and serves as a general-purpose government for the 
coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services within its jurisdiction. It delivers services 
which tend to be daily, direct and area specific such as environmental sanitation garbage collection, certain 
aspects o f education, health services, markets, water, power, telephone facilities, etc.
The City
The city is like a municipality but it covers more urbanised and developed communities. It serves as a 
general-purpose government for the coordination and delivery of all basic, regular and direct services within 
its jurisdiction. The major differences between municipality and city are as follows: the latter delivers all 
basic services to its constituents, it concentrates all its resources on urban problems while the former on more 
rural outlying barangays. The city enjoys more autonomy from the supervision of the province.
The Province . . . .  . .
The province is composed of a group of municipalities and component cities. It assumes area-wide, more 
specialised functions, roles and activities and serves as a mechanism for more efficient delivery of services 
for the development process. It is relatively a much larger area and more remote from the people.
Sources- Raul de Guzman and Mila Reforma. ‘Local government: Organisation, powers, and functions, 
relationship with central government’ in Perfecto Padilla (ed.) Strengthening Local Government 
Administration and Accelerating Local Development. Local Government Center, College of Public 
Administration, University o f the Philippines, The Asia Foundationphilippines 1992; R. de Guzman 
and M. Reforma, ‘Local government: Organisation, powers, and functions, relationship with central 
government’, in Raul de Guzman and Mila Reforma, Government and Politics of the Philippines, 
Southeast Asian Studies Program, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988.
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Built-in Research of the Project 'Demonstration and Pilot Application of Technology 
Packages and Production Systems of Bamboo and Rattan9
Appendix 7.2
1. Growth Performance of Outplanted Rattan (Palasan) Applied with Different Levels of Trichoderma 
Compost
The study was conducted to the newly outplanted rattan seedlings (0.50 ha.) within the ten-hectare project 
area to determine the effect of Trichoderma compost on the outplanted rattan. The Trichoderma (fungus that 
hastens the decomposition of farm-waste materials) compost was applied sidedressed 20 cm from the base of 
the outplanted rattan seedlings with different levels of application: A - control, B - 0.50 kg/hill, C - 1 kg/hill, 
D - 1.50 kg/hill, E - 2 kg/hill. The study had four treatments with four replications using Randomised 
Complete Block Design. The treatments have 16 experimental plants. Data gathering was conducted every 
two months starting January 1994 as a baseline data. After one year, the result was computed using the 
ANOVA set at 5%, at 1% level of significance. The results revealed that the outplanted rattan applied with 
various rates of Trichoderma compost was insignificant, meaning that with or without application of 
Trichoderma compost the growth performance of rattan was the same for treatments B to E. However, 
treatment A results showed the same effect to those with various levels of Trichoderma level application.
2. Rattan Plantation Establishment on Partially Shaded and Open Areas
The objective o f this research was to demonstrate and test the suitability of rattan in open and partially 
shaded areas. The experiment was conducted within the ten-hectare project area. Potted rattan seedlings were 
planted at 2m x 2m planting distance with a total population of 200 seedlings (0.18 ha.). Acacia mangium 
were used as nurse trees for the rattan on partially shaded areas.
3. Pilot Plantation of 1 Hectare Giant Bamboo
A one-hectare giant bamboo plantation was established at 10m x 10m planting distance with a total of 100 
seedlings. This was conducted to demonstrate and test the suitability of giant bamboo in Region VI and to 
have a supply of planting stock and bamboo poles for cottage industries and possible source of bamboo 
board for furniture industries. It was expected that after five years, the cooperative could supply the 
fisherfolks near the area of giant bamboo poles. There was a standby order of the first 200 poles at 100 pesos 
per pole. The cooperative also conducted research on ‘single to double node branch cutting’ as seed planting
material.
Source: Terminal Report of the project entitled: ‘Oemonstfation andPilot Application of Technology 
Packages and Production Systems on Bamboo and Rattan , DbJNK-vi.
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Production Systems and Technology Packages on Bamboo and Rattan
1. Bamboo Related Systems and Packages
1.1 Production Systems. Bamboos can be established in plantations or planted with other crops. The 
monopodial type is more suitable in mix planting. Also, bamboo can be planted as boundary crops to mark 
boundaries o f lands or as shelterbelts to protect crops on either side. These can be planted in backyards to 
provide an immediate source o f foodstuffs and raw materials for household jobs. When established in 
plantation, bamboos are planted usually in strips or lines similar to traditional reforestation schemes. In mix 
planting the scheme can be designed to fit the requirements of the user. A few clumps of bamboos may be 
established in backyards. The species popularly used include: Bambusa blumeana, B. vulgaris, Gigantochloa 
levis, G. after, Dendrocalamus merrilianus,Schizostachyum lumampao, S. lima, Dendrocalamus aspera, 
Sphaerobambos philippinensis.
A matboard production system developed in India is available for transfer to other countries. 
Provided the obtaining conditions in the Philippines are favourable, a collaborative technology transfer 
activity can be arranged between two countries.
1.2 Adaptability. The aforementioned bamboo species can grow in almost any type of soil which is not 
extremely acidic or alkaline. They grow best in well drained sandy loam to clay loam soil within a pH of 5.0 
- 6.0 at an altitudinal range between sea level to about 1,500 m above sea level (asl). Some species of 
Phyllostachys grow well at 1,500 meters asl. Bamboo thrives in places with temperature ranging from 8.8 - 
36 degrees Celcius. Bamboos grow bigger and taller in places of high humidity and fertile soil.
1.3 Propagation. Vegetative techniques which include offset, culm cutting, and branch-marcott culm 
cuttings are the more important ways o f propagating bamboo. Offset is best for 5. lima and S. lumampao. 
Culm and branch-marcott culm cutting techniques are suited for Bambusa, Dendrocalamus, 
Sphaerombambos, and Gigantochloa.. Offset, culm and branch-marcott culm cutting propagules must come 
from 1-2 year old culms. Except for G. levis and S. philippinensis where the middle to top portion of the 
culm is the better source of culm cutting propagules the rest involve the butt to middle portion. Except and S. 
philippinensis, which must be planted upright or slanting, the rest must be planted horizontally or slanting. 
Collection of offset and branch-marcott culm cuttings must be done during the rainy season for best result.
A mixture o f sand and ordinary garden soil is best for rooting culm cuttings. Culm propagules are 
ready for transplanting after two to three months in the nursery.
1.4. Field Planting. Planting holes must be big (between 30 x 30 cm and 50 x 50 cm) and deep enough to 
accommodate the planting stock. Spacing can be as close as 4 x 4 m (for S. lima) to as wide as 10 x 10 m (B. 
blumeana). Planting must be done early in the rainy season.
Appendix 7.3
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1.5. Care and Maintenance. Regular weeding of competing vegetation during the first two years is needed to 
enhance growth and survival o f planted stocks. Fertilisation at a rate o f 20-30 kg. of nitrogen, 10-15 kgs. 
each of phosphate and phosphorous, and 20-30 kg. of silica may be applied after one month of planting and 
repeated after three or four months may be done to improve vegetative growth.
1.6. Harvesting. Depending on the end-use harvesting may be done three to five years after establishment. 
Harvesting must be done during the dry season when the starch content is at minimum level and there are no 
emerging shoots. Overmature and defective culms must be cut. Selection cutting for mature culms must be 
practiced to sustain the productivity o f the clump.
1.7. Seasoning. Seasoning of bamboo may be done by air-drying or kiln drying. The former may last for four 
weeks or more while the latter about nine days.
1.8. Preservation. Penetration of preservative is better when treating split bamboo. Water borne preservatives 
used include Talalith, Boliden, Wakman, Boraxboric, ZnCl, CuSO, ASCU and BHC. In the handicraft 
industry split culms are treated for one week in a solution of caustic soda and hydrogen peroxide. Unsplit 
culms are soaked for three to five months. For salt and water solution, culms are soaked for three days. In the 
fishing industry, preservative treatment is not advised due to the preservatives polluting effect. Besides, its 
prolonged immersion in water has preserving effects.
1.9. Manufacturing. In the handicraft industry, freshly cut bamboo is preferred as it affords easy and fine 
splitting. Keeping the culms under shade maintains the freshness of bamboo for a longer time. A patent on 
the production of bamboo parquet blocks for flooring and panelboards has been registered with the 
Philippine Patent Office since the early 1960s.
1.10. Species Conservation. Two living gardens for bamboo has been established at the Makiling 
Experimental Forest and at the Baguio City Experiment Station of the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR)
2. Rattan Related Systems and Packages
2.1 Production Systems. Unlike bamboos, indigenous rattan species can be established only under nurse 
crops such as coconut and tree plantations and secondary & virgin forests because these species cannot 
tolerate fully open areas. These need shade to survive and develop but react negatively in heavily shaded 
areas.
Commercial species of rattan include: Calamus merrilli, C. omatus var. philippinensis, C. 
filispadix, C. caesius. C. microsphaerion, Daemonorops mollis, D. oligolepis, C. scipionum, C 
dimorphacanthus, and C. siphonosphatum. Alternate species include: C. marginatus and C. grandiflorus for 
C. merrilli and C. omatus var. philippinensis and C. lavensis for C. caesius.
2.2 Adaptability. Rattan can be grown in areas o f more than 2,000 m. above sea level (asl). Generally, most 
rattan species have a wide altitudinal range. However, some species are confined to specific soil and 
altitudinal ranges. Rattan generally grow faster in partially open/shaded than in heavily shaded areas. 
Extreme dryness can cause sucker mortality.
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2.3 Propagation. Rattan can be propagated through asexual and sexual methods. Suckers are primarily used 
for the asexual or vegetative technique. These are sideshoots or plantlets growing out of the basal nodes of 
mature rattan plants. This technique is recommended only when seeds are not sufficient or available. Most 
rattan species seed profusely posing no problems in sexual propagation. Also, the phenology of most species 
have been fully established.
2.4 Propagation o f Planting Stocks. Production of planting stocks is done best by raising seedlings. Removal 
of the hilar cover o f individual seeds ensure speedy and high percentage of seed germination. Most recently, 
the use o f germinants as planting stocks prove successful. Suckers may be raised in the nursery before 
outplanting.
2.5 Field Planting. Rattan are planted in rows or strips like in ordinary reforestation schemes. Ring weeding 
is usually done during the first two years o f plantation establishment. Fertilisation may be done to provide 
booster and enhance the survival o f the seedling.
2.6 Harvesting. Harvest only mature rattan canes. Falling off of leafsheaths indicates that the cane is already 
mature. As prophylactic control for stain, dip canes into solution of Dowicide 6 (1 kg. per 100 litres of 
water).
2.7 Treatment and Seasoning. Bleaching of heavily stained rattan can be done by dipping the material for 
two hours in hydrogen peroxide, sodium hydroxide, sodium silicate and tergitol solution heated at 50 degrees 
Celsius. Using a rattan pole dryer, canes can be dried down to 15 percent moisture content within 64 hours.
2.8 Processing. Different types o f jigs have been designed to facilitate the preparation of rattan canes for 
manufacture. Scraping of rattan skin may be done using a scraping machine equipped with a spokeshave 
metal scraper. A drying tunnel can be used to facilitate the finishing of rattan furniture products.
2.9 Species Conservation. A living collection of Philippine rattan containing 493 samples representing 30 
species and six varieties has been established to provide genetic materials both for propagation and species 
improvement purposes.
Source: PCARRD, Integrated R&D Project on Bamboo and Rattan (Phase III)
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Appendix 7.4
Giant Bamboo Clonal Propagation and Production Technology
Introduction
Bamboo is considered as one of the most valuable forest and farm products in our country today. Because of 
its low price comparing it to lumber it is considered as a "poor man’s lumber” .
Bamboo is the worlds biggest and tallest grass and the biggest and tallest among the bamboo species 
is the Dendrocalamus asper known to us as the giant bamboo or the ‘Apos’ in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. It is an 
erect bamboo with thick walled culm and swollen nodes with aerial roots from the lower portion. Being so 
big in size it has a great advantage when it comes to uses compared to other bamboo- species.
Description and Distinguishing Features Of The Giant Bamboo 
(Dendrocalamus asper)
Culms are erect and spineless and grows up to 20 meters tall; intemodes is 20-40 cm. long and 20-25 cm in 
diameter. The intemode of the young culm is covered with brown hairs that becomes deciduous when the 
culm matures, the nodes are slightly raised and rooting at the lower ones. There are several branches at each 
node, and one is larger than the rest with basal bracts. The culm sheat are deciduous but the lower ones have 
persistent hairs and the inner surface shiny, glabrous, with reflexed blades.
Distribution
Giant Bamboo is cultivated in Impasugong, Malaybalay and its adjacent areas . It is also being cultivated in 
Los Baños, Laguna, Baguio City, Samar, Leyte and Taminla, Dueñas, Iloilo (Tabarga MPC).
1. Selection/Collection Of Planting Stock
Select branches from a good mother clump of giant bamboo. The culm should be from 1 1/2 to 2 years old. 
Collect only those branches which are bigger and are found on the upper portion of the culm. Cut the 
branches carefully using a sharp saw or bolo.
2. Transport of Collected Propágales
Immediately after collection, planting materials, must be placed inside wet sack. If planting materials will be 
transported in far places they must be packed in boxes with wet saw dust and properly arrange to avoid 
dehydration which will cause low germination
3. Planting Stock Preparation and Potting
Prior to the collection of planting stock,see to it that all materials needed for propagation like plastic potting 
bags, potting medium, rooting hormones, clonal chamber, etc. are ready. Soak the bottom of the branches in 
the mixture of 5 - 10% rooting hormone for at least 3-5 minutes. Then plant it inside the potting bag with 
ordinary garden soil. Place the potted cuttings under shade with 50 - 60% sunlight or inside the clonal 
chamber.
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4. Clonal Propagation
After propagules are potted they are placed inside the clonal chamber. The cuttings inside the clonal chamber 
must be reached by the sunlight at least 30-40%. The chamber is covered with plastic to maintain high 
relative humidity inside the chamber which will hasten the growth of the root system. The potted propagules 
should stay inside the chamber for at least one month
5. Hardening
After propagules have developed leaves and root systems the plants must be hardened off. Gradually remove 
the shade o f the rearing shed until such time the plant could withstand the direct heat of the sun. Likewise, 
watering will also be controlled, 
ó. Outplanting
After the plants have undergone hardening, they are ready for outplanting. Prepare the planting holes in 
advance, the size of hole is 1/2 meter cube. In digging, separate the top soil from sub-soil. Before planting 
place the top soil at the bottom of the hole then place the plant and cover it with the sub-soil. The surface of 
the soil in the planting hole should be lower than the natural ground. Planting distance of giant bamboo in 
pure stand is 10m X 10m or if used as a water embankment stabilisation, it is spaced at 5m - 7m between 
hills and rows using the zigzag double row.
7. Maintenance and Protection
The bamboo plants should be well maintained especially during the first two years. Ring weeding at 1-2 
meters in diameter must be conducted and weeding frequency varies depending on the kind and population 
of the dominant weed species. Basal application of 50-100 grams of complete fertiliser (T 14) 15 cm. around 
the base o f the plant should be conducted on newly planted bamboo, and every quarter thereafter for one 
year. Mulching must also be practiced in order to reduce water loss from the soil and also to supply certain 
amount o f plant nutrients from organic mulch for the plant. In cases of bamboo plantation, firelines should 
be constructed, especially if the planting site is located in cogonal areas. The fireline should be constructed at 
the end of the rainy season. Watering is also important after outplanting, after one week without rain 
watering should be carried out. Fence must be installed to protect the plants from stray animals and bamboo 
shoot gatherers.
8. Harvesting
Harvesting is considered as one o f the principal activities of bamboo production. Knowledge and 
information on the different aspects o f harvesting operation of bamboo is of great importance because it is 
the culmination of all production efforts.
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Some Considerations In Harvesting:
1. Culm age - the strength, durability and other physio mechanical properties of a bamboo culm is a function 
of its age. Harvesting age of giant bamboo for construction materials is between 3-5 years and for pulp yield 
the culm should be 3 years old.
2. Cutting time season - the best time to cut bamboo is during the dry season when the starch content of the 
bamboo culm is low.
3. Cutting height- Cutting of harvestable culm should be done as close as possible to the ground.
Compiled by Neil G. Gigare, Arturo M. Rerospolo, Francisco B. Binoya, Jr., Department o f Environment
S ourc^ P fflo f A m su iN ursery1Techniques and plantation establishment, hand-outs on bamboo 
^^nronagarion aS*management, 17 April 1995; Umali, Paulino Jr., Identification of some unp°rtant 
bamboos found in the Philippines, hand-outs on Bamboo propaganon and m a n a g e m c ^
Technology Transfer Series, Commercialised nodal propagation, DENR, vol. 3 no 3, May to June ivw .
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Coconut Fibre Production from Coconut Husk
Coconut husks are waste materials from copra production for coconut oil processing. 
Copra is dried coconut meat that produces coconut oil. Coconut husks are normally used as 
fuel or medium for plant propagation. However, husks can produce more value-added by­
products such as fibre. Furniture making business uses coir fibre as filling material for 
mattresses or upholstered seats. Other uses of coco-coir fibre include brushes, ropes and 
twines yam, carpets/rugs/doormats, plant pads/liners, insulation materials, and particle 
boards.
Coco coir fibre is extracted from coco husks through the process of decortication. 
The main component of the decorticating technology is the decorticating machine and its 
accessories. The machines procured by Lutucan MPC have 4BA1 type engine and operate 
on an 8-hour basis, consuming about 65 to 70 litres of diesel fuel. They use the water 
coolant system, where the water that circulated into the radiator is changed every two days 
to prevent overheating. The machine has a capacity of 13,000 pieces of husks daily, with 
two passing. The 13,000 pieces of coconut husks produce about 1.3 metric tons of fibre or 
50 to 60 bales of fibre weighing 20 to 25 kilograms each. The main product of Lutucan 
coco-coir plant is coco-coir fibre. Coco fibre production, as applied by Lutucan MPC, 
involves the following steps:
1. Soaking. Soaking of husks is done for easy decortication. When the husks dry up, they 
become brittle and more difficult to decorticate. Husks are placed for a certain period of 
time in a soaking tank.
2. First P a ss . After soaking, the husks are fed into the decorticating machine for the first 
stage of decortication. The first pass usually lasts for five hours before all the 13,000 pieces 
of husks are finished. Fibres produced during this stage are not yet fully decorticated. Dust 
are also produced during this operation.
3. Second Pass. Fibres produced from the fir s t pass are fed again to the machine for the 
second p a ss , which is faster than the first one, lasting for about 3 hours. More dust are 
produced at this stage.
Appendix 8.1
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4. D rying . A cemented area at the plant site serves as the drying area for the coir fibres. 
When the sunshine is good, drying lasts for 4 hours. Drying operations stops during rainy 
days.
5. Baling and Storing. After drying, the coir fibres are baled for easy transport. The baling 
machine is alternately filled with fibre. Fibre is compacted with a presser. After the baling 
process, the baled fibres are weighed and stored or picked up by the buyer.
The coco coir plant operates 26 days a month but yearly operation is effectively 7 
to 8 months only because of the rainy season.
Source- Based on interview of Lutucan MPC and S. Medina, E, Matienzo, C. Medina, D, Manalo, and E. 
a L ù k  Documentation and Assessment of Successful Coconut Production, Provessing and Marketing 
Enterprises in Luzon, PCARRD and Farming Systems and Soil Research Institute, Los Banos, Laguna,
Philippines, 1997.
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Appendix 9.1
Member-Co-operatives of the Integrated Jalajala Federation of Co-operatives
(INJAFEDCO)
1. Sipsipin Multpurpose Co-operative (MPC) - started as a credit co-operative; involved farmer and non­
farmer members; with the most complete records and with orderly systems and procedures.
2. Jalajala MPC - a full credit co-operative.
3. Jalajala Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries MPC - created due to Land Bank of the Philippines’ credit
program.
4. Llano Farmers MPC - almost all services were purely for farmers; subsumed the irrigators’ association of
Llano; managed and operated irrigation facilities provided by IJRDP in Barangay Bayugo.
5. Samahang Nagkakaisa ng Punta MPC - operated as a credit co-operative.
6. Punta MPC - created due to the LandBank’s credit program; became inactive when LandBank support
ended.
7. Alibangbangan Multipurpose Farmer Co-operative, Inc. - a full farmer-membership co-operative; the
irrigators’ association in Barangay Palaypalay merged with the co-operative ; managed and operated 
irrigation facilities put up by IJRDP in the barangay.
8. Pagkalinawan MPC - co-operative created under IJRDP’s institutional development component; managed
the irrigation facilities constructed in Barangay Pagkalinawan by IJRDP
9. Tanglaw sa Kaunlaran MPC - already a co-operative before IJRDP; initiated through Meralco
Foundation’s support; quite inactive co-operative.
10. Bagumbong MPC - supported by LandBank but could not meet financial obligations to the bank due to 
defective management system; officials were active but not members.
Notes- The brief description o f co-operatives was derived from interview with Mr. Baraquiel de Guzman, 
Chairman o f INJAFEDCO. There were other associations in the municipality o f Jalajala that were not yet 
members o f INJAFEDCO like the Sipsipin Irrigator’s Association that managed and operated the 
irrigation facilities in Barangay Sipsipin.
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THE NATURE OF JAPAN’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE (ODA)
Introduction
Japan started to extend aid to Asian countries in 1954 to assist them in their 
socioeconomic development. Today, Japan is one of the top donors in the world in terms of ODA 
disbursement. In 1992, it was the major donor in 25 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
the Middle East. Japan’s ODA is described by JICA as based on the concepts of ‘humanitarian and 
moral considerations’ and the ‘recognition of interdependence among nations’.6 Other than these 
declared intentions, there were other views on Japan’s behaviour in aid.
Various explanations given by analysts of Japan’s aid behaviour were based on the 
following perspectives: mercantilist view—a Japan striving for greater global market shares; 
social patterns—personal and institutional relationship characterised by crosscutting ties with a 
central focus on achieving economic self-sufficiency and superiority; Japan’s vision of its 
leadership role in the international political economy; its self interest as the world’s largest 
creditor in maintaining a stable international economic system; a view that Japanese foreign 
economic decisions are in reaction to foreign pressure such as from the United States; and a 
perspective that sees Japanese aid policy as complementing Japan’s industrial policy and 
international economic objectives.7
The literature on Japan’s foreign aid is dominated by the evolutionary and historical 
perspective that sees the aid program in three major phases Phase 1 from the 1950s characterised 
by reparation payments to Burma, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam; Phase II from 1960s 
through the late 1970s with Japanese aid viewed as commercially motivated, a strategy to develop 
markets and ensure steady raw materials sources; and Phase III characterised by various motives 
that include political and security reasons and the desire for prestige and acceptance in the 
international economy.^
Appendix 9.2
6 Japan International Cooperation Agency document, 1995. .
7 Based on the literature review made by Margee Ensign, Doing Good and Doing Well: Japan s Foreign Aid
Program, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 7-11.
8 Ibid, p. 8.
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Types of Japanese Aid
There are three types of Japanese aid, namely bilateral grants, bilateral loans and technical 
assistance. Japan also contributes to multilateral donor organisations such as the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank. Grant aid is a type of financial assistance given to developing countries 
without obligation of repayment. The grant aid is generally used for aspects of basic human needs 
that are low in profitability such as medical care, public health, domestic water supply, rural and 
agricultural development, and human resource development.  ̂ Japan extends three kinds of 
bilateral loans, namely project loans, commodity loans and program lending. Loans are focused on 
economic infrastructure development and directed to medium-income countries that are seen to 
have developed and would soon no longer need aid.1̂
Institutions Involved and the Aid Process
Japan’s aid policy-making system involves four major ministries or agencies: the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Ministry of 
Finance (MOF); and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). These ministries are responsible for 
different aspects of the aid program. There is no agency that coordinates the activities of these four 
ministries on aid policy.
Two agencies were created to implement policy. The Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (OECF) is in charge of bilateral loans while the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) implements the grant aid, technical assistance and loans not handled by OECF. OECF is 
administratively under the EPA while JICA under MFA. Figure 1 shows how the grant aid 
program works.
JICA oversees the conduct of a basic design study in order to compile an optimum draft 
proposal necessary for the implementation of the project. The contents and effects of the proposed 
project are examined in terms of the system for maintenance and management in the recipient 
country. After the Exchange of Notes between the governments of Japan and the recipient country, 
JICA provides support to the recipient country to facilitate the smooth implementation of the 
project. JICA also provides follow-up services to ensure the continuing effectiveness of the 
project. Preliminary and full-scale survey, procurement and construction are administered by
JICA.9 101
9 JICA document, 1995.
10 David Potter, Japan’s Foreign Aid to Thailand and the Philippines, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p.
5.
11 JICA document, 1995.
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Various critics of the Japanese foreign aid program argue that the private sector has a 
major role in the making and implementation of the aid policy. They refer to the network of 
Japanese trading companies and construction firms that have strong allies in many developing 
countries and have their own networks in Tokyo through business related associations. These 
associations lobby members of the Diet and the bureaucracy to influence policies in their 
favour. 12 For instance, the Nippon Koei, Japan’s largest consulting company, is observed to rely 
on ODA for 30 percent of its contracts. The Japanese aid bureaucracy depends on the private firms 
at all stages of the aid process from project identification to implementation. 13
This reliance on Japanese firms is observable in the ‘request-based’ system of the 
Japanese foreign aid. The Japanese government requires that aid must be formally requested by the 
governments of the recipient countries. The request stage consists of eight steps (Figure 2) with 
JICA assisting through the whole process. 14
JICA coordinates the negotiations and confirmation of the ‘Scope of Work’ with the 
government of the recipient country. The field survey is conducted by a consultant chosen by JICA 
through the process of bidding. The survey results are studied in Japan and the final feasibility 
study presented to the appropriate ministries. The prime consultant or contractor that could assist 
in the request preparation must be Japanese. However, very recently the Japanese government has 
allowed foreign nationals and domestic consultants to become part of the study team (up to 25 % 
of the total number of study team members) and up to 50% of the subcontractors can be foreign.
It is this request-based nature of the aid program that raises the issue of the influence of 
the Japanese private sector on the request made by the recipient country. The Japanese companies 
or consultants and survey teams who assist the recipient government in preparing their request can 
advise the recipient as to which kind of projects will the Japanese government be most willing to 
fund. The consultants know the types of projects that will be acceptable to the aid bureaucracy in 
Japan. Threfore, they can influence what type of ‘request the recipient country will make.
This led the critics to conclude that the Japanese firms are open to charges of manipulating 
requests more advantageous to corporate rather than the recipient interests.^ These critics claim 
that requests could be developed such that only Japanese companies could meet the engineering 
specifications of the project.
12 Alan Rix, ‘Managing Japan’s Aid: ASEAN’ in Bruce Koppel and Robert Orr Jr. (eds), Japan’s Foreign
Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press, Colorado, 1993, pp. 8-9.
13 Potter, op cit., p. xv.
14 Ensign, op. cit., pp. 37-42.
15 Rix, op. cit., p. 9.
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Ensign cites an example in Patcharee Thanmai’s paper to illustrate this problem. This 
example concerns the Thammasat University in Thailand in which its proposal to acquire 
computer systems using Japanese foreign aid was approved for funding. There was a problem with 
purchasing during the implementation stage of the project. The Japanese government selected the 
contractors and there was only one company, NEC, that qualified because the proposal specified 
particular equipment that only NEC could supply. However, the problem with the equipment was 
that the university needed printers that could print both in English and Thai and at that time NEC 
did not have such printers.
Tied Aid
Tied aid means that aid monies must be principally but not necessarily totally utilised to 
procure goods and services from the donor country. 17 This condition gives the impression that the 
donor country does not allow their money to leave the country. The Japanese government has 
started a major untying of their assistance in the mid 1980s such that by 1990, based on their 
statistics, Japanese aid was 84.5 percent generally untied (recipient can use aid for procurement 
world-wide) and 15.5 percent partially untied (recipient can use aid for procurement from the 
donor and most other developing countries). 19
The Japanese government maintains that even at the request level, the engineering services 
component of the feasibility studies has become increasingly partially untied. However, many 
experts in the field of aid argue that while aid projects are untied officially, the real issue is that 
informal mechanisms or the complex web of relationships among Japan’s engineering and 
construction firms and the aid bureaucracy still ensure that Japanese firms will win bulk of the 
bids.
The case of the ODA to Thailand illustrates how strongly tied Japan aid was. Three major 
groups in Thailand—the Thai Construction Industry Associations (TCIA), the Consulting 
Engineers Association of Thailand (CEAT), and the Association of Siamese Architects (ASA)— 
were strongly opposed to Japanese ODA conditions that placed them in a disadvantageous position 
vis-a-vis the Japanese firms. Their discontent with the ODA conditions were aired and raised 
through the mass media; during conferences and seminars; and by appealing to the appropriate
16 Patcharee Thanmai, ‘Japanese and U.S. aid in Thailand’ quoted in Margee Ensign, Toward an empirical 
approach to high-stakes questions’, Doing Good and Doing Well: Japan s Foreign Aid Program, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 13-14.
17 Ensign, op. cit., p. 16.
18 Rix, op. cit., p. 10.
19 Ensign, op. cit. , pp 16-17.
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Thai government bodies and the Thai Chamber of Commerce to instruct Thai government 
agencies getting aid to give priority to Thai firms.20
To verify the view that indeed these Thai firms were dissatisfied with the ODA conditions, 
a survey was conducted by Chittiwatanapong among Thai managers of member-firms of TCIA, 
members of the CEAT, and members of ASA. The survey revealed that the majority of the Thai 
contractors and consulting firms believed that they were disadvantaged because almost all the 
bidding for engineering consulting works were won by Japanese consultants as ‘lead firms’.
The Thai architects on the other hand were very disturbed to see JICA’s grant projects in 
Thailand designed by Japanese architect for reasons of ‘cultural infiltration’. They felt that the 
Thai architectural beauty could best be expressed by Thai architects. They also questioned the 
unnecessary importing of expensive construction parts from Japan (e.g. roof tiles, toilets).
Tied assistance is also criticised for the difficulty of maintaining the facilities installed 
and/or constructed once projects are funded. For example the Philippine General Hospital 
completed in 1989 contained state of the art equipment purchased from Japan. However, parts for 
repairing equipment must come from Japan and funds were not available for these maintenance 
costs.21 The same is true with the Chiang Mai University medical faculty in northern Thailand. 
JICA provided the hospital with high technology equipment beyond the capabilities of the 
recipient institution to maintain.22
Concluding Statement
The implications of the request-based system of Japanese aid program for the Integrated 
Jalajala Rural Development Project (IJRDP) are covered in the main body of chapter 9.
20 Prasert Chittiwatanapong, ‘Perspectives on Japan’s ODA relations with Thailand , in Bruce Koppel and
R o b e r t ^  Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press, Colorado,
1993, pp. 102-104. .
21 Filologo Pante Jr Japanese and U.S. development assistance to the Philippines: A Philippine perspective,
paper presented to a workshop on Japan as Number One Donor: Japan’s Foreign Assistance, Conference 
on Japan and U.S. in the 3rd World Development, Montana May 1987, quoted in Ensign op. at., p. 89.
22 Potter, op. cit., p. ix.
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•  Grant Aid Program - How it Worts
Exchange of Notes [E/N] 
Between both Governments
pPreliminaiy survey 
§  Full-scale suive))
Piocuiement
Approval by the 
Japanese Cabinet
Administrated by JICA
Figure 1. JICA’s grant aid program
Source: JICA, ‘Support for Japan’s grant aid program: Grant aid program’, 1995, website: 
http://www.jica.go.jp/E-jica/lp009.html, accessed on 27 April 1998.
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Figure 2: The development study: the request process
Source: JICA, Development Study, quoted in M. Ensign, 1992, pp. 40-41.
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Appendix 9.3
Existing and Recommended Rice Production Practices in Jalajala
1. Rice Varieties
The rice seeds used by most farmers in Jalajala were contaminated and had been generated 
from their own harvested rice. There was no certified, registered and foundation seeds sold 
because of the inaccessibility of the area before the IJRDP infrastructure project.
SEARCA’s RPG introduced Foundation Seeds of high yielding yet good eating 
quality rice varieties as well as ordinary varieties acquired from the Philippine Rice 
Research Institute.
2. Fertiliser Application
Use of chemical fertiliser was limited due to bad road condition in Jalajala before IJRDP. 
Urea was normally used and applied at the maximum amount of 100 kg. per hectare. This 
rate was way below the nitrogen requirement of rice crop and there was practically no 
phosphorous and potassium applied.
The recommended fertiliser level for the area based on the soil laboratory analysis 
and on-farm trial was 60-3-30 (NPK). SEARCA’s RPG recommended a combination of 
chemical and organic fertilisers (e.g. chicken manure) to meet the required level of 
fertiliser in the area.
3. Pest Management
The average volume of insecticide used by farmers in Jalajala was only one litre per 
hectare, meaning they were not heavy users of insecticide.
Integrated pest management was taught to the farmers in Jalajala to make them 
understand that spraying must only be the last resort when pest outbreak occurred.
Source: R. Vega and J. Asirot, ‘Study on the adoption of sustainable rice production technologies in irrigated 
lowland rice o f Jalajala’.
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